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Since 1994, I have been working on topics related to climate change policy making. Roughly 
speaking, during the first half of this period, I worked mostly on issues related to the design and 
implementation of Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism, which are economic 
policy instruments included in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 
1992 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. Most of this work was based on (research) projects for the 
Netherlands Government, UNFCCC secretariat and the European Commission.  
Since 2005, the main focus of my work has been on technology transfer for climate and development. 
As part of project teams working for the European Commission, UN Development Programme 
(UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and as advisor to the UNFCCC secretariat, I have 
focussed on how technology choices for climate change mitigation and adaptation can be embedded in 
developing countries’ national development planning.  
During both periods, it struck me that international climate policy making is often subject to 
negotiations between countries. Irrespective of whether it concerns high-level policy decisions (such 
as legally-binding commitments) or designing a policy instrument, countries try to balance their role in 
a globally supported agreement with how this aligns with their domestic social and economic 
priorities. This observation was the main motivation for this study. 
I would like to thank my promotor Catrinus Jepma for all his advice during the several stages of this 
study. His careful monitoring of the study design, process and tactics contributed strongly to the end 
result. The members of the assessment committee, Steven Brakman, André Faaij and ZhongXiang 
Zhang, are gratefully acknowledged for their willingness to read the manuscript. 
Finally, I would like to thank Anna and Alicia for all their love and support, and my JIN colleagues 
and Katie Begg for the pleasant cooperation for many years. 
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 Chapter 1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
 
1.1. Global Warming as an Emerging Policy Issue during the 1980s1 
 
The adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 
1992 Earth Summit was not the starting point of international climate talks; rather, it was the 
conclusion of a series of governmental meetings and conferences which started already at the end of 
the 1970s. In 1979, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) organised, in Geneva 
(Switzerland), the First World Climate Conference which was primarily a scientific meeting to assess 
existing knowledge of how higher atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration levels could lead 
to average temperature increases (WMO, 1979).  
From a political perspective, human-induced global warming was in those days mainly considered a 
theoretical possibility, insufficiently backed by scientific evidence and surrounded by relatively large 
uncertainties (Arts, 1998, p. 102). Nevertheless, the basic concept of global warming was quite clear. 
The climate systems on earth are determined by a complex process that basically balances the inflow 
of solar radiation into the atmosphere, the trapping of some of this heat in the atmosphere by GHGs, 
and the re-radiation of heat back into space (Jepma & Munasinghe, 1998, pp. 7-14) (Gubasch, et al., 
2013, p. 126) (see Box 1-1). During the 1980s, climate models were further improved and awareness 
of the global warming issue among the public and politicians increased (Arts, 1998, p. 103). In 1985, 
at the Villach Conference (9-15 October 1985, Villach, Austria) scientists called for the world to take 
action on climate change which raised the profile of the whole issue and engaged a wider audience 
(WMO, 1986). 
In 1988 the WMO and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in order to bundle scientific knowledge into an intergovernmental scientific 
panel under the auspices of the UN. IPCC’s main task became to address climate change issues from a 
policy maker’s perspective. Since its start, the IPCC has completed five so-called Assessment Reports 
(Houghton, et al., 1990), (IPCC, 1995), (IPCC, 2001), (IPCC, 2007) and (IPCC, 2013), which contain the 
work of three Working Groups representing particular categories of scientific disciplines. 
At international climate conferences, the increased climate awareness resulted in international high-level 
discussions among policy makers about potential climate policy measures (Barrett, 2005). For example, 
the 1988 climate change conference organized by the Government of Canada recommended the so-
called Toronto Target, which stipulated an arbitrary objective of reducing global CO2 emissions by 
20% below 1989 levels (Arts, 1998, p. 103). The Toronto conference was followed in 1989 by, among 
others, the Hamburg Conference which concluded that “establishment of explicit carbon emission 
budgets for each country within an international framework of agreement” should be the first international 
aim and therefore recommended a 30% CO2 emission reduction (Grubb, 1990). Moreover, two ministerial 
conferences on climate change were organised by the Netherlands Government (in 1989) in Noordwijk at 
which participants were much more reserved regarding recommendations on a quantitative emission 
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reduction target. Eventually, the ‘Noordwijk Declaration’ did not mention a target level such as in the 
‘Toronto Target’. 
The approach recommended at Toronto, Hamburg and Noordwijk to agree on international climate policy 
targets rather than relying on individual country actions was modelled after the successful approach of the 
Montreal Protocol (Barrett, 2005) and the EU’s Large Combustion Plant Directive (Grubb, 1990). 
However, the complexities related to negotiating such targets and timetables for climate policy making 
were acknowledged as climate change is a global issue which requires a global approach and which is 
complicated by large differences between countries in terms of social and economic welfare and the 
extent to which countries have contributed to GHG emissions (Grubb, 1990). Nonetheless, since the late 
1980s UN-led climate policy negotiations have resulted in several milestones, such as the adoption of 
the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
Box 1-1. Global warming through heat-trapping 
An important determinant for the temperatures on earth is the heat-trapping effect by GHGs (the 
greenhouse effect). These gases mix evenly in the atmosphere and as such they create a ‘blanket’ around 
the globe, which traps heat underneath it. Basically, the greenhouse effect has a natural cause and 
historically GHGs have existed in the atmosphere due to the natural interaction between earth and 
atmosphere. It is also the main reason why the average temperature on earth has for the past 10,000 years 
been well above 0
o
 Celsius, whereas without the greenhouse effect it would have been well below zero 
(Jepma & Munasinghe, 1998) (Gubasch, et al., 2013, p. 126). 
The greenhouse effect has gradually become an important policy issue because of the increasing 
awareness that the burning of fossil fuel has caused and will cause a significant increase in the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere to (much) higher levels than before the industrial revolution. As 
(Jepma & Munasinghe, 1998) (Gore, 2006, pp. 66-67) show, during the past 1000 years up to around 
1800, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere remained almost constant at a level of 280 parts per million 
by volume (ppmv). Since 1800, however, the concentration level has grown to around 400 ppmv in 2013 
(NOAA, 2013).
2
 This evidence, in combination with the knowledge of the heat trapping characteristics of 
GHGs, raised awareness among scientists and environmental NGOs that the trend of increasing GHG 
emissions through combustion of fossil fuels and a subsequent increase of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations could cause a human interference with global climate systems and thus enhance the natural 
greenhouse effect. 
 
1.2. International Climate Policy Making during the 1990s - Towards a 
Legally Binding Climate Protocol 
 
1.2.1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
In 1989, UNEP and the WMO initiated the preparations for negotiations on a framework convention 
on climate change. The idea was that this convention would contain basic principles and agreements 
which could subsequently be worked out in further detail through amendments and protocols. As 
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explained by (Grubb, 1990), the framework approach has the advantage that it can flexibly deal with 
evolving scientific knowledge and areas of concern. 
During 1990 and 1992, negotiations took place during five sessions of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC).
3
 During these 
negotiations it became clear that the positions of industrialised and developing countries strongly 
differed. Developing countries argued that since industrialised countries were responsible for most of 
the historical anthropogenic GHG emissions, they would have to take the lead by adopting quantified 
emission reduction targets. Most industrialised countries opposed such targets. A key challenge during 
the negotiations, therefore, was to agree on a global responsibility for the global climate and climatic 
impacts and how this responsibility could or should be differentiated between countries based on 
historical GHG emission patterns and socio-economic welfare levels (Grubb & Patterson, 1992). 
During the negotiations the latter concept has become known as the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. 2). 
At the fifth session of the INC, negotiating countries agreed on a compromise text which contained an 
objective (not legally binding) for industrialised countries to return their GHG emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2000, while exempting developing countries from such quantitative targets. It also 
became clear that, for the time being, legally binding quantitative targets were not feasible.  
The agreed negotiation text was adopted on 9 May 1992 at the UN Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil) as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
4
. The ultimate objective of 
the Convention is to achieve a stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. 9 
Art.2). This should be achieved “within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. 9 Art.2). 
 
1.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol 
After 1992, negotiations under the UNFCCC continued in the form of annual sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties or COP.
5
 The first session was held in March-April 1995
6
 in Berlin and here 
it was concluded that industrialised countries’ stabilisation targets as agreed under the Convention 
were inadequate. This conclusion was based on an analysis of the national GHG emission inventories 
submitted by 15 industrialised countries (together representing 41% of global GHG emissions), as well 
as insights from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1995, p. 22), which concluded, among 
other findings, that: 
 Atmospheric GHG concentrations had continued to increase;  
                                                     
3
 INC was established on 21 December 1990 by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 45/212). It was 
scheduled that INC would deliver a draft Convention text that would be ready for signature at the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May-June 1992). 
4
 See footnote 3 
5
 The COP itself was established under the UNFCCC in Article 7 as the supreme body of the Convention with, 
among others, the task to periodically examine the obligations of the Parties. 
6
 The first COP in 1995 could only be organised after the entry-into-force of the UNFCCC on 21 March 1994, 90 





 Climate had changed since the late 19th century; and  
 The “balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate”. 
In light of this, the COP initiated a negotiation process (the Berlin Mandate) towards a protocol with 
quantified emission reduction targets to be achieved within a certain timeframe. The result of this 
process was the adoption of the ‘Kyoto Protocol’ by the COP in December 1997 (at Kyoto, Japan) 
(UNFCCC, 1998). At the heart of the Kyoto Protocol was a joint GHG emission reduction target for 
industrialised countries of at least 5% below 1990 levels to be achieved within a 5-year commitment 
period from 2008 through 2012 (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. 3-5 Art. 3, Annex A). Most of the time during 
this almost three-year negotiation process, little progress was made. Again, countries struggled with 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ which, in the view of developing 
countries, implied that quantified commitments would only apply to industrialised countries. 
Industrialised countries, on the other hand, doubted the usefulness of a protocol without commitments 
for, in particular, rapidly developing countries such as China, India, Mexico and Brazil (see for further 
details Chapter 3). 
Even shortly before the negotiations in Kyoto, the US Congress instructed US negotiators not to agree 
on a protocol with quantified emission reduction commitments for industrialised countries only, and 
without ‘meaningful participation’ by the developing country Parties. Such a text would be considered 
harmful for US economic interests (Fletcher, 1997).
 
During the first negotiation week in Kyoto this 
position was generally reflected by the interventions by the US delegation. However, there was a 
change at the beginning of the second negotiation week when US Vice-President Al Gore addressed 
the COP in person. The US delegation accepted a quantified emission reduction commitment, even 
though developing countries were exempted from such commitments in the Kyoto Protocol.
7
 The 
agreement of the US delegation in Kyoto was never ratified by the US Congress though. On the 
contrary, in March 2001, the newly elected US President George W. Bush decided to withdraw US 
support from the, in his view, “fatally flawed” text. 
Nevertheless, other countries managed to keep the Kyoto process on-going throughout 2001, partly by 
allowing industrialised countries more room for counting sequestration of carbon in soils and trees and 
agreeing on more flexible compliance procedures. Although these concessions were criticised for 
reducing the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol,
8
 they secured the support of important 
industrialised countries such as the EU, Russia, Canada, Japan and Australia. 
 
                                                     
7
 It must be noted that the Kyoto Protocol eventually contained various aspects which the US delegated had 
introduced in the negotiations, such as the decision that industrialised countries could fulfil their commitments 
flexibly, i.e. by spreading compliance across a five-year commitment period, by focusing on six GHGs instead of 
the initial focus on CO2 and by applying GHG emissions trading. 
8 For example, because of the concessions, Japan’s required emission reduction dropped from six percent below 
1990 levels to a one percent reduction, while it was estimated that Canada could let its GHG emissions increase 
by five percent (Benedick, 2001). 
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1.3. Towards a Post-2012 Agreement 
 
Immediately after the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005
9
 a new round of negotiations 
started on its continuation beyond 2012. By design, the Kyoto Protocol was the most suitable 
framework for these negotiations as it contained an infrastructure to guide countries through 
consecutive commitment periods. However, the Kyoto Protocol had not been ratified by all 
industrialised countries (e.g., USA) and had kept a strong distinction between industrialised countries 
with quantified commitments and developing countries without such commitments. Consequently, at 
the eleventh session of the COP in 2005 (Montreal, Canada), it was decided to move on with 
negotiations in two separate tracks: one track would focus on the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol 
after 2012 (the Ad-hoc Working Group on continuation of the Kyoto Protocol or AWG KP) and the 
other would focus on long-term cooperative actions by all UNFCCC Parties (the Ad-hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action or AWG LCA). The latter track was primarily established to 
bring the USA back into the negotiations. Somehow, it was envisaged that eventually the two tracks 
would come together into one overall climate policy regime. 
In 2007, COP-13 was hosted by Indonesia where it adopted the Bali Plan of Action, which outlined a 
process to “reach an agreement on long-term cooperative action up to and beyond 2012” (UNFCCC, 
2008a). A first attempt to that failed in December 2009 when the Copenhagen Climate Conference
10
 
did not manage to reach consensus on the Copenhagen Accords. The final negotiation text in 
Copenhagen was therefore not legally binding. Instead, the COP took note of the text so that it was 
formally acknowledged and there was a mandate to follow up on its implementation. 
Though not legally binding, the Copenhagen Accords invited industrialised countries to submit 
individual or joint economy-wide emission targets for the year 2020. In addition, it stated that “non-
Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions”11 which could partly be 
considered a break with the interpretation of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ as it implied that also developing countries would need to undertake GHG emission 
reduction measures. On 1 February 2010, less than two month after ‘Copenhagen’, 55 countries, 
including a number of developing countries, had submitted national pledges to cut and limit GHG 
emissions by 2020. These countries together accounted for 78% of global emissions from energy use. 
The EU, for instance, pledged a GHG emission reduction for the entire bloc of 20% by the year 2020 
(JIN, 2010, p. 2). 
A particularly important signal came from the so-called BASIC group, with Brazil, South Africa, India 
and China. On 24 January 2010, this group met in New Delhi and underscored their support to the 
Copenhagen Accords and announced the following emission reduction pledges (JIN, 2010, p. 2): 
 Brazil: 36% emission reduction below business-as-usual by 2020; 
 South Africa: 34% emission reduction below business-as-usual by 2020; 
                                                     
9
 The Kyoto Protocol could enter into force on 16 February 2005, 90 days after deposit of the instrument of 
ratification from the Russian Federation. With the Russian ratification the number of Annex I Parties became 
sufficiently large to represent at least 55% of the total GHG emissions of industrialised countries in 1990. 
10
 COP-15 and fifth meeting of Kyoto Protocol Parties (COP-MOP). 
11
 Non-Annex I refers to the countries that were not included in the UNFCCC Annexes of Parties with GHG 





 India: 20% reduction in the carbon intensity by 2020 compared to 2005 levels; 
 China: 45% reduction in the carbon intensity by 2020 compared to 2005 levels. 
The US climate position remained uncertain after Copenhagen. Before December 2009, the Obama 
administration had proposed a 17% GHG emission reduction below 2005 levels by the year 2020. This 
percentage was included in a bill that passed the House of Representative during 2009, as well as in a 
similar climate bill that was discussed by the Senate. However, the Senate did not pass its bill before 
‘Copenhagen’ and mid-term elections later in 2010 further reduced the chances of acceptance of the 
bill (JIN, 2010, p. 3).
12
 
The Cancun Agreements of December 2010 (COP-16, Cancun, Mexico) reflected the shift in the 
negotiations since ‘Copenhagen’ from a top-down architecture where an overarching goal is translated 
in individual country targets (such as in the Kyoto Protocol) to one in which national pledges should 
add up to a joint international effort. In line with the Copenhagen Accords, the Cancun Agreements 
invite countries to formulate national targets (‘pledges’) and agree on international review procedures 
for these (Kok, et al., 2010). As such the Cancun Agreements created the possibility for countries to 
formulate packages of climate change mitigation actions derived from domestic circumstances (Gaast, 
2011). 
Looking at the history of the negotiations, the softer, i.e., more voluntary based, ‘pledge and review’ 
approach did not come as a surprise.
13
 Although Parties such as the Small Island Developing States 
and the EU emphasised at Cancun the importance of agreeing on an overall long-term climate target 
(e.g., reducing industrialised country emissions by 25-40% by the year 2020), especially the USA (but 
also countries such as Canada and Japan) opposed such a top-down approach. Important reasons were 
the preference to take decisions domestically instead of deriving targets from overarching international 
goals, and perceived lack of meaningful participation by emerging economies such as India, Brazil, 
and especially China. In addition, several countries made their pledges conditional on the actions 
proposed by other Parties. For instance, the pledges of several developing countries are conditional on 
international financial and technical support from industrialised Parties. According to (Falkner, et al., 
2010): “little has thus changed in the way in which the major players in climate politics define their 
interests.” 
Nevertheless, the Cancun Agreements were considered a success, which was not only because of the 
successful completion of the session with a set of agreements, but also because it managed to show a 
new direction for future climate negotiations. Up until ‘Copenhagen’, negotiations had attempted to 
formulate an overall GHG emission reduction target, based on science (i.e. IPCC) in combination with 
the precautionary principle of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. Art.3.3), with individual country 
targets. ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Cancun’ had shown that climate policy making may lead to more GHG 
emission reduction measures if embedded in countries’ domestic sustainable development objectives, 
especially when aiming at actively involving developing countries in global climate policy making. 
                                                     
12
 On 12 November 2014, President Obama, in a meeting with the Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing 
during an APEC summit, announced that the USA would reduce its GHG emissions in 2025 by 26-28% 
compared to emission levels in 2005. At the same meeting, President Xi announced that Chinese GHG emissions 
would peak by 2030, to be followed by a decline in GHG emissions. (Vlaskamp & Elshout, 2014). 
13
 At COP-19 (Warsaw), the concept of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions was introduced for 
developed and developing countries to propose voluntarily GHG emission reduction measures, which could take 
various forms, such as national emission ceilings or technology packages (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2013). 
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For example, the Cancun Agreements contain a decision that developing countries “will take 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions [NAMAs] in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, finance and capacity-building, aimed at achieving a deviation in 
emissions relative to ‘business as usual’ emissions in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 9-10 para. 48).” 
This decision illustrated the new line of thinking: developing countries were more willing to reduce 
their GHG emissions (through NAMAs) if these were in accordance with their sustainable 
development plans and supported by international transfer of technologies and finance and capacity 
support. For this, developing countries were also encouraged to develop low-emission development 
strategies (LEDS) or plans in the context of sustainable development (UNFCCC, 2011a, p. 3 para. 6). 
With LEDS, countries were encouraged to formulate pathways towards (developing) countries’ longer 
term visions (Gaast & Begg, 2012). A LEDS can become a domestic strategic document that 
integrates a national climate change policy into a broader framework of development (Clapp, et al., 
2010) (Gaast & Begg, 2012). How to formulate NAMAs and LEDS was not further specified by the 
Cancun Agreements (i.e. no methodology was agreed, nor was a mandate given by the COP to any of 
its bodies to develop a methodology). For the time being, it was left to studies to identify key steps of 
the process (Clapp, et al., 2010), (World Bank, 2009) and (Project Catalyst, 2009). Finally, ‘Cancun’ 
was an important step as it: 
 Elaborated on how capacity building and financial support to developing countries could be 
arranged; 
 Offered guidelines for reducing GHG emissions through avoided deforestation and reduced land 
degradation; and 
 Established the Technology Mechanism for support of development and transfer of technologies 
for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries. 
Further decisions on how these capacity, finance, forestry, land-use and technology-related concepts 
would form a new post-2012 climate policy regime were postponed until the following COPs in 
Durban (COP-17, South Africa, November – December 2011) and Doha (COP-18, Qatar, December 
2012). At these two COPs, it was agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol with a second commitment 
period (‘Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’ to cover the period between 2012 and 2020) 
(UNFCCC, 2012a) and to prepare a new climate regime for the period after 2020. The continuation of 
the Kyoto Protocol was the result of a successful alignment of the positions of the small island states 
and least developed countries with the EU’s support in favour of continuation of ‘Kyoto’ (the 
Guardian, 2011). The continued Kyoto Protocol has, however, not been covered by countries such as 
USA, Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation, so that the countries agreeing on GHG emission 
reduction pledges jointly represent only 14% of global GHG emissions.
14
 Neither has it managed to 
restore balance in the international carbon markets, which had initially flourished during the early 
                                                     
14
 Of the industrialised countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (countries with quantified commitments 
during 2008-2012) only Australia, Belarus, Croatia, EU, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Ukraine made pledges for GHG emission reductions by 2020 under the 2012 Doha Amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, the group of countries in the amended Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
represent a much smaller share of global GHG emissions (14%) than in the initial Annex B of the protocol as 
agreed in 1997 (containing almost all industrialised countries of the UNFCCC Annex I), but their representation 
of global GHG emissions is also smaller than that of the group of countries that pledged mitigation actions after 
the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 2009 (containing several Annex I as well as large non-Annex I 





stage of the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period but were later characterised by significant 
oversupply of credits and strongly reduced prices. 
Furthermore, at COP-17, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(AWG-DP) was established with the objective to prepare a “protocol, or legal instrument, or agreed 
outcome with legal force” which covers all negotiating Parties (UNFCCC, 2012b) and which is to 
come into effect and be implemented from 2020. The envisaged deadline for the AWG-DP is to 
complete the architecture for the new regime by 2015 (to be agreed at COP-21 in Paris, France). An 
important element of the AWG-DP mandate is that it shall cover all negotiation Parties, in other words 
both developed and developing countries. To what extent this implies a breach with the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ remains to be seen, but developments since ‘Copenhagen’ 
have shown the strict line between developed and developing Parties no longer exists. This seems to 
reveal a new paradigm in negotiations. Whereas during earlier negotiations (e.g., Rio 1992 and Kyoto 
1997) responsibilities were assigned on the basis of countries’ GHG emissions in the past, nowadays 
responsibilities are also, and increasingly, based on what countries currently emit and what they are 
expected to emit. As such, it appears that future negotiations will “allow for the reformulation of the 
meaning of the Convention principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ into a spectrum of 
climate action in light of country-specific development context” (Taminiau, 2011). 
 
1.4. What has been Achieved? 
 
In light of the several negotiation sessions since the early 1990s it is interesting to analyse briefly in 
this chapter whether and to what extent these have resulted in global reductions of GHG emissions. A 
first step in this analysis is to look at GHG emissions trends in industrialised countries (grouped in 
Annex I of the UNFCCC), which are shown in Figure 1-1. The diagram shows that industrialised 
countries’ overall emissions (excl. emissions related to land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities, LULUCF) decreased by almost 7% in 2000 (compared to 1990) and were 9.3% below 1990 
levels in 2011 (UNFCCC, n.d.). From Figure 1-1 it can also be concluded that for industrialised 
countries which did not belong to the group of formerly centrally-planned economies (countries with 
economies in transition, EIT), GHG emissions  increased during the 1990s by 8.9% in 2000 (above 
1990 levels). Therefore, the decrease in GHG emission reduction of all Annex I Parties together 
during the 1990s has been mainly caused by an emission reduction in EIT countries of 41.5% 
(between 1990 and 2001). 
During the early 2000s, industrialised countries’ GHG emissions slightly increased again, both in EIT 
and non-EIT countries, which this took place despite the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2005. The strongest change in industrialised countries’ GHG emissions took place between 2008 and 
2011, which has been mainly due to the impacts of the economic recessions and corresponding drop in 
industrial production. Although this study has not conducted a detailed analysis to disentangle the 
importance of political, economic and policy interaction factors (e.g., other environmental policies 
positively or negatively affecting GHG emissions), from Figure 1-1 the impression can be obtained 
that industrialised countries’ GHG emissions have not been very sensitive to UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol negotiation outcomes, whereas domestic (e.g., disintegration of centrally planned economic 
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system in Central and Eastern Europe) and international context developments (e.g., financial and 
economic crisis since 2009) seem to have had much stronger impacts on GHG emissions. 
 
Figure 1-1. Trends in aggregate greenhouse gas emissions, 1990-2011, for industrialised 
countries (% change of emissions from 1990 levels) (UNFCCC, n.d.) 
 
These conclusions are reinforced by Figure 1-2, which shows percentage changes in GHG emissions 
for individual industrialised countries during 1990-2012 (UNFCCC, n.d.). For instance, it shows that 
GHG emissions (excl. land use and forestry-related emissions) in, e.g., Australia rose by 31%, in 
Spain by 20.1%, in New Zealand by 25.4%, Canada by 18.2%, and in the USA by 4.3%. It also shows 
how in Germany (-24.8%) and the UK (-25.2%) GHG emissions strongly dropped, which was largely 
due to domestic circumstances, such as the German unification and the restructuring of the UK energy 
sector which led to a reduced use of coal in energy production. Also the reduction of GHG emissions 
in Central and Eastern European countries (as described by the EIT Parties trend in Figure 1-1, due to 
the disintegration of their centrally planned economies in the early 1990s) is clearly shown in Figure 
1-2. Including GHG emission (reductions) caused by LULUCF-related activities changes the above 
picture in terms of: e.g., 111.4% increase of GHG emissions in New Zealand (25.4% without 
LULUCF), 42.2% GHG emission increase in Canada (compared to 18.2% without LULUCF) and a 
2.4% emission reduction between 1990 and 2011 in Australia due to extra uptake of carbon in forests 
(UNFCCC, n.d.).  
Studies focusing only on CO2 emissions have shown, among others, that annual growth of global and 
regional emissions accelerated from an annual rate of 1.1% during 1990-1999 to 3% per year for the 
2000-2004 period (Global Carbon Project, sd). Moreover, between 2005 and 2010, global energy-
related CO2 emissions increased by 10%, from 30 to 33 Gigatonnes (Höhne, et al., 2011). It was found 
that while CO2 emissions in industrialised countries have reduced due to the recession, in developing 
countries there has been an increase, although the recession may have slowed down the increase. For 
instance, China’s energy sector CO2 emission grew during 2005-2010 by over 40%; in India the 
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Figure 1-2. Changes in GHG emissions individual Annex I Parties, 1990-2012 (%, excluding 
emissions caused by land use, land-use change and forestry) (UNFCCC, n.d.) 
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1.5. Understanding the Dynamics of International Climate Policy Making – 
Why Climate Negotiations are not Ideal 
 
The above synopsis has briefly outlined how international climate policy negotiations have taken place 
since the early 1990s. Among the negotiation characteristics, especially during the 1990s, was that 
GHG emission reduction goals were often subject of negotiations. This was largely due to the initially 
limited scientific knowledge of how human actions could affect global climate systems. For instance, 
both the objective to stabilise industrialised countries’ GHG emissions between 1990 and 2000 
(UNFCCC agreement in 1992) and the goal to collectively reduce their emissions by 5.2% by 2008-
2012 (Kyoto Protocol agreement in 1997) were the result of negotiations, rather than that these targets 
were derived from science as negotiation guidance. 
Ideally, although it may be difficult to determine what an ideal negotiation process may look like for 
addressing international environmental or other issues, negotiations would be supported by a clear 
identification and description of the (environmental) problem to be addressed with corresponding 
goals (see, a.o., Fells, 2012, pp. 57-58, Susskind, et al., 2000, and APRAISE, 2012). Second, such 
goals (such as a quantified goal in terms of required GHG emissions, maximum atmospheric GHG 
concentration level, or maximum allowable temperature increase) would provide reference points for 
negotiators and help assess whether and to what extent the course of a negotiation process is in line 
with the upfront goal(s). Third, for achieving the goal, policy makers use their best available 
knowledge of the efficacy of policy instruments to decide which instrument(s) to apply, at what scale, 
within which timeframe, with responsibilities for whom and how to monitor and evaluate the results of 
the policy package (APRAISE, 2012). Finally, in light of the goals, negotiation parties (i.e., countries) 
would then agree on forming an international coalition to implement a pathway towards the goal and 
with clear descriptions of each party’s responsibility in the negotiated package. 
In this respect, the Montreal Protocol for the phase-out of ozone depleting substances (ODS) could 
serve as an example of a successful coalition formation process for addressing an international 
environmental problem. As is explained in Box 1-2, during the 1980s the depletion of the ozone layer 
became internationally recognised as an important environmental problem with corresponding health 
impacts. As scientific evidence for the problem became available, a clear problem statement could be 
formulated which facilitated negotiations on country actions and timetables. Moreover, as explained in 
Box 1-2, the number of ODS emitting countries was relatively small and alternative technologies were 
relatively cheap, once operational. Although this comparison is not meant to consider the Montreal 
Protocol negotiations as easy or ‘ideal’, they contained several of the above aspects for an ‘ideal’ 
negotiation process.  
In an international climate policy context, such an ‘ideal’ situation could exist if scientific research 
resulted in a clear description of the climate change problem and corresponding damage with related 
costs, as well as a long term GHG emission reduction target, which countries, through negotiations, 
could divide among each other in individual country targets. In Figure 1-3, this ‘ideal’ situation is 
shown by point A where UNFCCC Parties reach consensus on a climate policy package with which a 
determined climate target can be reached, e.g., as derived from the best available scientific knowledge 





Box 1-2. Successful policy design through international cooperation under the Montreal Protocol 
One example of how building an international coalition with effective compliance was arranged within 
an international treaty is the 1987 Montreal Protocol (and its 1990 London amendments) for the phase-
out of ozone depleting substances (ODS).
15
 To a large extent, successful compliance was supported by 
the availability of relatively cheap ODS substitutes, so that compliance costs could be kept low 
(Zeeuw, 2001). Moreover, the Montreal Protocol commitments were accompanied by financial 
assistance to developing countries (through a multilateral fund), availability of technical expertise and 
dissemination of project lessons within countries and regionally, which also supported compliance. 
This process was facilitated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Finally, countries were able to 
take specific initiatives to support others to comply. 
For example, when the Russian Federation (traditionally responsible for 10% of global ODS 
emissions) declared that it lacked the financial and technical capability to comply with 'Montreal' by 
the deadlines of 1994 and 1996, and requested a four-year extension until 2000, the GEF and ten 
donor countries provided support. The ‘Special Initiative for Ozone Depleting Substances Production 
Closure in the Russian Federation’ gathered USD26.2 million, which was used to close ODS 
production facilities in the seven Russian companies concerned (World Bank, 1999). 
Regarding the willingness of countries to participate in and comply with a legally binding agreement, 
however, compliance with the Montreal Protocol is generally considered much easier to achieve than 
in the case of a global regime for climate policy. First, substitutes for GHG-intensive fossil fuels (e.g., 
renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal energy) have been relatively 
costly (as mentioned above, ODS substitutes were relatively cheap because substitutes were widely 
available and could be used in a cost-effective manner) (Zeeuw, 2001). Second, during the 1980s the 
damage to the ozone layer due to the emissions of ODS was considered by society and politicians an 
extremely serious environmental and health issue, so that benefits from abatement action were clear 
and supported by scientific evidence. On the other hand, the science behind climate change has long 
been surrounded by uncertainties, especially concerning the relationship between GHG emissions and 
atmospheric GHG concentrations, and, subsequently, the impact on the earth's average temperature 
and the climate (World Bank, 1999) (Zeeuw, 2001) (Barrett, 1991) (Gaast & Begg, 2012). 
 
However, in the practice of climate negotiations since the early 1990s, such an ideal situation has been 
difficult to realise. IPCC projections in the first assessment reports (Houghton, et al., 1990) (IPCC, 
1995) provided indications of how climate change and corresponding climatic impacts may occur due 
to increasing GHG emissions, but these scenarios were also surrounded by several uncertainties. As a 
result, early climate change negotiations were limited by a lack of a clear problem description of the 
climate change issue, so that setting a medium to long term GHG emission reduction goal became a 
topic of negotiations in itself, rather than that negotiations were guided by scientifically determined 
goals and targets. 
A second reason why climate policy negotiations have deviated from an ‘ideal’ negotiation pathway is 
related to game-theoretical aspects of negotiations. Investing in GHG emission reductions may well 
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require economic restructuring with accompanying socio-economic costs and addressing questions 
such as: what would such a restructuring look like, how to balance short-term socio-economic costs 
with possible longer-term benefits,
16
 how would it affect a country’s competitiveness and whose 
further interests are negatively or positively affected (Jackson, 2009) (Gaast & Begg, 2012)? Most 
countries will generate different answers to these questions due to their different short-, medium- to 
longer-term development priorities, welfare levels, and perception of the urgency of the climate 
change issue. Based on that, it can be assumed that the higher the (perceived) costs for countries of a 
climate policy package, the lower their willingness to support such a package. A particular aspect 
which could be observed during UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations was the choice of policy 
instruments with some Parties being in favour of legally-binding national quota while others preferred 
sets of policies and measures determined at the country-level (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
In a nutshell, this explains the game-theoretical dilemma of UN climate policy negotiations (see 
Chapter 2): a climate policy regime with strict emission reduction measures may be supported by few 
countries only, whereas a globally supported deal is easier to achieve if measures are less strict and 
costly. This outcome can be explained by the following underlying dynamics of international climate 
policy making:  
 GHGs mix evenly in the atmosphere, which implies that emissions in one country will have an 
impact across the globe. At the same time, no country can be excluded from the benefits of GHG 
emission reduction efforts. Based on game theoretical insights, such as ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ or 
‘tragedy of the commons’, one could therefore argue that in the absence of international climate 
policy cooperation, individual countries may prefer no or limited climate abatement action: i.e. a 
country could refrain from climate actions if it assumes no abatement actions by others, while the 
country could also decide not to undertake climate action if it assumes GHG emission reduction 
measures by others from which it cannot be excluded (‘free riding’) (Posner & Weisbach, 2010). 
This argument is in line with insights from game theory that if countries would only take their 
own marginal abatement costs and benefits into consideration, many globally existing abatement 
opportunities could be missed (Tulkens, 1998). Through a global policy regime, free riding can 
be better addressed while countries can be supported in achieving benefits from international 
cooperation that are not feasible without such cooperation. 
 In spite of these potential benefits from international cooperation, the effectiveness of a climate 
regime is generally hampered by the fact that it is based on an agreement between sovereign 
states without an overarching disciplinary system above them (Cooper, 1999) (Gaast & Begg, 
2012). As a consequence, international agreements are largely based on voluntary participation 
and compliance systems that create sufficient surpluses for states to join the agreement and to 
remain ‘on board’.17 It is thus essential that international agreements are self-enforcing, which 
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 As the EU Climate Policy Roadmap for 2050 has shown, longer-term economic benefits of an economic 
restructuring towards a low-emission or even 85% carbon-free society could even be positive due to lower 
energy cost, stimulating of renewable energy technology producing and service sectors, etc. 
17
 For instance, to give an example based on international agreements on development assistance, in 1970 
industrialised countries agreed to reserve 0.7% of their annual National Income (GDP) for development 
assistance to developing countries. In 2004, on average, industrialised countries only spent 0.25% of their GDP 





implies that they provide incentives to countries to comply with the agreed commitments (Barrett, 
1990), (Barrett, 1995), (McEvoy, 2007), (Zeeuw, 2001), (Tulkens, 1998). Too costly agreements 
(from the perspective of countries) would then reduce their potential self-enforcement. 
 
Figure 1-3. Interaction between ambition and participation of Parties in climate negotiations 
 
The above-described aspects of (initial) lack of scientific evidence concerning the climate change 
issues and game theoretical characteristics of climate change negotiations have generally (since the 
early 1990s) resulted in negotiated policy packages which deviate from the ‘ideal’ outcome A in 
Figure 1-3. Instead, negotiation directions have often been largely guided by two principles covered by 
(UNFCCC, 1992a): the precautionary principle and the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. According to the first principle, “Parties should take precautionary measures to 
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as 
a reason for postponing such measures” (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 9-10, Art. 3.3). In Figure 1-3, the 
precautionary principle is shown as a driving force for climate policy actions with stronger GHG 
emission reductions measures. 
With the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the UNFCCC acknowledges the 
global nature of climate change and calls for “the widest possible cooperation by all countries and 
their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
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conditions” (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. 2). As explained above in this chapter (with more detailed 
elaborations in Chapter 3), both during the negotiations on the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, this 
principle could easily lead to a stand-still in negotiations with countries blaming each other for not 
taking their responsibilities. As a result, Parties could express a lower willingness to adopt GHG 
emission reduction or limitation targets if other Parties would not undertake such mitigation actions 
either. In Figure 1-3, this situation is shown by outcome B. During multiple negotiation sessions per 
year, in order to obtain wider country support, targeted GHG emission reduction measures are scaled 
down (outcome C).  
However, at this point, other countries may find the suggested climate policy measures insufficient so 
that another negotiation ‘twist’ is needed to increase policy ambitions while keeping the initially 
opposing countries on board (outcome D). It must be noted that the distances between A, B, C and D 
are purely hypothetical, while the processes from A to D in practice are usually not as linear as 
represented by the straight arrows.  
Contrary to the UNFCCC negotiations in 1992 and Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, recent 
negotiation sessions (after ‘Copenhagen’ in 2009) have had a much stronger and broader scientific 
evidence support. For instance, current climate negotiations are fed by scientific insights that average 
global temperatures should not rise by more than 2ºC above pre-industrial times levels (IPCC 2007) 
(IPCC, 2013) (UNEP, 2014). In addition, a continuation of GHG emissions growth according to 
business-as-usual trends could lead to even a 4ºC rise in global temperature by the 2060s (to further 
increase thereafter) (New, et al., 2011). Accordingly, based on this growing scientific knowledge, the 
2
o
C temperature increase threshold has become an important negotiation target and was officially 
included in the Cancun Agreements of 2010 (UNFCCC, 2011a).  
As illustrated in Figure 1-3, growing scientific evidence (with the 2
o
C goal) could even lead to a 
higher ambition level for negotiations as it could create a stronger sense of urgency among Parties 
(outcome A
1
) (New, et al., 2011). Although this may have an impact on how Parties play their 
negotiation ‘game’ (e.g., Parties may feel a stronger responsibility to address the urgency), the game 
theoretical dynamics as described above may continue to exist, leading to intermediate outcome B
1
 
(possibly with more Parties as in outcome B) towards final outcome D
1
 (the positioning of D
1
 to the 
right of A is hypothetical, only for the purpose of illustration). 
An important challenge that remains, should A or A
1
 in Figure 1-3 represent the 2
o
C target, is to bring 




) (which is the main focus of UNEP, 2014). What 
such a pathway may look like will be subject of ongoing and future climate negotiations. However, as 
will be argued in Chapter 7 of this thesis, since the COP sessions of Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun 
in 2010, there has been a tendency to focus on embedding actions for mitigation and adaptation more 
strongly in countries’ national socio-economic planning and organising international support for that. 
The main rationale for this focus is that while a national, quantified target for a country as in the Kyoto 
Protocol (for industrialised countries) may initially lead to a clearer envisaged policy outcome, reality 
has shown that such targets are difficult to enforce. In a ‘bottom up’ approach, as will be explained in 
Chapter 7, a country could formulate a medium to long term national plan with social, economic and 
environmental targets which are to be achieved with low GHG emission and climate-resilient 





provide a stronger stimulus to GHG mitigation and adaptation measures as these would support 
countries’ national green development. 
 
1.6. Scope of the Study and Research Objective 
 
1.6.1. Research questions 
From the above it can be concluded that climate policy negotiators face the challenge of achieving a 
globally supported policy package which is in line with the UNFCCC precautionary principle and 
recommendations derived from best available scientific knowledge. As explained, this challenge is 
complicated by the potential trade-off that stricter climate policy measures (higher envisioned GHG 
emission reductions) with accompanying socio-economic costs may reduce the number of countries 
willing to join the climate policy coalition. The above synopsis has shown that since the 1980s climate 
policy makers have spent considerable time on the design and structure of climate policy negotiation 
packages in order to deal with the game-theoretical negotiation aspects (as introduced above and 
specified in more detail in Chapter 2), such as limiting free riding and achieving a broad international 
climate coalition despite the absence of an overarching disciplinarian. 
Next to the design (including choice of policy instruments) of a global climate policy to arrive at a 
successful end result of a negotiations ‘game’, it is also important that the negotiation process enables 








) as in 
Figure 1-3. Negotiations under the UNFCCC have, for instance, been characterised by attempts to 
make progress by taking several small steps followed by larger steps when feasible; the resulting 
agreements, e.g., UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Cancun Agreements, have all been the result of a 
gradual, multi-year negotiation process with the objective to arrive at an agreement on which Parties 
can reach consensus. 
Moreover, the examples of ‘Kyoto’ and ‘Copenhagen’, as described above, have shown that there 
have been situations where the direction of negotiations was influenced by, a.o.: 
 Publication of scientific reports on climate change patterns and their consequences (e.g., (IPCC, 
1995), 
 Personalities of important negotiators (e.g., US Vice President Gore at Kyoto), the chair of a 
negotiation process (e.g., the President of a COP session), as well as 
 Ability of the UNFCCC secretariat to facilitate negotiation processes (e.g., formulating 
negotiation texts, preparing background papers, organising expert meetings, etc.).  
These latter examples illustrate how tactical and facilitating aspects can change the course of 
negotiations, so that the negotiation process becomes more effective with an improved negotiation 
result. 
Therefore, based on the initial overview and characterisation in this chapter of climate policy making 
since the early 1990s, as illustrated by the negotiation developments and outcomes in comparison to an 
‘ideal’ situation (as in Figure 1-3), this study formulates as a hypothesis that for successful climate 
policy negotiations (in terms of  climate policy measures leading to lower GHG emissions and 
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stronger climate resilience about which UNFCCC Parties reach consensus) at the least the following 
three basic conditions need to be fulfilled: 
 The design and structure of the negotiation text need to acknowledge and address the diverging 
positions of negotiating countries, the challenges and complexities of international climate policy 
making, including game-theoretical aspects and uncertainties regarding scientific information 
about climate change and its potential impacts on ecosystems;  
 The negotiation process needs to enable an international coalition of countries to move from one 
negotiation intermediate outcome to another (e.g., from outcome B to outcome C in Figure 1-3), 
while enabling Parties to accommodate to changing positions and negotiation directions; and  
 Decisive tactics and facilitative negotiation support are needed at certain points during the 
negotiation process to enable changes in the course and/or direction of negotiations, such as at 
points A, B and C in Figure 1-3, as well as to avoid and/or address negotiation obstacles. 
Examples of such tactical support are: ability to avoid negotiation sensitivities, ability to change 
the sequence of addressing negotiation topics, and ability to formulate compromises. 
These basic conditions for progressing negotiations are not exhaustive but follow from the discussion 
in this chapter about how to address game theoretical aspects of climate negotiations, and facilitate 
implementation of the precautionary principle and principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ of the UNFCCC. They can be further characterised as follows: 
1. The design and structure of the overall policy regime must acknowledge that: 
a. international cooperation can lead to more effective outcomes than individual country 
actions, as it, among others, helps to avoid free riding behaviour (Tulkens, 1998), 
b. states are sovereign and their national self-interests need to be reflected by the policy 
agreement, which leads to a tension that proposed GHG emission reduction measures may 
have to be mitigated in order to keep all countries on board, and  
c. coalition building by groups of countries may be an effective way to have a balanced 
assessment of countries’ varying economic and social backgrounds. 
Part of this condition is that the policy instruments applied within this structure need to be 
efficacious for achieving a desired negotiation goal. For instance, if the negotiations focus on 
achieving an overall quantified GHG emission reduction target, then an effective instrument 
could be to divide this target across countries in combination with emissions trading for increased 
cost-effectiveness (see for instance the result of the Kyoto Protocol in Chapter 3). However, if 
countries aim at integrating climate policy making in countries’ overall sustainable development 
priorities, then instruments such as technology needs assessments and low-emission development 
strategies may be more efficacious (as illustrated in Chapter 7). 
2. The process of negotiations needs to reflect that reaching a global climate deal takes times, that 
trying to accelerate negotiations may be counterproductive and that taking small steps at a time 
can be relatively productive. Moreover, the process of negotiations may benefit from relatively 
general agreements first with detailed modalities and procedures to be worked out at later 
sessions (such as relatively strict GHG emission reduction goals with compliance arrangements to 






3. Tactical and facilitating aspects of negotiations, such as who is the President of the COP and 
does he or she sufficiently keep in mind the above conditions and does he or she have the 
personality to bring parties closer together by keeping negotiations plenary or, instead, break 
these up in negotiation groups when needed. As explained above, an important facilitating factor 
is the input from science to negotiations, such as IPCC assessment reports or the UNEP 
Emissions Gap reports (UNEP, 2014), as well as the support from the UNFCCC secretariat in 
terms of background papers, synthesis reports and draft negotiation texts, etc. Another possible 
facilitating factor for negotiations is the support provided to developing countries, especially the 
poorer countries which have only small delegations and for which alignment with other 
negotiation groups can be a relief. Negotiations also require successful balancing of various 
country group positions (such as Alliance of Small Island States, Africa Group, Umbrella Group, 
G77+China group, Oil Producing and Exporting Countries group and Environmental Integrity 
Group), which includes that negotiation outcomes need to reflect their positions (e.g., exemption 
of developing countries from commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’, inclusion of GHG emissions trading, etc.). Finally, availability of 
general information sources such as newsletters, policy briefs, blogs and project report 
dissemination can be mentioned as a facilitating factor for negotiations, particularly when they 
aim at providing balanced information about the pros and cons of politically delicate issues.
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These three key conditions are not only important individually, but in particular their combined 
strength (due to their interrelations) is decisive for the success of climate policy design and 
implementation. For instance, without the review of adequacy of agreed measures under the UNFCCC 
in 1995, the Berlin Mandate towards a Kyoto Protocol would have been less likely or even unlikely 
(see also Chapter 3). Moreover, to give another example, the negotiation process towards 
‘Copenhagen’ (in 2009) showed an increasing agreement on mitigation actions by developing 
countries too and the establishment of a Green Climate Fund and a Technology Mechanism to support 
developing countries on climate change mitigation, adaptation and technology transfer. However, the 
negotiation process at ‘Copenhagen’ could never build the momentum that characterised the second 
week of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997 (failing the third condition). This contributed to the 
lack of consensus to adopt the Copenhagen Accords.  
As a third example, the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-18 in Doha can be mentioned. In 
terms of negotiation process and tactics, countries relatively smoothly agreed on the importance of the 
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, especially in light of the absence of an alternative policy regime. 
However, as the design and structure of the continued protocol only contained binding quota for a 
limited group of countries and did not address the surplus of carbon credits from the 2008-2012 
commitment period (failing the first condition), the efficacy of the policy instruments Joint 
                                                     
18
 For example, the newsletter Joint Implementation Quarterly (JIQ) was launched in 1995 by the Netherlands 
Government to inform policy makers, the business community and knowledge institutes about the latest 
developments around the concept of Joint Implementation (JI, see Chapter 4) and to provide a balanced 
reflection of arguments against and in favour of this politically delicate issue during negotiations during 1992-
1995. Other examples of such information sources are the Climate and Development Knowledge Network 
(CDKN, focus on climate policy making and the role of developing countries), CDC Clima (focus on emissions 
trading through projects and quota trading), Climate_L e-mail list server (operated the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development) and ClimateTechWiki.org (website with descriptions of technologies for mitigation 
and adaptation and with country programmes for technology transfer, operated by UNDP). 
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Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the prolonged protocol can be 
considered low (with a global carbon credit price close to zero).  
These examples indicate the importance of meeting the three basic conditions for successful climate 
policy negotiations simultaneously: e.g., even with a good overall structure and with good support 
from scientific sources, negotiations may fail if the process does not allow Parties to exchange points 
of view and bridge gaps between their positions. With a view to these identified basic enabling 
conditions for successful climate policy making, the first question for this study is: 
1. To what extent have the three basic conditions be met during the negotiations on the Kyoto 
Protocol (during 1995 – 1997), its modalities and procedures (during 1997 and 2005), and 
the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms JI and CDM? 
This question will be answered by analysing a set of policy files which were of key importance for the 
formulation of the Kyoto Protocol and for the formulation of its modalities and procedures. These files 
are further introduced in the next section. It is noted that this question focuses on the result of the 
negotiations for a number of climate policy files addressed in this study; it does not necessarily imply 
a successful or unsuccessful implementation result of a policy. It is therefore acknowledged that a 
successful negotiation outcome with, e.g., a package with strict GHG emission reduction or limitation 
goals, and wide international support, does not guarantee that implementation will be successful and in 
line with the expectations from negotiations. At the same time, as will be explained in further detail in 
Chapters 3-7, meeting the three basic condition towards a successful negotiation outcome is likely to 
enhance the success of policy implementation. 
Irrespective of the conclusions from the analysis of the first research question, from the description in 
Section 1.2 above, it can already be concluded that no agreement was reached (at Copenhagen in 
2009) on an extension of the Kyoto Protocol with GHG emission reduction or limitation targets for a 
broader range of countries (including rapidly growing developing countries). Since then, climate 
negotiations have diverted from a commitments-with-timetables pathway (as under ‘Kyoto’) towards a 
(voluntary) pledge-and-review pathway with an increased focus on supporting developing countries in 
formulating low-emission development strategies as a basis for nationally appropriated mitigation 
actions (NAMAs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs).  
With a view to this more bottom-up focussed  development and considering the answer to research 
question 1, the second research question in this study then becomes: 
2. What options can be identified from past negotiations and recent policy developments for 
meeting the three basic conditions during the negotiation process on a future climate policy 
regime for the period after 2020, in terms of policy design structure, enabling negotiation 
process and tactics? 
 
1.6.2. Negotiation files to be examined for the research 
In order to answer the first question, four negotiation files have been selected which illustrate in detail 
how the overall design and structure of the Kyoto Protocol was developed during a range of 
negotiation sessions between 1992 and 2012, including: choice of instruments, organisation of the 





during negotiations and how scientific knowledge has been fed into the negotiations. Therefore, the 
first file selected for addressing the first question is: 
 The process of establishing the UNFCCC as an overall framework for a climate regime and 
adopting the Kyoto Protocol. This file deals with the process of negotiating the UNFCCC, the 
adoption of the Berlin Mandate, the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiation process 
towards its entry-into-force. 
In addition to assessing the three basic conditions for processes at the highest negotiation level of the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, also negotiation files at the level of individual policy instruments 
have been identified. The Kyoto Protocol introduced a number of policy instruments that countries 
could use for achieving the Convention objectives and Kyoto Protocol’s quantified emission reduction 
targets, such as: technology transfer to developing countries, the possibility for industrialised countries 
to trade their emission quota among each other, the option of counting carbon sequestration in forests 
and soils against industrialised countries’ efforts to comply with Kyoto Protocol targets, and the 
options for industrialised countries to generate carbon credits through international projects and use 
these credits for complying with their targets. Of these instruments, the latter was the most intensively 
negotiated one, especially when it concerned project collaboration and credit trading between 
industrialised and developing countries (i.e. the CDM). While developing countries had no quantified 
mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, through the CDM, they could actively become 
involved in global mitigation actions. 
For that reason, the following three files are analysed in this study to explore whether and how the 
three basic conditions for successful climate policy negotiations were met at the level of negotiating 
more technical aspects of the Kyoto Protocol. These files are presented in ‘descending order’ from 
negotiations on the general concept of project-based emissions trading under the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol (i.e. JI and CDM), via negotiations on a broad package of JI and CDM project-related 
design and operational issues (which largely took place at the level of the COP), towards dealing with 
aspects related to the accounting of GHG emission reductions of JI and CDM projects (which 
negotiations mainly took place at the level of the CDM Executive Board, which is a subsidiary body of 
the COP). 
These three files are presented below: 
 The development of the concept of Joint Implementation in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC 
introduced the possibility for industrialised countries to implement part of their commitments 
jointly with other countries. This created the possibility to invest in projects in countries where 
GHG emission reduction costs are relatively low. During 1990-1995, negotiations on JI were 
extremely sensitive as environmental NGOs and developing country Parties were cautious that JI 
might delay emission reduction action within industrialised countries. The COP3 negotiations in 
Kyoto in 1997 extended the JI concept to a global scale. Project cooperation among industrialised 
countries was still referred to as JI, whereas for project cooperation between industrialised and 
developing countries the CDM was established. The concepts are similar in the sense that the 
emission reductions achieved by both JI and CDM can be transferred as GHG abatement credits 
to Parties with quantified commitments. Investor countries can use these credits for compliance 
with their Kyoto Protocol targets. The key difference between both concepts is that the CDM has 
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a dual objective: next to the GHG emission reduction, CDM projects must also contribute to 
sustainable development in the host countries; JI projects do not have such an explicit sustainable 
development objective. 
 Dealing with various JI/CDM project-related design issues: The negotiations following COP3 
on JI and CDM modalities and procedures covered several topics which varied from political 
issues, such as the extent to which JI and CDM projects would be supplemental to industrialised 
countries’ domestic abatement action, to technical issues, such as the calculation of the emission 
reductions achieved through projects, including an assessment of a project’s business-as-usual 
reference scenario (‘baseline’). This file will focus on the latter modalities and procedural issues 
to explore whether and how also for these technical issues the above conditions for successful 
negotiation outcome prevail; e.g., strict accounting rules for enhanced environmental integrity 
may imply fewer credits from JI and CDM projects and therefore lower political acceptance. 
 Dealing with accounting of JI/CDM project GHG emission reductions: determining (multi-) 
project baselines: As modalities and procedures were being negotiated in the aftermath of 
‘Kyoto’, particular attention was paid to the whether and how GHG accounting techniques could 
be standardised. There were two main reasons for raising this issue. First, accounting procedures 
for JI and CDM projects create transaction costs and it might be cheaper if multiple projects could 
apply a common accounting methodology. Second, several potential JI and CDM projects were 
so-called ‘greenfield’ projects whereby a new installation (e.g., a hydro power plant) was built 
and connected to a  power grid. As for this type of project it is usually difficult to precisely 
identify what existing (or planned) capacity it replaces, methodologies are needed to calculate 
average emission levels across the relevant grid. All greenfield projects connected to the grid 
could subsequently use this average emission factor for its baseline calculations. Also for this file, 
a priori a trade-off could be expected between on the one hand conservative emission factors 
(with possibly fewer non-additional emission reductions) and on the other hand fewer credits and 
therefore lower attractiveness of the project options. 
The second research question in this study is addressed by analysing the changed direction in climate 
policy negotiations since COP-9 in Copenhagen with its increased focus on identifying climate change 
mitigation and adaptation measures in light of countries’ economic, social and environmental priorities 
(with particular attention to transfer of technologies for mitigation and adaptation to developing 
countries). The negotiation file to be studied for that contains the following two elements: 
 Development and transfer of (technology) options for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in light of countries’ low-emission and climate-resilient development strategies. 
During the Kyoto protocol negotiations, technology transfer as a negotiation topic remained 
relatively separate from the negotiations on countries’ climate mitigation commitments. 
Technology transfer was only connected to the latter through the low-emission technologies 
selected in CDM projects. Nonetheless, since 2001, the provision under the UNFCCC to 
encourage developing countries to conduct technology needs assessments (TNAs) for mitigation 
and adaptation has developed into a global set of activities with 92 TNAs conducted between 
2001 and 2009 and 36 TNAs since 2010 (with support from the Global Environment Facility) 
(UNFCCC, 2013a). COP18 (Doha, Qatar, December 2012) even decided that TNAs “should be 





mitigation actions, national adaptation plans and low-emission development strategies.” 
(UNFCCC, 2013b, pp. 7 para. 10-13) Through this decision, and with the establishment of a 
Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2011a), technology transfer has become 
a pillar of climate negotiations. 
 Increased interlinkages between technology, finance and capacity building directions for 
mitigation and adaptation in international climate policy making: As explained above, for 
embedding actions for climate change mitigation and adaptation more strongly in countries’ 
development strategies, a number of provisions can be used such as LEDS, TNAs, NAMAs and 
NAPs. In this file, possible interlinkages between these provisions are analysed as well as 
interlinkages with the several climate policy pillars under the Convention, such as: Technology 
Mechanism, Cancun Adaptation Framework, Capacity Building Framework and Financial 
Mechanism. In this file, it will also be addressed how meeting the three basic conditions as 
explained above can support a rationalisation of these current directions in climate policy making 
by suggesting areas where activities can be integrated so that duplication and wastage of 
resources can be avoided. 
The selection of negotiation files could be criticised on the ground of its seemingly large focus on 
mitigation and less on adaptation. Although this study acknowledges the importance of adaptation, it 
has been decided not to select it as a separate negotiation file because at several points in negotiation 
sessions, mitigation and adaptation measures both become part of one compromise package, e.g., 
relatively stringent commitments for industrialised countries with flexibility measures and additional 
support for adaptation measures for developing countries. Moreover, in the file selected for answering 
the second research question, adaptation and mitigation are treated equally. Therefore, adaptation as a 
climate policy negotiation topic will be represented throughout the above files. 
 
1.6.3. Structure of the research 
Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework to the research. It provides a background to the three basic 
conditions for climate negotiation as identified in this chapter (related to the structure and design of a 
policy, the negotiation process and tactical and facilitating aspects for negotiations). 
In Chapters 3 through 6 the four files will be examined for answering the first research question. 
Chapters 7 will focus on the answering the second research question with a focus on formulating 
practical guidance for negotiating a globally supported post-2020 climate policy regime. 
Chapter 8 will present conclusions from this study. 
 
 
 Chapter 2. Elaborating Key Conditions for 




General characteristics of climate policy making have been described in Chapter 1 as an introduction 
to the analysis in this study. It has been explained how climate negotiations were initially complicated 
by limited scientific knowledge of climatic impacts caused by human activities, which made it rather 
difficult to ‘precisely’ determine required GHG emission reductions for meeting the precautionary 
principle of the UNFCCC.  While the scientific knowledge base has been growing over the past two 
decades, negotiations have also been complicated by game theoretical aspects such as countries’ 
potential incentives for free riding and lack of an overarching international disciplinary. As a 
consequence, actual climate policy negotiations have deviated from an ‘ideal’ negotiation process. 
In order to deal with the above aspects, in Chapter 1 it has been argued that successful negotiation 
outcomes not only depend on the design of the policy package to be negotiated, but also on the extent 
to which the negotiation process provides sufficient scope for dealing with country positions and 
interests, as well as on tactical and facilitating aspects. As noted in Chapter 1, the identification of 
these three basic conditions is not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, they are considered minimally 
required aspects for achieving a successful international climate policy negotiation result (in terms of 
agreeing on low-emission and climate-resilient measures on which countries reach consensus). 
These basic conditions are further elaborated on in this chapter on the basis of theoretical literature, 
before analysing in the next chapters whether and how these conditions have been met in different 
climate policy negotiation files. Their interaction is illustrated in Figure 2-1. 
In Section 2.2, aspects related to the design of a global climate policy are examined with help of 
insights on formation of international coalitions (using insights from game theory) where the size of 
coalitions is determined by the number of the countries for which collaboration is more beneficial than 
acting outside the coalition. The section discusses how coalition building works in a situation where 
countries jointly aim at achieving an agreement without an overarching disciplinarian and whether and 
how trade-off effects take place in such situations between strictness of policy measures and size of 
the coalition (see for illustration Figure 1-3). With these insights a better understanding can be 
obtained of how international coalition building dynamics influence the basic structure of an 
international climate policy regime and the instruments applied within this structure for achieving a 
desired negotiation goal (e.g., instruments for dividing an overall quantitative goal across countries or 
instruments to assess possible integration of climate policies in countries’ economic, social and 
environmental priorities) (basic condition 1). 
This is followed by a discussion in Section 2.3 of the process of negotiations in different negotiation 
contexts as described in the literature, such as the integrative or cooperative negotiation approach in 
cases where clear win-win potentials exist in policy making (negotiations enable negotiators to be all 
better off) and distributive negotiations which could take place in so-called win-lose situations (some 





under the UNFCCC is explained in detail, by describing both the high-level negotiations process at 
sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the more technical negotiations on particular 
policy issues such as instruments and mechanisms and modalities and procedures for these (basic 
condition 2). 
Finally, Section 2.4 discusses, based on theoretical insights from the literature, how country 
negotiation positions and tactics emerge from domestic values, interests, institutions and experience. 
Moreover, it describes, based on climate negotiation experience, a range of facilitating and 
negotiation tactics factors, with examples, that have been observed during climate policy negotiations 
and how these factors have influenced the direction and scope of the agreements reached and size of 
the coalition supporting and implementing these (basic condition 3). 
 
Figure 2-1. The three distinguished basic conditions for success 
 
2.2. Meeting the Condition of a Well-Designed International Climate Policy 
Regime 
 
2.2.1. Factors determining international cooperation on transboundary issues 
As explained in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4), achieving an ‘ideal’ international climate policy coalition is 
complicated by a number of aspects which are well understood from literature about game theory. One 
aspect is the absence of an overarching international disciplinarian. As sovereign states, countries (or 
groups of countries) balance their benefits and costs of joining such a coalition, which could lead to 
international climate policy structures with lower GHG emission reduction targets (i.e. possibly less 
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costly for participating countries) in order to acquire a broader international support (Barrett, 1999) 
(Kiyono & Okuno-Fujiwara, 2004). This possible trade-off between higher or lower targets and 
country participation in an agreement results in a challenge to design an international climate policy 
regime which keeps emission reduction measures sufficiently strict for meeting the UNFCCC 
precautionary principle and stimulates a sufficient number of countries to join the coalition for 
achieving climate policy goals.  
For the latter, for instance, compensatory measures or ways to reduce the costs of compliance could be 
introduced, which is not only important for making it attractive for countries to join a coalition but 
also to support their compliance with the agreements and commitments within the coalition. After all, 
the absence of an overarching disciplinarian also complicates enforcement of compliance with 
coalition agreements. Of course, not committing to objectives in an international policy regime may 
cause a loss of goodwill for a country, a complaint in the framework of the International Court of 
Justice or a sanction, but these ‘sanctions’ could become difficult to impose and are far from a 
guarantee that countries will comply with multilateral treaties (Barrett, 1999) (Barton, et al., 2006). In 
fact, as will be described in Chapter 3, in spite of the US agreement with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
the country never ratified the protocol. Moreover, to give another example, Canada’s ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol was followed in 2012 by a unilateral decision by the Canadian government not to 
comply with its quantified GHG emission reduction commitments under the Protocol. There was little 
that the international climate policy regime could do to prevent these cases. 
At the same time, an important reason for international cooperation on transboundary environmental 
issues is that it enables countries to reduce costs and achieve larger benefits than in case of unilateral 
country actions (Barrett, 1991). Collaboration enables countries to explore options for cost reductions, 
such as through the use of concepts of emissions trading and international division of abatement 
actions (Jepma, 1995a). This insight is generally supported by game theory, which has been well 
known since the work by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). They 
developed mathematical theories based on games where two or more individuals choose strategies to 
maximise their benefits in competitive situations.  
The individuals are faced with clear rules and it is assumed that they behave fully rationally and that 
information is exchanged symmetrically among the players in the game. An interesting insight from 
game theory, which could be relevant for the discussion on climate policy negotiations, is that of the 
dynamics of so-called non-cooperative games.
19
 Non-cooperative in this context refers to situations in 
which no overarching authority exists to assure that players stick to the agreed rules. Hence, as 
explained above, cooperation in these games must be self-enforcing.
20
 A well-known example of a 
non-cooperative game is the so-called ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, which explains how players’ unilateral 
optimisations result in outcomes that are worse than the optimisation which would have resulted 
should players have cooperated (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009). Key characteristics of 
the prisoners’ dilemma are that both players act rationally; they optimise their decision given their 
assumption that the other player also acts rationally. Another characteristic of this case is the 
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publications by Nash (Nash, 1996). 
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symmetry of information: although the players do not know each other’s decisions, they both have the 
same amount and type of information. Third, the players do not communicate with each other. Should 
they be able to exchange views on the situation they have been placed in, a different outcome would 
have been likely in order to create the largest possible common surplus. A fourth characteristic of this 
game is that there is no repetition. Should the game be repeated in a second round, then each player 
may make a different choice based on the knowledge of the other player’s behaviour in the first round. 
It can be argued that decision making on climate change resembles the prisoners’ dilemma. Suppose, 
taking a very stylistic example, that a country has two choices regarding what policy it will undertake 
concerning climate change: it can take GHG emission reduction measures or it can decide not to take 
any action. Moreover, there is no international regime and no information exchange among countries, 
although all countries have access to the same information sources, so that the country will have to 
assume what other countries will do in terms of climate policy. For the other countries, also two 
options exist: carry out abatement policy or no climate policy activities at all. 
In case the country assumes that the other countries are all likely to carry out GHG emission reduction 
measures, it has an incentive to undertake no action. After all, by doing nothing the country would 
benefit from the activities by all other countries at zero costs. Hence, in this case the country could be 
a free rider, taking profit of the public good created by other countries. On the other hand, if the 
country assumes that none of the other countries will carry out climate policy measures, it has no 
incentive to undertake abatement action itself; the benefits from such action would generally be much 
smaller than the costs, especially when the country is small or medium-sized. This outcome resembles 
the prisoners’ dilemma case: whatever the policy action by other countries, without a cooperative 
framework, the country’s optimal policy is to refrain from abatement action. A repetition of the game 
in a second round of negotiations could lead to a different outcome, for instance, if it turns out that 
refraining from abatement action leads to considerable environmental damage and economic costs. 
Another extension of the prisoners’ dilemma, and which has a high relevance for environmental 
issues, has become known as the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The origin of this concept goes even back 
to Aristotle (“What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it”) (Ostrom, 
1990) and in more recent scientific literature its roots go back to Hardin (Hardin, 1968). The commons 
refer to any resource which is shared by a group of people, e.g., air and water, but also land, fish and 
wood. A general characteristic of commons is that they are not protected by property rights as 
everybody can freely use the commons. 
A problem that could arise with using the commons, and this is where the link to the ‘prisoners’ 
dilemma’ can be made, is that overuse reduces their quality. For example, the overuse of land in 
Britain in the fourteenth century (as in Hardin’s example) due to the free use of common pastures by 
nearby villages to graze horses, cattle and sheep, resulted in ruining of the pastures. In order to halt 
this process, property rights were introduced by parcelling up the common pastures in individually 
owned parcels. Each household then had a responsibility for its own parcel and an incentive to prevent 
overgrazing. 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is also often used in the context of fishing (too much fishing would 
deteriorate fish populations) and in the context of air pollution: considering the air as a common, 
people have emitted pollutants in the air, which has gradually reduced air quality. Based on these 
examples, the tragedy of the commons can be defined as the result of the perception of people that 
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using a common results in an individual benefit, whereas the costs of using it can be shared so that 
they are hardly felt by individuals. As a consequence, up to the point where the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ is truly felt by the users themselves, there is little incentive to adjust behaviour in terms of 
e.g., reduction of emissions of pollutants. 
This makes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ helpful in describing the issue of global warming and why it 
is taking place and why it could become a problem (Böhringer, 2002) (Paavola, 2011). It does also 
offer some solutions to address the problem (internalising the costs of emissions in individual cost 
calculations, e.g., with a Pigovian tax, or translating emissions into individual property rights), but its 
value to the discussion of what an optimal size of a stable climate coalition would be is limited. The 
concept of ‘public goods’ is more useful for that purpose. 
Although interrelated, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the ‘public goods’ concepts are different in 
the sense that the first concept refers to the over-use of a common good, whereas a public good is a 
good from which no-one can be excluded. In the example of global warming, a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ takes place when worldwide emissions of GHGs lead to climate change; the reduction of 
GHG emissions and the prevention of global warming would then be a public good. Especially, the 
public good characteristic of climate change policy has turned out to be important when designing a 
climate regime. This is mainly because of the free-rider incentive that countries may have when they 
see that others are active with abatement policies whereas no country can be excluded from the 
improved circumstances. In conclusion, a climate regime aims at preventing a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ situation for the global climate, but must be designed so as to prevent free rider behaviour 
due to the public good character of the formulated policy. 
The above discussion has shown that insights from game theory help explain why climate policy 
negotiation outcomes, in an attempt to reach consensus among UNFCCC Parties (see Figure 1-3), 
often result in lower GHG emission reduction targets than in an ‘ideal’ situation (as illustrated in 
Chapter 1). Within the eventually achieved coalition, countries try to achieve the best outcomes for 
themselves individually and, depending on the negotiation case, for the ‘group’ (e.g., the global 
climate). How this game has been played so far by countries in the context of establishing a climate 
regime will be discussed in the next chapter based on experience with UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations. 
 
2.2.2. How is the size of a coalition for international policy making determined? 
Based on the discussion in Chapter 1 and above, the process of establishing and maintaining an 
international climate regime faces the challenge that a truly effective climate policy regime must have 
a widespread international coverage because the emissions by countries outside the regime would have 
an impact on the well-being of the countries under the regime. Similar to the illustration by the 
prisoners’ dilemma example, in the context of climate change, policy cooperation between countries 
could generate larger benefits than unilateral actions. For instance, within a framework of cooperation, 
countries with relatively high marginal GHG abatement costs could carry out emission reductions in 
countries where marginal costs are relatively low (as the impact of GHG emissions is independent of 
the location where the emissions take place). This would not only reduce overall abatement costs but 





where they would not have been available otherwise. Countries could also agree on differentiated 
targets and/or commitments based on socio-economic welfare levels. In addition, within a framework 
of cooperation, countries could agree on financial and technology transfers or specific support 
measures to reduce costs of and increase benefits from cooperation. 
For instance, the UNFCCC contained, as a first international climate policy step, promises by 
industrialised countries to bring their GHG emissions back to 1990 levels by the year 2000. This 
coalition was not difficult to maintain as almost all (groups of) negotiating parties were satisfied: most 
industrialised countries were pleased by the fact that the stabilisation goal was not legally binding; 
developing countries did not have quantitative targets at all. The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 also achieved 
global support, but this coalition could only be achieved by exempting developing countries from 
quantitative emission reduction commitments and enabling industrialised countries to partly achieve 
their commitments through international emissions trading mechanisms. For example, as will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 3, in return for its willingness at ‘Kyoto’ to join the group of countries 
with quantitative commitments, the Russian Federation received compensation in the form of a 
relatively easy target (i.e. stabilisation of its GHG emissions at l990 levels, when the country was still 
part of the USSR). US negotiators, who had been given a mandate by the Congress to only agree on a 
stabilisation of US emissions (Byrd & Hagel, 1997), felt that the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of the 
concept of emissions trading (basically on a worldwide scale) would be enough compensation for the 
7% emission reduction target they agreed for their country (on which they soon turned out to be 
wrong, though). 
As benefits from GHG emission reduction have the characteristic of a global public good, as explained 
above, no country can be excluded from these. By not joining or leaving a coalition (or even not 
becoming part of it, see below), a country could benefit from the actions undertaken by the coalition 
without undertaking actions itself. This could induce other countries also to withdraw from the 
coalition, thus threatening the overall objectives of the regime. Literature on game theory then 
suggests that international agreements, given the enforcement complexities, must be self-enforcing, 
i.e. the agreement must be designed in such a manner that the incentives for countries to stay in the 
coalition are larger than the incentives to leave the coalition (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) (Barrett, 
1991) (Zeeuw, 2001) (Tulkens, 1998) (Eyckmans & Finus, 2003) (Ray, 2000).
21
 This could imply that 
participating countries are compensated for their efforts (costs) and receive a share of the benefits that 
result from the cooperation (Zeeuw, 2001) (Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, 2006, p. 25). As a result, all 
participating countries are better off by staying a member of the coalition. 
An important question that remains is how large an international climate policy coalition would need 
to be. In theory, since no country can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of GHG emission 
reduction (e.g., lower adaptation costs), a climate coalition would have to be global. This would 
prevent any country from taking a free ride on the GHG abatement efforts of other countries or 
countries feeling their efforts being offset by lack of action by others. However, whether this 
practically means that all countries would have to join the coalition of countries undertaking 
abatement actions remains to be seen. For instance, an effective and stable coalition with countries 
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 It must be noted that applying the theory of coalition building to climate change policy is complicated by the 
complexity of determining marginal benefits and costs of policy action. For instance, calculating costs and 
benefits from climate abatement actions is surrounded by several complexities and uncertainties (IPCC, 2001, 
pp. 200, Working Group I). In addition, the benefits and costs differ across countries. 
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with commitments may not need to contain all countries in the world but mainly the key players: “the 
success of an international environmental agreement is not related to the total number of participants, 
but to the number of key players for tackling the problem – in the case of global warming USA, China, 
Russia (FSU) and India, among others” (Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, 2006, p. 27). 
Strictly speaking, the Kyoto Protocol, while ratified by 192 Parties (191 countries and the EU) 
(UNFCCC, 2014a), was largely built on the coalition of 37 Parties with quantified emission reduction 
measures with compensating measures for countries that undertake emission reduction efforts (access 
to low-cost investment options through international emissions trading
22
) and financial and 
technological transfers to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1998) 
What a coalition with “key players for tackling the problem” (Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, 2006) 
could look like was illustrated in 2009 by the World Resources Institute (WRI, 2009) in a diagram 
which plotted countries from left to right according to their absolute annual GHG emissions (based on 
2005 data and updated from Herzog, et al. (2005). The analysis showed that, in 2005, the 15 UNFCCC 
Parties (both developed and developing countries) with the largest GHG emissions together, taking the 
EU as one Party, accounted for approximately 80% of global emissions. 
 
Figure 2-2. Cumulative global GHG emissions in 2005 (WRI, 2009). 
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 International trade of emission reduction titles could broaden small stable coalitions; the challenge is to 
“design a sufficiently ‘clever’ transfer scheme such that it ensures the largest possible stable coalition.” 





Obviously, the above analysis (WRI, 2009) was not hindered by political negotiation barriers, but, as 
explained in Chapter 1, a few months after the climate negotiations at ‘Copenhagen’ 55 countries, 
including a number of developing countries, had submitted national pledges to the UNFCCC 
secretariat to cut and limit their GHG emissions by 2020,
23
 together accounting for 78% of global 
emissions from energy use (which is different from the diagram in Figure 2-2 which has a broader 
basis of GHG emissions, including energy, national transportation and industrial production). 
These examples show that while climate policy making has a global scope due to the uniform mixing 
of GHGs in the atmosphere with climate impacts for all countries (to a larger or lesser extent), 
negotiations and literature analysis up to 2009 tended to focus on international coalition building with 
quantitative GHG emission reduction actions for relatively small groups of countries with relatively 
large GHG emissions. Countries within such a coalition could then still collaborate with other 
(developing) countries on CDM emission reduction projects, climate change adaptation support and 
technology transfer.  
The above could be an indication of the increasing importance of ‘sub-games’ by major GHG emitting 
countries within the overall UNFCCC negotiation context. However, it remains uncertain as of yet 
what coalition building will look like towards a post-2020 climate policy to be concluded by 2015 (as 
per the 2011 ‘Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’ and the 2012 ‘Doha Climate Gateway’) 
(UNFCCC, 2012b) (UNFCCC, 2012d)(UNFCCC, 2013b). The practice of the Kyoto Protocol, as 
described in Chapter 1, has shown that the effectiveness of a coalition with industrialised countries 
adopting quantified, legally binding commitments, including the possibility of emissions trading, was 
threatened without the inclusion of rapidly growing developing countries such as Brazil, China, India 
and Mexico. The absence of these countries was an important reason for the USA to leave the ‘Kyoto’ 
coalition in 2001. Attempts to establish an effective coalition under a post-Kyoto regime with 
inclusion of developing countries with rapidly growing GHG emissions have thus far resulted in 
mainly voluntary emission reduction or limitation pledges. In a study by UNEP, it has been argued 
that these pledged actions together are likely to be less than what is required for stabilising GHGs 
around a level of 450 ppmv in the longer term in order to reach the goal that average global 
temperature increase should not be more than 2
o
C, compared to pre-industrialised times temperature 
levels (UNEP, 2014). The ‘Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’ has achieved limited success 
given the relatively small country coverage and voluntary nature of commitments. At the same time, 
since ‘Copenhagen’ in 2009, a number of non-Annex I Parties with relatively high GHG emissions 
have agreed on emission reduction pledges, while these were not in the Kyoto Protocol list of Parties 
with quantified emission reduction or limitation commitments. 
During the negotiations since ‘Copenhagen’, there has been a trend to increasingly consider climate 
change mitigation and adaptation actions in light of countries’ economic, environmental and social 
priorities. The emerging concepts of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and national 
adaptation plans (NAPs) to be identified and conducted in developing countries as part of low-
emission development strategies (LEDS) (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 7-11), with financial and technical 
support from developed countries, are examples of this trend. These concepts aim at supporting 
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 Among these pledges was the EU target of 20% emission reduction by 2020 as well as a number of individual 
EU Member State pledges. Therefore, the number of Parties with pledges after ‘Copenhagen’ is larger than the 
number of states listed in under the 80% level in Figure 2-2. 
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countries in identifying their longer term sustainability priorities (as a long term vision) and 
subsequently formulating a strategy towards those priorities with low GHG emissions and increased 
climate resilience. It was also agreed at ‘Cancun’ in 2010 that support from developed to developing 
countries for NAMA, NAP and LEDS formulation and implementation can be combined with 
procedures for monitoring, reporting and verification of the supported actions (UNFCCC, 2011a).  
As a potential result of this trend, with a climate policy regime focussing more on embedding climate 
change mitigation and adaptation actions in countries’ national sustainable development and/or growth 
visions, the chances of a larger coalition (with lower importance of ‘sub-games’) seem to have 
increased in comparison with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol with its legally 
binding emission reduction or limitation commitments. This trend with its potential positive impact on 
climate policy coalition building during negotiations on a post-2020 climate policy package will be 
further elaborated on in Chapter 7. 
 
2.3. Meeting the Condition of an Effective Climate Policy Negotiation 
Processes 
 
Section 2.2 has characterised the context of climate policy making with help of game-theoretical and 
economic concepts such as ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the ‘public good’ 
nature of GHG emission reduction benefits. In addition, basic characteristics of coalition building 
around climate change have been discussed in light of the absence of an overarching disciplinarian. 
With these insights a better understanding has been obtained of those factors which could prevent a 
negotiation outcome to be close to the ‘ideal’ situation of strict GHG emission reduction measures and 
globally supported international coalition of countries under the UNFCCC and which should be 
considered in the design of a negotiated policy package (basic condition 1). Furthermore, for 
successful climate policy negotiations, this study has identified the condition of an enabling 
negotiation process which helps negotiators to consider the above game-theoretical aspects in the 
policy design during climate negotiations. How the condition of an enabling climate negotiation 
process can be fulfilled is described in this section with a specific focus on a number of elements that 
drive the climate policy negotiation process itself, such as negotiation setting, context, individual 
country interests, and particular circumstances. 
 
2.3.1. Integrated versus distributive negotiations  
The literature distinguishes two main approaches to negotiations (Fisher & Ury, 2011) (Nierenberg, 
1978) (Wertheim, n.d.) (Sprangler, 2012) (Meerts & Postma, 2005). The first approach is called 
‘integrative’ or ‘cooperative’ and is recommended in circumstances where clear potentials for win-win 
situations exist. The second approach is called ‘distributive negotiations’ and is generally applied in 
so-called win-lose situations where parties have to compete with each other because of strongly 
differing interests (e.g., a customer negotiating the price of a product with the potential seller). The 





the other one loses – although also lose-lose outcomes are possible if a party realises that it cannot win 
and cancels the negotiations. 
In cases of ‘integrative’ (win-win) negotiation circumstances, negotiations would be focussed more on 
striking creative deals which could result in negotiation outcomes where for each party the 
advantageous aspects outweigh the disadvantageous aspects. A typical characteristic of ‘integrative’ 
negotiation circumstances is that there are resources available that can be divided among the 
negotiation parties (e.g., a party that loses on one issue can be compensated by winning on another 
issue), so that both parties can benefit from negotiations. Awareness of such a situation among the 
negotiation parties creates an incentive for both sides to strive for maximisation of the joint outcome. 
These circumstances also make it easier for parties to solve mutual problems, to share information, 
and to prevent decentralised behaviour with a focus on individual optimisation (Barrett, 1999, p. 2). 
Of the approaches described here, the ‘integrative/cooperative’ negotiation approach has the largest 
potential of offering a way out of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ situations described in Section 2.2, as it 
limits or prevents decentralised action (Barrett, 1999, p. 3). An important key to ‘integrative’ 
negotiations is to orient oneself to the interest of the opponent so that mutually satisfactory solutions 
can be found. Such an approach generally increases the flexibility of parties to find compromises that 
do not conflict with one’s own interests. This could even lead to ‘Pareto efficient’ outcome whereby 
no options remain on the table that could make at least one party better off without making the other 
parties worse off (Wertheim, n.d., p. 12). 
The Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997 (as discussed in Chapter 3) could be considered an example 
of how an initially ‘distributive’ negotiation approach turned towards an ‘integrative’ approach. 
During the first week of the ‘Kyoto’ negotiations countries were unwilling to give in, but this changed 
during the second week when industrialised countries were eventually willing to unilaterally accept 
stricter quantitative emission reductions because their developing country negotiation partners had 
agreed on the eligibility of a system of quota-based international emissions trading and the 
establishment of the CDM for emissions-trading projects between industrialised and developing 
countries. Both these emissions-trading mechanisms offered considerable scope for industrialised 
countries to fulfil their commitments in a cost-effective way. As a result, the ‘Kyoto’ negotiations 
could be completed successfully, because the protocol text reflected the national priorities of the 
several countries, such as “binding targets for the EU, flexibility for the U.S., success in Kyoto for 
Japan, no commitments for developing countries, financial pay-off for Russia, and good terms with the 
EU for Eastern Europe” (Wijen & Zoeteman, 2004, p. 31). 
Finally, some authors have concluded that the ‘integrative/cooperative’ negotiation approach is often 
used in negotiations on conflict solving issues where the parties involved have or need an on-going 
relationship with each other (Fisher & Ury, 2011) (Wertheim, n.d.).
24
 Several negotiations, in 
particular on transboundary issues, take place as a series of subsequent rather than isolated events. 
Therefore, it is important that negotiators take into consideration that they will meet again at future 
negotiation rounds. For example, in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), negotiations 
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 It must be noted that a strict distinction between ‘integrative/cooperative’ and ‘distributive/competitive’ not 
necessarily has to exist in practice and parties, although aiming at a long-term cooperation and acting with an 
incentive to strive for a win-win outcome, could still to some extent try to introduce some elements of 
competitive negotiation in the talks (Wertheim, n.d., pp. 2-3) (Barrett, 1999, p. 2). 
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could last for several years (e.g., Kennedy round, Uruguay round, Doha round). Such negotiations 
could be better considered as a process for which it is important to keep in mind that the negotiation 
atmosphere during one negotiation step may have an impact on the atmosphere in the next step, i.e. 
parties may harden their position if another party formerly did not want to co-operate, or show 
willingness to compromise if former negotiations resulted in a true win-win situation (Fisher & Ury, 
2011). 
With a view to the climate change talks, this negotiation aspect can be illustrated by the opposition of 
developing countries, prior to the COP-1 (Berlin, 1995), to JI as an official instrument for helping 
industrialised countries stabilising their GHG emissions by the year 2000 at 1990 emission levels. As 
will be explained in Chapter 4, this opposition was strongly motivated by developing countries’ lack 
of confidence in industrialised countries’ efforts or even intentions to really stabilise their emissions. 
However, simply rejecting the JI option in Berlin would likely have frustrated climate negotiations for 
the next couple of years, which were focussed on developing a climate protocol with quantified 
commitments for industrialised countries to be concluded at ‘Kyoto’. At COP-1, the majority of the 
countries realised that such commitments would hardly be feasible without an emissions-trading 
instrument such as JI. Therefore, with a view to the continuation of the climate negotiation progress, a 
pilot phase for JI called activities implemented jointly was established (see also Chapter 4). 
With a view to these examples and assuming on-going relationships between the negotiation parties in 
most of the cases, Wertheim (n.d.) concludes that “the key to successful negotiations is to shift the 
situation to a ‘win-win’ even if it looks like a ‘win-lose’ situation. Almost all negotiations have at least 
some elements of win-win. Successful negotiations often depend on finding the win-win aspects in 
any situation” (Wertheim, n.d., p. 2). 
 
2.3.2. Organisation of climate negotiations under the UNFCCC 
Since the early 1990s, climate negotiations under the UNFCCC have taken place during multiple 
‘rounds’ as described in Chapter 1. Initially, the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) was 
the main negotiation forum which prepared the text of the UNFCCC that was adopted at UNCED 
(1992) and which continued until the first Conference of the Parties (COP) in Berlin (Germany, 
March-April 1995). Since then, the COP, established by the (UNFCCC, 1992a, p. Art.7), has been the 
central body for international climate negotiations. The COP is hosted annually during two week-
sessions, usually by the end of the year, by either a developed or a developing country. Generally, 
countries try to apply the ‘rule’ that when a COP is hosted by a developed country in one year, then 
the next year a developing country will host the session. The ground rules for the process of 
negotiations within the context of the UNFCCC, as further explained in this section, have been 
determined by (UNFCCC, 1992a). In the course of ongoing negotiations, additional bodies with their 
accompanying operational rules have been added to the UNFCCC organisational structure, such as the 
Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (1995-1997), the CDM Executive Board and the Adaptation 
Fund Board. These bodies receive their mandates from the COP, which also appoints their governing 
boards. The boards determine their operational processes and report annually to the COP. 
Between 1995 and 1997, COP negotiations focussed on the Berlin Mandate to agree on a protocol 





1997, negotiations focussed on its modalities and procedures for successful implementation of 
protocol agreements. An important role in this process was played by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technical Support and Advise (SBSTA) of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). These two bodies support the COP negotiation process and negotiators meet usually twice a 
year for these discussions, during spring (May-June) and during the first week of the COP by the end 
of the year. As per November  2014, 40 SBSTA and 40 SBI sessions have been held in total. 
In 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol formally entered into force, after receipt of the Russian instrument 
of ratification in November 1994, two new negotiation tracks were established under the COP which 
had the objective to work on a post-2012 climate agreement (to cover the period after the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC 2005, Montreal COP). The first track was 
conducted by UNFCCC Parties under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the second track organised negotiations by Kyoto Protocol 
Parties under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). As explained in the climate negotiations synopsis in Chapter 1, the 
reason for having two working groups for negotiations on a post-2012 agreement was that, by 2005, 
not all UNFCCC Parties had ratified the Kyoto Protocol (including the USA). As post-2012 
agreements would formally take the form of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, 
limiting the negotiations to protocol Parties only would exclude non-ratifying Parties from post-2012 
negotiation. Eventually, it was hoped that both working group tracks would come together by 2012. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Copenhagen COP session (COP-15) failed at reaching a climate 
agreement as successor of the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period, so that at Durban (COP-17) a 
new platform was established for negotiating a climate policy regime by 2015, which would need to 
become effective after 2020. At COP-18 in Doha (December 2012) work on this Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action was started and the work on the AWG-LCA and AWG KP formally concluded. 
During this overall negotiation process of over 100 meetings, several milestones were achieved, which 
are summarised in Table 2-1 for COP sessions. 
In terms of milestones, COP-1, COP-3, COP-4, COP-6bis, COP-7, COP-11, COP-13, COP-15, COP-
16 and COP-17 turned out to be the most important sessions. Most of the other COPs became 
‘intermediate’ sessions, which was also often a consequence of the time schedules agreed at earlier 
COPs. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, for example, had a deadline for 1997, which implied that COP-2 
would mainly have to create the momentum to keep negotiations on track. COP-4 delivered a working 
agenda to help countries implement the Kyoto Protocol in their national climate policies; the deadline 
for the completion of this agenda became COP-6 in 2000. COP-6 therefore became a key session as it 
was basically the first time since 1997 that Parties had to handle politically sensitive issues. The Dutch 
Presidency did not manage to conclude negotiations successfully but reached agreement with the 
Parties to continue negotiations within six months (COP-6 bis). COP-7 managed to reach agreement 
on a comprehensive set of modalities and procedures for the Kyoto Protocol. COP-8 and 9 were 
overshadowed by the uncertainty about the status of the Kyoto Protocol as the withdrawal of the USA 
and the doubts of the Russian Federation about the treaty made the entry into force of the Protocol 
highly uncertain. Only at COP-10 it was certain that enough Parties (including the Russian Federation) 
would have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, so that negotiators decided to move their attention to the post-
2012 commitment periods. COP-13 (at Bali) decided on an action plan for negotiations towards a post-
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2012 agreement to be achieved at COP-15 (Copenhagen). COP-16 became of crucial importance after 
the failure of ‘Copenhagen’ as it managed to keep the process in motion and change the course of 
actions towards stronger embedding of climate actions in countries’ economic, social and 
environmental priorities. COP-17 formalised a new negotiation process towards post-2020 climate 
policy making.  
Table 2-1. COP sessions held and their milestones 
COP Location Milestones 
COP-1 (March-April 1995) Berlin, Germany  Berlin mandate to start negotiations on a 
Climate Protocol 
 AIJ pilot phase 
COP-2 (July 1996) Geneva, Switzerland  USA agrees to negotiate legally-binding 
targets 
 Geneva Declaration 
COP-3 (December 1997) Kyoto, Japan Kyoto Protocol 
COP-4 (November 1998) Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
COP-5 (November 1999) Bonn, Germany Self-imposed deadline for Kyoto Protocol entry-
into-force by the time of Rio+10 summit in 
2002 
COP-6 (November 2000) The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
President’s Note based on topic-wise 
agreements 
COP-6-bis (June 2001) Bonn, Germany Bonn Agreement 
COP-7 (November 2001) Marrakech, Morocco Marrakech Accords 
COP-8 (November 2002) New Delhi, India New Delhi Statement on adaptation and future 
climate policy regime 
COP-9 (December 2003) Milan, Italy Role of sinks in Kyoto Protocol further defined 
COP-10 (December 2004) Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Start of post-2012 negotiations 
COP-11 (December 2005) Montreal, Canada First meeting of Kyoto Protocol Parties, 
establishment of AWG LCA and AWG KP. 
COP-12 (November 2006) Nairobi, Kenya Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to climate change 
COP-13 (December 2007) Bali, Indonesia The Bali Road Map 
COP-14 (December 2008) Poznan, Poland Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology 
Transfer 
COP-15 (December 2009) Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
Copenhagen Accords (not adopted by consensus 
decision) 
COP-16 (December 2010) Cancun, Mexico The Cancun Agreements 
COP-17 (December 2011) Durban, South Africa Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
COP-18 (December 2012) Doha, Qatar Doha Climate Gateway and Doha Amendment 
to Kyoto Protocol 
COP-19 (November 2013) Warsaw, Poland Decisions towards a universal agreement in 
December 2015; to enter into force in 2020 
COP-20 (December 2014) Lima, Peru  
 
The sequence of annual ‘milestone’ and ‘intermediate’ COP sessions have turned out to allow for a 
flexible negotiation process in the sense that topics can be placed on the agenda of a COP which have 
been identified at an earlier COP and/or by a preparatory meeting. COP practice shows that 





considered for further consideration, either by the same COP session, or a next COP session or by a 
subsidiary body. This generally supports addressing more flexibly the game theoretical aspects as 
explained in Chapters 1 and 2 and handling the issue that climate policy target setting has often been 
part of climate policy negotiations, rather than that negotiators were guided by scientifically 
determined targets. 
Countries that have ratified the UNFCCC have access to the COP negotiations. Since the entry-into-
force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005, which was 90 days after the submission of the 
instrument of ratification by the Russian Federation, the COP has also served as the meeting of the 
Parties (COP-MOP) that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. AWG-KP negotiations, as mentioned 
above, therefore took place under supervision of the COP-MOP. The implication of this change is that 
countries that have ratified the UNFCCC but which had not (yet) ratified the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., 
USA and, until May 2009, Turkey) could only participate at COP-MOP sessions as observers, without 
the right to vote, upon invitation of the COP-MOP President (generally the Minister for the 
Environment of the hosting country). 
As explained above, the sessions of the COP are prepared and supported by the so-called Subsidiary 
Bodies (SB) and Ad-hoc working groups (see above for some example). These sessions have a lower 
political profile (in terms of media coverage), although they are at times important for the progress 
with negotiations. At SB and Ad-hoc working group sessions, negotiations take place somewhat ‘in 
the shadow’ with less of the pressure to achieve agreements which is often so strongly felt at COPs. It 
is also important to note that the sessions are not pressurised with the necessity to gain political 
prestige from hosting the sessions. Contrary to the COP, the annual stand-alone climate negotiation 
sessions are held in Bonn and organised by the UNFCCC secretariat, mostly in May/June. SB sessions 
are also held in conjunction with the COP for the final preparations of the eventual COP decisions. 
Decision-making by the COP takes place according to a procedure that has never officially been 
adopted. Before the first session of the COP in 1995, the UNFCCC Secretariat had prepared a voting 
procedure upon which Parties could not reach agreement (UNFCCC, 1996a) (Depledge, 2004). As a 
consequence, “in the absence of any specified majority voting rule, there is currently a broad 
understanding in the climate change regime that substantive decisions should be adopted by 
consensus” (Depledge, 2004, p. 5). More recent amendments to the UNFCCC state that the COP 
should make every effort to reach agreement by consensus, but where consensus cannot be reached, 
amendments to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol may be adopted by a three-quarter majority vote of 
the Parties present and voting (Siegele, 2013). 
At this point, the President of the COP must ensure that two-third of the Parties are present at the 
meeting. However, this still requires a definition of what consensus means. In the context of the 
climate negotiations, consensus is generally achieved if there are no stated objections to a decision. 
The complication of consensus as a guiding principle for voting is that any Party can block decisions 
and that additional efforts are needed to adjust the decision text in such a way that it meets the 
concerns of the Party or Parties that have stated objections. This happened, for instance, at the 
‘Copenhagen’ COP in 2009 when Bolivia rejected the Copenhagen Accords, so that it was not 
adopted. However, when a similar situation occurred at COP-16 in Cancun, a year later, during AWG 
LCA negotiations, “Colombia questioned how not having any agreement could be beneficial for the 
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environment and, supported by Gabon, noted that consensus did not mean that one country could 
block decisions” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2010, p. 12). 
In order to avoid situations where decisions are blocked by a small group of Parties, the COP President 
establishes small informal working groups (or ‘joint contact groups’, or ‘negotiating groups’, or 
‘drafting groups’) to prepare decisions on particular topics during the COP. These groups consist of 
experts that form a fair representation of the UNFCCC regions, i.e. Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Europe and others, including Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and USA. They are often chaired by a co-Chair from an Annex I country and a 
co-Chair from a non-Annex I country. Generally, when an informal working group has reached 
agreement on a particular issue and the decision text is presented to the COP plenary, consensus can 
more easily be reached. 
In this process the SB sessions held in parallel with the COP play an important role (especially during 
the first week of the COP). The informal working group members have often already formed a similar 
working group at the annual stand-alone SB and Ad-hoc Working Group sessions in Bonn where 
country representatives prepare first drafts of decision texts, which often have the form of consolidated 
texts based on proposals submitted by Parties. At the COP, these consolidated texts can be further 
developed into COP decision texts, such as Chair Texts or President Notes which become subject to 
the consensus ‘voting’ procedure. It should be noted that negotiations do often not take place at the 
plenary meetings of the COP. The working groups, preferably with a balanced geographical division 
and specific competence, work on the texts and when they have completed their work and have 
reached agreement, these can be presented for conclusion to the Plenary of the COP. 
The negotiations are furthermore supported by technical workshops organised by the UNFCCC 
secretariat in between of the stand-alone SB and Ad-hoc Working Group sessions and resumed 
sessions at the COP on issues that need further exploration by country representatives in consultation 
with third-party experts, who are invited to these workshops. In addition, as a result of the 
Copenhagen-Cancun-Durban COP cycle (2009-2011) new bodies have been established to work on 
technology development and transfer (Technology Mechanism), finance (Green Climate Fund) and 
adaptation (Adaptation Fund Board). These bodies are also populated by representatives of developed 
and developing countries and meet a few times a year at Bonn (Gaast & Begg, 2012). 
While preparing for the COP, its President often identifies the issues that could ‘break or make’ the 
COP. In order to already sort out some of the issues before the COP, its President can organise a small 
workshop with key players, about two months before the COP session. These key players are, for 
instance, the EU troika, the main negotiators of important industrialised countries, the acting chair of 
the G-77&China, a representative of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), etc. This meeting 
generally offers a good opportunity for the President to show his/her “charm, cunning, humour, daring 
and a range of other techniques” (Depledge, 2004, p. 6) that later may help to generate consensus at 
the COP. In addition, several COP Presidents in the past formed so-called ‘friends of the President’ 
groups, which are small gatherings of selected negotiators to support the President in preparing the 
negotiations, identifying key issues during the negotiations, and drafting compromise texts during the 
final stage of the COP sessions (at this stage also some ministers attending the Ministerial or high-





Obviously, inviting country representatives to the groups is a very delicate task for the President to 
perform as it requires a politically sensitive selection of key countries. One option to select negotiators 
is to select from each UN region one representative, so that all regions are represented. Another 
option, which is nowadays mostly used by COP Presidents, is to invite one representative from the 
various negotiation coalitions that have been active in the course of the climate negotiations over the 
past 20 years (see for an overview Box 2-1).  
Box 2-1. Groupings of UNFCCC Parties during climate negotiations 
According to the UN tradition, Parties, while they are each represented by national delegations, are 
organised in five regional groups, mainly for administrative reasons: 
 African States, 
 Asian States, 
 Eastern European States, 
 Latin American and the Caribbean States, and  
 Western European and Other States (e.g., including EU, Australia, Norway, Switzerland and 
USA). 
In order to have their substantive interests better presented at negotiations, Parties usually organise 
themselves in ‘like-minded’ groups. According to the UNFCCC website, the main groups are: 
 Group of 77 (G-77), which was founded in 1964 and has nowadays over 130 developing country 
members; China generally collaborates with G-77 so that the group’s inputs to the COP are 
usually tabled as G-77&China submissions, 
 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which is a coalition of 43 low-lying and small island 
countries (which are mostly also member of the G77&China group), 
 Least Developed Countries (LDC), which contains of 50 countries and which share a common 
interest in, e.g., vulnerability and adaptation to climate change, 
 European Union (EU), which as a regional economic integration organisation has become a Party 
to the UNFCCC itself, 
 Umbrella Group, which is loose coalition of non-EU developed countries, and 
 Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), which comprises Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the 
Republic of Korea and Switzerland. 
In addition, there are several other groups, such as OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries), CACAM (Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China), and COMIFAC (Central African Forestry Commission). 
Source: (UNFCCC, 2014c) 
 
An example of using the latter option was at COP-6 bis in Bonn (June 2001) which was chaired by the 
Dutch Minister of Environment, Mr Jan Pronk. He had already intended to establish a negotiation 
table system with key negotiators selected from these groups at COP-6 in November 2000, but then it 
was met with too much resistance, as within the groups it was difficult to appoint a ‘leading country’. 
At the Bonn COP session, Mr Pronk tried again and this time a negotiation table could be formed with 
one chair per group to be taken by a spokesperson who was backed by a number of colleagues from 
the same group sitting on chairs behind him/her. Perhaps also the changed negotiation climate 
facilitated this set-up of the ‘friends’ group. After all, since the decision by US President Bush to 
consider the Kyoto Protocol fatally flawed, the remaining countries had become engaged in an intense 
diplomatic carousel with representatives from negotiation groups visiting each other in order to design 
Elaborating key conditions for success during climate policy negotiations 
39 
 
strategies to save the Protocol at the resumed session of COP-6 in Bonn. Since the successful 
application of the ‘friends of the President’ formula at COP-6bis, it has also been applied by other 
COP Presidents, although not always with similar successes. The ‘friends’ groups do not always 
manage to step beyond political dividing lines, so that, during the final hours of the COP sessions, the 
President still needs to negotiate bilaterally with particular negotiators to strike final deals (Depledge, 
2004, p. 22). 
Finally, the COP sessions acquire an extra political dimension through the participation of ministers or 
high-level officials from the Parties in the concluding phase of the negotiations. The influence of 
ministers on the final outcome differs from case to case. Sometimes, ministers or high-level officials 
create a breakthrough in negotiations because their political power goes beyond the mandate of the 
official negotiators. The speech delivered by US Vice-President Al Gore in 1997 at COP-3 is seen as a 
good example of this effect. However, ministers could also hamper negotiations in cases where they 
try to strike deals by negotiating on issues, whereas official negotiators tend to incorporate political 
sensitivities, which they are generally well aware of in the texts they draft. It is without doubt that the 
high-level segment adds more prestige to the COP, but its contribution to reaching agreement is not 
always decisive. 
 
2.4. Meeting the Condition of Decisive Tactical and Facilitating Factors 
during Negotiations 
 
This section addresses basic condition 3, with a particular focus on how and why for agreements on 
globally supported GHG emissions reduction measures (basic condition 1) there needs to be scope for 
tactics and making tactical manoeuvres, so that, in terms of Figure 1-3 in Chapter 1, the course of  






 in Figure 1-3. With a view to that, 
first, the section focuses on possible (domestic) drivers for Parties’ positions and negotiation tactics, 
which is followed by an identification of tactical and facilitating factors which can, each in their own 
way, determine the course of negotiations and whether, when and how negotiation breakthroughs can 
be achieved. 
 
2.4.1. Reflection of national interests in countries’ negotiation positions 
In Section 2.2 it has been concluded that countries have an incentive to join a climate policy regime if 
their share in the regime’s surplus is sufficiently large to outweigh the costs of participation. The term 
‘share’ is rather abstract though and it generally consists of the benefits that accrue to countries when 
joining a climate regime. However, what is actually perceived as a benefit typically depends on the 
country concerned. Some countries may take into consideration all benefits to the national economy, 
whereas other countries only look at the benefits that accrue to powerful interest groups. Still other 
countries may take a more altruistic approach and consider a slowdown of global warming, the 
protection of ecosystems and the prevention of damage to vulnerable countries important benefits. 





costs be defined on a national level or only for key interest groups and assessed with a view to the 
short term or to the medium to longer term. 
The process of determining what share a country would need from the surplus of a climate regime 
before being willing to join is an important determinant of a country’s negotiation position. A number 
of theories have tried to formalise how a domestic interplay between a government and interest 
groups, a country’s perception of international norms and values, and domestic institutional structures 
add up to the negotiation position of the country (Cass, 2002) (Heck, et al., 2004). 
For instance, when determining their desired share in a coalition’s surplus, countries could consider 
the absolute gains of joining an international treaty or the relative gains vis-à-vis other countries. In 
the first viewpoint, often referred to as ‘neo-liberalism’, a country does not necessarily look at how 
other countries gain or lose, as long as it gains itself. According to the second viewpoint, ‘neo-
realism’, a focus on relative gains is justified by countries’ traditional focus on the division of power 
between states and it identifies security, safety and prosperity as key elements for the positions that 
countries take at international negotiations. The most important objective of a country is to maintain 
its relative power vis-à-vis other countries and cooperation is generally based on defensive arguments, 
i.e. a country is willing to join an international policy regime if it feels that their security, safety and 
prosperity (or one or more of these factors) are threatened and that the coalition can improve this 
situation. The key actors in the neo-realism tradition are states and only little attention is paid to the 
behaviour and interests of individuals and private groups within countries (Cass, 2002) (Heck, et al., 
2004). 
Whereas neo-realists consider domestic interests as exogenous variables in modelling countries’ 
position taking, neo-liberalists believe that over time awareness among domestic institutions and 
interest groups of potential costs and benefits to other states may increase and influence their 
positions. The neo-liberal school sees a possibly positive impact of negotiations on the evolution of 
domestic interest groups. 
Other theoretical approaches, such as ‘social constructivism’, focus on how a national negotiation 
position is influenced by opinions, expectations, and perceptions in their domestic social context. An 
important element that constructivist theories add to the theories mentioned above is an explanation of 
how the behaviour of states may be influenced by ideational interests, next to material goals such as 
economic prosperity, safety and security. This leads to a fundamental difference with neo-realist and 
neo-liberal theories (Heck, et al., 2004): whereas neo-realists and neo-liberals consider state behaviour 
as egocentric in the sense that states take international positions to protect their own well-being, 
social-constructivists believe that also ‘soft’ elements such as political culture, history, perceptions 
regarding identity, norms, well-being of other states and population groups play an important role in 
the formulation of national and international policies by countries. For example, “one of the core 
principles of German environmental policy is the Vorzage Prinzip or the precautionary principle” 
(Cass, 2002). According to this principle, it is better to take action to prevent environmental damage, 
rather than to wait until the damage occurs and to take measures then (UNFCCC, 1992a). Therefore, 
as also explained in Chapter 1 and Figure 1-3, the precautionary principle is both aimed at preventing 
damage and saving adaptation costs, even when the projections of environmental damage are 
surrounded by uncertainties. 
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In the view of social constructivists, collective mental constructions such as ideologies, countries’ 
perceptions with respect to cooperative and non-cooperative international players, and countries’ self-
esteem are also important elements to take into consideration when explaining the position taken by 
countries in international cooperation contexts, next to economic well-being, safety and security. In this 
respect, also country private and public actors’ experience with policy concepts can become a factor in 
formulating a country’s policy position. For example, in the USA, there has been a decade’s long tradition 
of emissions trading schemes whereby polluters face emission quota (maximum amount of allowable 
pollution) but which also enable trading of quota surpluses and deficits among polluters. At negotiation 
sessions on the Kyoto Protocol during 1995-1997, US negotiators repetitively argued in favour of 
international emissions trading as a policy tool to increase the cost-effectiveness of an international GHG 
abatement policy. Several EU Member States, such as Germany and the Netherlands, referring to their 
domestic experience, focussed more on voluntary agreements with industries, which allowed polluting 
companies sufficient freedom to achieve energy efficiency improvements and GHG emissions reduction 
targets in their own way. Only in 2002, the European Commission started to adopt emissions trading as a 
key tool to achieve EU Kyoto Protocol targets. 
Next to theoretical insights on motivations for countries to take negotiation positions (absolute versus 
relative gains and whether and how a negotiation position is based on opinion, expectations, ideals and 
perceptions in the country context), other theories also offer insights on how a negotiation position can 
be formed through a country’s institutional characteristics. According to ‘material and institutional 
liberalism’ theories, the central actors in society are individuals and private groups that rationally 
pursue their private interests, which are subsequently reflected in the policy making at the level of the 
state (Cass, 2002). An important aspect in this process is how micro-level interests eventually 
culminate into a national policy. For instance, if from a macro perspective a certain national policy 
position were optimal, there may still be individual interest groups that wish to prevent the position if 
it would be harmful for them. 
The extent to which these groups are able to do so depends on a number of institutional issues. For 
example, the election system with proportional parliamentary representation provided a larger scope 
for the German environmental party, the ‘Grünnen’, than the UK and US district election systems did 
(Cass, 2002, p. 10). The latter systems tend to provide scope for larger ‘catch all’ parties which 
consider environmental protection as one of the several items on their political agenda. Moreover, the 
division of power between the Parliament and the cabinet of ministers or the President of a country 
could be an important factor for the formulation of the eventual negotiation position. It is noted that 
‘material and institutional liberalism’ theories pay less attention to the possible effects of a country’s 
position on other states (similar to ‘neo liberalism’ as discussed above). 
From the above description of categories of theories it can be concluded that the position of countries in 
international debates and negotiations can be influenced by a range of factors, for which each country may 
have different weights. It is outside the scope of this study to analyse in detail how national procedures 
culminate in country positions at international climate negotiations, but for a good understanding of how 
climate negotiations develop it is useful to take into consideration how and why domestic decision-
making institutions and procedures influence the positions of countries at international negotiations. 





what extent negotiations on a global climate regime are influenced by the following key elements, derived 
from the categories of theories described in this section: 
 National cost-benefit analysis – To what extent do countries make national cost-benefit analyses in a 
narrow sense by balancing present and future costs and economic benefits using market discount 
factors (‘narrow’ in this context implies that only costs and benefits to the country itself are taken into 
account)? In case the benefits are larger than the costs of joining a regime, a country may have a 
strong incentive to join. 
 Cost-benefit analysis by interest groups – Do particular interest groups within a country dominate 
the international negotiation position of the country? In this context, it is the cost-benefit analysis of 
the interest group that determines the national negotiation position. 
 Domestic institutional structures – To what extent is the negotiation position on environmental 
issues stimulated or hampered by domestic institutional structures, e.g., election system, division of 
power between Parliament and President and/or Cabinet of Ministers, justification of policy to 
domestic judiciaries? 
 International context – What is the influence of international norms, opinions, expectations and 
perceptions on the position taken by a country at international negotiations? 
 National principles and concepts – To what extent do countries aim at promoting domestically 
preferred policy principles and concepts at international negotiations, e.g., precautionary principle, 
market-based instruments, voluntary agreements, or command-and-control measures? 
In conclusion, determining which ‘share’ of the surplus from a climate regime countries would need 
for joining the regime is not at all straightforward and differs across countries. As explained in this 
section, some countries may let their participation in a climate coalition depend on a cost-benefit 
analysis in a narrow sense by balancing present and future costs and economic benefits using market 
discount factors. Other countries may use a broader assessment by also taking into consideration the 
damage from climate change that may occur to other countries or to ecosystems in terms of loss of 
biodiversity. Countries may base their positions on what other countries do (including perceptions), or 
what they believe that other countries expect them to do. Countries could also place the issue of 
climate change in the context of other international issues and aim at ‘package deals’ and/or realise 
that the position taken in the climate debate may have an impact on their benefits under other 
international treaties and agreements. Finally, countries could use international negotiations as an 
opportunity to emphasise their national identity or image, e.g., as a country with a long tradition in 
underlining international solidarity or, on the contrary, as a country that has the power to follow an 
independent course of action. 
 
2.4.2. Particular facilitating negotiation factors for effective climate policy making 
In addition to the context in which negotiations take place (win-win or win-lose) and the extent to 
which national, domestic interests and priorities are reflected in negotiation positions, negotiations and 
their eventual outcomes also depend on several factors that are related to the circumstances under 
which negotiations take place, the personality of the negotiators, whether the negotiation is a stand-
alone process or a step in an on-going process, whether all negotiators have clear upfront targets, etc. 
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These tactical factors are briefly described below and illustrated with anecdotes taken from past 
climate change negotiation sessions.  
Upfront negotiation target 
According to (Wertheim, n.d.), “too many negotiations fail because people are so worried about being 
taken advantage of that they forget their needs.” This could make parties decide to break off or 
complicate negotiations, even if a reasonable deal is about to be closed, because they are reluctant to 
accept any deal due to their fear that they will be taken advantage of and lose. Such situations could be 
prevented if negotiators clearly explore a priori what would be a fair and reasonable deal and what 
would be minimally acceptable (Fisher & Ury, 2011). 
The negotiations at the COP-6 meeting in The Hague (November 2000), described in Chapter 5, 
provide some anecdotic evidence of such a situation. After two weeks of intense negotiations, COP-6 
President Pronk presented his so-called President’s Note which contained compromises on all the 
crunch issues that had remained on the agenda. This Note brought the negotiations close to an end and 
when US negotiator Loy and UK Minister Prescott proposed a final agreement on the hottest issue 
(carbon sequestration in agricultural soils), which addressed the concerns of the EU on this issue, the 
COP meeting was about to be closed successfully. However, at the last minute, the EU rejected the 
deal in the person of its main negotiator, French Minister Dominique Voyner, because she was not 
convinced about the environmental integrity of the US-UK proposal. According to Mr Prescott, Ms 
Voyner “got cold feet. She was exhausted and tired and could not understand the detail” (Oakley, 
2001). 
The extent to which people/countries are separated from issues 
In the view of (Fisher & Ury, 2011), negotiations should be on issues and best take place in a rational, 
goal-oriented frame of mind. It is therefore critical to separate people or countries from the issues 
during negotiations. Parties that exchange person/country-oriented, emotional arguments run a 
considerable risk that the real issues are overlooked (Wertheim, n.d., p. 4). In the context of climate 
negotiations, during 1991-1995, negotiations were largely focussed on distrust among groups of 
countries with respect to each other’s willingness to effectively tackle climate change. For instance, 
developing countries repeatedly held industrialised countries responsible for the global warming issue 
and felt reluctant to allow Annex I Parties to comply with their GHG emission reduction commitments 
through low-cost JI projects abroad. Instead, developing countries insisted on industrialised countries 
taking significant abatement action domestically. This attitude created an atmosphere, as explained in 
Chapter 3, with irritation among some industrialised countries and with a threat by the USA to boycott 
UNCED. 
Mandates for negotiators given by their governments 
Mandates for negotiators given by their governments, which formulate their scope of manoeuvre, 
could create considerable barriers during negotiations, especially if the mandate of one negotiator is in 
conflict with that/those of other negotiators. In such cases, negotiators can decide to move on and try 





considerable experience of the negotiators. After all, if the negotiation outcome differs largely from 
the mandate, there may be little chance that the national policy institutions (government, parliament) 
will approve it. This is an issue that negotiators should keep in mind during the sessions. If they only 
focus on their own mandate and insufficiently care about the extent to which the mandates of other 
negotiators are taken into consideration, they may win the negotiations but eventually lose the treaty, 
because the other countries will not ratify the outcome. 
Overstepping mandates does not always have to be a problem as long as the negotiators have valid 
arguments to explain ‘back home’ how this happened. A reason for overstepping is often that the 
mandates are generally based on estimates of what negotiations may look like. At negotiations, the 
position of countries can change, conflicting proposals creatively combined, and new, unexpected  
proposals tabled. What is important in the end is that negotiators are able to judge whether the 
proposed negotiation outcome package is acceptable for the countries they represent. 
For example, the US negotiators at Kyoto (1997) clearly made a wrong judgement when they believed 
that the Kyoto Protocol package with emissions trading among industrialised countries and CDM 
cooperation with developing countries weighed sufficiently against the 7% emission reduction target 
for the USA without corresponding commitments for key developing countries. This package largely 
deviated from the negotiation mandate given by the administration (e.g., Byrd-Hagel resolution of 
1997). On the other hand, the Brazilian negotiators rightly concluded that the establishment of the 
CDM would eventually have the same outcome in terms of supporting sustainable development in 
non-Annex I countries as the clean development fund based on sanctions as initially proposed by the 
Government of Brazil (Matsuo, 2003). The outcome of the CDM as a market mechanism under the 
Kyoto Protocol could thus be considered to remain within the mandate of the Brazilian negotiators. 
Impact of groups other than official negotiators  
Country delegations at climate negotiation sessions consist on average of between five and ten 
members, which implies that at each session in total between 1000 and 2000 country delegates 
negotiate on a climate regime (Depledge, 2004). Nevertheless, the sessions are generally attended by 
many more people: in the order of magnitude of 4,000 to over 10,000; next to official negotiators also 
several other organisations are admitted to the sessions, such as: non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in the areas of environmental protection, business and industry, research, and religious 
groups, local governments, indigenous people, as well as media representatives. Many of these groups 
consider the sessions as a dynamic meeting point for information exchange, whereas others try to 
lobby for their particular interests with negotiators. 
Their influence on negotiations is generally difficult to identify and depends on which issue is at stake. 
Although the influence of NGOs on climate negotiations during the sessions seems fairly limited 
(Arts, 1998), business lobbies and environmental organisations may have an influence on the 
preparations of countries’ negotiation positions and mandates during the months preceding the climate 
negotiations. 
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Set up of the negotiation session 
Negotiations are often more effective if they take place in smaller working groups per topic instead of 
in large plenary sessions (see also Section 2.3.2). The small groups consist of issue specialists and 
communication can be less formal and more direct than in a plenary. At COP sessions, negotiations 
largely take place in technical working groups with specialists from a number of country delegations. 
The working groups are always established with a balanced representation from Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. These groups prepare negotiation texts for presentation to and approval by the COP 
plenary. 
Time pressure and exhaustion 
Regularly, international negotiations between countries (e.g., under the UN or WTO) are characterised 
by negotiations around the clock on the last day of the session. In this final phase, working groups 
draft decision texts on particular issues, ministers or other high-level country delegates negotiate 
outstanding issues, ‘friends of the President’ groups are formed to facilitate more informal talks, etc. 
Lack of time to complete negotiations could lead to unexpected outcomes where Parties suddenly give 
in because they do not want to be blamed for the failure of the negotiations. Or, on the contrary, a lack 
of time could make Parties reluctant to accept a proposed deal, which would in principle meet the 
conditions for a win-win case, simply because negotiators have insufficient time to carefully judge the 
proposal. The climate talks have shown examples of both effects: the Kyoto 1997 talks were under a 
time pressure, because several exhausted delegates had to catch their planes (especially delegates from 
developing countries who often had cheap, fixed tickets (Depledge, 2004, p. 24)) and, although not all 
legal texts had been discussed in a plenary meeting, the protocol text was adopted; the COP-6 talks 
failed in November 2000, because the EU negotiator was not convinced that the last-minute proposal 
for a deal adequately covered the EU concerns (see above). 
Another problem that may arise in this phase is that exhaustion of delegates particularly affects 
relatively small delegations (e.g., of some developing countries). Negotiators from small delegations 
must often follow the round the clock schedule, whereas delegates from the larger delegations are 
regularly replaced by ‘fresh’ colleagues. This unbalance could have an impact in two directions: either 
exhausted delegates agree on texts that they would otherwise not have agreed on, or they refuse to 
agree on draft decisions simply because they have lost view on the consequences of the text. One 
option for smaller delegations is to collaborate within larger negotiation groups, as described in Box 
2-1. 
Location of the negotiations 
Hosting a negotiation session is prestigious and the host will do whatever it can to make the session a 
success so that the agreement can be named after the city where the session was held (e.g., Berlin 
Mandate, Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Bonn Agreement, Marrakech Accords, Bali 
Plan of Action, Cancun Agreement, Durban Platform, Doha Climate Gateway). This could affect the 





Kyoto, the Japanese government was willing to accept relatively strict emission reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, in an effort to show the right example. 
Availability of documents 
All official documents (i.e. reports, negotiation texts, etc. prepared by the official secretariat of the 
UNFCCC) to be discussed at UN negotiation sessions need to be made available at least six weeks 
before the session in the six official UN languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish. In practice, however, this rule is difficult to comply with as compiling official texts and 
translating these into the six language is a time-consuming process (several tens of official documents 
are submitted to negotiations). Not rarely, texts become only available at the meeting itself and only in 
English, which makes negotiations on these texts more difficult for non-English speaking (or even 
non-native English speaking) negotiators. This could delay negotiations as delegates at COP 
negotiations could refuse to continue negotiating without the availability of a text in their own UN 
language (which actually happened in the past). 
Personalities of the key negotiators 
Finally, for their success negotiations strongly rely on confidence in negotiators’ intentions to come to 
a successful closure of the sessions. The personality of the key negotiators plays an important role in 
this respect. When US Vice-President Al Gore came to Kyoto to address COP-3, he offered more 
flexibility from the side of the USA during in the remainder of the COP session. He effectively 
stepped over the Byrd-Hagel resolution ‘mandate’ and allowed the US negotiators to accept emission 
reduction commitments, even if key developing countries would not accept commitments. This 
facilitated negotiations during the second week of the COP after a very disappointing first week. 
Another example is the role of the chairperson of the COP-3 working group on a Protocol text, Mr 
Raul Estrada from Argentina. He cleverly merged the US proposal to establish project-based 
emissions trading between industrialised and developing countries with the Brazilian idea to establish 
a Clean Development Fund, which would collect penalties from industrialised countries that would not 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol commitments, and use this money to invest in sustainable 
development projects in developing countries (Matsuo, 2003). Estrada took the sustainable 
development objective of the Brazilian idea as a starting point but proposed that industrialised 
countries immediately invest in such projects for which they would receive GHG emission reduction 
credits in return, instead of waiting for penalties to become available after 2012. Estrada thus kept the 
project-based emissions trading idea (which developing countries had generally opposed) alive by 
ensuring that its main objective would be sustainable development for developing countries. This 
combination was acceptable for Annex I countries and difficult to be rejected by non-Annex I 
countries as it was mainly based on an idea put forward by a developing country, Brazil. 
Information availability 
Section 2.2 has shown cases where a prisoners’ dilemma situation could emerge due to a lack of 
communication between players or the absence of an overarching authority to guide players to the 
aggregate optimum: the outcomes may be optimal from the viewpoint of each individual player (given 
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his options and available information), but sub-optimal from an overall, aggregate perspective. 
Communication among the players via an overarching authority, through bargaining concepts or 
through external sources, such as newsletter, policy briefs, books, workshops and conferences, could 
subsequently help achieve a better aggregate outcome. In the context of climate change policy such 
communication would for instance enhance the common knowledge of the players of the benefits and 
costs related to cooperation in a climate policy regime, which could create opportunities to jointly 
carry out GHG abatement action that countries would not have carried out on their own. 
 
2.5. Method for Analysis 
 
In this chapter, the three basic conditions identified in Chapter 1 as minimally required for successful 
international climate policy negotiations have been further elaborated on, based on a literature review. 
From literature on game theory, factors have been identified that determine the design (i.e. size and 
structure) of an international coalition, such as for climate policy making (basic condition 1). It has 
been concluded that formal negotiations on international agreements, such as under the auspices of the 
UN, are characterised by the absence of an overarching authority to enforce compliance with the 
agreed objectives and targets. It has been explained how incentives for compliance should preferably 
come from within the agreement in the form of political goodwill from cooperation, compensating 
financial and technology transfers, and cost-effective mechanisms to reduce compliance costs (e.g., 
emissions trading). Such incentives not only enable the creation of a sufficiently large climate policy 
coalition to address free riding, consider climate change as ‘tragedy of the commons’ and treat climate 
policy making as a public good, but also keep the coalition stable during its operationalisation. An 
important aspect of negotiations, in order to establish a stable coalition, is that an acceptable allocation 
of commitments and surpluses is sought across the participating parties and that institutional structures 
are adequate for monitoring the compliance with agreed commitments. Different approaches can be 
used for that, such as dividing an overall climate goal across countries or a bottom up assessment of 
how climate measures fit within country needs. 
Insights on the process of negotiations (basic condition 2) have been generated from literature sources 
on ‘integrative’ versus ‘distributive’ negotiation process context and it has been examined to what 
extent climate negotiations would fall in either category, or in both with development from one 
process category to the other as a result of repetitive negotiation rounds. The chapter has also 
described what the official climate regime negotiation process looks like, with a central role for the 
COP. Not all negotiations necessarily take place at the level of the COP. The COP often formulates 
general principles, modalities and procedures for particular issues and gives specialised bodies, with a 
balanced geographical (and political) representation, the task to focus on the details of each issue. As 
will be shown elsewhere in this study, also at this lower level, negotiations could be politically 
sensitive with conclusions based on political compromises. 
Finally, tactical and facilitating aspects during negotiations have been elaborated on. It has been 
discussed how country tactics can be determined by preferences of the state as a whole, preferences of 
domestic interest groups and the role of domestic institutional structures in building up a national 





can be influenced by a range of tactical and/or facilitating factors, such as whether negotiators have 
clear mandates from their governments, are influenced by (international) interest groups such as 
environmental NGOs, face time pressure to complete negotiations before a deadline, and have all 
necessary documents available in the right languages and at the right moment (basic condition 3). 
In the next chapters, it will be examined whether and how these basic conditions – as identified in 
Chapter 1 as minimally required for addressing game-theoretical aspects of climate negotiations – 
have been met during high-level negotiations on the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and, currently, a post-
Kyoto agreement (Chapters 3 and 7), as well during more technical-level negotiations on the 
modalities for the market mechanisms JI and CDM (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). For that, each negotiation 
file introduced in Chapter 1 will be described first in terms of: 
 Chronological sequence of negotiation steps within the file; 
 Characterisation of the steps made; 
 Identification of decisive negotiation aspects in terms of design, process, and tactics; and 
 Description of the final negotiation result. 
As a next step, each file will be analysed in terms of whether and how the basic conditions for success 
have been met. In order to support that analysis, using the theoretical insights gained in this chapter, 
the conditions are examined, whereby design of the agreement (related to basic condition 1) is 
analysed in terms of: 
 Scope of the policy area addressed by the policy package (e.g., mitigation, projects, accounting), 
 Principles applied in the package, such as ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, whether 
or not to allow non-additional projects in the CDM, link between GHG abatement measures with 
countries’ sustainable development priorities, 
 Main goals formulated in the packages to be achieved within a timeframe, with characterisation 
of responsibilities and procedures for monitoring and evaluation of progress towards achieving 
goals, and  
 Means for achieving the goals, such as policy instruments, compliance structures, capacity 
building and finance.  
The examination of the negotiation processes (related to basic condition 2) will focus on: 
 Organisation of meetings (frequency, political level, technical, procedural or political nature of 
meeting, etc.) and how this has contributed to successful negotiation outcomes. 
 Negotiation approach or strategy applied: e.g., formulating mandates with a longer or medium 
term goal and with formulation of intermediate milestones, negotiations in smaller working 
groups with representatives of country groups, keeping some progress steps deliberately vague so 
as to avoid sensitivities, or assuring that negotiations do not result in clear winning and losing 
groups so that next negotiation steps would be threatened. 
 How responsibilities during negotiations are defined, in terms of electing chairs, appoint work 
group leaders, which countries take the lead on which topic, etc. 
Finally, tactical aspects of negotiations (related to basic condition 3) are examined by focussing on: 
 How are scientific findings fed in the process? 
 How is the negotiation process facilitated by administrative support from the UNFCCC 
secretariat or other bodies under the Convention? 
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 What has been the impact of personalities of key persons, e.g., in accelerating negotiations or 
avoiding negotiation deadlocks? 
 How have negotiations managed to consider country differences and resulting differentiated 
negotiation perspectives? 
 How have unexpected developments during a negotiation process been dealt with, such as for 
instance the US withdrawal from the UNFCCC (as explained in Chapter 1) in 2001? 







 Chapter 3.  Negotiations on a Global Climate Policy 
- the Kyoto Protocol 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 described the negotiation process leading towards the adoption of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on 9 May 1992. As explained, the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC is to achieve a stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 9, Art. 2). 
Such a level should be achieved “within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner” (INC, 1992). 
In addition to this long-term overall objective, the guiding principles have been defined for Parties when 
taking GHG abatement measures in the context of the UNFCCC (1992a. Article 3), such as the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and the precautionary principle, which have been 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Other principles included in Article 3 are that: 
 The climate system should be protected for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind; 
 Full consideration should be given to specific needs and circumstances of developing country 
Parties; 
 Parties should promote sustainable development; and 
 Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination of or a disguised restriction of international 
trade. 
With the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle in mind, the UNFCCC distinguishes 
between Annex I Parties (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 32 - Annex I),
25
 Annex II Parties (only OECD members 
in 1992 (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 33 - Annex II)), and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries). This 
distinction is mainly based on differences between signatory Parties regarding economic welfare levels 
and allows for assigning different commitments and responsibilities to different groups of countries. In 
terms of objectives, the main differences between Annex I, Annex II and non-Annex I countries under the 
UNFCCC are: 
 Annex I Parties agreed, in 1992, to return individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of 
anthropogenic emissions of CO2 and other GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol by the 
end of the 1990s. 
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 Member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Central and Eastern 
European countries with economies in transition Note that of the formerly centrally planned countries in Central 
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addition, the former Soviet Union Republics in Central Asia have become OECD member: Kazakhstan, 





 Non-Annex I Parties, on the other hand, did not have such a quantified objective under the 
UNFCCC. 
 Annex II Parties also adopted a commitment to facilitate technological and financial transfers to 
developing countries in order to protect them against the adverse effects of possible climate 
change. 
Since 1992, in the context of the UNFCCC, a large number of policies, measures and instruments have 
been developed which generally aim at climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. With respect to 
mitigation, a specific policy measure in the UNFCCC context is to define emission limitation and 
reduction targets or objectives to be achieved by a particular year or period of time (commitment 
period). In addition, and partly in support of these quantified targets/objectives, Parties must set up 
national bookkeeping systems to make an inventory of the GHG emissions per sector and/or economic 
activity (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 23, Art. 12). Next to these bookkeeping systems, Parties also need to 
periodically inform the UNFCCC bodies about their domestic efforts to combat GHG emissions and 
enhance climate change resilience. The latter commitment also holds for developing countries. 
This chapter describes the processes of designing the structure of the UNFCCC and, in particular, that 
of its first protocol with quantified commitments agreed at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) 
in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. It discusses the main elements of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol structures 
and details the steps in the negotiation processes followed, as well as the tactical and facilitating 
aspects of the negotiations up to 1992 and from 1992 through 2005. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of how and to what extent the three basic conditions identified for this study’s research 
questions have been met for these negotiations.  
 
3.2.  Towards a Climate Convention in 1992 
 
3.2.1.  Emerging country positions during the INC negotiation process 
As explained in Chapter 1, by the end of the 1980s, a number of countries took the initiative to host 
international conferences about a global climate policy structure, such Canada (Toronto conference) and 
the Netherlands (Noordwijk conference). These conferences were held against the backdrop of upcoming 
intergovernmental negotiations on a UN Climate Convention. In 1989, UNEP and the WMO started with 
the preparations for negotiations on such a Convention. Developing countries, however, feared that if 
these two UN bodies would set up a negotiation framework, the negotiation focus might become rather 
technical, which in their view would insufficiently emphasise the vulnerable position of developing 
countries in terms of being able to adapt to climatic changes. Eventually, on 21 December 1990, the UN 
General Assembly took the initiative and decided on ‘Resolution 45/212’ (UN, 1990), which established 
an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC). It 
was scheduled that the INC would deliver a draft Convention text that would be ready for signature at the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May-June 
1992). 
The INC held five negotiation rounds during 1991-1992 under the Chairmanship of Mr Jean Ripert 
(France). In order to complete INC’s work, the discussion in the fifth and final round had to be continued 
in a resumed session. The INC negotiations resulted in a true preamble for the later negotiations in the 
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context of the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent negotiations 
leading to the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords. All UN 
members were invited to the INC sessions and almost from the outset of the negotiations the priorities of 
the negotiating countries differed widely. These differences became particularly clear in terms of 
answering the question which countries could be held responsible for past GHG emissions and how this 
responsibility could be translated into concrete actions. During the negotiations positions were also 
increasingly determined within country groups rather than by individual countries. The main groups and 
what positions they represented are briefly described below. 
G-77 & China 
First, the group of developing countries attempted to speak with a common voice in order to express the 
concerns and priorities of the ‘South’. The so-called Group of 77 and China (G-77&China) officially 
presented the common position of the developing countries by emphasising that these countries are 
relatively vulnerable to the adverse effects of possible climate change.
26
 For instance, small and low-lying 
island states and coastal areas in developing countries with a high population density would need 
assistance in order to adapt themselves to a projected rise of the sea level due to global warming. Such 
assistance would, in their view, have to take place in the form of transfers of mitigation and abatement 
technologies and financial resources. 
At the same time, developing countries were concerned about adopting absolute emission reduction or 
limitation targets, as this could hamper their socio-economic developments. They argued that they 
needed sufficient scope for an increase in their standards of living and thus should not be subjected to 
emission cuts that could produce public backlash and political impasse (PANOS, 2000). 
In addition, the G-77&China argued that industrialised countries, through their large-scale combustion of 
fossil fuels in the past, had been mainly responsible for the build-up of anthropogenic GHGs in the 
atmosphere. In the negotiations, G-77&China claimed that industrialised countries would, given this 
responsibility, have to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions through adoption of quantitative emission 
reduction or limitation targets to be achieved within a particular timeframe. Throughout INC negotiations, 
this position formed the basis for the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (see above). 
In the course of the negotiations, however, the group of developing countries slowly but surely 
fragmented, which reflected the wide spectrum of countries with diverse levels of development and 
different priorities as far as the global warming issue is concerned (Depledge, 2004). The oil producing 
and exporting countries (OPEC), for example, became increasingly reluctant to accept a Climate 
Convention with (strong) emission reduction targets for industrialised countries as this could affect OPEC 
oil exports. The small islands states, with several states directly vulnerable to sea level rise, started to 
present their own position papers under the heading of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and 
were in favour of emission reduction targets for industrialised countries which were often stricter than 
those proposed by the G-77&China. AOSIS was concerned about climate change because of the direct 
threat to them in terms of a sea level rise and a lack of resources to properly adapt to this threat. 
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 The G-77 was formed in 1964 and consisted by that time of 77 countries; nowadays, it comprises 133 
members and is active throughout the UN system (UNFCCC, 2014c). Although not a member, China usually 





Other developing countries opted for a position somewhere in the middle of OPEC and AOSIS. They 
underscored the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, but chose positions that were in 
between of those of the other two groups. Countries like China and India belonged to this ‘middle’ group. 
OECD industrialised countries 
A second category of countries consisted of members of the OECD. This group of industrialised 
countries did not speak with a common voice as they strongly differed with respect to their readiness 
to commit to GHG emission reduction targets. The European Community, for example, at the Second 
World Climate Conference (Geneva, November 1990), proposed that industrialised countries stabilise 
their CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Bodansky, 2001). This proposal, which the EU 
subsequently submitted to the INC negotiation process, was met with huge resistance from particularly 
the USA, which strongly opposed any binding quantitative target to be achieved within the short or 
medium term. Other countries, such as Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia were not as 
outspokenly restrictive as the USA, but did not support the European Community proposal for a 
quantitative target, either. 
The USA was a strong opponent to binding commitments in the early 1990s and even threatened to 
stay away from the UNCED meeting if other countries (especially the EU and the G-77&China) 
would pursue such commitments (Shah, 2012). Domestic interests played an important role in this 
respect (see Chapter 2). The US economy strongly relied (and relies) on fossil fuels and, being a large 
producer of oil and coal, the USA had (has) a comparative advantage in fossil fuel-intensive products. 
Moreover, the US powerful fossil fuel based business lobby was able to affect government decisions 
and positions on climate change policy (Shah, 2012). 
Also individual EU Member States and their business communities expressed concerns about the 
impact of a global climate treaty with binding commitments on their competitiveness. In that sense, 
EU Member States did not differ from other industrialised countries in the OECD, where a growing 
awareness among the population of environmental issues went together with economic concerns 
(Shah, 2012), especially if a global treaty would not involve commitments for developing countries.  
Central and Eastern Europe 
The former socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe formed a third category of countries. These 
countries had just started a process of transition from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy, but 
were, given their industrial tradition, considered industrialised countries within the INC context. For them, 
the discussions on targets were not as sensitive as for most of their OECD colleagues because the 
disintegration of the centrally led regimes in these countries had sharply reduced GHG emissions since 
1989/1990. In addition, during the INC negotiations, Central and Eastern European countries were 
provided with some flexibility as far as the choice of the base year and reporting commitments were 
concerned. Therefore, a GHG stabilisation target at, say, 1990 levels would probably hardly affect their 
economic transition process because during the 1990s the actual emission levels in Central and Eastern 
Europe were generally well below 1990 levels (European Environment Agency, n.d.) As a result, the 
Central and Eastern European countries, though active at INC sessions, did not have a crucial and decisive 
influence on the negotiations. 




3.2.2.  Towards agreement on the UNFCCC 
The above-mentioned differences in points of view between countries or groups of countries still had to 
crystallise when the first INC session (INC-1) was held in Chantilly (USA) in February 1991 (INC, 
1991a). Negotiations were slow and often characterised by an extensive discussion on procedural 
matters.
27
 INC-3 (Nairobi, Kenya, September 1991 (INC, 1991b)) to a certain extent managed to deal with 
the contents of the future Convention, although progress remained slow. The main issue of discussion was 
the extent to which industrialised countries would agree on an emission reduction target
28
 and a timetable 
for this to be achieved. As discussed in Chapter 1, this file therefore formed a clear example of a 
negotiation process without an upfront GHG emission reduction goal, but where the target was subject of 
negotiations itself (see Figure 1-3). Another crunch issue was the extent to which industrialised countries 
would be willing to transfer adequate and additional funding to developing countries under the Climate 
Convention. The latter issue was crucial for developing countries’ support for the Convention to be 
established (see also above). 
The fragmentation of the G-77&China became apparent at INC-4 (Geneva, December 1991) (INC, 
1991c). For the first time at INC, a distinction could be made between the positions of the OPEC, AOSIS 
and ‘middle position countries’ like India and China (Arts, 1998, p. 105). 
The little progress made at INC-1 through INC-4 required the delegates to meet twice, instead of once 
more before UNCED. INC-5 was therefore held in two sessions which were both characterised by tough 
negotiations on binding targets and timetables, and on technology and financial transfers (INC, 1992). 
One group of industrialised countries (led by the USA) totally opposed binding targets and timetables, 
whereas the European Community, for example, remained in favour of a target to stabilise industrialised 
countries’ GHG emissions by a certain point in time in the future at the level of a chosen base year. 
At the resumed fifth session of INC (New York, May 1992) (INC, 1992), countries found a compromise 
on a text for the Convention. This text reflected the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
because it contained an objective for industrialised countries to return their GHG levels to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000 (or another base year for countries with economies in transition), whereas for developing 
countries no such objective was included (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 12, Art. 4.2(a)). The status of this 
‘objective’ was rather ambiguous though, because it was not formulated as a legally binding target and the 
text did not refer to an instrument to deal with non-compliance. The objective was rather a formal 
recognition that a stabilisation of GHG emissions would contribute to achieving the overarching 
objective of stabilising GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at safe levels. The INC-1-5 negotiations 
had made clear that a non-legally binding stabilisation objective was, for the time being, the most 
feasible quantitative target for the UNFCCC. This compromise, including an agreement on the issue of 
financial transfers to developing countries, was submitted by the INC to UNCED as a draft text for the 
UNFCCC (INC, 1992). 
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 For example, discussions at the INC-2 (Geneva, July 1991) (INC, 1991d) were extremely delayed because the 
delegates could not agree on who would chair the working groups established by INC-1. One working group was 
to focus on the contents of a future climate convention and the second working group's focus was on legal and 
institutional matters. 
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 For example, there were discussions on whether a target would have to be set, or perhaps whether an objective 
would be politically feasible. Furthermore, views differed on whether to focus on emission reductions or 





The UNFCCC was adopted at UNCED, on 9 May 1992, and it entered into force on 21 March 1994, 90 
days after deposit of the 50
th
 instrument of ratification (Portugal, 21 December 1993) (UNFCCC, 1992b). 
 
3.2.3.  Balancing between effectiveness and international participation in the UNFCCC  
As concluded earlier in this study, the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC needed to balance the aim 
of creating an environmentally effective treaty on the one hand, and acquiring as much support from 
countries as reasonably possible, on the other hand, given the global nature of the climate change 
issue. However, as explained in Chapter 2, a global climate treaty faces compliance problems since 
there is no overarching authority to enforce compliance with internationally agreed goals or 
commitments. Therefore, the challenge of negotiations is to establish an international climate coalition 
which creates sufficient surpluses, in order to make it more attractive for countries to become/remain 
part of the coalition than to stay outside/to leave it. Consequently, a global climate treaty must balance 
between strictness and international country participation. 
This chapter explores, in analysing whether and how the three basic conditions for negotiations were 
met, how this balancing took place during negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the 
subsequent agreement and accords that were concluded between 1997 and 2001 on modalities and 
procedures for Protocol implementation. The Kyoto Protocol has been a first concrete step to define in 
more detail what was actually meant by ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Negotiations 
between 1995 and 1997 again centred on questions related to quantified targets (for which countries? 
and how strict?) and the potential role for Joint Implementation (JI) as an instrument for countries to 
fulfil their commitments jointly with other countries in a cost-saving manner. Generally, developing 
countries stressed that accepting GHG emission limitation targets would be unacceptable to them 
given that this would hamper their economic growth and would insufficiently reflect the fact that 
industrialised countries since the industrial revolution have emitted most GHGs into the atmosphere. 
Furthermore, developing countries disliked the idea of using JI as they were concerned that through JI 
projects industrialised countries would postpone relatively costly domestic energy production and 
consumption reforms. 
However, a limitation of the use of JI would imply higher GHG abatement costs for industrialised 
countries, which would make them less willing to adopt strict emission reduction targets. Hence, 
immediately after the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-1, Berlin, 1995) had 
decided to start Protocol negotiations, the earlier tensions became visible again, which is analysed 
elsewhere in this Chapter. As a prologue to that analysis, the question will be discussed below to what 
extent the UNFCCC – with 195 ratifying countries, but without legally binding commitments – can be 
considered reasonably effective. It should be noted, however, that an analysis on the effectiveness of 
the UNFCCC must be interpreted with care because, as explained above, the UNFCCC was the first 
global climate change policy treaty of its kind under the auspices of the UN when scientific evidence 
of the relation between anthropogenic GHG emissions and global warming was still limited. Since the 
adoption of the UNFCCC, scientific knowledge has been increased through, among other sources, 
three IPCC Assessment Reports (by the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 the IPCC had just 
completed its First Assessment Report (Houghton, et al., 1990)). The conclusion of the Second 
Assessment Report of IPCC in 1995 for the first time stated that “there is a discernible human 
influence on the climate systems” (IPCC, 1995). This conclusion offered policy makers a more 
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specific input on human-induced climate change during climate regime negotiations in the second half 
of the 1990s. Nonetheless, this did not imply that negotiators could rely on a clear upfront GHG 
emission reduction target to be achieved within the context of the precautionary principle (see 
discussion in Chapter 1 around Figure 1-3). As a result, the overall goal to be achieved by a negotiated 
package became a negotiation topic in itself. 
In the particular case of the UNFCCC it is obvious that the objective of global participation was 
achieved as the Convention was adopted at UNCED (1992) by consensus and has been ratified since 
then by 195 countries (194 countries and the EU) (UNFCCC, 1992b). To what extent the UNFCCC 
has established an effective climate regime, in terms of reducing or limiting GHG emissions on a 
global scale, is explored below: 
 The UNFCCC contains a long-term objective to stabilise GHG concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. This 
objective, however, was not further defined in terms of the concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. At best it placed an important question on scientific and political agendas: beyond 
which atmospheric GHG concentration levels will ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ take place? The UNFCCC also included a short-term objective for industrialised 
countries to stabilise their emissions by the year 2000 on 1990 levels. In the UNFCCC, however, 
there was no link between these two objectives in terms of the extent to which the short-term 
emissions stabilisation would contribute to achieving the long-term atmospheric concentration 
stabilisation objective. Rather, as explained in Section 3.2.2, it could be concluded that the short-
term stabilisation objective for industrialised countries was the result of a political process of 
finding a compromise between the desire of, among others, the AOSIS and the EU to have 
binding limitation targets for industrialised countries with clear timetables and the opposition to 
such targets from mainly the USA. 
 The short-term stabilisation objective of the UNFCCC was absolute: it was not related to the 
economic performance or demographic developments within countries. It was common in the 
sense that it applied to all industrialised (Annex I) countries in the same manner, but 
differentiated in the sense that developing countries were exempted from such an objective. Next 
to the quantified GHG stabilisation objective, the UNFCCC included commitments in terms of: 
facilitating technological and financial transfers from industrialised countries to developing 
countries, developing national inventories of GHG emissions by sources (all countries), and 
promoting scientific, educational, training and public awareness initiatives (all countries). 
 An important element in the UNFCCC was the inclusion of JI as a market-based instrument. As 
such, the UNFCCC provided ample scope for achieving cost-effectiveness of abatement actions 
by accepting a market-based instrument in the set of policies and measures. However, the 
decision at COP-1 in 1995 to establish a pilot programme for JI, called Activities Implemented 
Jointly (AIJ), without the possibility of crediting the emission reductions achieved under AIJ 
against countries’ UNFCCC commitments, made this market-based instrument non-effective for 
the time being (see Chapter 4). 
 As a consequence of this political game, the best achievable outcome for the UNFCCC was a 
non-binding target or objective for the short term (year 2000). Therefore, meeting the UNFCCC 
objectives was largely based on the voluntary actions and, related to that, the economic 





Central and Eastern Europe, compliance with the UNFCCC stabilisation objective for the year 
2000 was no problem as they showed a strong decrease in emissions due to the disintegration of 
their centrally planned economies. In many OECD countries, however, GHG emission levels 
continued to grow during the 1990s due to their economic growth (see Figure 1-1). This made 
their efforts to return emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 difficult, especially without an 
effective use of JI.
29
 Compliance with the non-quantitative commitments of the UNFCCC was 
easier for all countries, and this was enhanced when the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 made the 
participation of countries in emissions trading and emissions trading projects (such as JI) 
conditional on, among others, the submission of national communications on climate policies and 
national inventories of GHG emission sources. 
 In the design of the UNFCCC it was assured that the treaty would be compatible with other 
treaties. For example, in its formulation of the stabilisation objective between 1990 and 2000, the 
UNFCCC text explicitly stated that the stabilisation target does not apply to GHGs already 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Thus, reductions under the Montreal Protocol could not be 
counted under the UNFCCC. With respect to compatibility of the UNFCCC with domestic 
policies, countries had a fairly large scope of flexibility in making climate measures compatible 
with already existing national policies. Finally, the UNFCCC explicitly stated that countries 
should not use climate change measures as a disguised restriction of international trade 
(UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 9-10). 
 The eventual outcome of the INC negotiations on the UNFCCC was strongly based on equity 
considerations. As explained above in the previous sections, developing countries successfully 
pointed at their disadvantageous position in terms of socio-economic welfare and the fact that 
industrialised countries in the past had released most of the anthropogenic GHGs into the 
atmosphere. Based on their ‘ability to pay’ and ‘larger responsibility’, industrialised countries 
were expected to take the lead. 
In conclusion, the agreement in 1992 on the UNFCCC without specifying legally binding quantitative 
commitments for countries and without a compliance regime towards the year 2000 had a low 
effectiveness. In line with the analysis in Chapter 2, the 1992 agreement left considerable scope for 
‘free riding’ and it hardly created incentives for countries to carry out additional efforts to bring GHG 
emissions back to 1990 levels. The benefits from such efforts (‘share of the surplus’) were mainly 
goodwill (e.g., progressive action and a green image) and to some extent establishing and/or 
enhancing cooperation between countries on promoting sustainable development and energy 
efficiency improvement.
30
 However, compliance with the UNFCCC objectives did not guarantee a 
favourable treatment during future negotiation rounds (e.g., Kyoto 1997), nor did over-compliance 
offer banking opportunities against future commitments. 
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 Of the 1992 OECD countries, only Germany (due to the unification of the BRD and DDR), Luxembourg, and 
the UK (due to the reform of its electricity production in the early 1990s, which implied a large-scale conversion 
from coal-firing to less carbon intensive fuels) met the UNFCCC stabilisation target in 2000. This conclusion is 
based on an analysis of National Communications by Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2014e). 
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 For instance, the Netherlands Government gave its bilateral energy co-operation programme with countries 
with economies in transition (‘Programma Samenwerking Oost-Europa, PSO, established in the early 1990s) a 
considerable climate change dimension by underlining the GHG abatement potential of PSO energy efficiency 
and conservation projects. Another example can be found in the range of bilateral sustainable development 
agreements that the Clinton Administration signed with the countries in the Central Americas during 1993-1995 
as part of the US Climate Action Plan of 1993. 
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In this respect, it can be concluded that in the process of establishing the UNFCCC basic condition 1 
(design of agreement) was not met; the final outcome was quite far away from what would be 
considered an environmentally effective agreement. Although it showed increasing recognition among 
Parties that the danger of human-induced climate change is real
31
 and that industrialised countries 
should take the lead in solving the problem (‘common but differentiated responsibilities’), the absence 
of binding commitments, clear timetables for further action, and emissions trading made the UNFCCC 
far from effective during the 1990-2000 decade. The negotiation power of industrialised countries 
such as the USA versus the group-wise negotiation positions of developing countries and Europe 
created a situation in which achieving the objective of global participation and cooperation was only 
feasible if the Convention text itself was watered down to a relatively weak treaty (in terms of Figure 
1-3, the distance between A and D was rather large). Just before a prestigious summit as UNCED 
(1992), countries realised that it was better to have a weak climate treaty than no treaty at all. 
Basic condition 2 was met in the sense that the process had the flexibility to accelerate negotiations 
shortly before the UNCED summit. However, it also became clear that the two-year negotiation period 
1991-1992 was rather short for proving enabling conditions for meeting basic condition 1. The 
adoption of, e.g., the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and taking precautionary 
actions, as well as handling of the stabilisation objectives for industrialised countries without legally-
binding status showed that at some negotiation stages there had been decisive tactical manoeuvres, 
which enabled reaching an agreement (meeting basic condition 3). 
 
3.3.  The Negotiation Process leading to the Kyoto Protocol 
 
3.3.1.  The Berlin Mandate 
Within the context of the UNFCCC, countries met in 1995 in Berlin at COP-1 to elaborate in further 
detail the Convention’s objectives, policies and measures framework, and institutional setting (e.g., 
facilitating technology transfers to developing countries, designing of compliance regime, etc.).
32
 A 
key task of COP-1 was, in accordance with UNFCCC Article 4.2(d), that the COP should, at its first 
session, review the adequacy of commitments for Annex I Parties as formulated in Articles 4.2(a) and 
(b): to adopt national policies and corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change; and to 
return GHG emission levels to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
33
 An important instrument for this review 
was the obligation of Parties to submit to the COP a national inventory of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions, including the policies and measures adopted and their estimated effect on emission levels 
(hereafter: ‘national communications’, UNFCCC, Article 12). By the time the eleventh session of INC 
was held (6-7 February 1995, New York) (INC, 1995a), 15 Annex I countries (together representing 
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 This aspect can be pointed out as a success of the UNFCCC as in the early 1990s a huge amount of scepticism 
existed on whether human action could really affect the climate. Some scientists argued that global warming 
could also be the consequence of natural millennium-type cycles in the change of the climate (Shah, 2012). 
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 COP-1 was held one year after the entry-into-force of the UNFCCC, which took place in March 1994; 
between UNCED (1992) and COP-1 (1995) Parties continued negotiations in the context of the INC (see also 
Chapter 4). 
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 The COP itself was established under the UNFCCC in Article 7 as the supreme body of the Convention with, 





41% of global GHG emissions) had submitted their national communications based on which the INC 
made a first assessment of the adequacy of commitments. 
The discussions at INC-11 took place in the context of the preparations for COP-1, which was 
scheduled for a month later. The UNFCCC secretariat had prepared an assessment of the national 
communications received and concluded that CO2 accounted for 75% of the reported emissions (INC, 
1995b) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995a). Nine Parties projected an increase in CO2 emissions 
between 1990 and 2000, six Parties expected that their CO2 emissions would either have stabilised or 
decreased by 2000 or 2005. Based on this assessment and in the light of the expected conclusions of 
the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report of 1995 (IPCC, 1995), Parties agreed at INC-11 that the 
stabilisation targets for Annex I Parties as agreed under the UNFCCC in May 1992 were inadequate. 
Parties disagreed, however, on the next step to be taken by the COP (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
1995a). Several Annex I Parties, particularly Germany and the USA, proposed that COP-1 would 
formulate new aims for a global climate policy for the post-2000 period, for instance via a protocol or 
other legal instrument. Developing countries, however, said that negotiations on new aims and legal 
instruments for the post-2000 period should not lead to a diversion of attention away from Annex I 
Parties’ stabilisation objective prior to 2000. Moreover, developing countries feared that a debate on 
new commitments could put pressure on them to also agree with emission reduction or limitation 
commitments. This concern was particularly raised in reaction to the German ‘elements paper’, which 
was circulated at INC-11 and which suggested formulating differentiated commitments for some 
groups of developing countries.
34
 Consequently, while agreeing on the inadequacy of commitments, 
non-Annex I Parties stressed at INC-11 that post-2000 negotiations should not focus on commitments 
for developing countries (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995a). 
At COP-1 (Berlin, Germany, 24 March-6 April 1995), non-Annex I Parties repeated these concerns. In 
the course of the two-week negotiations, Parties slowly moved towards a compromise on a mandate to 
establish a protocol or other legal instrument for post-2000 commitments, based on the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. Several Parties tabled proposals for a protocol, which 
varied from proposing the ‘Toronto target’ (see Chapter 1) by the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) to New Zealand’s proposal that, next to industrialised countries, also developing countries 
with relatively high GHG emissions should adopt emission reduction goals in a protocol. Eventually, a 
‘Friends of the Chair’ group with 24 Party representatives prepared the final text that was agreed upon 
by the COP-1 and which was referred to in the COP Decision as the ‘Berlin Mandate’ (UNFCCC, 
1995a) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995b).
35
 
The Berlin Mandate aimed, for Annex I Parties, “to elaborate on policies and measures, as well as to 
set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 
2020, for … anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (UNFCCC, 1995a, p. 5). As a result, the overall goal to be 
achieved by the package to be negotiated under the Berlin Mandate, became a negotiation topic itself 
(see discussion in Chapter 1 around Figure 1-3). 
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Furthermore, the mandate recognised that Annex I Parties differ in terms of economic structure and 
resource base, which would need to be reflected in the eventual negotiation outcome. It was 
specifically mentioned that no new commitments would be introduced for non-Annex I Parties. 
Finally, the mandate called upon Parties to carry out the negotiation process “in the light of the best 
available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impact.” The Berlin 
Mandate negotiations took place at sessions (held once or twice a year) of the Ad hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM) during 1995-1997. 
A breakthrough in the negotiations was achieved in a number of ways (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
1995b). First, Annex I Parties agreed with a similar interpretation of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities as in 1992 under the UNFCCC, i.e. negotiations on a post-2000 protocol 
should only focus on new commitments for the group of Annex I Parties, not for developing countries. 
Second, Annex I Parties made clear that negotiations on post-2000 commitments would not reduce 
their efforts to comply with the UNFCCC stabilisation objective. By that, they addressed non-Annex I 
Parties’ concerns that protocol negotiation would actually delay GHG abatement action in 
industrialised countries. Third, the G-77&China temporarily ‘broke’ with the OPEC countries in the 
group because the latter were of the opinion that it was premature to draft a protocol at all. In the 
corridors, it was said that OPEC countries were against attempts to reduce GHG emissions as this 
might reduce global demand for fossil fuels, including oil. The G-77&China, inspired by India’s input, 
continued negotiations as the so-called Green Group, which was in favour of a post-2000 climate 
protocol with common but differentiated responsibilities. 
 
3.3.2. From ‘Berlin’ to ‘Kyoto’ – negotiations under the Berlin Mandate 
Between August 1995 and December 1997, the AGBM met eight times to negotiate a protocol or other 
legal instrument within the framework of the Berlin Mandate.
36
 Similar to the process leading to the 
UNFCCC, also the AGBM negotiation process was, at the first sessions, characterised by a strong 
focus on procedures and principles before Parties actually began drafting a legal document. Especially 
the notion in the Berlin Mandate that the negotiations were to take place in the light of best available 
scientific information led to considerable confusion. Some Parties proposed to assess available 
information first in the AGBM context before starting the actual negotiations, whereas others believed 
that the assessment and the negotiations could, or even should, be carried out in conjunction as both 
information assessment and negotiations were, in their view, continuous, iterative processes. 
Eventually, Parties decided in favour of the latter option, but when time was running out towards 
COP-3, Parties mainly focussed on negotiation dynamics and less on the (scientific) information 
which could feed the negotiation process. 
Despite the agreement at COP-1 not to focus on new commitments for non-Annex I Parties, 
commitments for developing countries, especially for those that are undergoing a relatively strong 
industrialisation process, remained a pending issue throughout the AGBM process, as well as at COP-
3. Proposals for such commitments were, for instance, formulated as voluntary targets, or sets of 
policies and measures, and by US President Clinton as ‘meaningful participation’ when he announced 
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the US proposal for a protocol or other legal instrument
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 in 1997. Developing countries remained 
very critical on this issue and rejected any claim from Annex I Parties that new scientific information 
(mainly from IPCC) had changed the background for negotiations since COP-1 and argued that there 
was no need to adjust the Berlin Mandate accordingly. 
In this discussion, the EU, unlike countries such as New Zealand and Australia, did not support the 
USA. The EU focussed strongly on formulating mandatory sets of policies and measures next to 
quantified targets for Annex I Parties and held on to its official position taken prior to COP-1 that 
Annex I Parties should show a considerable abatement effort first before requesting developing 
countries to also adopt commitments. 
One effect of the debate on the participation of developing countries in a Protocol was that the 
splitting of the G-77&China into a ‘Green group’ and the OPEC countries, which happened at COP-1, 
was repaired during the AGBM process. OPEC countries managed to include on the agenda the topic 
of compensation for developing countries whose economies strongly depend on income generated 
from fossil fuels. The other G-77&China countries generally supported the OPEC countries on this. 
Eventually, the G-77&China negotiators turned out to be very skilful in avoiding detailed debates on 
non-Annex I commitments, especially at COP-3 when they focussed so much on the issue of 
emissions trading (introduced by the USA) that, by the end of the session, no consensus could be 
found anymore for negotiating meaningful participation by developing countries. 
Notwithstanding the importance of this topic, most attention during the negotiations was paid to the 
issues of setting targets/commitments for Annex I Parties and to what extent these could be achieved 
flexibly in terms of location, timing and inclusion of GHGs other than CO2. In this context, Parties 
discussed a number of options. Some Parties proposed so-called flat rate commitments (a similar 
emission reduction percentage target for all Annex I Parties) with maximum flexibility in terms of: 
location where emission reductions can be achieved (e.g., through JI or emissions trading); timing, 
with proposals varying from a single compliance year to an emissions budget or commitment period of 
five years; and, number of GHGs covered, whereby proposals ranged from focussing on CO2 only to 
baskets of GHGs expressed as CO2-eq. The rationale of this option was that differences in marginal 
abatement costs between countries (due to structural differences) would be levelled out through the 
flexibility provided. 
Other Parties proposed differentiated targets, which would reflect structural differences between 
industrialised countries. However, there was a long debate on whether such differentiation should be 
based on a formula with agreed, scientifically supported, criteria or simply be left to the dynamics of 
negotiations. It was increasingly felt during the AGBM process that differentiation was necessary for 
reaching agreement, but, as stated by the German delegation at AGBM-6 (3-7 March 1997), 
scientifically derived indicators may not necessarily reflect political reality. Hence, in the course of 
time, Parties began issuing proposals with their own quantified targets which had either been 
scientifically determined, or set as a matter of principle or reflecting domestic political interests. For 
example, in March 1997 the EU presented its collective GHG emission reduction target of 15% (below 
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1990 levels to be achieved in 2010), which was based on the scientifically determined Triptych 
Approach (Phylipsen, et al., 1998) (see also below). The USA, instead, announced in October 1997 
that it aimed at stabilising its GHG emissions during a period of five years (2008-2012) at 1990 levels, 
which reflected the Byrd-Hagel resolution in the House of Representatives adopted in July 1997 (see 
elsewhere in this section) (Byrd & Hagel, 1997). 
AGBM-1, Geneva, Switzerland, 21-25 August 1995 
At the first session of the AGBM most of the discussion was on the scope of the Berlin Mandate and 
the organisation of the ad-hoc working group. Particularly important was the issue of analysis and 
assessment of available information on global warming, as required by the Berlin Mandate. Some 
Parties, in particular the USA, argued that negotiations on targets could only be effective if based on a 
comprehensive analysis of scientific research material as this would suggest which policy measures 
and targets are needed to achieve the overall UNFCCC objective. Other Parties warned against 
delaying the negotiation process and argued that assessment of new information should take place 
parallel to negotiations on targets and policies. 
The basic difference of opinion in this context was rather nuanced. Proponents of assessment and 
negotiations taking place in parallel (e.g., G-77&China as well as a number of EU Parties) argued that 
the need for targets/commitments had become clear from the review of adequacy of commitments at 
COP-1 and that assessment and analysis of detailed information would provide insight on what climate 
policy measures would be needed. Opponents to this vision (e.g., the USA), on the other hand, said 
that negotiations would be insufficiently focussed on a required outcome without a clear guidance on 
what precisely would be needed. They saw the following sequence of events: first, review of adequacy 
of commitments by the COP; second, analysis and assessment of available information; and, third, 
determination of targets. Some Parties, particularly the G-77&China, but also Switzerland, Germany 
and UK, were concerned that the methodological debate could become a tactic to delay the process of 
strengthening Annex I Parties’ targets. 
AGBM-2, Geneva, Switzerland, 30 October – 3 November 1995 
In comparison with AGBM-1 the second negotiating session on the Berlin Mandate was more 
constructive as a number of Parties delivered concrete proposals for the contents of the legal 
instrument to be adopted. To some extent, this might have been due to the official presentation of the 
IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) shortly before AGBM-2 which concluded that the “balance 
of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate” (IPCC, 1995). Also, and 
perhaps more importantly, some Parties realised that presenting their views on the structure of a future 
climate regime as early as possible would enable them to influence the negotiation agenda. Experience 
from the INC negotiations had shown that proposals tabled in an early stage of the negotiations and 
supported by a significant group of countries would often form the basis of the eventual negotiation 
texts. 
In this context, the USA, again, tried to show the importance of meaningful participation of 
developing countries in a climate regime. The US delegation even delivered a slide presentation of 





targets as well as mandatory policies and measures. Based on IPCC SAR data, the USA argued that 
already in the first half of the twenty-first century, absolute GHG emission levels in developing 
countries would become higher than those of Annex I countries. According to the US proposal, this 
requires a global solution (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995c). 
The EU’s early AGBM proposal was much less focussed on addressing responsibilities for non-Annex 
I Parties (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995c). The EU emphasised that it wanted to base its 
assessment on the Berlin Mandate, which excluded quantified commitments for developing countries. 
Nevertheless, also the EU’s proposal contained elements in the direction of a more active role for 
developing countries in a future legal instrument. However, instead of shaping this via quantified 
commitments, the EU’s text described this role in terms of policies and measures, such as energy 
efficiency, production standards, and labelling. On the latter, the EU distinguished three types of 
activities: mandatory policies and measures for Annex I countries; voluntary action by developing 
countries; and certain measures that all countries would have to carry out. 
However, the EU text did not clearly link these sets of policies and measures to quantified emission 
reduction targets. Germany and Canada instead suggested that quantitative targets should drive the 
policies and measures so that the legal instrument would define both the target and how to achieve 
this. In their view, this would enhance the credibility of a climate regime. 
At this stage, the G-77&China were forced into a more defensive role as they felt that especially the 
US proposal and its rationale were a direct violation of the Berlin Mandate and a clear attempt to shift 
the focus of the AGBM. The group was particularly critical on the fact that the US presentation 
seemed to disregard historical, structural differences between countries on a global scale and argued 
that these differences had precisely formed the basis of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in both the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate. 
Of a more technical nature, but not necessarily less political, were the proposals tabled at AGBM-2 by 
countries such as Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA on differentiation of targets and the 
flexibility in achieving these in terms of timing and location (i.e., JI). Some proposals suggested 
establishing group-based targets (similar targets for comparable countries) or individually 
differentiated targets, instead of a flat-rate target for all Annex I Parties. 
The US proposal also introduced the option of having cumulative targets which would allow Parties to 
remain below the target level on average during a number of years. With cumulative targets, a country 
could, for instance, avoid being ‘punished’ for a suddenly strong economic growth or another 
unexpected event in the target year. Spreading the targets over a number of years (e.g. 5 years) would 
enable spreading the GHG abatement efforts over a longer period of time. The UK added to this 
proposal the option of basing targets on a basket of GHGs instead of just one. 
AGBM-3, Geneva, Switzerland, 5-8 March 1996 
Almost one year after the decision on the Berlin Mandate at COP-1 and with COP-2 forthcoming, 
AGBM-Chair Mr Raúl Estrada-Oyuela decided to point the negotiators at the growing urgency of the 
AGBM discussions. In the opening session of AGBM-3, he expressed his concern that attempts to 
delay negotiations, as had happened at the first two sessions (e.g., by requesting further assessment 
and analysis of available information or discussing the issue of adverse effects of climate policy for 
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countries dependent of production of fossil fuels) would have a destructive effect on the overall 
negotiation process. 
To a large extent, AGBM-3 continued the discussion on several of the topics discussed at AGBM-2 
(quantitative targets, differentiation, policy and measures, participation of developing countries, and 
flexibility), but the ranking of topics in terms of importance throughout the discussion had somewhat 
changed. For instance, the sharp discussion at AGBM-2 on commitments for developing countries had 
clearly reduced the willingness of negotiators to touch upon the issue again. Instead, the discussion on 
participation of developing countries in a future legal instrument was more focussed on how to 
facilitate financial and technological transfer to non-Annex I Parties and the feasibility of having JI 
between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. 
Also the discussion on policies and measures was less pronounced than at AGBM-1 and 2. 
Apparently, countries had concluded from AGBM-2 that policies and measures would only be 
effective if linked to legally binding quantitative commitments. Therefore, the policies and measures 
debate, although it largely took place at the session and at an informal workshop held two days before 
AGBM-3, was politically much less sharp than the negotiations on quantitative commitments. 
Regarding quantified commitments, Germany presented its proposals for a legal instrument text. 
Germany recommended that all Parties reduce their CO2 emission in two stages at flat rates of 10% by 
2005 and 15 to 20% by 2010. The German delegation preferred a flat rate instead of differentiated 
targets because it expected practical problems for differentiation in terms of defining criteria and 
indicators, which would further complicate negotiations. Differentiation could only be considered for 
countries with economies in transition. The absence of differentiation in the German proposal would 
be compensated for by flexibility measures in terms of JI. 
Finally, regarding quantitative commitments, Brazil proposed that eventually AGBM would agree on 
an overall Annex I target which Parties could either adopt as a flat rate or differentiate among each 
other. In its view, a top-down procedure with an agreement on an overall target would prevent bottom-
up agreements with individually agreed quantified targets which on aggregate would result in a 
disappointing overall effort. 
AGBM-4 at COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland, 8-19 July 1996 
Although AGBM-3 had already created some openings in the negotiations on a number of key issues 
in the Berlin Mandate context, the high-level character of the COP, during which AGBM-4 was held, 
turned out to be a stimulus to make considerable progress. Perhaps the biggest achievement of COP-2 
was the announcement by the USA that it supported a legally-binding protocol or other legal 
instrument. Thus far in the AGBM process, the US delegation had submitted proposals on the design 
of an instrument (cumulative targets, differentiation, multiple gases, etc.), but never clearly on its legal 
nature. Note that the US announcement was made at the more political high-level segment of the COP 
(the Ministerial Segment on 17-19 July 1996), not at the AGBM-4 meeting itself (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, 1996a). 
The USA, however, also called upon other Parties to create maximum flexibility in a legal instrument 
in order to complement legally-binding commitments. Important elements in the US proposal for 





emissions trading scheme with participation of Parties with quantitative commitments. The latter 
option was also discussed at AGBM-4 in combination with a flat rate target approach as an alternative 
to differentiated targets approaches. 
Regarding the inclusion of policies and measures in a global climate regime, which at former AGBM 
sessions had basically been considered in conjunction with quantified emission limitation and 
reduction objectives (or QELROs), there was general agreement that their application should not be 
overly strict. In fact, Parties suggested that differences in national circumstances should be an 
important factor in deciding which policies and measures to incorporate in national climate policies. 
There was discussion on whether the COP should define a menu of policies and measures from which 
countries could choose and on whether a limited set of policies and measures should become 
mandatory for Annex I Parties. Most outspoken in this respect was the US delegation which argued 
that no single set of policies and measures exists that fits all countries. 
The progress made at AGBM-4/COP-2 was reflected by the ‘Geneva Declaration’ in which the 
Ministers and Heads of Delegations, among others stated that, while notifying the principles of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and precautionary actions, they would “instruct their 
representatives to accelerate negotiations on a legally-binding protocol or other legal instrument to be 
completed by COP-3” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1996a) (UNFCCC, 1996b). 
AGBM-5, Geneva, Switzerland, 9-13 December 1996 
At AGBM-4, Chair Estrada had called upon Party delegates to submit proposals for a legal instrument 
text, in order to accelerate the drafting of a negotiation text. By its fifth session, the AGBM could 
consider 14 proposals submitted by Parties, including one from the EU as a whole (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, 1996b). Although the proposal texts still showed a wide range of views on issues such as 
policies and measures and QELROs, it could be observed that negotiations had become more 
streamlined now that consensus had been reached on the nature of eventual targets as legally-binding 
commitments. Now, as UNFCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar said, the time had 
come to decide which proposals should be set aside or could be considered mutually exclusive, in 
order to single out a limited number of options to focus on in the final year of the Berlin Mandate 
process (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1996b). 
At AGBM-5 it became clear that the status of policies and measures in a legal instrument remained an 
issue on which Parties still disagreed. The EU repeated its proposal to adopt a mandatory approach 
with common and co-ordinated policies and measures for so-called Annex X Parties. Annex X would 
consist of Annex I countries and new OECD members not included in UNFCCC Annex I, as well as, 
on a voluntary basis, some developing countries. Generally, the EU proposal was considered as rather 
strict and some Parties (e.g. Japan, Canada and New Zealand) repeated their preference for a menu 
from which policies and measures can be selected depending on national circumstances. 
The debate on quantitative targets basically continued with an exchange of views on differentiation 
and flexibility as in the earlier AGBM sessions, with the exception of three issues: 
 The US delegation introduced an inter-temporal element by proposing that countries which emit 
less than their target levels could bank this surplus for compliance with future climate 
agreements. On the other hand, countries that surpass their target would have the possibility to 
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compensate for the deficit by agreeing on stricter targets in the future. The latter aspect 
(‘borrowing’) was met with criticism as it was seen as an opportunity to delay abatement action. 
 The EU was concerned that in the proposals of some Annex I Parties, especially the USA, 
emissions trading was considered an alternative for a set of policies and measures. The EU argued 
that emissions trading, being just one measure, could never replace a balanced set of policies and 
measures as proposed by the EU. 
 Developing countries urged to treat JI and its pilot version AIJ as two separate concepts in the 
draft texts. They argued that AIJ had been set up as voluntary project-based cooperation with a 
global scope, but without the possibility of crediting emission reductions against Annex I 
countries’ UNFCCC objectives or commitments. In their view, JI, with crediting of GHG 
emission reductions, should be limited to cooperation among industrialised countries only.  
Finally, it became clear at AGBM-5 that the issue of involvement of developing countries had become 
even more sensitive than before. This was most clearly illustrated by the protest raised by the USA 
when Chair Estrada presented his draft conclusions of the session and, among others, quoted the 
Berlin Mandate which specifies that no new commitments for non-Annex I Parties should be included 
in a legal instrument (UNFCCC, 1995a, pp. 5, para.2b). The USA, but also the EU, did not understand 
why emphasising this issue was needed. Eventually, Estrada copied the entire paragraph from the 
Berlin Mandate into his conclusions (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1996b, p. 7). Nonetheless, at 
AGBM-5, the USA had somewhat changed its tone with respect to the participation of developing 
countries by proposing positive incentives for non-Annex I Parties to join the group of countries with 
quantitative targets. Also to this proposal the G-77&China had replied that developing country 
participation would only be up for discussion if Annex I Parties showed clear progress towards 
meeting their stabilisation objectives by 2000 as defined in the UNFCCC. 
AGBM-6, Bonn, Germany, 3-7 March 1997 
For the first time the AGBM session was held in Bonn, the new location of the UNFCCC secretariat 
(as decided at COP-1). It continued considering proposals on the design of a legal instrument 
submitted by Parties, such as the EU, USA, Switzerland, Australia and Norway. Most attention was 
paid to the EU and US proposals. Many other Parties, including the G-77&China, had not yet 
delivered elaborate proposals for negotiation texts. They mainly focussed on key issues on which they 
commented and for which they proposed alternatives (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997d). 
The EU had been very active prior to AGBM-6. Under the Dutch presidency, the EU Council of 
Ministers and Heads of State had agreed on a common EU emission reduction target for three GHGs 
(CO2, N2O and CH4) of 15% below 1990 levels to be achieved by 2010. The aggregate target had been 
differentiated across the EU, using the so-called Triptych Approach (Phylipsen, et al., 1998),
38
 with 
strong emission reduction targets for, e.g., Germany and the UK and permissible emission increases 
for other Member States, e.g., Greece and Portugal. 
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In addition, the EU kept pushing its proposal on policies and measures which it wanted to become 
legally-binding under a legal instrument. On this issue, the discussion showed that the EU became 
increasingly isolated as also the G-77&China criticised the proposal because of the possibly negative 
impacts of the proposal on developing countries (both directly through their envisaged participation in 
policies and measures schemes in the EU proposal and indirectly through negative trade effects from 
implementing policies and measures in industrialised countries, such as reducing imports from 
developing countries). Other countries, such as the USA, Japan, and Australia, repeated their criticism 
on this issue and/or proposed weaker alternatives. 
Despite its specific proposal for a QELRO, which was generally applauded, the EU was not able to 
‘steer’ the agenda for the negotiations. On differentiation of targets, the EU had never been very clear, 
but it could not oppose the concept as it now had applied a burden sharing formula itself. In addition, 
on emissions trading, introduced by the USA, the EU did not present a clear view, except that it 
cautioned that purchasing allowances from other countries should not fully replace domestic 
abatement action. Particularly painful for the EU was that Chair Estrada had not copied any of the 
policies and measures priority options from the EU proposal (from the 200 options listed originally by 
the EU) in his “Framework Compilation of Proposals from Parties for the Elements of a Protocol or 
Another Legal Instrument” (UNFCCC, 1997a). 
At AGBM-6 it became clear that Parties had generally accepted the principle of differentiation of 
QELROs among countries in order to take into consideration structural differences between countries. 
As explained above, the EU had applied differentiation internally and also the USA agreed on 
including differentiation as an option in the negotiation text (up to then the US delegation had been in 
favour of a flat rate target with emissions trading as an instrument to even out cost differences between 
countries). Parties only had to sort out how to apply differentiation for which basically two options 
existed: either formalise differentiation using criteria and indicators (formula-based or selective 
approach), or ‘simply’ leave it to negotiations (negotiation approach). During the AGBM-6 talks, 
Parties slowly seemed to move towards the latter approach, mainly for practical reasons, or, as a 
German delegate put it: “indicators do not necessarily reflect political reality” (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, 1997d, p. 7). The proposals submitted to AGBM-6 revealed an increasing preference for a 
top-down approach with an aggregate target for Annex I Parties which Parties would need to allocate 
among each other through negotiations. 
Perhaps the biggest issue at AGBM-6 was ‘flexibility’: to what extent could Annex I Parties with 
QELROs acquire emission reduction credits from abroad through JI projects and emissions quota 
trading? This debate focused largely on the geographical scope for JI and on the extent to which 
Parties could apply these flexibility mechanisms to comply with their QELROs. Several Annex I 
Parties proposed JI cooperation both among Annex I Parties and between Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties. The latter was opposed by the G-77&China which even proposed deleting the text on JI from 
the Chair’s compilation text. Developing countries again urged Annex I Parties to first show 
demonstrable progress with reaching their stabilisation objectives for the year 2000, as in the 
UNFCCC. The G-77&China and also the EU argued that acquiring emission reduction credits or 
emission allowances from abroad should not entirely nor largely replace required domestic abatement 
action in industrialised countries. 
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Chair Estrada announced that he would distribute a draft negotiation text for a legal instrument by 1 
June 1997 before the final round of the AGBM process (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997d, p. 7). 
AGBM-7, Bonn, Germany, 31 July – 7 August 1997 
Less than half a year before COP-3, the time had come to make compromises between negotiation 
positions of countries. The EU increasingly gained support for its internal ‘bubble system’ presented at 
AGBM-6 (a common goal, differentiated among EU Member States), also from the USA which had 
long been in favour of a flat emission reduction rate. ‘In return’, the EU supported the US proposal for 
emissions trading among Annex I Parties, provided that the eventually adopted targets at COP-3 
would be sufficiently ‘adequate’ for fulfilling the Berlin Mandate. 
However, the EU, again, failed to gain support for its proposals for legally-binding policies and 
measures for Annex I Parties. The USA had always been against this proposal and several other 
Annex I Parties also objected to mandatory lists of policies and measures, as they wanted flexibility in 
shaping their domestic policy packages. In addition, the G-77&China (in particular the OPEC 
countries) repeated their argument that the EU proposal, which also contained a provision for policies 
and measures on a voluntary basis for developing countries, might induce negative trade effects for 
(some) developing countries. 
Finally, AGBM-7 was to some extent overshadowed by the domestic political debate within the USA, 
which had resulted in a strong support for the resolution sponsored by Senators Byrd and Hagel by the 
House of Representatives and the Senate (in July 1997, shortly before AGBM-7) (Byrd & Hagel, 
1997).39 The Byrd-Hagel resolution stated that “the United States should not be a signatory to any 
protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would...mandate 
new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the 
protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period”. 
Senator Byrd personally contacted Chair Estrada to explain US domestic objections to unilateral 
commitments by industrialised countries. 
However, the above does not imply that there was a sharp dividing line between the ‘Byrd-Hagel’ 
mandate and the official US position at AGBM negotiations. Throughout the entire process since 
1995, the US delegation had argued in favour of commitments for or meaningful participation by 
developing countries and it had proposed including a section in a legal instrument on ‘evolution’, i.e. 
to actively involve developing countries in a climate regime at the shortest possible notice. The 
difference was mainly in the wording and the proposed procedures: ‘immediately’ (Byrd-Hagel) 
versus ‘in an evolutionary process’ (US negotiators). 
Although several Annex I Parties in principle supported the US position on ‘meaningful participation’ 
by non-Annex I Parties (e.g., the EU wanted developing countries to adopt some GHG abatement 
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policies and measures), the general view was that preparations for commitments for ‘industrialising 
developing countries’ in a climate regime should not be started within the context of the Berlin 
Mandate, i.e. ‘yes’ to evolution of developing country participation, but not yet.40 Consequently, Chair 
Estrada literally stuck to the Berlin Mandate (‘no new commitments for non-Annex I Parties’) 
(UNFCCC, 1995a) and left the US proposal on ‘evolution’ out of the draft negotiating text. 
AGBM-8, Bonn, Germany, 23-31 October 1997 
About a month before COP-3, the negotiations were approaching a climax, particularly because key 
Annex I Parties had submitted their proposals for QELROs. AGBM-8 also made clear that the real 
negotiations were actually taking place outside the ‘Bonn context’, via bilateral talks through various 
‘shuttle diplomacies’. The US delegation visited EU Member States to sort out issues before the Kyoto 
summit, the EU troika met with US government officials and leading senators on the issue of climate 
change, and Japan, being the host of COP-3, had regular contact with the US administration and EU 
leaders when submitting its proposal for a legal instrument to AGBM (see below). 
Shortly before AGBM-8, US President Clinton had announced the US proposal for a legal instrument 
on climate change (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997a, p. 3). It contained a stabilisation target for the 
USA at 1990 levels for six GHGs to be achieved during the period 2008-2012. In addition, the 
proposal called upon developing countries to participate in a meaningful way, although it did not refer 
to an evolutionary process, which at ABGM-7 had turned out to be controversial. Finally, the USA 
proposed inclusion of JI among Annex I countries and with developing countries, as well as emissions 
trading among Annex I Parties. 
The G-77&China criticised the US proposal as, in their view, it was in conflict with the Berlin 
Mandate (based on arguments they had elaborated on at earlier AGBM sessions, see above). Chair 
Estrada tried his best to find compromises in this respect by suggesting a more general discussion at 
COP-3 on the future participation of developing countries in quantitative target regimes, but to 
separate such a debate from the Berlin Mandate negotiations. He also considered including terms of 
references for JI cooperation with developing countries in the draft negotiating text, i.e. only projects 
leading to a transfer of sustainable (energy) technologies to developing countries would be eligible in 
JI cooperation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. Moreover, Estrada considered including a 
paragraph on voluntary participation of developing countries in an emissions trading regime (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 1997a, p. 5). 
On differentiation, Parties expressed different opinions on how to achieve differentiated targets (note 
that the question of ‘whether differentiation’ seemed to have been affirmatively answered at AGBM-
7). Again, Parties discussed bottom-up and top-down options. The EU (in favour of a top-down 
approach) feared that focussing on a methodological agreement first (supported by Australia, Japan, 
and Norway) could lead to situations in which all Annex I Parties claim exceptional domestic 
circumstances to be included in the calculations which could eventually result in a strongly watered 
down overall Annex I target. 
                                                     
40
 Of the non-Annex I Parties, Brazil proposed at AGBM-7 that in the future all countries should adopt 
commitments (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997c, p. 3).  
Negotiations on a global climate policy – the Kyoto Protocol 
71 
 
Finally, Japan’s proposal contained several elements for a compromise on this issue. It suggested an 
overall Annex I Parties’ emission reduction target of at least five percent with scope for 
differentiation. Realising that the Japanese delegation had been in close contact with at least the EU 
and US delegations for some time before AGBM-8, it was generally assumed that the Japanese 
proposal more or less showed the scope for manoeuvre at COP-3. 
COP-3 (Kyoto, Japan, 1-11 December 1997) was preceded by the resumed session of AGBM-8. At 
this meeting, which took place on 30 November, Chair Estrada wanted to complete the AGBM report 
to the COP, which consisted of an inventory of issues to be resolved by COP-3 and a draft negotiation 
text (UNFCCC, 1997b). While concluding that the AGBM had not reached agreement on a protocol or 
legal instrument text, the report was submitted to the COP Presidency. 
 
3.3.3. COP-3 
At COP-3, the negotiations on a legal instrument continued in the so-called Committee of the Whole.
41
 
From the AGBM process a list of articles had been suggested for the instrument and several alternative 
formulations for each article were available from proposals by Parties, as well as texts containing 
proposed compromises by the AGBM Chair. Keeping in mind how the AGBM negotiations had taken 
place, it was no surprise that most attention at COP-3 was paid to the draft-Articles 2 (policies and 
measures), 3 (QELROs, sinks, emissions trading, clean development fund), and 10 (voluntary 
commitments for non-Annex I Parties).
42
 
The final discussion on policies and measures went rather smoothly, which seemed largely due to the 
fact that during the last sessions of AGBM the EU had made considerable concessions. For example, it 
had reduced its list of policies and measures to a priority list. The text adopted at COP-3 stated that 
under Article 2 of the Protocol each Annex I Party shall “implement and/or further elaborate policies 
and measures in accordance with its national circumstances” (Kyoto Protocol Article 2.1(a)). 
Furthermore, the Article lists a number of possible policies and measures that Parties could 
implement/elaborate. There was no consensus to include a reference to activities by non-Annex I 
Parties in this respect, although it was noted that Annex I Parties should strive to minimise adverse 
effects on, among others, developing country Parties. The text did not arrange co-ordination of 
policies and measures among Parties, but left it to future sessions of the COP (serving as the meeting 
of the Protocol Parties) to take further decisions if required. 
All in all, the final outcome of the negotiations on policies and measures substantially deviated from 
the original EU proposal which had a stronger legally-binding nature and included limited 
participation of developing countries. 
The COP-3 discussions largely focussed on the proposed Article 3. Already during the AGBM 
process, QELROs, whether and how to differentiate these, and what flexibility to offer Annex I Parties 
in terms of accounting (one GHG or a multiple gases approach), location and timing had been 
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intensively debated. At COP-3 the issue of including carbon sinks in the Article was added to the list 
of issues. Already at AGBM-7, some delegates had pointed out that including carbon sinks (e.g., 
sequestration of carbon in soils and trees) in a legal instrument would greatly affect the capacity of 
countries to comply with their QELROs. The Brazilian delegation presented a calculation which 
showed that a broad inclusion of sinks in Article 3 would reduce required aggregate Annex I Parties’ 
efforts by around 30% (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 7). 
On sinks, an informal group explored possible options for including carbon sequestration through 
forestry and land use in the protocol text. The options could be broadly categorised as ‘immediate 
inclusion’ or ‘future inclusion’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 7). The latter would depend on 
progress with addressing methodological uncertainties regarding accounting of sequestered carbon. 
The ‘sinks group’ reported that the ‘future inclusion’ option would bring the best chances for a 
compromise, but within the Committee of the Whole there was strong pressure from several Annex I 
Parties to include as many sinks options as verifiable. The text that was eventually adopted in Article 3 
described how Annex I Parties should include in their national GHG accounting the net changes in 
GHG emissions since 1990 due to human-induced land use, land-use change and afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation activities (Article 3.3 of the Protocol). 
The debate on QELROs took place in a ‘top down’ context after Chair Estrada43 had submitted his ‘big 
bubble’ proposal with an aggregate 5% emission reduction target for Annex I Parties (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 7). In this proposal, the EU was to reduce its emissions by 8% below 
1990 levels during a proposed commitment period of 2006-2010 (note that before AGBM-6, the EU 
had proposed to collectively reduce its emissions by 15%). Estrada proposed a -5% target for Canada, 
the Russian Federation, the USA, and Ukraine, and -4.5% for Japan. Countries like Australia and 
Norway had to limit their GHG emissions to 5% above 1990 levels. The differences in targets in 
Estrada’s proposal were a reflection of different national circumstances of the Parties (e.g., large 
reliance on renewables, or strong coal sector), although no formal method for differentiation as 
proposed at a number of AGBM sessions (e.g., Australian proposal) had been used for this. Note that 
the ‘big bubble’ contained targets for three GHGs only (CO2, CH4, and N2O). 
Informal discussions persuaded the Chair to make several adjustments to his proposal, especially with 
respect to flexibility, the number of gases covered, delaying the commitment period to 2008-2012, and 
voluntary commitments for non-Annex I Parties. Within the COW context on the last day of the COP, 
when negotiations continued ‘round the clock’, the Russian Federation and Ukraine expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the differentiated targets because they did not reflect both countries’ proposals to 
stabilise their GHG emissions at 1990 levels. Eventually, Article 3 was adopted with quantified 
emission reduction or limitation commitments (QELRCs) defined and listed in Annex B to the 
Protocol. On aggregate, Annex I Parties agreed to reduce their GHG emissions (for six gases, listed in 
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998)) by 5.2% during the period 2008-2012 (the so-
called first commitment period). These commitments are defined as assigned amounts, which are 
expressed as a percentage of Annex I Parties’ GHG emissions levels of 1990. For example, a Party 
with an assigned amount in Annex B of 93% must reduce its emissions by 7%. 
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Annex I Parties were allowed further flexibility in terms of location through JI, the CDM and 
International Emissions Trading (see Chapter 4 for the negotiations leading towards the inclusion of 
these mechanisms). The surprising inclusion of the three flexibility mechanisms in the Protocol cannot 
be seen in isolation from the hectic negotiations during the second week of COP-3. The US delegation 
had hold on a stabilisation target during the first week of COP-3, but was openly instructed to show 
more flexibility during negotiations from the administration when US Vice-President Al Gore 
addressed the COP in person at the beginning of the second week. The open willingness of the USA to 
accept an emission reduction commitment was accompanied by US pressure for more flexibility in 
terms of emissions trading and broadening the JI concept towards collaboration with developing 
countries (for which the CDM was created). 
On meaningful participation of developing countries, however, the US delegation did not achieve what 
it intended. Throughout the AGBM process, this issue had been extremely sensitive, both in terms of 
voluntary quantified targets and in terms of adopting policies and measures. The G-77&China 
demonstrated a strong determination to literally stick to the text of the Berlin Mandate and did not 
allow any margin for interpretation in this respect. It repeatedly argued that developing countries 
would only consider adopting targets and/or policies and measures once Annex I Parties had 
demonstrated real progress with meeting UNFCCC targets. 
According to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the key negotiators of the G-77&China group 
effectively defeated the original Article 10 in the draft protocol: “in a clever play, India and China led 
off a debate on emissions trading, ambushing the US and JUSSCANZ and succeeding in delaying the 
pace at which trading will come into effect. In doing so in the closing hours of the negotiations, they 
signalled decisive opposition to the Article on voluntary commitments and exhausted all proponents. 
As a result, the article on voluntary commitments was dropped”44 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, 
p. 15). 
On Thursday, 11 December 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. 
 
3.4. Post-COP-3 Negotiations on Protocol Modalities and Procedures 
 
The discussion of the negotiations in the Berlin Mandate context has made clear that a relatively small 
group of Parties played a key role in shaping the final text of the Kyoto Protocol. The G-77&China 
strictly opposed attempts from some industrialised countries to incorporate commitments for non-
Annex I Parties, either as voluntary policies and measures or as flexible emission budgets, and thus 
lost their strength to otherwise influence the negotiations. Several institutional elements of the Kyoto 
Protocol were taken from the US proposals – e.g., emission budgets, national quota emissions trading, 
project-based emissions trading with developing countries, multiple gases and a multi-year 
commitment period – whereas, on the other hand, the US delegation managed to remove the legally-
binding status from the EU-proposal on policies and measures. This lower profile for policies and 
measures was a disappointment for the EU, which had spent much effort on precisely this element. 
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However, the EU softened the disagreement between the USA and G-77&China on legally binding 
commitments for developing countries by literally sticking to the text of the Berlin Mandate. The EU 
strongly influenced the debate on differentiation of commitments, a concept which it initially seemed 
to oppose but suddenly applied in practice itself through the March 1997 burden sharing agreement 
among the EU Member States. Finally, Japan perhaps showed more flexibility during the negotiations 
because of its status as host of COP-3. 
These Parties continued to play their key roles also after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol when 
negotiations focussed on working out its operational details (these negotiations took place from 1998 
through early 2005 when the protocol entered into force). The analysis of the post-1997 negotiations in 
this section will focus on themes and key players rather than on a chronological description of 
negotiation sessions. The main reason for this approach is that, contrary to the Berlin Mandate 
negotiation process, the 1998-2005 negotiations were largely characterised by (high-level) bilateral 
meetings between key Parties (sometimes even in the context of other multilateral meetings such as of 
the World Trade Organisation, WTO). These diplomatic meetings of country representatives between 
the official UNFCCC sessions turned out to be almost as important as the discussions inside the 
official negotiations room. A focus on negotiation sessions alone would thus only cover part of the 
story. 
COP-3 recognised that the Kyoto Protocol, despite being a much more specific treaty than the 
UNFCCC, still needed further decisions on specific modalities and procedures for its 
operationalisation. For instance, the inclusion of land-use (change) and forestry in Article 3 had 
opened the way for Annex I Parties to also include carbon sequestration achievements in their 
emission budgets. The Kyoto Protocol had not yet defined how and to what extent this should be 
included, e.g., what type of forestry (afforestation and/or forest conservation) and how to define land 
use and land-use change? Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol opened a large new debate on the so-called 
flexibility mechanisms JI, CDM and International Emissions Trading, which will extensively be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, COP-3 did not really resolve the issue of compliance, i.e. would the 
Protocol generate enough incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments or should 
additional measures (e.g., sanctions and compensation) be included? 
The process of developing modalities and procedures for the Kyoto Protocol was, however, largely 
overshadowed by the problems that arose when, in March 2001, US President George W. Bush 
decided not to support the protocol. He considered the Protocol ‘fatally flawed’ because it did not 
contain quantified commitments for rapidly industrialising developing countries such as China, India, 
Mexico, Brazil and South Korea. Moreover, the protocol would require an emission reduction effort 
from the USA which could, in the view of the Bush Administration, strongly disrupt the US economy 
(by 2001 US GHG emissions had grown to over 15% above 1990 level, whereas the country had to 
reduce its emissions by 7% by 2008-2012 under the Kyoto Protocol (US EPA, 2011)). 
Note, however, that the decision of the Bush Administration could not be considered a sudden change 
in the US governmental position concerning a global climate policy. First of all, earlier in this chapter, 
the Byrd-Hagel resolution of 1997 has been mentioned, as well as the pressure placed on AGBM 
Chair Estrada by US Government officials before ‘Kyoto’ to include ‘meaningful participation by 
developing countries’ in the protocol next to Annex I Party commitments. Second, prior to COP-6, US 
Government officials, when meeting with the Dutch Presidency of COP-6, made clear that for US 
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ratification of the Kyoto Protocol it would be extremely important that the issue of ‘meaningful 
participation by developing countries’ were placed on the agenda. Between COP-3 and COP-6, the 
USA tried at least five times to include this issue in the agenda for negotiations, without the desired 
result (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000d, p. 2) (Viguier, 2003). In fact, the Dutch Presidency of 
COP-6 argued, based on its pre-COP bilateral meetings with developing country representatives, that 
adopting a decision on ‘meaningful participation’ at COP-6 would not be realistic and thus left it out 
of the agenda. 
The US decision to withdraw from ‘Kyoto’ posed a serious threat to the Kyoto Protocol. For its entry-
into-force the protocol needed to be ratified by a number of Annex I Parties, which would be 
sufficiently large to cover a minimum of 55% of Annex I Parties’ overall CO2 emissions in 1990. 
Early 2001, the EU had already expressed its readiness to ratify the protocol, but for reaching the 55% 
threshold also ratification by the Russian Federation (17.4%), Japan (8.5%), Canada (3.3%), and 
Australia (2.1%) was very important (see Table 3-1). As a result, the US shift in position suddenly 
increased the negotiation power of these four countries in the remainder of the process. 
Table 3-1. Percentage of Annex I emissions in 1990 – Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol* 
USA 36.1 
EU 24.2 














New Zealand 0.2 
Other Annex I Parties 2.2 
Total Annex I 100.0 
* This list does not include Ukraine which, by 1997, had not yet submitted its national communication on 
1990 emissions. Therefore, its emissions are not included in the Table annexed to Article 25 of the Protocol. 
The Ukrainian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol therefore had no effect on the entry-into-force of 
the Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. 18, Art.25). 
 
The role of the G-77&China became less important as their emissions did not count for reaching the 
55% threshold, whereas they strongly supported the Kyoto Protocol and showed willingness to accept 
special wishes of some industrialised countries which could even reduce the environmental integrity of 
the protocol (see below). Consequently, the negotiations during 2001-2005 did not focus so much on 





1997), but on how to persuade key industrialised countries to continue their support to the Kyoto 
Protocol. In this process, the EU eventually played a key, if not decisive, role. 
EU: shift in negotiation strategy 
Although the Kyoto Protocol deviated on several points from the EU proposals submitted during 
AGBM negotiations, the EU remained a strong supporter of the protocol throughout the period 1997-
2000. During negotiations at COP-4 through 6, the EU delegations tried to identify a number of issues 
in the protocol to support the environmental integrity of the package. For example, the EU was 
strongly in favour of defining the term ‘supplementarity’ in relation to using the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms. The protocol states that Annex I Parties’ use of JI, CDM and emissions trading should be 
supplemental to their domestic activities (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. 6-7, Art.6.1(d) & 11-12, Art.12.3(b)), 
without specifically determining which part of the commitments could be covered by emission-
reduction credits acquired from abroad. 
In the course of 1999, the European Commission and the EU Council of Environment Ministers 
developed a formula which would limit the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms to about 50% of 
Parties’ abatement effort under the Protocol (Zhang, 2001). This ceiling approach was heavily 
criticised by the so-called Umbrella Group,
45
 which wanted freedom for each Annex I Party to define 
its own supplementarity rules (for a detailed discussion on this issue, see Chapter 5). The main 
rationale for the EU to propose a ceiling was that it feared that a large use of the flexibility 
mechanisms would crowd out domestic abatement efforts in industrialised countries. On this topic the 
EU was strongly supported by the G-77&China. In addition, the EU argued that the use of the 
flexibility mechanisms was surrounded by several methodological uncertainties (such as baseline 
determination and additionality, see Chapter 5), which would need to be addressed first. 
Furthermore, the EU wanted to limit the scope for using land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) activities in support of Annex I Parties’ compliance efforts. Especially during the year 
2000, at the SB-sessions in June (Bonn, Germany) and September (Lyon, France) and at COP-6, the 
US delegation had opened the debate by proposing to also consider improved agricultural harvesting 
techniques in Article 3.3, the use of which would reduce the release of carbon from soils. The EU 
delegation argued, in a reaction, that a broad interpretation of LULUCF would enable several Annex I 
Parties to largely avoid energy and industrial sector emission reductions, and doubted whether there 
was already enough scientific evidence on the permanence of LULUCF abatement options (see 
Chapter 5). 
Throughout the period 1998-2000, the EU thus tried to counterweigh the more flexible attitude of the 
Umbrella Group (especially the USA) towards the modalities and procedures of the Kyoto Protocol. 
As the Earth Negotiations Bulletin wrote in 1997, when anonymously quoting a US delegate: “the EU 
had more fun in being green than in being practical” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 15). This 
difference of opinion eventually resulted in the failure to reach agreement at COP-6 on a text on 
LULUCF measures (November 2000), which forced the Dutch COP Presidency to suspend the 
meeting to July 2001. 
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After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process, however, a significant change in the EU 
negotiation position could be observed. Concerns about the entry-into-force of the protocol stimulated 
the EU troika to start an intense diplomatic campaign in March 2001,
46
 which led to a number of 
bilateral meetings with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the G-77&China 
delegations. An important observation from this period is that the EU showed much more coherence 
than before when disagreements among Member States regularly led to weaker EU positions at 
negotiation sessions (Hyvarinen, 2000). After March 2001, the EU showed a strong unanimous 
determination of rescuing the Kyoto Protocol. Eventually, at COP-6 bis in Bonn, Germany (July 
2001), the EU efforts paid off as Parties reached consensus on the Bonn Agreement, which was 
generally considered the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Bonn Agreement 
Strikingly, the Bonn Agreement was much ‘less green’ than the EU proposals for modalities and 
procedures before the US withdrawal. For instance, at the resumed session of COP-6, Canada, Japan 
and the Russian Federation had proposed a methodology for negotiating maximum levels of forest 
management abatement credits that individual Annex I Parties would be able to take into account 
when calculating achieved GHG abatement under the Kyoto Protocol (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
2001, p. 7). These levels were defined in a new Appendix Z to the Protocol’s Article 3.4.47 The Bonn 
Agreement consequently allowed Annex I Parties a larger use of LULUCF activities in complying 
with the protocol commitments which was especially beneficial for Canada, Japan and the Russian 
Federation. 85% of the overall maximum credits level in Appendix Z consisted of these countries’ 
forest management credits. 
It was unavoidable to link this additional flexibility to Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation with 
the EU’s efforts to gain these countries’ support to the Kyoto Protocol. In the closed negotiation group 
on LULUCF, which met at COP-6 bis from 16 through 18 July 2001, the delegates of the three 
countries had emphasised that LULUCF was fundamental to their ratification of the Protocol (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, p. 13). In the LULUCF debate, the EU not only accepted a wider 
definition and use of forestry and land-use GHG abatement, it even contributed to the negotiations 
through a model with which the consequences and opportunities of using forest management could be 
directly estimated.
48
 It was widely concluded that the larger flexibility in the LULUCF debate had 
been a “beneficial trade-off for keeping the Protocol alive” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, p. 14). 
An even stronger example of how the US withdrawal from the Kyoto process affected the 
environmental integrity of the Protocol could be found in the debate on compliance. At COP-6 in 
November 2000, in The Hague, Parties were quite close to an agreement on a compliance regime 
under the Kyoto Protocol that would legally bind non-complying Parties to a compensation of the 
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‘environmental damage’ caused by their non-compliance, e.g., through payments. The EU and the G-
77&China, supported by the USA, were then in favour of strong compliance measures, whereas 
Australia, Japan and the Russian Federation proposed a compliance regime based on ‘environmental 
integrity’ rather than based on ‘reparation of damage.’ (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000a, p. 10) 
In The Hague, the latter position was clearly a minority point of view, but at the resumed COP-6 
session six months later, this situation had changed. Now, without the support of the USA, the EU and 
the G-77&China had less negotiation power to move their strict compliance proposals forward and 
Australia, Japan and the Russian Federation cleverly managed to re-open the compliance debate. 
Eventually, negotiators needed a marathon session, which lasted from Saturday 21 July through 
Monday morning 23 July 2001, to settle the compliance issue, which had turned out to be the major 
obstacle for reaching the Bonn Agreement. The result was that, instead of ‘reparation payments’, 
Parties agreed that Annex I Parties who surpass their assigned amounts would have to carry out extra 
abatement efforts in a future, post-2012, commitment period. This extra effort would amount to 1.3 
times the excess emissions from the Party’s first commitment period assigned amount (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, p. 8). 
Consequently, the compliance regime agreed at COP-6 bis was much weaker than initially envisaged 
by the EU and the G-77&China and the majority view at COP-6. For instance, although the required 
extra effort during a future commitment period was presented as an incentive for present compliance, 
it could also easily be interpreted as an elegant way to postpone abatement action to the future. This 
interpretation was especially relevant when assuming that future commitments would be negotiated in 
a similar way as during the Berlin Mandate process. In other words, a country realising that it will 
overshoot its Kyoto Protocol cap has an incentive to negotiate a higher future assigned amount so that 
the required extra abatement effort (1.3 times the excess emissions) can be compensated by a more 
flexible future target. 
Russian hesitation 
After the Bonn Agreement and Marrakech Accords in 2001, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
was still uncertain, even though the countries with a potentially decisive vote, especially Japan, the 
Russian Federation (together responsible for about a quarter of Annex I Parties’ 1990 emissions), 
Australia and Canada, had been offered considerable concessions at the COPs in Bonn and Marrakech. 
After Japan’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on 4 June 2002, the Russian Federation held the key to 
the entry into force of the protocol. Assuming that Annex I Parties in Central and Eastern Europe 
would ratify as they had indicated and which was likely to happen as most of these countries were 
candidates for EU Membership, the Japanese step raised the percentage of 1990 GHG emissions 
covered by ratification to over 40. For this percentage to surpass the 55% threshold, the 17.4% of the 
Russian Federation was needed, irrespective of whether Canada and/or Australia would ratify.
49
 
Initially, during the 1990s, the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental 
Monitoring (Roshydromet) was responsible for the UNFCCC negotiations as climate change was long 
considered a mainly scientific or technical issue. The Kyoto Protocol changed this picture as the 
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introduction of both quota and project-based emissions trading implied interesting business 
opportunities for the country. With its GHG emissions capped at 1990 levels and after having 
experienced a 35% GHG emission reduction below those levels, due to the strong economic decline 
during the 1990s (Government of the Russian Federation, 2013), the country realised in 1997 that it 
could earn a lot of money from selling surplus assigned amounts. This new political situation made the 
Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade a key player in the Russian debate on climate 
change policy (JIN, 2003a, p. 2). Understandingly, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was a 
big disappointment for this Ministry as this strongly reduced potential international demand for 
Russian surplus assigned amount units and thus lowered projected and actual credit prices and 
revenues.
50
 Without this big earning potential, climate change was no longer a priority issue for the 
Russian government, which basically stopped the ratification process. 
However, under pressure of the EU and Japan, the Russian Government decided to analyse the impact 
on the Russian economy of joining the Kyoto Protocol (Henry & McIntosh Sundstrom, 2007). A key 
concern of the Government was the implication of President Putin’s objective to double the country’s 
GDP by 2010 compared with the year 1990. According to some Russian experts, this could easily lead 
to a larger use of relatively cheap and carbon-intensive fuels in Russian industrial processes (JIN, 
2003a, p. 1). Consequently, increasing Russian GHG emissions would reduce the assigned amount 
surplus. Model simulations showed that due to a doubling of its GDP, Russia would exceed its 1990 
GHG emission levels and turn into a buyer, not a seller, of emission reduction credits (Henry & 
McIntosh Sundstrom, 2007, p. 51) (Illarionov & Pivovarova, 2004).  
Some Russian politicians, such as deputy prime-minister Viktor Khristenko, considered the Kyoto 
Protocol an opportunity to acquire sustainable energy technologies (JIN, 2003a, p. 1), but others, 
especially Putin’s economic advisor Andrey Illarionov, strongly questioned the benefits for the 
Russian Federation from ratifying the Protocol (The Economist, 2003). Within the Government, the 
Ministry of Energy supported the Kyoto Protocol with a view to its potential contribution to improving 
energy conservation and reliability of energy delivery, particularly through JI. The Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, as explained above, lost interest in a Protocol without the USA 
and believed that ratification could only be supported if considered in the context of other multilateral 
agreements. However, perhaps the most important step in the ratification process would be the first 
one: a decision by President Putin to officially request the Cabinet of Ministers to take a decision on 
the Kyoto Protocol. Subsequently, in case of a positive decision, the documents had to be sent to both 
the Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house). Upon an endorsement by the 
Council, President Putin would have to sign and forward the ratification to the UN. 
Eventually, the ratification process was halted until approximately May 2004. President Putin did not 
give any indication on his next steps when the Russian Federation hosted the World Conference on 
Climate Change (WCCC, September 2003). On the contrary, at a WCCC press conference, he even 
remarked, or joked, that climate change could have net benefits for the country in terms of higher 
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agricultural revenues (Baker & McKenzie, 2003). Also, almost at the same time, Mr Vladimir 
Popatov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, in an article in the newspaper Russian 
Gazette, made a comparison with the Russian ratification of the Montreal Protocol, which, in his view, 
had been naïve and had led to serious economic disadvantages for the Russian economy (Baker & 
McKenzie, 2003). Finally, the Russian Government had expressed its disappointment over the €2 
million in the form of technical assistance that the European Commission had promised in case of 
Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The ‘Kremlin’ repeatedly complained that the European 
Commission negotiated with moral arguments instead of tangible incentives (Baker & McKenzie, 
2003). 
By the time of COP-9 (Milan, Italy, December 2003), the perspective of Russian ratification had 
become very low, as Illarionov again explained to the climate ‘community’ why the Kyoto Protocol 
would only bring illusory benefits to his country (Walsh, 2003). 
The first breakthrough, however, came on 21 May 2004 when the Russian Federation reached a 
bilateral agreement with the EU on future Russian membership of the WTO. Given the large trade 
flows between the EU and the Russian Federation, this agreement was extremely important for the 
Putin Administration. During the negotiations, the EU had softened its position regarding the 
artificially low energy prices in the Russian Federation, which it had always considered an important 
obstacle to a WTO agreement. At the press conference on the same day, Putin said that the positive 
outcome of the WTO negotiations with the EU “could not but have helped Moscow’s positive attitude 
to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol” (The Boston Globe, 2004). 
A second breakthrough took place on 30 September 2004 when the Russian Cabinet decided to send 
the Kyoto Protocol to the Duma for final debate and ratification. This decision followed Putin’s re-
election as President but also came after a month during which contradicting signals were heard from 
the Russian Government with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Lavrov, expressing doubts about the 
protocol’s benefits and Prime Minister Mr Fadkov being in favour of ratification. The votes of the 
Duma and the Federal Council, which were dominated by the pro-Putin United Russia Party, were 
acquired relatively easily so that President Putin could send the Russian Federation’s instrument of 
ratification to the UN Secretary General on 19 November 2004. Ninety days later, on 16 February 




3.5. Discussion: Kyoto Protocol Negotiations in Light of Design, Process and 
Tactics Conditions 
 
In this chapter the process leading to the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 at COP-3 and its 
entry into force in 2005 has been discussed in a largely chronological order with specific attention to 
negotiation themes, country positions and dynamics. In this section, the negotiation processes will be 
disentangled with a view to whether and how the three basic conditions for successful climate 
negotiations, as identified in Chapters 1 and 2, have been met. 
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 Eventually, 192 countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2014a). 
Negotiations on a global climate policy – the Kyoto Protocol 
81 
 
Meeting basic condition 1: Kyoto Protocol design 
The key elements of the Kyoto Protocol design as it entered into force on 16 February 2005 were the 
following: 
 The geographical scope of the protocol was clearly global. With its ratification by 192 Parties the 
Kyoto Protocol had a global coverage. During the negotiations the largest thematic focus was on 
GHG emission reduction efforts (mitigation); adaptation was discussed by Parties but was never 
really a crunch issue to ‘make or break’ a negotiation step. 
 Among the key principles of the Kyoto Protocol is that of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities.’ This was reflected by the fact that only industrialised countries adopted 
quantified commitments under the protocol, so that the actual coalition of countries with 
quantified emission reduction or limitation commitments had a size of 36 countries (listed in 
Annex B of the protocol). The actual participation of developing countries in the protocol has 
been more indirect via their possible involvement in GHG emission reduction projects via the 
CDM or via, e.g., technology transfer support programmes (such as technology needs 
assessments, see Chapter 7). Under the Berlin Mandate, some industrialised countries (mainly the 
USA) argued that also developing countries, especially those with rapidly growing economies, 
should adopt quantified emission reduction targets (even on a voluntary basis), but developing 
country negotiators managed to avoid this step at COP-3. 
 Differentiation of responsibilities was also reflected in the different treatment under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol of industrialised countries. Industrialised countries who were, 
by 1992, member of the OECD (listed in UNFCCC Annex II) agreed: to provide new and 
additional financial resources to developing country Parties for meeting their obligations under 
UNFCCC Art.12 (communication of national inventories of GHG emissions by sources and 
removal of sinks); to assist vulnerable developing countries in meeting costs of adaptation to 
adverse climate change effects; and to support promotion, facilitation and finance of 
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 13-14, Art. 
4.3-5). Other industrialised countries, mainly the former centrally planned economies in Central 
and Eastern Europe, were not included in Annex II and thus exempted from these support actions. 
 The main goal towards mitigating GHG emissions in the Kyoto Protocol was that all 
industrialised countries would jointly reduce their emissions by 5.2% during the commitment 
period 2008-2012 compared to emission levels in 1990. This common goal was built up by 
individual country goals as specified in Annex B. As explained in this chapter, the overall target 
and the differentiation of country targets was not based on scientific analysis; rather, it was the 
result of negotiation dynamics during the last days at COP-3. Having a longer term target 
(scheduled to be achieved ten to fifteen years after 1997), however, made it difficult for countries 
to clearly assess what would be the economic costs and other consequences of the negotiation 
results at ‘Kyoto’. As explained by, among others, Oikonomou, et al. (2014) based on an 
assessment of six European environmental policy case studies, policy planning requires that 
policy makers make well-informed assumptions about factors such as the socio-economic and 
political policy context, the policy design and implementation process and possible interactions 
with other (environmental) policy areas and instruments. The longer the timeframe of a target, the 





realisations deviate from anticipated targets. Moreover, there could be a risk of non-compliance 
by Parties should it become clear over time that compliance costs become too high. In order to 
reduce this risk, the Kyoto Protocol aimed at a five-year commitment period so that compliance 
costs could be spread across multiple years. 
 The Kyoto Protocol introduced a number of policy instruments to enable countries to comply 
with the protocol goals. The key instrument for determining quantitative commitments for 
industrialised country Parties was that of annually assigned amounts of GHG emissions per Party 
(i.e. maximum emission levels). These assigned amounts were tradable so that Parties with 
surplus assigned amounts could sell these to other Parties with a deficit. To their assigned 
amounts, Parties could add credits which had been derived from JI and CDM projects in other 
industrialised countries or in collaboration with developing countries. With these two 
mechanisms, it was aimed to increase the ‘surplus’ for industrialised countries to join the Kyoto 
Protocol coalition as it would enable them to broaden their assigned amounts with relatively low-
cost mitigation options in other countries. 
 Next to the geographical flexibility and flexibility in terms of timing for industrialised country 
Parties to fulfil their commitments, the protocol also included flexibility in terms of 
commitments across multiple GHGs. Instead of considering only CO2 emissions, assigned 
amounts were expressed in CO2-equivalents based on six GHGs as listed in Annex A of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, emission reductions achieved in terms of any of these GHGs would 
count against staying below countries’ assigned amounts (also when using JI and CDM credits for 
that, see next chapters). Finally, flexibility was introduced under the protocol, and further 
broadened after US withdrawal from the protocol, through accounting of GHG emission 
reductions achieved with land use, land-use change and forestry measures.  
 With these forms of flexibility the Kyoto Protocol offered a wider scope for industrialised country 
Parties to lower compliance costs as they could choose where GHG reduction measures would 
be relatively cheap, when taking actions would be most beneficial and which GHGs would be 
most efficient to focus on to achieve the protocol’s effectiveness requirements. 
 The compliance regime developed under the Kyoto Protocol to enforce industrialised country 
Parties to comply with their quantified commitments was relatively weak. By requiring non-
complying Parties to make extra efforts during a second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, countries could in principle postpone actions until after 2012. A relatively strict 
compliance measure introduced in the Kyoto Protocol was that countries could be excluded from 
JI project cooperation and international emissions trading if they did not have in place their GHG 
inventory and reporting systems (see Chapter 5). 
In terms of environmental integrity, the Kyoto Protocol was criticised by, for instance, environmental 
NGOs which called the Bonn Agreement a ‘Kyoto lite’ agreement (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, 
p. 13). Moreover, of the initially envisaged GHG emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol, only 17% 
was left due to the larger scope for sinks and the US withdrawal in 2001 (Elzen, 2002). It could 
therefore be argued that the Kyoto Protocol design had lost part of its environmental integrity while 
trying to keep the Umbrella Group countries on board (Dessai & Schipper, 2003). 
In conclusion, the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process resulted in a design which limited GHG 
emission reduction commitments to the relatively small group of industrialised countries. As GHG 
emissions of developing countries were not capped by the protocol, the growing emissions of rapidly 
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industrialising developing countries remained unaddressed. As a compensation, the net quantified 
abatement targets that industrialised countries faced (emission reduction with inclusion of accounting 
of carbon sequestration through LULUCF) were relatively low, with a rather weak compliance regime 
and a large scope for using the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. At the same time, through the flexibility 
mechanisms (in particular the CDM), the Kyoto Protocol design enabled an almost global scope for 
GHG emission reduction measures.  
In terms of the negotiation framework described in Chapter 1, Figure 1-3, this chapter has shown how 
initially the design of the Kyoto Protocol moved to outcome B when it was realised that only 
quantitative commitments for industrialised countries were feasible. The turn towards outcome C, with 
increasing support by Annex I Parties, was made by introducing in the protocol design, among others, 
the concept of GHG emissions trading (including JI and CDM). The end point D was achieved by, 
among others, acknowledging that CDM projects would need to contribute to developing countries’ 
development priorities and enabling compliance with Annex I Parties’ commitments through a broader 
set of carbon sequestration options (including land use and land-use change, see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed discussion on this), so that the protocol could be supported by consensus.  
The deviation between D and ‘ideal’ situation A (in the hypothetical situation of Figure 1-3) remained 
in the final Kyoto Protocol package, because: compliance procedures were weak, rapidly 
industrialising non-Annex I Parties were not included in the list of countries with quantified 
commitments, the 5% emission reduction target was not derived from scientific evidence but the result 
of negotiations, and the scope for accounting GHG emission reductions through LULUCF activities 
was considerably extended, so that fewer incentives remained to reduce GHG emissions in energy and 
industrial sectors in industrialised countries. 
Therefore, in terms of whether basic condition 1 has been met during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, 
it can be concluded that the negotiations managed to successfully consider the key principles of the 
UNFCCC and to address the several game theoretical aspects of country behaviour (meeting the 
condition). However, in terms of whether the negotiations (between 1995 and 2005) produced a 
protocol design for which it could be anticipated that it would strongly reduce GHG emissions in main 
emitting sectors in industrialised countries, it is concluded that the basic condition 1 was not fully met 
for the Kyoto Protocol, as the final design contained too many uncertainties regarding costs, 
compliance and GHG accounting strictness. 
Meeting basic condition 2: Impact of negotiation process under the Berlin Mandate on Kyoto 
Protocol agreement 
The negotiation process leading to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and its entry-into-force in 2005 began 
officially in March 1995 when the first COP was held. From then on, an intense negotiations trajectory 
took place which had the following key characteristics: 
 Parties to the UNFCCC met annually at sessions of the COP to take political decisions at the 
highest political UNFCCC level. The COP process was supported by meetings and more 
technical negotiations in the framework of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies SBSTA and SBI. In 
addition, for the development of the Kyoto Protocol the COP formulated a mandate (Berlin 





which met on average twice a year. During 1995-1997, the COP, supported by SBSTA/SBI, 
worked on implementation of the UNFCCC (focussing on issues such as: GHG emission 
stabilisation, JI pilot projects under AIJ, adaptation, capacity building, technology transfer and 
finance), whereas AGBM solely focussed on protocol negotiations. Therefore, these processes 
were largely kept separate whereby AGBM formally reported to the COP. 
 During the AGBM process, as well as before 1992 during the negotiation process towards a 
UNFCCC agreement, the first meetings mainly focused on organisational or procedural 
matters, which were followed at later sessions by discussions on more fundamental issues such 
as whether developing countries would have to adopt GHG emission reduction commitments or 
whether and how commitments should be focussed on mandatory policies and measures or 
national emission quotas or budgets. The final stages of the INC and AGBM processes were 
largely characterised by intense negotiations where key principles agreed earlier were observed 
(e.g., differentiation, flexibility, equity and an overarching goal such as stabilisation of GHG 
emissions by 2000 or joint 5% emission reduction goal for industrialised countries by 2008-
2012), but where eventually agreed commitments and responsibilities were mainly the result of 
negotiation dynamics under time pressure rather than based on scientifically derived 
methodologies. 
 The negotiation processes towards the Kyoto Protocol (as well as towards the UNFCCC) could 
also be characterised by taking several small steps instead of trying to make a few large steps 
towards a final agreement. With small steps countries could familiarise themselves well with 
positions of other countries and related sensitivities, e.g., how strict are developing countries on 
non-acceptance of quantified commitments or how does the EU proposal on mandatory policies 
and measures for climate change policies differ from quantified, national emission quota and to 
what extent are countries’ internal political situations and sensitivities reflected in their 
negotiation positions? Although progress may not always have been visible and satisfactory 
during the AGBM process, these small steps were indispensable for making the final step in 
Kyoto. 
 During negotiations under the AGBM process and after ‘Kyoto’, countries hardly negotiated as 
individual Parties. Instead, they formed negotiation groups or coalitions to jointly formulate and 
express their views and demands on what benefits they expected from a protocol and what costs 
they would accept. Logically, country negotiation groups were formed by ‘like-minded’ countries 
which had common concerns and interests (e.g., Alliance of Small Island States or Umbrella 
group). The groups subsequently appointed representatives to smaller negotiation groups such as 
‘Friends of the Chair’ or working groups on specific topics at AGBM, SB or COP sessions. At 
some stages during the AGBM process, especially the G-77&China sometimes seemed to splinter 
into smaller developing country groups with different interests on particular topics. However, by 
the time of ‘Kyoto’, the G-77&China regained unity and formed an important negotiation partner 
with strong influence on the eventual negotiation outcome.  
 While the Berlin Mandate negotiation process had mainly taken place within the AGBM and 
COP framework, during 1998-2005 negotiations were increasingly characterised by (high-level) 
bilateral meetings between key Parties (sometimes even in the context of other multilateral 
meetings such as of the WTO). These diplomatic meetings of country representatives between the 
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official UNFCCC sessions turned out to be almost as important as the discussions inside the 
official negotiations room, especially after the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol by the USA. 
In conclusion, the main benefit from the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process was that it was 
sufficiently flexible to enable an ongoing international debate on climate change by observing the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ so that most countries decided to ratify it. 
After all, the negotiation process in this chapter has shown that generally there was no disagreement 
about the requirement to combat global warming; disagreements emerged about the roads to be taken, 
responsibilities and the AGBM process managed to find a mutually acceptable pathway. In that 
respect, basic condition 2 was met during Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The condition was also met 
with respect to the possibility to distinguish political from technical issues, by leaving some 
negotiation steps to the COP and others to the AGBM and Subsidiary Bodies, so that political issues 
would not necessarily have to block technical discussions. However, after the US withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the UNFCCC negotiation process was not able to immediately handle the new 
situation, so that the Protocol had to be saved with help of bi- and multilateral meetings between key 
Parties (for entry into force of the protocol) outside the UNFCCC negotiation process. It showed that 
the negotiations process was sufficiently enabling to work flexibly from hypothetical points A to D in 
Figure 1-3 when the negotiation environment was relatively stable, but when external ‘shocks’ 
emerge, the process needed external support, such as bi- or multilateral meetings of government 
leaders. 
Meeting basic condition 3: Decisive negotiation tactics and facilitating aspects during AGBM 
protocol negotiations 
The Kyoto Protocol design and structure and the progress during the negotiation process were 
influenced by the following negotiation tactics and facilitating aspects: 
 In 1995, the IPCC published its Second Assessment Report with the important conclusion that 
human action could have climatic impacts. This conclusion had a direct impact on climate policy 
making with the COP-1 decision that the stabilisation targets agreed under the UNFCCC for the 
year 2000 were inadequate. The IPCC report conclusions thus formed an important input for the 
Berlin Mandate negotiations. 
 The personalities of Chair Raul Estrada during the AGBM process and US Vice President Al 
Gore were important factors for successful completion of the AGBM and COP-3 negotiations. 
Estrada managed to keep all Parties on board despite their controversies and disagreements and 
managed to keep the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ alive (important for 
developing countries) while enabling considerable flexibility to industrialised countries for 
fulfilling commitments (thereby utilising a broad range of US proposals for the protocol text). 
Gore’s intervention halfway the negotiations at ‘Kyoto’ was important to mobilise the US 
position in a direction away from a stabilisation target for the USA with meaningful participation 
by developing countries (as in the Byrd-Hagel resolution). However, this tactical manoeuvre 
overlooked that the thus agreed Kyoto Protocol text could not be supported by the US Congress 
after ‘Kyoto’, so that US ratification of the text never took place. 
 During the AGBM negotiation process and thereafter, at several points in time, crucial 





instance, the US agreement with the legally-binding nature of GHG emission reduction or 
limitation targets (at AGBM-4) was an important step for continuing protocol design work. It 
clearly facilitated the flexibility in meeting mitigation targets as desired by the USA (flexibility in 
terms of geography, timing and GHG basket). At ‘Kyoto’, broadening the scope of the JI 
mechanism to developing countries (through the CDM) and allowing international quota trading 
were important breakthroughs as these enabled industrialised countries to accept quantified 
emission reduction or limitation commitments. 
 Another main breakthrough took place at COP-6bis in July 2001 when Parties agreed on a 
broader application of accounting methods for using carbon sequestration for Kyoto Protocol 
compliance and on an overall compliance procedure, which triggered protocol support by 
important Annex I Parties such as Japan, Russian Federation and Australia. Finally, a key 
breakthrough for the entry-into-force of the protocol was the EU agreement in May 2004 with 
Russian membership of the WTO, which strongly facilitated Russian ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2004. 
 During the negotiation process, several negotiation groups played prominent and decisive 
tactical and facilitating roles: 
o The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) were prominent during the first stages of the 
negotiation process by tabling concrete proposals for overall emission reduction targets with 
clear equity principles. These proposal were particularly important as they were a reflection of 
the concerns of a group of Parties directly threatened by climatic changes. In terms of 
ambition levels these proposals could be seen as starting points for negotiations (in terms of 
Figure 1-3, close to point A). 
o The JUSSCANZ and later Umbrella Group strongly argued in favour of emission reduction 
commitments for both developed and developing countries, especially those with rapidly 
growing economies and increasing GHG emissions. This proposal was not agreed in the 
eventual Kyoto Protocol text, but in return for ‘losing’ this point, industrialised countries 
acquired broad flexibility tools to comply with their commitments at relatively low costs and 
under a relatively weak compliance regime.  
o The G-77&China negotiators managed to keep commitments for developing countries, even 
voluntary targets, out of the Kyoto Protocol, which they could claim as a success, but which 
also reduced the chances of ratification of the protocol by key industrialised countries and 
their compliance with protocol targets later on.  
o The Russian Federation position during protocol negotiations was characterised by ‘threats’ to 
support the OPEC Parties position and not to adopt quantified emission targets. Eventually, 
the Russian Federation was kept on board of the Annex I/Annex B coalition by agreeing that 
the country would stabilise its GHG emissions at 1990 levels, while the Russia’s actual 
emissions since 1990 had been much lower (giving rise to the debate on ‘hot air’ as explained 
in Chapter 5).  
o The EU, finally, faced several difficulties during the AGBM negotiations as its core proposal, 
mandatory policies and measures for Parties under the protocol, was not supported and 
eventually withdrawn. After the US withdrawal from the protocol in 2001, however, it was 
mainly the EU that managed to save the protocol through careful diplomacy.  
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 At the stage of developing a climate regime during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, probably the 
most important aspect was to obtain a broad international political support for a climate 
policy framework, either through quantified commitments or through non-quantifiable measures, 
such as reporting, awareness building, voluntary action, etc.
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 Eventually, the global climate 
‘community’ was sufficiently determined to keep a global climate policy regime alive, when 
looking at the sudden increase in international diplomacy, both with involvement of industrialised 
and developing countries, after the US decision to withdraw itself from the Kyoto process and 
when the Russian Federation hesitated to ratify the protocol.  
 The Kyoto Protocol process has also revealed some of the characteristics of the international 
relations theories explained in Chapter 2. The behaviour of the four Umbrella Group countries 
during July-November 2001 (i.e. Australia, Japan, Russia and Canada, after the US withdrawal 
from the protocol) can be explained from a neo-realist perspective (Dessai & Schipper, 2003), 
which states that countries look at the distribution of power among the other states and then 
assess what the prospects are for cooperation and making a deal. Realising that they, as a group, 
actually had veto power, the four countries did all they could to acquire the negotiation outcomes 
that they wanted. Nonetheless, also elements from constructivism can be found in the sense that 
the vast majority of Parties have continuously realised that individual decision-making on climate 
policy would lead to less beneficial (long-term) outcomes than multilateral cooperation would 
(Dessai & Schipper, 2003). 
With respect to the above observations, it can be concluded that basic condition 3 (tactics) has been 
met during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in several ways: emerging scientific knowledge creating a 
stronger sense of urgency, personalities with decisive value during key negotiation stages, linking 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations with external negotiation processes such as WTO (EU and Russia), and 
showing creativity by introducing new concepts and weighing other Parties’ responses to that. On the 
other hand, basic condition 3 may not have been successfully met with a view to tactical manoeuvres 
by key negotiators (such as by the US delegation at Kyoto in 1997) which resulted in short-term gains 
(adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-3), but which turned out to be rather unrealistic for domestic 
acceptance at a later stage, such as by the US Congress. 
The above design, negotiation and tactical aspects as basic conditions for the negotiations on the 
formulation and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol during 1992-2005 are summarised in Table 
3-2. 
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 Some authors argued that the Kyoto Protocol should be looked at as a learning-by-doing experiment, to be 





Table 3-2. Summary of design, procedural and tactical aspects of Kyoto Protocol negotiations 
 Description of basic condition in negotiation file 
























 Global coverage, but with commitments for Annex I 
Parties only 
 Both mitigation and adaptation 
Principles: 
 Common but differentiated responsibilities 
 Precautionary principle 
 Cost-effectiveness 
Goals: 
 Overall GHG reduction target (>5% for Annex I Parties) 
 Differentiated commitments for individual Annex I Parties 
Means: 
 Flexibility in terms of timing (5-year commitment period) 
 Geographical flexibility (JI, CDM) 
 Multiple GHGs 
(+)Key principles of the UNFCCC 
were considered in protocol 
(mainly precautionary actions 
and common but differentiated 
responsibilities) 
(–) Uncertainties about Annex I 
Parties’ policy context, 
implementation and policy 
interactions remained 




















 Annual COP sessions 
 Meetings of AGBM 
 Bilateral country leader meetings (esp. 2001-2005) 
Strategy: 
 AGBM enabled small step negotiations 
 Process started with focus on procedures, followed by 
detailed content discussions and concluded with high-
pressure negotiations 
Responsibility: 
 COP chairs annually appointed 
 AGBM chair appointment was longer term 
 Negotiation topics negotiated in working groups 
(+) Sufficiently flexible process to 
enable an ongoing debate on 
climate change and policies 
(+) Distinction between political and 
technical issues 
(–) After US withdrawal, UNFCCC 
negotiation process needed 
external support from bilateral 
























 IPCC SAR 1995 – indication of possible human impact on 
climate systems 
 UNFCCC secretariat facilitated meetings by preparing 
negotiation texts in multiple languages 
 AGBM-Chair Estrada and US Vice-President Gore had 
important roles towards COP-3 agreement on Kyoto 
Protocol 
 Inclusion of JI and CDM on global scale facilitated 
agreement on Annex I Party commitments 
 EU recognition of Russia’s WTO ambitions supported 
Kyoto Protocol ratification 
 US withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol led to weaker 
compliance regime of protocol. 
(+) Stronger sense of urgency, role of 
personalities, link with external 
negotiations (WTO), new 
concepts introduced 
(+) Inclusion of world-wide GHG 
emissions trading instruments 
(+) Facilitative secretariat support 
(–) US agreement of Kyoto Protocol 




 Chapter 4.  Negotiations on a Climate Policy 




When agreeing under the UNFCCC that industrialised (Annex I) countries shall “adopt national 
policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs” (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 12, Art.4.2a), it was also agreed that “these Parties may 
implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties” (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 12, Art.4.2b). 
This agreement formed the basis of the concept of ‘Joint Implementation’ (JI) which created the 
possibility for Parties to invest in GHG emission reduction measures on the territory of and in 
cooperation with other countries. The main rationale for JI is that GHGs mix evenly within the 
atmosphere so that there is no direct link between the location and the impact of GHG emissions or 
emission reductions (Cubasch, et al., 2013, pp. 123-129).
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 Therefore, the effect of GHG emission 
reduction actions is independent of their location, which implies that cost reductions can be achieved if 
these actions take place where costs are relatively low. 
As has been shown in Chapter 3, JI was among the negotiation factors which facilitated agreements on 
the UNFCCC and also later on the Kyoto Protocol. An important reason for that was that inclusion of 
JI (and the related Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) in the negotiations generated a stronger 
willingness of industrialised countries to adopt country-specific GHG emission reduction targets. In 
terms of Figure 1-3, while the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations initially moved from 
outcome A to outcome B, the cost-effectiveness potential and envisaged sustainable development 
contribution of JI (and CDM) enabled negotiations to move to outcomes such as C or D. In that sense, 
JI was an important design element for reaching global consensus on the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol. How this has taken place, has been explained in Chapter 3. 
Negotiations on JI itself, however, faced similar negotiation dynamics as UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations had faced. Also for JI, an ideal negotiation outcome could be envisaged (point A 
in Figure 1-3) with global collaboration between industrialised and developing countries whereby 
countries with relatively high GHG emission reduction costs would invest in low-cost countries, so 
that a similar GHG emission reduction performance could be achieved at lower costs. However, soon 
after the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, it became clear that JI was among its most controversial 
elements, which resulted in fierce debates at INC meetings during 1992-1995 (see also Chapter 3). At 
these meetings a controversy among countries arose on whether it was fair to allow industrialised 
countries, for instance when complying with their UNFCCC year 2000 stabilisation targets, to 
implement relatively cheap GHG abatement measures on the territory of, e.g., developing countries. 
Sceptics argued, for instance, that JI would delay investments in sustainable energy systems in 
                                                     
53
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a situation that for a certain time period the amount of GHG above a certain region remains bigger than above 
another region (R.J. Heintz & Tol, 1995). In the long run, however, the mixing process of GHG will equalise 





industrialised countries (Maya, 1995). These arguments resulted in a reduced support by developing 
countries of the concept JI (corresponding to a move from outcome A to outcome B in Figure 1-3). 
It is probably due to careful diplomacy at negotiation sessions and the energetic support of some 
countries that the JI concept remained ‘alive’ during this period and eventually became one of the 
pillars of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. The debate on JI was fuelled by scientific contributions showing 
the cost-effectiveness potential, the concerns of environmental NGOs and those of governments who 
favoured JI or were against the concept (Kuik, et al., 1994) (Jepma, 1995b). Slowly, however, after a 
difficult start at the first post-UNCED sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), 
Parties began to listen to each other’s arguments. This led to an interesting debate moving from an 
initially negative attitude towards JI to a further development of the concept. As the JI negotiations 
thus turned out to have a similar dynamics as the overarching climate policy negotiations on the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, this chapter explores whether and how the three basic conditions for 
negotiating globally supported GHG emission reduction measures have been met for JI. 
 
4.2. The Theoretical Background of the Concept of Joint Implementation 
 
4.2.1.  The cost-effectiveness principle of JI 
The cost-effectiveness principle of JI can be illustrated via the following elementary case (Pearce, 
1995, p. 19). Figure 4-1 shows a two-country model with countries X and Y. Country X’s marginal 
cost curve is shown in the Figure as curve MCx and country Y’s marginal cost curve is reflected by 
MCy. MCx should be read from left to right and MCy should be read from right to left (both curves 
have a positive slope). In this example, Annex I Party X has a quantified GHG emission reduction 
commitment of AZ. Country Y does not have such a commitment because it is a non-Annex I Party 
and has been exempted from a commitment according to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (UNFCCC, 1992a). With help of JI projects, country X could fulfil part of its 
quantified commitment across its own borders, i.e. on the territory of country Y. In return, country X 
receives a credit from country Y for the emission reduction achieved, which it can use to fulfil its 
overall abatement effort AZ. 
Should country X fulfil its commitment AZ solely through domestic actions, then its total abatement 
costs would amount to triangle ABZ (the area below curve MCx). If, instead, country X achieved 
reduction AZ fully through JI projects in country Y, X's total abatement costs would amount to 
triangle ACZ. 
From Figure 4-1 it becomes clear that, in terms of cost-effectiveness, neither a strategy of domestic 
action only, nor full use of JI is optimal for country X. The optimum policy for X is to achieve 
reduction AD at home and DZ via JI projects in country Y. After all, domestic reduction beyond AD 
can only be achieved by country X at marginal abatement costs which are higher than those in country 
Y; all JI emission reductions beyond DZ have higher marginal costs than domestic investment in X. 
As a result, total abatement costs for country X amount to the area AEZ and the cost-savings for 
country X through JI amount to area BEZ. 
 


















Figure 4-1. Cost-effective GHG abatement with JI 
 
As a concept of international cooperation among countries to reduce abatement costs, JI was not new. 
Earlier, some forms of JI had been introduced in other international agreements, treaties, and 
conventions, such as in the Convention Concerning the Protection of Rhine Against Pollution by 
Chlorides (1976), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (1979), the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(1985), and the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention (1987) (Schrijver, 1995). Each of these 
conventions enabled Parties to cooperate in order to achieve targets together, with a view to reducing 
the overall costs. While drafting the UNFCCC, the country delegations were able to consider some 
lessons learned elsewhere. 
However, the cost-effectiveness potential in the context of climate change policies is potentially 
(much) larger than in the more region-based conventions mentioned above. For example, JI in the 
ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution is complicated by the fact that most of 
the gases covered by this Convention (e.g. sulphur dioxide) do not mix evenly in the atmosphere, but 
deposit, after their emission, in a region which is relatively near to the source of pollution. This 
implies, for example, that if Germany agrees with the Czech Republic that part of the pollution caused 
by emissions in the German Ruhrgebiet would be offset by a German investment in a Czech pollution 
reduction programme, the regions in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg adjacent to the 
Ruhrgebiet would still suffer from the pollution caused there. Eventually, the ECE Convention divided 
Europe in a number of rectangular areas within which JI is possible; action outside the area must be 
accompanied by action within the area as well. This, however, has strongly reduced the potential for 
cost-effective international cooperation under the ECE Convention.
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 This situation has often been referred to as the SO2 dilemma: the extent to which JI can be applied is limited 
due to the regional disposition of the pollutant (Schrijver, 1995). 
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4.2.2.  JI in the IPCC Second Assessment Report 
Fairly remote from the political negotiations on a climate Protocol, the IPCC completed its Second 
Assessment Report (SAR) in December 1995. Part of the SAR was a report by Working Group III 
(WG III) on “the socio-economic perspectives of climate change in the context of sustainable 
development” (IPCC, 1995) (JIN, 1995a). In its Chapter 11 (An Economic Assessment of Policy 
Instruments to Combat Climate Change), WG III identified JI as one of the market-based policy 
instruments for meeting GHG emission targets and discussed, among others, the following two topics 
related to the instrument. 
First, the ‘lead authors’ considered JI as a possible first step towards establishing an international 
tradable quota system for GHGs (IPCC, 1995, pp. WGIII, ch.11). In such a trading system, an Annex I 
Party with lower GHG emissions than its quota can sell this surplus to a Party that has surpassed its 
quota. Intuitively, this implies that Annex I Parties with relatively low abatement costs have an 
incentive to create surpluses within their quota and sell these to Parties with relatively high abatement 
costs. Parties with relatively high costs, on the other hand, have an incentive to surpass their quota and 
purchase surpluses from other Parties. As such, an international market emerges where a price is put 
on GHG emissions. 
However, such a quota system assumes that countries with relatively low abatements costs are able to 
invest in emission reduction measures themselves in order to create a surplus within their quota. In 
reality, however, such up-front investments may be difficult for countries which suffer domestically 
from a lack of capital, insufficient investment infrastructure, and a lack of specialised human capital. 
In other words, what may look like relatively cheap investment options from an international 
perspective, may, from a purely domestic perspective, turn out to be prohibitively expensive for the 
potential GHG quota units selling country. Through JI, these problems could be avoided as it 
envisages a (project-level) cooperation between Parties whereby the buyer of the emission reduction 
credits could support the upfront project investment and support the mitigation of investment risks in 
the host country. 
However, a second observation of the IPCC ‘lead authors’ was that it may be difficult to demonstrate 
that JI investments would not have taken place anyway. According to the IPCC, especially the 
additionality of low-cost JI projects in developing countries would be uncertain, since “such projects 
may be close to being profitable and hence may be carried out by the market itself in the near future” 
(IPCC, 1995, pp. WGIII, ch.11). Moreover, a country hosting a JI project may, have an incentive to 
exaggerate the emission reductions achieved. The authors point out that the latter problem could be 
partly solved by establishing a clearinghouse version of JI between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties: 
“[t]he role of such a clearinghouse would be to screen and aggregate all projects from potential sellers 
before they are offered as anonymous carbon credits to buyers at a market clearing price” (IPCC, 
1995, pp. WGIII, ch.11). 
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4.3.  Concerns about JI Expressed during UNFCCC Negotiations 
 
As has been explained in Chapter 3, the possibility of cooperation among countries on GHG emission 
reduction measures in order to reduce overall abatement costs was discussed, among others, at the 
1989 ministerial climate conferences in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. About two years later, Norway 
submitted a proposal at INC-3 (Nairobi, September 1991) to establish a clearinghouse which would 
match cost-effective GHG investment options (JI supply) with industrialised countries’ search for such 
options (JI demand) (Wexler, et al., 1994) (McKinsey and Company, 1989). In general, the 
participants at INC-3 warmly welcomed the Norwegian proposal (Arts, 1998, p. 139). Industrialised 
countries supported the proposal as it would enable them to also comply with future GHG emission 
reduction targets through actions across their borders at relatively low costs. Also developing 
countries, as potential JI project host countries, initially had a positive attitude towards the Norwegian 
proposal (Arts, 1998, p. 139). However, the positive reception of the concept at INC-3 and the 
subsequent inclusion in the final draft of the UNFCCC was no guarantee for an easy implementation 
of JI once the UNFCCC had entered into force. Environmental NGOs and a growing number of 
developing countries expressed their objections to JI (Arts, 1998, p. 140). 
First, they feared that JI would enable industrialised countries to continue with their relatively carbon-
intensive domestic consumption and production patterns. JI sceptics tended to place the discussion on 
JI within the context of historic GHG emission patterns and concluded that industrialised countries 
would first have to reduce their GHG emissions domestically, before considering low-cost investments 
abroad. Otherwise, JI could become a reason for postponing domestic GHG emission reduction 
measures (Maya, 1995) (Gupta & Kuik, 1995). 
A second concern of environmental NGOs and developing countries was related to the initial 
popularity of carbon sequestration in forests as JI project option (Arts, 1998, p. 140), such as forest 
conservation (mainly halting deforestation), afforestation (planting trees on a fallow site) and 
reforestation (planting tree on a deforested area) activities. On the one hand, several countries (e.g., the 
Latin and Central American countries) recognised that the value of the carbon credits from forestry JI 
projects could offer an incentive for protecting forest areas which might otherwise be threatened by 
logging (for instance if the area on which trees grow becomes more valuable than the trees 
themselves). However, other developing countries, thereby supported by environmental NGOs (Hare 
& Stevens, 1995), argued that the relatively long lifetime of forestry projects, e.g., 50 or 100 years,
55
 
would imply that a JI forestry project would occupy a certain area in the host country for a long time, 
thereby reducing or even removing host countries’ flexibility to use the area for other purposes. It 
could also lead to replacement of deforestation activities to other areas that are not covered by the JI 
project so that in fact no net carbon sequestration takes place (this effect is often referred to as carbon 
leakage).  
A third issue raised during the INC negotiations on JI was related to the accounting of GHG emission 
reductions achieved by a JI project. For that it is needed to measure the actual emissions under the 
project scenario and compare these with the emissions in a reference (or baseline) scenario. 
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 For example, some of the projects implemented under the programme of the Dutch foundation FACE (forests 
absorbing carbon dioxide emissions) have a contractual lifetime of 99 years with 3 or 4 rotation periods of 25 or 30 





Determining a baseline could be problematic as it describes a scenario that is replaced by the project 
and therefore counterfactual. A baseline can therefore at best be based on a set of assumptions about 
the future development of project-related variables, such as: the host country's economic growth 
perspective, demographic development, relevant government policies, etc. Given the uncertainties that 
surround the estimation of such variables, there may be a risk that JI partners deliberately estimate 
baseline emissions at too high levels in order to claim more GHG emission reduction credits from JI 
projects (PROBASE, 2003). This could reduce the environmental integrity of JI as the claimed 
emission reductions are not realised in reality, while they are still sold to a foreign JI investor as real 
emission reductions to be used as a compensation for domestic GHG emissions. Chapter 6 further 
elaborates on this issue, especially with a view to how negotiations have dealt with JI’s (and the 
CDM’s) environmental integrity while trying to keep the mechanism workable on a large scale. 
A fourth concern expressed during INC negotiations was related to the possible relationship between 
JI funding and industrialised countries’ contribution to Official Development Assistance (ODA). Since 
the early 1970s, OECD countries have been committed to ODA transfers to developing countries.
56
 In 
addition, as Annex II Parties under the UNFCCC they have a commitment to enable financial transfers 
to countries with economies in transition and developing countries under the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). During the INC negotiations, developing countries argued that JI projects should not 
be financed from ODA and GEF funds, as this would lead to GHG credit transfers to industrialised 
countries for financial transfers which they had to carry out anyway. When COP-1 in 1995 decided on 
the pilot phase for JI, it was explicitly mentioned that JI project should not be financed with funding 
reserved for ODA and GEF purposes (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995b, p. 5). 
Finally, there was a concern that JI projects could lead to a process of ‘skimming’ in the host 
countries, i.e. investors pick the cheapest abatement options (‘low hanging fruits’) first (Lee, et al., 
1997, pp. 19-25) so that by the time developing countries would need to undertake emission 
reductions by themselves, only the more expensive options would remain. Although this argument 
received much attention in several academic studies (Gupta & Kuik, 1995) (Lee, et al., 1997), it was 
not been widely supported as it tended to overlook JI’s potential for deployment and diffusion of 
technologies and resulting innovation support in JI host countries. Nonetheless, the concern addressed 
the issue that technologies transferred to a host country should not only be beneficial for the investor 
countries in terms of realising GHG emission reductions but also be beneficial for host countries with 
a view to meeting their domestic economic, environmental and social needs. Therefore, developing 
countries managed to keep this issue within the negotiations where it formed the basis for the 
condition in the CDM definition (in Kyoto Protocol Art. 12) that a GHG abatement project should in 
the first place contribute to achieving sustainable development in the host country (UNFCCC, 1998). 
With these concerns in mind, JI became a controversial issue at the INC sessions between 1992 and 
1995, which is discussed in the next sections. 
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4.4.  Towards a JI Pilot Phase - 'Rio' to 'Berlin' (1993 - 1995) 
 
4.4.1.  Introduction 
Among the first tasks of COP-1 (Berlin, March-April 1995) was to take decisions regarding criteria for 
JI to be reviewed by the COP by 31 December 1998 at the latest (UNFCCC, 1992a, pp. 11, 
Art.4.2(d)). Preparatory discussions for COP-1 took place under the INC, which met six times between 
UNCED and COP-1 under the Chairmanship of Mr Raúl Estrada-Oyuela from Argentina. 
At the INC sessions, it soon became clear that several passages in the UNFCCC had been 
ambiguously formulated and therefore left room for different interpretations. The passage defining JI 
was an example of such ambiguity. According to UNFCCC Article 4.2a, Annex I Parties could 
implement their commitments (e.g., the quantitative objective for Annex I Parties to stabilise their 
GHG emissions by the year 2000 at the levels of 1990) jointly with other Parties (UNFCCC, 1992a). 
However, developing countries immediately opposed the idea of Annex I Parties fulfilling their 
stabilisation objective under the UNFCCC through JI. Among industrialised countries there was no 
consensus about this issue, either. The USA was in favour of using JI already for the UNFCCC 
stabilisation target in 2000 (whether it was called an objective or a commitment), whereas the EU 
preferred to wait until the mechanism had been completely developed (including properly addressing 
the concerns mentioned in Section 4.3) and to use JI only for GHG abatement efforts that would go 
beyond the UNFCCC stabilisation target.  
An important issue at INC meetings was the role of developing countries in JI cooperation. In the view of 
several developing countries, UNFCCC Article 4.2b only referred to cooperation among Annex I Parties 
as only these countries had a quantitative target under the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992a). During the 
negotiations, Parties subsequently considered possible interpretations of the scope of the Article. 
According to a narrow interpretation, Annex I Parties could partly achieve their quantitative targets on the 
territory of another Party. A wider interpretation of the Article would also provide scope for cooperation 
on any type of joint action to meet the overall UNFCCC objective, e.g., through technology and financial 
transfers (Arts, et al., 1994).  
At INC sessions, the wider interpretation did not receive much support, but focussing on the narrow 
interpretation still left unanswered the question of which countries could host JI projects, only Annex I or 
also non-Annex I Parties? From a purely legal perspective, UNFCCC Article 4.2b did not exclude the 
possibility of developing country Parties acting as host countries of JI projects. After all, the Article stated 
that Annex I Parties may implement policies and measures “jointly with other Parties,” so that legally 
speaking there was no reason why developing countries could not be eligible as JI host countries. 
The political perspective of this interpretation issue, however, was different. At INC-8 (in August 1993, 
see below), many negotiators felt that JI could not, or at least not for the time being (i.e. before 2000), 
include cooperation between industrialised and developing countries with the objective to support 
industrialised countries in achieving their commitments. In addition to this higher level political argument, 
developing country negotiators emphasised that JI was not ready yet for use as an operational instrument 
under the UNFCCC as several issues had not been resolved yet. Examples of such issues were the 
accounting of GHG emission reductions and eligibility of project types. For instance, several Parties at 





excluded from JI because of the relatively high uncertainties associated with measuring the carbon 
sequestration, the risk of leakage, and the opportunity costs that may occur for the host country because of 
the relatively long lifetime of forestry projects. Regarding the sinks issue, there certainly was no 
unanimity among developing countries, because some of them, e.g., Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Belize, had 
already become involved in forestry projects with the Netherlands and the USA (INC, 1993). 
Below, the exchange of views at the INC negotiation between August 1993 (INC-8) and February 1995 
(INC-9) is described. 
 
4.4.2.  INC-8 
At INC-8 (Geneva, Switzerland, 16-27 August 1993), the discussions on JI were based on statements 
delivered by 59 Parties, including Colombia, speaking on behalf of the G-77&China, and Belgium 
speaking on behalf of the EU (INC, 1993). In their statements, developing countries generally took a 
negative position on JI. The G-77&China, supported by Nauru on behalf of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), expressed the above-mentioned position that JI only applied to cooperation 
among Annex I Parties. Malaysia added that JI with developing countries could only be considered an 
eligible instrument once industrialised countries would have fully met their stabilisation obligations 
under the UNFCCC through national measures. In addition, Nauru argued that JI should not create an 
incentive for industrialised countries to postpone the development of appropriate technological 
innovation (Kuik, et al., 1994, p. 191). 
The EU supported many of the points raised by developing countries. While recognising the potential 
of JI to reduce global GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner, the EU stated that JI “also entails the 
risk of development in the wrong direction” (INC, 1993). The EU also took the official position that 
industrialised countries should not use JI for achieving their stabilisation objective under the 
UNFCCC: “in order to fulfil the specific commitments of Annex I Parties (contained in Article 4.2b) . 
. . countries must limit their greenhouse gas emissions at home through their own actions and should 
not use other countries to do the work for them” (INC, 1993). In addition, the EU argued that “Parties 
should implement a significant and specified share of any future commitments through measures taken 
on their own territories” (INC, 1993). The latter statement later became an official EU position during 
the negotiations on modalities and procedures for the Kyoto Protocol between 1998 and 2005 (see the 
discussion in Chapter 5 on supplementarity). 
In its intervention in Working Group I of INC-8,
57
 the Netherlands’ delegation pointed at the 
importance of gaining practical, hands-on experience with JI. The lack of such experience had made 
“the debate about the role of joint implementation and the criteria that should be developed to ensure a 
proper application a somewhat theoretical exercise” (Netherlands, 1993). In the same Working Group, 
the EU supported the idea of testing the JI concept during a pilot phase after which the final JI criteria 
could be decided upon along the lines of UNFCCC Article 4.2d. The Dutch intervention was partly 
based on pilot projects with JI resemblance that the Netherlands had already developed during 1992-
1993. The Dutch Electricity Generating Board (SEP) had agreed with the Netherlands Government to 
offset the GHG emissions of a 600 MW power plant through the planting of trees both in the 
Netherlands and abroad (Stuart & Moura Costa, 1998). In addition, the Dutch delegation at INC-8 
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Negotiations on a climate policy instrument – Joint Implementation 
97 
 
underlined the importance of having an extensive dialogue on JI and announced that it would publish a 
book on JI and organise an international JI conference (see Box 4-1) (Netherlands, 1993). 
Box 4-1. The Groningen International Conference on Joint Implementation  
From several publications on JI since 1993 it became clear that if JI were to become a successful tool 
under the UNFCCC and future climate protocols it was necessary to establish a regular exchange of 
views between stakeholders at the project level and international policy makers.
58
 In this pre-Internet 
era, one of the first attempts to create a platform where business representatives, government officials, 
academics and environmental NGOs could meet and exchange thoughts and experiences was the 
‘International Conference on Joint Implementation’ held in Groningen, the Netherlands, on 1-3 June 
1994 (Jepma, 1995a). The Conference was an initiative of the Netherlands Government
59
 and hosted 163 
participants of which 90 persons where from Central and Eastern European and developing countries. 
Next to scientific contributions, updates on the political development of the JI concept, and presentations 
of national JI programmes (e.g., the newly launched US Initiative on Joint Implementation, USIJI), the 
conference provided specific examples of GHG offset projects, such as a sink enhancement project in 
Paraguay implemented by the US utility company AES, the ILUMEX compact fluorescent light bulbs 
project in Mexico, carried out under auspices of the World Bank, and the Decin-Bynov co-generation 
project in the Czech Republic. 
At the meeting, it became clear that several policy makers in both developed and developing countries 
seemed to be rather unaware of the experiences with actual projects. At the same time, for the business 
community the INC negotiations seemed fairly remote from their own interests. For example, by the 
time of the Groningen conference the INC negotiations were moving into the direction of a 
compromise on a JI pilot phase without crediting of the emission reductions achieved. This 
compromise was strongly criticised by business community representatives, especially by those 
companies who had already become engaged in GHG offset projects and felt that their project 
experience was insufficiently taken into consideration during the negotiations. Eventually, the 
participants agreed on the ‘Groningen Statement on Joint Implementation’ which underscored: the role 
of JI as a complement for domestic action in industrialised countries, the need for clear and verifiable 
JI project criteria (including the accounting of emission reductions), and the importance of gaining 
further experience with JI through international cooperation on GHG emission reduction and carbon 
sequestration. 
 
The Dutch delegation at INC-8 supported the G77 & China position that industrialised country 
stabilisation targets for the year 2000 should not be met through JI (in line with the EU position). 
However, the Netherlands also argued that this would not exclude JI cooperation with non-Annex I 
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Parties for actions carried out on top of the stabilisation targets. In its intervention, the Netherlands 
unilaterally offered a further five per cent reduction below its 1990 GHG emission level by the year 
2000 of which two percentage-points were to be achieved through JI projects. To account for these 
emission reductions, a bookkeeping system with separate accounts for domestic and international (i.e. 




4.4.3.  INC-9 
By the time of INC-9 (Geneva, 7-18 February 1994), the political lines of estrangement among 
(groups of) industrialised country Parties on the one hand, and between industrialised countries and 
developing countries on the other hand, had become sharper as far as the discussion on JI was 
concerned. This was largely the result of the launching of the Climate Change Action Plan by the 
Clinton Administration in the USA in October 1993 (Graham, 1995). Although the Plan had 
announced that the USA in principle aimed at achieving its stabilisation target via domestic abatement 
action, the Plan did not explicitly exclude the use of JI in this context. On the contrary, the US 
Government emphasised that an enormous potential existed for cost-effective GHG abatement 
measures to be taken abroad in cooperation with other countries. In order to support the development 
of the JI concept, the Climate Change Action Plan introduced the US Initiative on Joint 
Implementation (USIJI), which was the first full-blown JI pilot programme in the world (Graham, 
1995). 
The fact that the USA had announced that it would in principle meet the UNFCCC target via domestic 
action invited the EU to present a somewhat sharper position than it had done at INC-8. Although, due 
to the EU system of rotating Chairs, the INC-9 position paper had been prepared under the 
responsibility of a different Chair (i.e. Greece), the change in the tone of the statement was largely 
induced by the EU Council of Environment Ministers, of which the composition had hardly changed. 
Contrary to the EU statement at INC-8, which had begun with recognising the cost-effectiveness 
potential of JI, the EU INC-9 statement stated in paragraph 2 that JI is “a complex issue with far-
reaching political implications” (Greece on behalf of EU, 1994). In paragraph 3 (out of 6), the EU 
repeated its earlier position that Annex I Parties “must limit their greenhouse gas emissions at home 
through their own actions and that this commitment should not be met by joint implementation 
projects” (Greece on behalf of EU, 1994). The EU argued that for JI to become a useful instrument 
under the UNFCCC, it was necessary to build confidence amongst all Parties first. In this process, 
crediting of GHG emission reductions achieved by JI projects would, for the time being, not be 
eligible as this “would be very damaging for the credibility of Annex I Parties.” As a result, the EU 
wanted to “refrain from talking about crediting of joint implementation towards the current [1990-
2000] commitments” as a too strong focus on crediting JI in the short term would “harm the potential 
long-term benefits of joint implementation” (Greece on behalf of EU, 1994, p. para.4). 
At INC-9, the idea of a JI pilot phase was further discussed. On 10 February 1994, the Netherlands 
delegation elaborated on a proposal of a phased approach for JI development. According to this 
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commitment approach with a view to quantitative commitments beyond the UNFCCC stabilisation target for the 
year 2000 (Netherlands, 1993). 
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approach, Parties could first start with a JI pilot phase (without crediting emission reductions against 
UNFCCC stabilisation targets), which could, after three years of the pilot phase experience and a 
further exchange of views during negotiations, be followed by a consecutive phase with ‘more 
elaborate criteria’ (Netherlands, 1994). For the pilot phase, general and flexible criteria would be 
sufficient, which could be extended with more detailed criteria based on the pilot project experiences 
(Metz, 1994). The Dutch INC-9 intervention carefully avoided the issue of whether crediting of 
emission reductions would be allowed in the second phase. At most it said that a “phased approach 
implies that issues such as ‘crediting’ against commitments under the Climate Convention, are dealt 
with and agreed upon at a later stage” (Metz, 1994) (Netherlands, 1994). 
Box 4-2. Catalyzing a Market for Joint Implementation Projects 
At INC-9, the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD, presently World BCSD) 
presented a study project ‘Catalyzing a Market for Joint Implementation Projects’, prepared by a 
network of senior business executives and government officials to coordinate international action on JI 
(Verdugo & Leslie, 1994). At a BCSD meeting in Miami (USA, early 1994) business representatives 
had expressed their concern that INC negotiations had still not resulted in modalities for implementing 
JI projects, including rules for credit sharing, whereas at the same time several BCSD members had 
already expressed their interest in JI demonstration projects. Therefore, BCSD recommended that the 
INC develop a framework for such demonstration projects, including guidance to potential JI 
investors. Furthermore, the Miami meeting stated that the business community would only invest in JI 
pilot activities if it had sufficient guarantee that a pilot phase would be followed by a full-blown JI 
regime. 
‘Catalyzing a Market for Joint Implementation Projects’ was presented at INC-9 by Jim Leslie, Senior 
Vice-President of Corporate Services at TransAlta Utilities in Canada, and Sergio Verdugo, Planning 
Manager of CAP S.A. in Chile (Verdugo & Leslie, 1994). In 1992 and 1993, TransAlta, being a medium-
sized electric utility generating 95 percent of its electricity by coal and one of the largest sources of CO2 
emissions in Canada, began developing activities to reduce GHG emissions: CO2 emission reduction from 
its own operations; pursuing energy efficiency improvements with its own customers by enhancing 
demand-side management programmes and investments; and making an inventory of the opportunities to 
reduce the effects of the company's emissions via offsets, e.g., via measures carried out abroad. TransAlta 
realised that it would need JI-type of actions for meeting possible future GHG abatement commitments. 
However, as the report explained, an internal TransAlta advisory process showed that its customers 
preferred that the company spent capital locally in order to create local jobs. TransAlta’s stakeholders 
were also concerned that the uncertainties surrounding GHG would offset projects outside the own area of 
Western Canada. In order to help addressing these uncertainties, TransAlta decided to play an active part 
in the JI study project of the BCSD and to set up a JI demonstration project together with the Chilean 
company CAP S.A. in Santiago de Chile. Through this project both companies, as well as their 
stakeholders, could learn what a real JI project would look like. The TransAlta-CAP pilot became a key 






The EU and Dutch statements turned out to be a reflection of the general feeling at INC-9 amongst the 
delegates that a testing period would enable Parties to better assess JI’s potential benefits and risks, 
and that during the pilot phase GHG emission reduction credits should not accrue to JI investor 
countries. As Box 4-2 shows, also the business community could support a phased approach, on 
condition of a guarantee that a pilot phase would be followed by a full-blown JI regime. The reserved 
attitude at INC towards JI in general, and JI crediting in particular, in combination with INC’s slow 
progress with formulating general JI criteria, made the idea of a pilot phase without crediting the main 
input into the negotiations at INC-10 and 11. In its conclusion on JI, INC-9 requested the interim 
secretariat of the UNFCCC
61
 to develop further documentation on JI, which should include options for 
a phased approach beginning with a JI pilot phase. The documentation should address objectives and 
list possible criteria for a pilot phase and institutional arrangements so that an outline of the main 
elements of a pilot phase could be prepared by INC-10 and 11 to be adopted by COP-1. 
 
4.4.4.  Preparing for COP-1: INC-10 and 11 
INC-10 (Geneva, 22 August - 2 September 1994) (INC, 1994) and INC-11 (New York, 6 - 17 
February 1995) (INC, 1995b) further elaborated on the JI pilot phase based on a note by the interim 
secretariat of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 1994) which described that the purpose of the JI pilot phase 
was to: 
 test the JI concept, 
 develop a better understanding of complex issues, 
 develop a broad basis of experience, and 
 address the political implications of JI in a step-by-step manner. 
In the note, the secretariat put forward the consideration that, assuming no crediting would take place 
during a pilot phase, all Parties, including non-Annex I Parties, would be eligible to participate in JI 
activities. As such, the secretariat reduced the negotiating scope for developing countries. Since the 
assumption of a pilot phase without crediting removed an important concern of developing countries, 
it became more difficult for them to oppose voluntary participation of non-Annex I Parties in the pilot 
phase. Consequently, for several developing countries the participation of non-Annex I Parties on a 
strictly voluntary ‘opt-in’ basis had become acceptable, at least for the pilot phase. 
In the draft COP-1 decision prepared at INC-11, JI pilot phase projects were for the first time referred 
to as “joint action to implement policies and measures which in no way modifies the commitment of 
each Party” (INC, 1995c). Another term used in New York was ‘joint implementation activities’. Both 
terms were a reflection of the attempts to make explicitly clear that the pilot phase would be different 
from a JI regime with crediting of emission reductions. 
In general, at the eve of COP-1 (i.e. early 1995) the positions on introducing JI were as follows. Some 
countries, e.g., the USA, were in favour of an immediate introduction of a full-blown JI system with 
crediting (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995a). Other Parties, such as the EU, supported a pilot phase 
without the possibility of crediting JI emission reductions towards Annex I Parties’ objectives under 
the UNFCCC for the year 2000 (Article 4.2). Finally, the majority of the non-Annex I Parties 
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considered a full-blown JI system with crediting of GHG emission reductions before 2000 
unacceptable. The main difference between the latter two positions was that, unlike the EU, many 
developing countries did not want to already express their support for a JI-with-crediting scheme for 
commitments after the year 2000. The G-77&China repeatedly argued that they wanted the Annex I 
Parties to first fulfil their GHG stabilisation targets for 2000 and enable financial and technology 
transfers to developing countries (Article 4.4). They therefore preferred avoiding the term ‘Joint 
Implementation’ and to focus on ‘Joint activities’ instead. 
Nevertheless, Parties reached consensus at INC-11 that JI could be taken further as an element of 
negotiations on quantitative commitments for Annex I Parties for the period after the year 2000, 
should COP-1 decide on such negotiations based on a review of the adequacy of commitments (see 
Chapter 3) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1995a). Eventually, there was consensus at INC that crediting 
of JI emission reductions would not be allowed for pre-2000 objectives and that allowing future 
crediting would to a certain extent depend on the results of a JI pilot phase. 
Shortly before COP-1, it could be concluded that during the INC negotiations on JI between 1992 and 
1995 industrialised countries had failed to clearly demonstrate the benefits of JI for all Parties 
involved. Basically, JI has a triple-win potential with the possibility to bring different policy priorities 
of Parties together. First, by reducing GHG emissions (and often, as a side effect, also emissions of 
other pollutants) JI contributes to preventing global climate change. Second, the investor country in 
the Annex I region can fulfil its commitments at lower costs, and, third, the host country (for instance, 
a developing country) benefits through the additional transfer of modern technologies and finance 
accruing from the project. Initially, when JI was proposed by the Norwegian delegation for 
introduction in the UNFCCC text at INC-3, developing countries appreciated this win-win-win 
potential (see above). 
However, at INC sessions, developing countries managed to move the negotiation focus towards the 
potential risks of JI thereby openly questioning whether a JI-like concept were acceptable at all under 
the UNFCCC, for the period up until 2000 and beyond. Several industrialised countries (e.g., EU) 
supported developing countries in this discussion, although the UNFCCC had already explicitly 
recognised JI as an eligible instrument to assist Annex I Parties in achieving their commitments. One 
could argue that industrialised countries allowed JI discussions at INC to move into a political debate 
on an issue that had already been resolved before UNCED (i.e. whether or not JI). Consequently, there 
was insufficient focus on the real, more technical accounting and equity issues related to JI (e.g., 
baselines, leakage, credit sharing). As a result, JI was indeed not ready yet as a full-blown instrument. 
Regarding JI, COP-1 faced the task to bring the focus of discussion back on the technical issues. 
Yet, with developing countries’ fairly negative general attitude towards JI and a consensus on a fragile 
proposal for a phased approach for JI, which divided the group of industrialised countries, Parties left 
for Berlin. 
 
4.4.5.  Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase agreed at COP-1   
As Parties had agreed at INC-11, JI was one of the policy measures to be included in negotiations on a 
protocol or other legal instrument. Starting from the consensus reached a month earlier in New York 





discussion took place about the nature and name of the JI pilot phase. The G-77&China repeated its 
point of view that a pilot phase would not imply that after its conclusion an official JI regime with 
crediting of GHG emission reductions would automatically enter into force. Therefore, they expressed 
their concern regarding the use of the term Joint Implementation in the name of the pilot phase. As a 
compromise, COP-1 decided to establish a pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) among 
Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
1995b, p. 9) (UNFCCC, 1995b). During this pilot phase, planned to last until the end of 2000, 
industrialised country Parties could establish AIJ pilot projects in order to gain experience with several 
technical and accounting issues, which needed to be resolved, e.g., baseline determination, 
infrastructure needs to carry out projects, monitoring, verification of the emission reductions achieved, 
etc. 
For non-Annex I Parties the AIJ pilot phase was sufficiently in line with their positions taken before 
COP-1 and also the EU had argued in favour of a pilot phase. The change in name (from JI to AIJ) and 
the changed focus on joint activities were not real obstacles for the EU. After all, whether JI was to be 
allowed as a policy instrument for future commitments was expected to be a decision to be taken 
during the negotiations on a protocol or other legal instrument. Therefore, not including the term JI in 
the COP-1 decision did not imply that the option of project-based emissions trading had been removed 
from the negotiation table and the UNFCCC process. The US Government was disappointed about the 
decision to establish a pilot phase without crediting, but announced that it would continue its USIJI 
programme for which the first projects had been approved in February 1995, shortly before COP-1 
(JIN, 1995b). 
COP-1 decided on the following criteria for AIJ pilot projects (UNFCCC, 1995c, pp. 18-20): 
1. AIJ should be compatible with and supportive of national and development priorities. 
2. AIJ activities have to be accepted, approved or endorsed beforehand by the Parties’ governments. 
3. The environmental benefits to be expected should be additional, i.e. the reduced emission should 
stay below an ex ante determined project baseline. 
4. The financing of the activities should be additional to current GEF and ODA funding. 
5. No credits should accrue to any Party from AIJ during the pilot phase. 
The first criterion dealt with the concern raised by developing countries that AIJ investor countries, or 
private sector entities acting on their behalf, may be mainly focussed on the GHG emission benefits of 
a project, rather than consider the development priorities of host countries. It was argued that AIJ 
could only contribute significantly to sustainable development if the project would be in line with 
national priorities in the host country. The second criterion defined that a project can only be 
considered an AIJ investment if the governments of both the host country and the investor country 
have agreed, approved and endorsed the project as such. 
Criteria 3 and 4 dealt with the issue of additionality of GHG emission reductions beyond business-as-
usual actions. Criterion 3 stated that an AIJ project should reduce GHG emissions below a pre-
determined reference scenario (the baseline). Criterion 4 emphasised that funding to be made available 
for AIJ programmes and projects should not be taken from GEF funding and ODA flows. In general, 
criteria 3 and 4 formalised that an activity already planned under, e.g., domestic legislation in the host 
country or under GEF or ODA could not be considered additional, and would thus not qualify for AIJ 
recognition. 
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The background of the fifth criterion – no crediting during the AIJ pilot phase – has been discussed 
above. However, this decision could lead to a chicken-and-egg dilemma. On the one hand, an 
important argument for not allowing AIJ crediting had been the lack of experience with several 
technical issues. On the other hand, however, precisely the lack of crediting during the AIJ pilot phase 
turned out to be a serious obstacle for project developers to implement AIJ projects. The AIJ potential 
was, therefore, only sparingly utilised and, thus, relatively little experience was gained. 
Finally, COP-1 requested the UNFCCC Secretariat to compile synthesis reports on AIJ progress 
during the pilot phase for consideration by the COP: “on this basis, the COP shall, at its annual 
session, review the progress of the pilot phase with a view to taking appropriate decisions on its 
continuation” (UNFCCC, 1995c, pp. 18-20). 
 
4.5.  Continuing JI Negotiations during 1995-1997: from ‘Berlin’ to ‘Kyoto’ 
 
4.5.1.  Initiating Learning from AIJ Experience 
The first negotiations after COP-1 took place in Geneva (28 August – 1 September 1995) where 
sessions were held of the SBSTA and SBI and the AGBM (see Chapter 3). AIJ was discussed at 
SBSTA sessions with a strong focus on additionality of GHG emission reductions and baselines to 
help determine that. For better comparison and evaluation of experiences gained with these technical 
issues, SBSTA decided to develop a uniform format for reporting on AIJ projects “taking into 
consideration views expressed by Parties and experience gained in AIJ for consideration at its future 
sessions, in coordination with the SBI, in order to allow COP at its next annual session to review the 
progress of the pilot phase, in implementation of COP decision 5/CP.1” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
1995d, p. 5) (SBSTA, 1995) (JIN, 1995c). 
An important aspect of SBSTA-2 discussions (Geneva, 27 February - 4 March 1996) was to establish 
a framework for learning from AIJ experience. For that, an initial framework for reporting on AIJ was 
adopted (see Box 4-3 for further details). In addition to the discussions on the initial framework for 
reporting, several delegates at SBSTA-2 argued that the time had come to start discussions on a 
mutual crediting system for (some of the) AIJ/JI projects (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1996c, p. 7) 
(JIN, 1995d). With JI being discussed as a policy instrument in the AGBM process (see Chapter 3) 
and given that only one COP would be held before Parties would have to agree on a Protocol at COP-
3, it was considered important to reach agreement on a crediting regime for JI projects to be included 






Box 4-3. Initial framework for reporting on AIJ 
According to the Initial Framework for Reporting on AIJ, each national government of Parties 
involved in AIJ should report to the COP on a project-by-project basis unless Parties agreed on a 
common report (JIN, 1995d). These reports were for information purposes only but the following 
information was required: 
 A project description, including: type of project, actors involved, institutional arrangements, actual 
costs to the extent possible, technical data, mutually agreed project assessment procedures, long-term 
viability of the project, etc. 
 Governmental acceptance, approval or endorsement. 
 The project's compatibility with and supportiveness of national economic development and socio-
economic and environmental priorities and strategies. 
 The benefits that can be derived from the project. 
 A calculation of the project’s ‘baseline’. 
 The additionality to the financial obligations of Annex II Parties under the finance mechanism of the 
UNFCCC
62
 as well as to current ODA flows. 
 The extent to which the project contributes to capacity building, transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them 
to implement the provisions of the UNFCCC. 
 
Next to the negotiation process after COP-1, high-level discussions on JI and AIJ also took place at 
meetings, such as the Ministerial Conference organised by the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) in Sofia (Bulgaria, 23-25 October 1995) (JIN, 1995e). Although this conference was not part of 
the UNFCCC negotiation cycle, it was considered as highly relevant for the political process of 
designing a broad European climate change policy framework including measures such as JI. 
The Ministerial Declaration of the Sofia Conference contained a passage on AIJ in which the 
Ministers “note the recent initiatives to establish pilot projects for activities implemented jointly as a 
cost-effective means for private investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a bilateral basis” 
(JIN, 1995e). The Ministers recommended that AIJ pilot projects be further developed in the near 
future and that national experiences be reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat. In addition, AIJ was also 
included in the ECE’s ‘Integrated Report on Financing’ presented and discussed at the Sofia 
Conference (JIN, 1995e). This report described potential techniques to facilitate the financing of 
emissions reduction policies and measures. Among the techniques described were, for example, debt-
for-nature swaps and green investment schemes with fiscal incentives. 
For the identification of potential AIJ pilot projects the European Environment Ministers proposed 
using the Project Preparation Committee (PPC)
63
 to match project budgets and loans for environmental 
projects in Central and Eastern Europe. The Ministers endorsed that the PPC “should strengthen its 
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 PPC was established in 1993 by the Second Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe”, Lucerne, with 
representatives from bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Its focus was on environmental investments and 
improvement of coordination between international financial institutions and donors wanting to invest in 
environmental protection in the region. The PPC was established at the EBRD (EBRD, 2007). 
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cooperation with [Central and Eastern European] countries and, in conjunction with NEAPs [National 
Environmental Action Programmes], identify, prepare and develop economically viable environmental 
projects” (JIN, 1995e). 
Box 4-4. Regional Conference on Joint Implementation 
On 17-19 April 1996, initiated by the Netherlands Government and the Dutch Joint Implementation 
Network (JIN), a regional conference on JI was organised by the Czech energy efficiency centre 
SEVEn in Prague, the Czech Republic (Tichy, 1996). The conference, which hosted over 100 
participants, focused mainly on actual JI pilot projects (or projects similar to JI) that had been 
implemented in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose a report, ‘Joint Implementation Projects 
in Central & Eastern Europe’, had been prepared describing 31 pilot projects (Center for Clean Air 
Policy, 1996). 
At the conference, which was one of the first non-UNFCCC meetings since COP-1 dealing with JI and 
AIJ, participants expressed concern that although several potential AIJ pilot projects had been 
identified in Central and Eastern Europe since April 1995, only a few of them had been able to find 
full funding. The main reason for investors’ hesitation to fund AIJ projects had been the absence of 
crediting. According to the additionality criterion of COP-1, only those projects would qualify as AIJ 
that would not have been implemented otherwise, e.g., for commercial reasons. Several identified 
potential AIJ projects were lacking some 10 to 15% of the investment capital so that their internal rate 
of return was too low. In principle, the revenues from the GHG emission reduction credits could have 
covered the lacking funding, but the COP had excluded this crediting option from AIJ so that GHG 
emission reductions could not be valued as part of the project revenues. As a consequence, the private 
sector was generally not interested in investing in AIJ and the funding had, therefore, to come from the 
investor country governments. This strongly reduced the amount of funding available for AIJ projects. 
The USIJI programme was an illustrating example of this situation. Although USIJI had already 
identified and approved a number of AIJ projects, the US private sector did not want to invest in these 
activities due to uncertainties about the eventual revenues from project. Several USIJI projects had 
thus difficulties in developing from approved AIJ activities on paper to actual GHG abatement action. 
The participants at the Prague conference recommended that the SB sessions and the upcoming COP-2 
should advance the role of JI by providing clarity about the possibility for Annex I Parties to use JI for 
future commitments. It was felt that, for the time being, the most feasible system would be JI among 
those Parties that would agree on quantitative commitments under a Protocol (likely to be the group of 
Annex I Parties, see Chapter 3). Trying to propose a global JI system with the participation of 
developing countries could frustrate the Protocol negotiations and could even lead to an extension of 
the AIJ phase beyond the year 2000, still without crediting. Several Annex I Parties present in Prague 
made clear that the latter would be unacceptable for them. Although the Prague conference was not an 
official UNFCCC meeting, its discussions and conclusions indicated the lines along which the 
Protocol negotiations were taking place up to COP-3. 
 
In Sofia, the Netherlands Minister for the Environment, Ms De Boer, announced that her Government 





and in developing countries (JIN, 1995e). In addition, the Netherlands announced two regional 
conferences on AIJ, one in the Czech Republic on AIJ in Central and Eastern Europe and one in India 
on AIJ in developing countries. These two meetings were a follow-up to the International Conference 
on JI (Groningen, 1-3 June 1994) and had the objective to bring the experiences of project 
stakeholders and policy makers together (see Box 4-4). Also the Governments of Germany and 
Austria expressed their positive attitude towards AIJ and their willingness to support the further 
development of the concept during the pilot phase. 
 
4.5.2.  Making progress with AIJ 
During COP-2 (Geneva, Switzerland, 8-19 July 1996), the political and more controversial discussion 
on whether and how to include JI in the Protocol took place at the AGBM meeting (see Chapter 3), 
whereas AIJ was on the agenda of SBSTA-3 (JIN, 1996). The AIJ discussions had a low political 
profile as it mainly focussed on the issue of reporting, particularly on how to improve the initial 
framework for reporting on AIJ projects. 
The UNFCCC secretariat submitted to SBSTA-3 its ‘Progress Report on Activities Implemented 
Jointly’, which contained a summary of officially reported AIJ reports and a description of the official 
AIJ programmes set up by six Annex I countries – Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway and USA (UNFCCC, 1996c). The report concluded that the project reports submitted were 
not always very clear about the additionality of reported GHG emission reductions and cost-
effectiveness of AIJ projects. Based on that, delegates recommended improved guidance to project 
developers in order to improve the consistency of submitted reports. On the basis of the discussions at 
COP-2 and the suggestions and recommendations received from Parties, SBSTA-5 (Bonn, 25-28 
February 1997) adopted a Uniform Reporting Format for AIJ projects (URF), both for reporting on 
AIJ projects and national AIJ programmes (JIN, 1997a). 
At SBSTA-7 (Bonn, Germany, 20-29 October 1997),
64
 the UNFCCC secretariat presented a ‘Synthesis 
Report on AIJ’ based on 39 AIJ project activities (UNFCCC, 1997c)65 and twelve national AIJ 
programme reports: Australia, Canada, Costa Rica (see Figure 4-2 for an example of a Costa Rican 
AIJ carbon credit), Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and USA. Almost half of the AIJ projects reported in October 1997 were renewable energy projects of 
which two-third had been set up in Central and Eastern Europe. One-third of the projects were energy 
efficiency projects of which the majority again was located in Central and Eastern Europe. Of the 39 
projects reported, 28 were in Central and Eastern Europe, one in Africa, and ten in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
With respect to the technical and financial aspects of the projects, the information reported was rather 
scanty. The secretariat noted that the description of project baselines was in most cases only brief. 
Except for one project where the baseline was chosen from a number of alternative scenarios, the 
reference scenario was in many cases simply based on an assumption that current unsustainable 
business-as-usual energy/heat consumption patterns would continue to exist. Concerning the 
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calculation of costs per ton CO2 emission reduction, the secretariat concluded that a clearer definition 
for reporting was required. Although many countries provided cost figures, it was not always clear 
which methodologies had been used for the cost calculations. According to the synthesis report, the 
basis for calculating the mitigation cost was often insufficiently explained, so that “information 
supplied by Parties does not always allow replication” (UNFCCC, 1997c). 
On the other hand, the AIJ project reports contained relatively detailed information on the 
environmental, social/cultural and economic benefits of the project, such as contribution to improving 
water quality, fostering biodiversity and reducing erosion of hydrological resources. Examples of 
social/cultural benefits of AIJ pilot projects listed in the reports were the active involvement of the 
local communities in the host countries and the increased public awareness. According to the project 
reports, economic benefits mainly resulted from efficiency gains through the introduction of new 
technologies, improved working environment and energy savings in the host countries. 
Generally, the activities set up under the AIJ phase could be categorised as follows. First, AIJ 
simulation studies were conducted based on already ongoing (i.e. implemented before 1995) bilateral 
cooperation projects in the field of, e.g., energy transition, technology diffusion, etc. Examples of 
simulation projects were the early experiences with JI supported by the government of Norway 
(ILUMEX and Kraków coal-to-gas projects) (JIN, 1997b). Other JI simulation studies were carried out 
by the Netherlands’ Government on the basis of projects already established in the early 1990s under 
the programme PSO,
66
 which supported Central and Eastern European countries in modernising their 
energy sector during the post-1989 economic transition processes. The Nordic Council of Ministers’ 
Ad-hoc Group on Climate Strategies in the Energy Sector carried out another simulation study based 
on actual projects. 
A second category of AIJ consisted of new projects prepared after COP-1 by private entities and 
approved as AIJ by the designated authorities of both the investor and host countries. These projects 
obtained an official AIJ status and were reported to the UNFCCC secretariat, but mainly relied on 
private sector financing to go ahead. For a long time during the AIJ pilot phase, the majority of these 
projects existed only on paper and the experience gathered was generally limited to project design 
issues only. The USIJI and the AIJ Japan Programme contained typical examples of activities in this 
category. 
The third category of AIJ consisted of projects which were mainly funded by investor country 
governments. The implementation of these activities was, therefore, not hampered by a lack of interest 
from private sector investors. Most of the projects in this category were investments by the Swedish 
Government in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These projects were mainly small-scale energy sector 
investments set up along the lines of a project design and implementation model, which could easily 
be replicated in each of the three Baltic States. In addition, the Netherlands’ Government ran an AIJ 
programme during 1997-1999 which provided funding and assistance to private sector project 
investors. The total budget of the Dutch AIJ programme amounted to almost USD 100 million. A third 
programme which provided investment funds for projects in Central Europe was the Swiss AIJ pilot 
programme. The Swiss Government did not initiate a large number of projects, but invested a lot in 
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streamlining the design of future JI projects, such as baseline determination, dealing with additionality, 
and minimising carbon leakage effects (see also Chapter 5). 
Table 4-1 presents an overview of Annex I investor countries in AIJ projects (based on an overview 
presented by the secretariat in 2002), the number of projects they were involved in and the role played 
by the Parties in terms of facilitation and/or funding (UNFCCC, 2002a). Box 4-5 briefly summarises 
the main experiences with the AIJ pilot phase. 
Table 4-1. Involvement of Annex I investor countries in AIJ projects 
Country No.  
projects 
Type of project funding 
Sweden 53 Public funding 
USA 44 Private sector funding with government facilitation 
Netherlands 24  Simulation studies 
 Public funding (AIJ in Eastern Europe, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs) 
 Private sector funding (AIJ in developing countries, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
Australia 10 Private sector funding 
Norway  6  Simulation studies 
 Public funding 
Germany 6 Private sector funding 
Japan 5 Private sector funding 
France  4 Private sector funding 
Switzerland 2 Public funding 
Belgium 1 Simulation study 
Canada/Germany/ France 1 Private sector funding 
Total  156  
Source: UNFCCC, 2002a 
 
Negotiations on a climate policy instrument – Joint Implementation 
109 
 
Box 4-5. Experiences from the AIJ pilot phase 
During the AIJ pilot phase (from 1995 through 2000), 156 projects were endorsed by governments of 
both investor and host countries and published on the UNFCCC Internet site (UNFCCC, 2002a). 
Together, these projects aimed at an emission reduction of 446 Mt CO2-eq., although it should be 
noted that several of projects have never been implemented due to lack of funding from the private 
sector. Moreover, other AIJ projects were mainly simulation activities based on already implemented 
projects, which were studied as if they were AIJ. The latter projects were especially set up by the 
Netherlands and Norway between 1994 and 1996.  
Although AIJ resulted in several investor and host country initiatives to facilitate JI cooperation and 
enabled several potential stakeholders to become acquainted with the JI concept, including its GHG 
accounting issues, the initial hesitation among developing countries to embrace the JI/AIJ concept and 
the absence of crediting of emission reductions turned out to be a serious barrier to large-scale 
implementation of AIJ project ideas.  
From a practical perspective, it turned out that the preparation and implementation of AIJ projects, 
either in the energy sector or in other sectors, generally turned out to be rather time consuming. To a 
large extent, this was due to the fact that AIJ was a rather new concept which required a number of 
additional project design elements in comparison with regular ODA projects or FDIs, e.g., identifying 
suitable abatement investment options, accounting of the GHG emission reductions (baseline, 
monitoring, verification, and carbon leakage assessments), and applying for approval of the project 
with the designated authorities of the host and investor countries. Governments and other stakeholders 
had no experience with this type of investment and also the market for environmental consultants was 
not as deep as it became after the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The AIJ experience showed that especially the cooperation between the host country governments and 
the private sector entities was often difficult. Although some host countries officially established JI 
secretariats or focal points, these were generally understaffed and did not have the authority to endorse 
a project as AIJ. In practice, it regularly happened that projects which had been identified by private 
sector parties in both the industrialised and host country and which had been approved by the 
government of the investor country, were not implemented or with a significant delay because of 
difficulties in finding the right official to endorse projects. For instance, prior to COP-1, the 
Netherlands had agreed with the Ministry of Environment in Uganda on recognising a forestry project, 
set up by the Dutch FACE foundation and their colleagues from Uganda, as an early JI experience. 
Later on, it turned out that this agreement was insufficient for an AIJ status because the Ministry of 







Figure 4-2. Costa Rica’s GHG emissions mitigation certificate 
 
4.6.  Inclusion of JI in the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Although the discussions on progress with the AIJ pilot phase at SBSTA-7 put emphasis on technical 
and methodological issues related to the JI concept, most of the political attention concerning JI, as 
mentioned above, was on the negotiations in the context of the Berlin Mandate. At AGBM-8, which 
took place in Bonn at same time of the SBSTA-7 (October 1997), Chairman Mr Raúl Estrada-Oyuela 
presented a draft negotiation text for a ‘Protocol or another legal instrument’ to be decided upon at 
COP-3 (see Chapter 3) (UNFCCC, 1997a).  
Article 6 of this text dealt with JI and stated that Parties participating in JI projects would have the 
right to share the credits among themselves in accordance with their contribution to the project. These 
credits could only be generated if the projects would meet a number of conditions, including the COP-
1 criteria for AIJ. Additional conditions proposed were that JI projects should be assessed on a project 
basis and that credits would have to be calculated and allocated on an annual basis. According to the 
draft negotiation text, the first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol would have to take decisions on 
criteria, guidelines and methodologies for: the attribution of credits to Parties; the reporting on JI 
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projects; the calculation of baselines; the monitoring and verification of JI emission reductions; and, 
the auditing of credits. 
To the surprise of several observers, the draft negotiation text distinguished between JI among Annex I 
Parties and JI between Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties. The text (which was largely based on 
a Norwegian proposal to AGBM-6, as well as on the EU proposal) suggested that JI with non-Annex I 
Parties would be eligible under the Protocol once the AIJ pilot phase would have been satisfactorily 
concluded, such to be judged by the COP based on progress made with AIJ.
67
 A possible date for the 
latter judgement could be just after the planned conclusion of the AIJ pilot phase in 2000. The US 
Climate Proposal for COP-3 (presented in October 1997), however, proposed not to wait until the end 
of the AIJ pilot phase and to already include crediting of JI projects with non-Annex I countries in the 
Protocol to be decided at COP-3 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 15). Developing countries, on 
their turn, underscored that they preferred to wait for the conclusion of the AIJ pilot phase before 
taking a decision on the eligibility of JI between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. 
As has been described in Chapter 3, COP-3 in Kyoto (Japan, 1-10 December 1997) resulted in an 
agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, which included quantified emission limitation or reduction 
commitments (QELRCs) for Annex I Parties, expressed as assigned amounts of GHG emission per 
year. As a group, these countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions by 5.2% over the period 2008-
2012 (the so-called first commitment period) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1997b, p. 14). Surprisingly, 
COP-3 decided to allow Annex I Parties the flexibility to fulfil part of their QELRCs by acquiring 
emission reduction titles generated abroad on the territory of another Party and/or by another Party. 
During the AGBM negotiations, concerning flexibility the focus had mainly been on JI among Annex 
I Parties, with a possible extension to JI with developing countries after the conclusion of the AIJ pilot 
phase, and international emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol went further than that by also 
including JI cooperation with developing countries, irrespective of the AIJ experience. As such, the 
following three Kyoto flexibility mechanisms were decided upon (UNFCCC, 1998):  
 Article 6 cooperation (Kyoto Protocol Article 6), which deals with project-based GHG emission 
reduction cooperation among industrialised (Annex I) Parties. Credits generated through these JI 
projects are called Emission Reduction Units (ERU). 
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Kyoto Protocol Article 12), which deals with 
project-based GHG emission reduction cooperation between industrialised (Annex I) and 
developing (non-Annex I) Parties. Emission reductions achieved through CDM projects can be 
transferred to Annex I Parties as Certified Emission Reductions (CER). 
 International Emissions Trading (Kyoto Protocol Article 17), which allows Parties with GHG 
emissions below their assigned amount under the Kyoto Protocol to sell this surplus to other 
Parties whose GHG emissions surpass their assigned amount. 
The envisaged Article 6 and CDM cooperation are both based on the JI concept discussed in this 
chapter. The CDM was introduced in the COP-3 negotiations based on a proposal by Brazil to 
establish a mechanism to compensate for social and economic losses by non-Annex I Parties in case 
Annex I Parties fail to comply with their QELRCs. The compensation fund would arrange financial 
and technology transfers from non-complying Annex I Parties to non-Annex I Parties, e.g., for 
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adaptation measures. During the negotiations, the Brazilian compensation mechanism proposal 
eventually developed into the CDM, based on the JI concept,
68
 but with a specific focus on sustainable 
development in non-Annex I host countries next to GHG emission reduction. The latter increased the 
acceptability of the CDM for developing countries as the mechanism, unlike Article 6 JI cooperation, 
has a clearly stated twin-aim objective: first, a CDM project must support non-Annex I Parties in 
achieving a sustainable development path, and, second, a CDM project can support Annex I Parties in 
complying with their QELRCs (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. pp.11-12, Art. 12). 
Nonetheless, for many observers the inclusion of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol was a big surprise as 
it basically allowed the JI cooperation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties which mainly the 
USA had proposed at the AGBM. Developing countries, supported by the EU, had long preferred to 
wait for the conclusion of the AIJ pilot phase before considering such a global project-based 
cooperation. Also surprising was the option of banking CDM project-based emission reductions 
achieved during 2000-2008 and to add these to the assigned amounts of Annex I Parties during 2008-
2012. JI crediting, on the contrary, could only start as of 2008. One could therefore conclude that the 
option of JI with non-Annex I Parties (the CDM), which had been generally rejected throughout the 
AGBM process, eventually contained much more flexibility than the initially widely accepted option 
of only JI among Annex I Parties. 
Yet, several questions concerning the institutional structure of the CDM remained unanswered at 
COP-3. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol on the CDM was unclear about whether the CDM would 
become a multilateral fund to invest, on behalf of public and private parties from Annex I countries, in 
projects in non-Annex I Parties or a more passive facility under the UNFCCC with an ‘executive 
board’ (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. 11-12, Art. 12) supervising bilateral and multilateral project cooperation. 
This was one of the issues to be decided upon by the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol (COP-MOP, which would have its first meeting after the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol). 
A similar guidance was needed with regard to the question of how to deal with CDM projects in non-
Annex I Parties which have not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Article 12 referred to non-Annex I 
Parties (under the UNFCCC), but did not specify whether such Parties also need to have ratified the 
Protocol. In other words, could CDM projects be carried out in countries that have ratified the 
UNFCCC but not (yet) the Kyoto Protocol? 
Finally, soon after COP-3 a discussion arose on the extent to which sink enhancement projects would 
be eligible under the CDM. After all, contrary to Article 6, Article 12 on the CDM did not explicitly 
refer to sink enhancement projects and only mentioned emission reduction activities as CDM project 
options. Basically, this would exclude carbon sequestration projects, such as forestry and soil 
management, from the CDM. However, sink enhancement was included in protocol Article 3 (defining 
Annex I Party commitments) as a feasible option for Parties to fulfil their commitments, although the 
Article text only referred to GHG emission reduction options (UNFCCC, 1998, pp. 3-5, Art. 3). In 
analogy to Article 3, sink enhancement projects under the CDM could thus also be categorised under 
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emission reduction activities. Further guidance on these issues were scheduled for COP-4 in Buenos 
Aires (November 1998). 
By November 2014, the JI market had developed into a pipeline of 761 projects in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Table 4-2 presents an overview of the number of projects per project type and share in total 
CDM market as well as the GHG emission reductions achieved during the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Since the Doha Agreement at COP-18 JI remains among the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms which Parties with commitments during the second commitment period can use for their 
compliance purposes (UNFCCC, 2013b). An overview of CDM projects is presented in the next 
chapter in Table 5-2). 
Table 4-2. Status of JI projects as per November 2014 
Type No. of 
projects 
% Issued ERUs (ktonnes) % 
Afforestation 2 0,3 4,557 0,5 
Agriculture 12 1,6 25,603 3,0 
Avoided deforestation 1 0,1 520 0,1 
Biomass energy 48 6,3 8,549 1,0 
Cement 5 0,7 4,417 0,5 
CO2 usage 1 0,1 0 0,0 
Coal bed/mine methane 33 4,3 9,774 1,2 
Energy distribution 56 7,4 60,188 7,1 
Energy Efficiency households 1 0,1 2,698 0,3 
Energy Efficiency industry 103 13,5 111,803 13,2 
Energy Efficiency own generation 7 0,9 1,385 0,2 
Energy Efficiency service 14 1,8 13,953 1,6 
Energy Efficiency supply side 37 4,9 17,020 2,0 
Fossil fuel switch 24 3,2 24,854 2,9 
Fugitive emission reduction 172 22,6 419,018 49,3 
Geothermal 5 0,7 1,010 0,1 
HFCs 4 0,5 40,117 4,7 
Hydro energy 27 3,5 5,953 0,7 
Landfill gas capture 83 10,9 2,900 0,3 
Methane avoidance 8 1,1 1,699 0,2 
Mixed renewables 0 0,0 0 0,0 
N2O 55 7,2 57,297 6,7 
PFCs and SF6 8 1,1 30,511 3,6 
Reforestation 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Solar energy 1 0,1 0 0,0 
Tidal energy 0 0,0 0 0,0 
Transport 4 0,5 0 0,0 
Wind energy 50 6,6 6,080 0,7 
Total 761 100,0 849,906 100,0 






4.7.  Discussion: JI Negotiations in Light of Design, Process and Tactics 
Conditions 
 
Five and a half year after the inclusion of JI in the UNFCCC, the concept had been included in the 
Kyoto Protocol in the form of two flexibility mechanisms to facilitate project-based collaboration 
among industrialised countries and between industrialised and developing countries, on a global scale. 
This result was the outcome of seven INC sessions (between 1992 and 1995), three COP sessions, 
seven SBSTA sessions and eight AGBM sessions (all between 1995 and 1997), which each 
contributed to long political and technical debates on the JI concept. Below, these negotiations are 
discussed in light of the question whether and how the three basic conditions identified in this study 
for negotiations have been met. 
Meeting basic condition 1: design of JI and CDM for inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol 
With respect to the design structure of JI and CDM, it became clear that the strength of JI lies in its: 
 Ability to reduce global costs of GHG emission reduction actions, as these could be selected in 
locations where costs are relatively low. As such, the JI concept enables optimal use of the 
characteristic of GHGs that they mix evenly in the atmosphere. 
 Potential to engage countries in GHG emission reduction actions through projects, even if these 
countries have not adopted quantified emission reduction commitments themselves. 
 Potential to support low-emission technology transfer between industrialised countries and from 
industrialised to developing countries. 
Industrialised countries were mainly attracted to JI because of its cost-effectiveness potential, which 
explains why they supported its application to reaching UNFCCC targets and its inclusion as a 
flexibility mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol. 
At the same time, negotiations revealed that JI had inherent weaknesses, such as the: 
 Aspect that widespread application of JI could postpone pathways in industrialised countries 
towards low GHG emission growth. 
 Risk that JI projects would mainly address GHG emission reductions and insufficiently consider 
host countries’ sustainable development objectives (e.g., risk of too many forestry projects while 
the host country may be more interested in energy or industrial sector projects). 
 Complexity related to the accounting of GHG emission reductions with risks of non-additional 
emission reductions. 
In the design of JI and the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol, especially the CDM definition explicitly 
contains the condition that projects should be in accordance with host countries’ sustainable 
development goals. The GHG accounting rules, what they need to look like and how strict, were not 
defined at COP-3. Instead, this design aspect was left for later COP negotiations and this will be 
discussed in the next two chapters. 
This implies that with the eventual conceptual design of JI and CDM in the Kyoto Protocol, without 
the operational details, basic condition 1 was met during the negotiations, as it addresses all main 
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motivations and concerns of negotiation Parties: a global scope with crediting of GHG emission 
reductions as desired by several industrialised countries and an explicit focus on sustainable 
development when designing CDM projects as desired by developing countries. In terms of Figure 
1-3, negotiations moved from point A (e.g., Norwegian Clearinghouse proposal at INC-3 in 1991) to 
point B when developing countries expressed concerns about the risk that JI would allow 
industrialised to postpone domestic abatement actions. The inclusion of a specific focus on sustainable 
development in CDM host countries stimulated developing country acceptance (from the B to C/D in 
Figure 1-3), which was also enhanced through the link between inclusion of flexibility mechanisms in 
the Kyoto Protocol and industrialised countries’ agreed QELRCs. It must be noted though that 
agreement on the design of JI and CDM was also facilitated by postponing discussions on operational 
modalities of the mechanisms to later negotiation sessions (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
Meeting basic condition 2: the negotiation process as enabling condition for JI and CDM 
adoption in the Kyoto Protocol 
During the 1993-1997 negotiation process, the key issue related to JI was whether industrialised 
countries could obtain the flexibility to achieve their quantitative GHG abatement commitments partly 
abroad. Developing countries, speaking with the voices of the G-77&China and the AOSIS, generally 
opposed JI and considered the mechanism a cheap way out of Annex I Parties’ potential commitments. 
The main argument used in this respect related to equity considerations between industrialised and 
developing countries. 
The controversies that surrounded JI during the INC negotiations resulted in a situation in which JI as 
a full-blown mechanism (including crediting of GHG emission reductions) had become politically 
unacceptable by the time of COP-1. At that time, though, the negotiation process enabled taking a 
side-step to keep the JI concept ‘alive’, as the COP decided to establish a pilot phase for JI (called 
AIJ). AIJ was sufficiently remote from the initial concept of JI to make it acceptable for developing 
countries, but an opening remained for industrialised countries to include JI as a concept in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Officially, AIJ was negotiated at COP-1 as an intermediate step in a ‘phased approach’ 
towards use of JI as a future carbon crediting instrument under the UNFCCC. This process allowed 
negotiators the flexibility to address developing countries’ concerns about JI, so that, eventually, the 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms became acceptable for developing countries too (supporting a 
development towards outcome D in Figure 1-3). 
In that respect, it can be concluded that the negotiation process with 25 different negotiation sessions 
(COP, SB, AGBM) with different political profiles (i.e. high-level climate policy making next to more 
technical negotiations) was an important enabling condition for inclusion of JI (and CDM) in the 
Kyoto Protocol (meeting basic condition 2). 
Meeting basic condition 3: decisive negotiation tactics and facilitating aspects during JI 
negotiations 
While the JI negotiation process during 1993-1997 was characterised by taking several small steps at 
the time at consecutive negotiation meetings, and sometimes even during parallel negotiation 





also be largely explained by country tactics during the negotiations. For instance, it could be argued 
that the patience of JI proponents during the negotiations paid off during the AGBM process and at 
COP-3. By accepting, at COP-1, a phased approach for JI and refraining from crediting of JI emission 
reductions, JI could, after a while, become an important instrument in the debate on flexibility which 
industrialised countries demanded in return for adopting quantified emission reduction or limitation 
commitments (see Chapter 2). 
The above also illustrates that national interests played a key role during JI negotiations. For 
industrialised countries, JI was a welcome mechanism for enhancing domestic political support for 
adopting QELRCs. Moreover, several business groups in industrialised countries who were specialised 
in producing sustainable energy technologies, considered JI an attractive instrument to promote their 
business internationally. Especially these groups showed a large interest in establishing AIJ projects. 
The national interest picture for developing countries was much less clear. Often, it was found that 
considerable differences existed between official negotiation positions of developing country 
governments at INC, AGBM and COP sessions and the opinion of local stakeholders on JI (see for 
example Box 4-1 on the Groningen Conference on JI). The first group focussed largely on equity 
principles (i.e. industrialised countries should reform their economies first), whereas the latter group 
also stated that JI projects could lead to additional transfers of sustainable energy technologies and 
funding to developing countries. Moreover, although developing countries mainly spoke via the G-
77&China, several Latin American countries were quite positive about JI and signed bilateral 
agreements with the USA and some EU countries to further stimulate JI and AIJ cooperation. The 
rather negative G-77&China position on JI was mainly the result of the opposition from China and 
India to the mechanism (in terms of combining it with Annex I QELRCs). Eventually, the strong G-
77&China resistance to JI became to some extent beneficial for developing countries, since the CDM 
explicitly defined sustainable development as a key important project requirement. 
Finally, next to the negotiation process, an important tactical aspect supporting the development of JI 
into flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol was the awareness building through conferences, 
publications and pilot projects. At conferences, such as the 1994 Groningen International Conference 
on JI, the 1995 Ministerial Conference on JI in Sofia, the 1996-1997 Regional Conferences on JI 
(Prague) and AIJ (New Delhi), negotiators could meet with JI practitioners and learn more about JI 
project benefits and risks. Through the publication ‘Joint Implementation Quarterly’, funded by the 
Netherlands Government, a platform was created with latest information on negotiations, policy 
background, research and projects. These meetings and publications were especially important during 
the pre- and early-Internet days during which JI negotiations took place. Finally, the initiative of 
countries such as the Netherlands, USA, Norway, Sweden and Germany to set up JI/AIJ pilot project 
programmes showed how JI could work and how collaboration and trust between JI investors and 
hosts could be built. The main contribution of these tactical and facilitating aspects during negotiations 
is that they supported building of awareness of JI/CDM benefits, costs and risks and therefore 
enhanced trust among developing countries that JI/CDM could support their domestic development. 
Without the tactical manoeuvres by key negotiators at COP-1 and COP-3 concerning the decisions on 
AIJ and CDM with global coverage, the JI concept might not have been included in the Kyoto 
Protocol. In that respect, this chapter has shown that tactics became an important condition for 
reaching agreement on AIJ, JI and CDM (meeting basic condition 3). Without these manoeuvres, JI 
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may either have disappeared (at least temporarily until after the Kyoto Protocol) or continued as a 
mechanism for project cooperation between industrialised countries, which would also have 
complicated meeting basic condition 1. 





Table 4-3. Design, process-related and tactical aspects related to negotiations on JI. 
 Description of basic condition in negotiation file 
























 JI project cooperation between developed and 
developing countries (JI and CDM) 
 JI was not used for achieving 1990-2000 stabilisation 
targets of Annex I Parties under the UNFCCC 
Principles: 
 As GHG emissions mix evenly in the atmosphere, 
emission reductions can be done where costs are lowest  
 JI should not be excuse for postponing emission 
reduction actions in industrialised countries 
Goals: 
 Achieving GHG emission reductions at lower costs and  
contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC  
Means: 
 Accounting processes of GHG emission reductions  
 Condition that CDM projects assist non-Annex I Parties in 
achieving sustainable development 
(+) All main motivations and 
concerns of negotiating Parties 
addressed by negotiation text: 
cost-effectiveness potential of JI 
and CDM could be utilised by 
industrialised countries while 
CDM-projects would have to 
contribute to sustainable 
development in host countries 
(note that negotiations on 
detailed project modalities and 
accounting rules were left to 
subsequent negotiations, as 




















 Annual COP sessions 
 Meetings of AGBM + SBSTA technical negotiations 
 Ministerial meetings outside context of COP 
Strategy: 
 JI was first discussed under AGBM as possible instrument 
under the Kyoto Protocol  
 Then, the discussion moved to SBSTA with a focus on a 
pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly 
 Before COP-3, JI negotiations moved to AGBM again 
Responsibility: 
 AGBM discussed JI as part of the protocol negotiations  
 SBSTA focussed on organisation of AIJ pilot phase, 
including reporting and synthesising project results 
(+) Flexibility to switch from one 
negotiation process to another. 
When JI became a politically 
sensitive issue during 
negotiations on a protocol with 
commitments, negotiations on JI 
continued with more technical 
discussions, based on the JI pilot 
phase called AIJ. After this 
‘break’, JI could be reintroduced 
at the COP-3 negotiations to 
support industrialised countries 























  Environmental NGOs resisted JI as it would postpone 
necessary abatement action in industrialised countries  
 JI information was scarce. Investments in awareness 
building (e.g., JIQ and Regional conferences) improved JI 
knowledge base  
 Country groups did not have uniform positions: Annex I 
Parties disagreed about the need for JI crediting; within 
G77&China,  China and India were against JI while several 
Latin American countries were in favour of it 
 Annex I Parties showed patience at COP-1 and adopted 
an AIJ pilot phase without crediting. Although AIJ did not 
allow GHG crediting, several Annex I Parties took it 
seriously by setting up pilot projects through which 
collaboration with non-Annex I Parties could be initiated 
(+) Tactical move to introduce JI pilot 
phase, called AIJ (see basic 
condition 2) 
(+) Business community presenting 
their own JI pilots 
(+) Awareness building regarding JI 
via regional conferences, 
dedicated newsletters and AIJ 
pilot projects 
 
 Chapter 5.  Negotiations on Modalities and 
Procedures for Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
The adoption at COP-3 of the Kyoto Protocol marked the start of a new series of negotiations to 
formulate guidelines, modalities and procedures for Parties to fulfil their commitments agreed at 
Kyoto. Although the Kyoto Protocol had specified quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments (QELRCs) for industrialised countries and defined mechanisms to meet these, several 
modalities and procedures needed to be worked out in further detail for such issues as: establishing 
systems for national GHG inventories; how and to what extent QELRCs could be met through land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities;
69
 the accounting of GHG emission reductions 
through Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects; and the 
accountability of JI and CDM credits against QELRCs.
70
 
This chapter focuses on negotiations on the guidelines, modalities and procedures for the project-based 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms: Article 6 project cooperation among Annex I Parties (generally dubbed 
as JI) and the CDM (Article 12). These negotiations took place between 1998 and 2005 (when the 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force). Similar to what has been observed concerning the discussion in 
Chapter 4 on the interlinkages between JI negotiations (between 1995 and 1997) and the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol, progress with negotiations on the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms during 1998-2005 
was an important factor towards the eventual entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. At the 
same time, negotiations on the operationalisation of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms formed a 
negotiation process in itself under the UNFCCC, with, for instance, a tension between, on the one 
hand, determining detailed GHG accounting procedures to assure that claimed emission reductions 
would be real, additional and verifiable (with possibly higher transaction costs) and, on the other hand, 
realising a wide, international participation in JI and CDM projects (with possibly a preference for less 
detailed procedures). 
This chapter addresses whether the three basic conditions for climate negotiations (identified for the 
research questions in Chapter 1) have been met during the negotiations on the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms, in terms of: whether and how the negotiations ‘produced’ the design elements for an 
agreement on the flexibility mechanisms which sufficiently reflected Parties’ views and preferences 
(e.g., low-cost emission reductions, sustainable development support and integer GHG accounting 
procedures); whether and how the negotiation process enabled considering and combining these 
elements in a package on which consensus could be reached; and whether and how negotiation tactics 
enabled bridging gaps between Parties’ negotiation positions, so that the eventual package could be 
widely accepted and implemented while producing real, additional and verifiable JI and CDM 
emission reduction credits. 
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Negotiations on the operationalisation of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms can roughly be divided in 
two phases: 1998-2001 and 2001-2005. During the first phase, negotiations largely focused on how 
and to what extent Annex I Parties could use JI and CDM for complying with their QELRCs, what 
would be eligible JI and CDM project types, and how to calculate GHG emission reductions from JI 
and CDM projects. This phase was concluded at COP-7 (Marrakech, Morocco, 2001) with the 
adoption of the ‘Marrakech Accords’ (UNFCCC, 2002b). During the second phase, between 2002 and 
2005, negotiations on JI and CDM largely took place outside the official scope of the COP (perhaps 
with the exception of the ‘forestry COP’, COP-9, Milan, 2003) and more within the context of the 
CDM Executive Board (UNFCCC, 2002b, p. 21) and the JI Supervisory Committee (UNFCCC, 
2002b, p. 6). These two bodies were established in 2001 to design and supervise the processes for 
validation of JI and CDM project plans, verification of project achievements and certification of 
emission reduction credits.
71
 The first part of this chapter discusses the negotiations during the first 
phase (Sections 5.2-5.4) and the second part (Section 5.5 and 5.6) analyses the second phase. 
 
5.2.  Towards an Integrated Approach for ‘Crunch’ Issues under the 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
 
One year after ‘Kyoto’, Parties adopted the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of Action’ (at COP-4, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, November 1998) (UNFCCC, 1999), which was a working agenda to prepare the entry into 
force of the Kyoto Protocol.
72
 Regarding the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action gave priority to the CDM because project activities undertaken under this mechanism could 
already result in GHG emission reduction credits as of the year 2000 (i.e. via the banking option of 
Article 12.10 of the Kyoto Protocol). JI emission reductions, instead, could only be accounted for 
when achieved between 2008 and 2012 (Jepma, et al., 1998). Therefore, while there was still enough 
time to arrange JI modalities and procedures, the time towards the official start of the CDM, 1 January 
2000, was very short. 
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action was scheduled to be completed by COP-6 (in 2000) (UNFCCC, 
1999, p. 37), after which the next COP(s) would formulate the agreement into draft decisions to be 
adopted later by the first session of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Kyoto Protocol Parties 
(COP-MOP-1). However, by the time of SB-13
73
 (Lyon, France, 4-15 September 2000), which was the 
last negotiation session before COP-6, progress with the Buenos Aires Plan of Action had been rather 
slow, also with the CDM (JIN, 2000a) (JIN, 2000b). Sharp political dividing lines between Parties 
blocked agreement on a number of ‘crunch issues.’74 According to the Chairman of the ‘Joint SB 
                                                     
71
 Note that the CDM Executive Board was established in 2001 by COP-7, whereas the JI Supervisory 
Committee was formally only established by the first COP-MOP, held in 2005. Nonetheless, JI activities were 
already carried out before 2005 and thus provided input into the informal negotiation process on JI and CDM 
project modalities and procedures. 
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 As explained in Chapter 3, the agreement at COP-3 on the Kyoto Protocol implied that the protocol text was 
submitted to Parties’ national governments for ratification. The protocol would enter into force when 55% of 
Annex I Party GHG emissions in 1990 were covered by ratifications. 
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 Thirteenth sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation and Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technical Support and Advise. 
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 ‘Crunch issues’ was a term used by the UNFCCC secretariat in the context of the Buenos Aires Plan of 
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Contact Group on the Mechanisms’, Mr Chow Kok Kee from Malaysia, negotiations were 
complicated by the strong interlinkages between the several issues, so that agreements on individual 
files was difficult to achieve (see below for some examples) (JIN, 2000a, p. 8). Therefore, in his view, 
an integrated approach was required to address these interlinkages. 
At SB-13, Parties could not agree on such an integrated approach or ‘package deal’ (JIN, 2000b, p. 7). 
However, the aforementioned Joint SB Contact Group managed to produce a negotiation text on the 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, which was further consolidated at an extra meeting held before COP-6, 
in New Delhi (India, 16-18 October 2000). Below, the state of play regarding a number of ‘crunch 
issues’ prior to COP-6 in November 2000 is described, as well as the opportunities for a balanced 
trade-off between enhancing environmental integrity and achieving wider support of policy makers 
and stakeholders. These issues were politically rather sensitive because they were directly related to 
the overall (geographical and intertemporal) flexibility for Annex I Parties to fulfil their Kyoto 
commitments. Therefore, the discussion on which part of QELRCs to be achieved domestically and 
which part abroad, which had been temporarily concluded in Kyoto with the adoption of the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms in the protocol, was reopened in the context of the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action’. 
 
5.2.1.  Supplementarity 
According to Kyoto Protocol Articles 6.1d and 12.3b, the emission reductions achieved through JI and 
CDM projects shall be supplemental to industrialised countries’ domestic actions for meeting their 
commitments (UNFCCC, 1998). In other words, a country cannot meet its QELRC fully through 
emission reduction credits generated abroad without any domestic climate change mitigation action. 
However, the protocol had not specified what supplemental meant in terms of, e.g., a maximum 
percentage of ‘foreign’ credits that could be used for meeting QELRCs. 
In the negotiations, the EU took the initiative to formalise the supplementarity concept, mainly 
because it feared that an over-use of relatively cheap JI and CDM options (as well as international 
emissions trading through protocol Article 17) would reduce incentives for industrialised countries to 
stimulate low-emission development domestically. Moreover, the EU Council of Ministers feared that 
the availability of ‘hot air’ emissions trading via Article 17,75 the uncertainties around JI and CDM 
emission reduction accounting, and the possible eligibility of LULUCF (sinks) projects under the 
CDM could result in several ‘paper credits’, i.e. claimed emission reductions which in reality may not 
have taken place. Therefore, the EU Council proposed that at least 50 per cent of Annex I Parties’ 
required GHG emission reductions for compliance with QELRCs should be achieved through 
domestic abatement actions.76 The EU proposal for such a ceiling was submitted to the SB-10 sessions 
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 ‘Hot air trading’ was a major political issue with respect to international emissions trading (Kyoto Protocol 
Article 17. At COP-3, some Annex I Parties (e.g., the Russian Federation and Ukraine) negotiated assigned 
amounts which were much higher than their actual GHG emissions in 1997, so that they Parties were assumed to 
have negotiated large assigned amount surpluses. This was referred to as ‘hot air’ since these surpluses were not 
the direct result of domestic climate and energy policies, but ‘mainly’ originated from the disintegration of the 
centrally planned economies. 
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 On 12 May 1999, the EU Council of Environment Ministers agreed, after a long internal discussion, on a 





in Bonn (May-June 1999) and marked the start of a long debate on ‘supplementarity.’ (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 1999a, p. 12) 
The Umbrella Group strongly criticised the EU proposal because it felt that the extent to which Annex 
I Parties use the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms should be left to the ‘market’, given that countries 
formulate their own national climate policies.
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 Although the Umbrella Group acknowledged that a 
balanced global climate policy would also contain domestic climate policy investments in 
industrialised countries, it believed that defining supplementarity is a country-specific issue (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 1999a, p. 12). For instance, countries which in the past already had carried out 
energy efficiency programmes may face higher domestic marginal abatement costs than countries 
which had not initiated such programmes. A ceiling to the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
would confront the first country with higher ‘Kyoto’ compliance costs than the second country. A free 
use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, instead, would enable the first country to acquire more 
JI/CDM credits from abroad than the second country (see Figure 4-1 in Chapter 4). 
The G-77&China and the AOSIS welcomed the EU proposal for a ceiling since this was in line with 
their traditional position that industrialised countries should fulfil a major part of their commitments 
domestically (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 1999a, p. 12). 
 
5.2.2.  Distinguishing project cycles for JI and CDM projects 
The EU, the Umbrella Group and the Central and Eastern European Parties negotiation group CG-11
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argued in favour of distinguishing between the project cycles for JI and the CDM, because they felt 
that the required cycle for JI projects could (or even: should) be simpler than the one for CDM 
projects. The reason for this position was that, contrary to CDM host countries, JI host countries, being 
Annex I Parties, basically had their emissions capped by the Kyoto Protocol. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, emission reductions by JI projects are transferred from the host country Party to the investor 
country Party as emission reduction units (ERUs). These ERUs were added to the assigned amount of 
the investor country and subsequently subtracted from the assigned amount of the host country. 
Consequently, overstatements of the emission reductions achieved through JI projects implied the risk 
for the host country that the number of ERUs transferred to the investor country would be higher than 
the actual GHG emission reduction. As such, JI host countries had an incentive to ensure that the 
emission reductions were not overstated, so that independent third party validation and verification 
systems would, according to the EU, Umbrella Group and CG-11 Parties, not be required for JI. For 
the CDM, such an implicit ‘yellow flag’ mechanism did not exist because CDM host countries, being 
non-Annex I Parties, did not have their emissions capped by an assigned amount under the Protocol 
and would thus not be ‘punished’ for overstating a project’s emission reductions to be sold as credits. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU submitted this viewpoint to the SB and COP negotiations during 1999 and 
2000  (JIN, 1999b). 
77
 During an informal meeting in June 2000 between US and Dutch government officials (in preparation of COP-
6 in the Netherlands), a US government official explained that the USA had considered the EU supplementarity 
proposal as ‘junk mail’ (based on personal communication with Dutch government officials). 
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 CG-11 was set up as a negotiating coalition of Central European Annex I parties (UNFCCC, sd): Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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The above, however, only holds when JI host countries comply with Kyoto protocol Articles 5, 7 and 
8 on institutional and administrative requirements for determining domestic GHG emission sources. 
At SB-12 (Bonn, June 2000), the EU, the Umbrella Group and the CG-11 thus agreed that JI 
procedures could be simpler (a so-called JI fast track or Track I procedure) for those Annex I Parties 
that comply with these articles (JIN, 2000c) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000b, pp. 11-12). The key 
characteristic of such a fast track procedure would be that validation of the project design (including 
the baseline) and verification of the project results is the responsibility of the Parties involved, without 
the required supervision by the COP or a designated supervisory body. Should an Annex I Party 
hosting a JI project not comply with Article 5,7 and 8 requirements, a slow track procedure with 
external validation and verification, would have to be applied. 
The G-77&China did not agree with a JI fast-track proposal, as they wanted JI projects to follow the 
same track as CDM projects. It should be noted here that these countries’ feared more competition 
from JI projects if JI procedures would become relatively simple (JIN, 2000c) (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, 2000b) (JIN, 2000a, pp. 2-3). Non-Annex I Parties referred to the AIJ experience as 
described in Chapter 4, which had shown that, apart from the Central Americas, only a few projects 
were implemented in developing countries. Therefore, several potential CDM host countries feared 
that their perceived existing competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe would be 




5.2.3.  Eligibility of project types under the CDM 
The discussion on project eligibility under the CDM focussed on mainly two issues. First, the EU, 
AOSIS and several G-77&China Parties supported the opinion that sink enhancement projects 
(LULUCF) could only be eligible under the CDM once specific sinks-related uncertainties would have 
been properly dealt with (JIN, 2000a, p. 5) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000d, pp. 3,4,11,12). The 
most important of these uncertainties was permanence, which relates to the issue that the sequestration 
of carbon in forests and soil is often only temporary. For example, due to the rotation period of a 
forest, sequestered carbon will after some time be released back into the atmosphere. Such ‘temporary 
credits’ should lose their value after the rotation period, unless the project partners agree on a forest 
management programme so that next rotations would follow and the carbon sequestration capacity 
would remain intact. Also accounting issues as leakage (e.g., a forestry CDM project could lead to 
moving the deforestation activities to another forest, see also Chapter 4) and the determination of 
precise sources of carbon sequestration (e.g., soil, trunks, leafs) required much attention during 
negotiations on CDM project eligibility. 
With a view to these uncertainties, the EU proposed to leave sink enhancement projects out of the 
Kyoto Protocol (both with respect to accounting against Annex I Parties’ QELRCs and under JI and 
CDM), at least for the time being (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000d, pp. 3,4). The EU wanted to 
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wait for the IPCC Special Report on LULUCF and the recommendations that the COP would provide 
based on this report (IPCC, 2000a). 
The G-77&China did not form a homogeneous group on this topic, though (JIN, 2000a, p. 5). Some 
Latin American countries, under the leadership of Costa Rica, hoped to acquire additional funding 
through the CDM for their national forest protection and reforestation programmes and, thus, were 
strongly in favour of sink enhancement projects under the CDM (JIN, 2000a, p. 5). At SB-12, non-
Annex I Parties from Latin America submitted a position paper in which they stressed the potential 
contribution of sink enhancement CDM projects (forest conservation, reforestation/afforestation and 
project halting land degradation) to improving biodiversity in the developing countries, restoring the 
forest coverage, halting a process of soil erosion and bringing about other local ecological benefits 
(UNFCCC, 2000a, pp. 2-5) (JIN, 2000c, p. 9) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000c, p. 2). Brazil and 
Peru were the only Latin American countries that did not agree with this position. 
China, India, AOSIS, and Brazil and Peru, on the other side of the G-77&China spectrum, suggested 
excluding sinks from the CDM because, in their view, relatively cheap sink enhancement projects 
would (partly) displace the transfer of sustainable energy technologies under the CDM to developing 
countries (JIN, 2000a, p. 5) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000b, p. 4). China and India considered 
CDM energy sector projects to deliver the strongest contribution to their domestic sustainable 
development. Brazil and Peru stated that forest conservation projects and projects preventing land 
degradation should not be eligible under the CDM given that contributions to improving biodiversity 
should come from other international programmes (e.g., the UN Convention on Biological Diversity). 
The Umbrella Group strongly supported the inclusion of sinks in the CDM because it felt that such 
projects would increase cost-effectiveness of the CDM and deliver local ecological benefits to a large 
group of developing countries (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000d). 
A second project eligibility issue was how to determine the contribution of CDM projects to 
sustainable development in the host countries. A number of non-Annex I countries argued that this 
judgement should be a sovereign decision of host countries themselves, whereas other countries 
argued that the COP should at least set some requirements for sustainable development. Also, it was 
feared that competition among developing countries to host CDM projects could lead to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in terms of an increasing focus on low-cost emission reduction credits and a decreasing focus 
on sustainable development (JIN, 2000a, p. 5) (Thorne & La Rovere, 1999). 
This discussion soon focused on the possible inclusion of nuclear energy and large-scale hydro energy 
projects in the CDM (JIN, 2000a, p. 5). Basically, if the contribution to sustainable development 
would be a sovereign judgement of host countries, a CDM host country could decide that nuclear 
energy would be sustainable from its domestic perspective. Especially at COP-5 (Bonn, October-
November 1999) ‘pro and con nuke’ lobby groups were largely represented in the corridors of the 
negotiation rooms. Within the meeting rooms, the majority of Parties were reluctant to consider 
nuclear energy as an eligible project option under the CDM and JI (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
1999b, p. 12). 
At SB-13 (September 2000), the EU proposed a ‘positive list of CDM projects’ (UNFCCC, 2000b, p. 
4), which included projects in the following categories: renewable energy; energy efficiency; and, 
demand-side management. Project types on the list could be subject to more lenient procedures in 
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terms of, for example: deciding on project eligibility, project baselines and carrying out validation, 
monitoring and verification procedures. With this positive list, the EU hoped to contribute to a prompt 
start of the CDM. 
Members of the Umbrella Group opposed the idea of a positive list because it could limit investors’ 
choice from CDM project types. Instead, they supported the suggestion to develop simplified 
procedures for CDM project development in general, and for small-scale CDM projects in particular. 
Such simplified procedures would reduce transaction costs of project design and implementation under 
the CDM. The G-77&China neither supported the positive list idea, because, in their view, it should be 
up to developing countries themselves to decide on the eligibility of CDM projects. 
 
5.3.  Progress with ‘Crunch Issues’ at Unfinished COP-6 
 
The objective of COP-6 (The Hague, The Netherlands, 13-24 November 2000) was to complete the 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action. In order to facilitate the negotiations, COP President Mr Jan Pronk, the 
Dutch Minister of the Environment, submitted a negotiation text, ‘Note by the President of COP-6’, on 
all the ‘crunch issues’ that needed a political agreement by COP-6 (Pronk, 2000).80 The Note was 
divided into four sections (see Box 5-1) of which one specifically addressed the issues related to the 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (however, also the other sections addressed issues directly or indirectly 
related to the mechanisms) and reflected progress made at SB-13.
81
 It also took account of the 
negotiations held in four informal sub-groups of the COP, which had been formed on Tuesday 21 
November and finished their work on Thursday 23 November 2000. 
Box 5-1. Clusters of issues at COP-6 
At COP-6, the issues of the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of Action’ were clustered in four negotiation clusters 
A, B, C and D. The clusters contained the following topics: 
 Box A: Capacity building, technology transfer, implementation of Articles 4.8/4.9 and 3.14, and 
finance, including creating an adaptation fund. 
 Box B: Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. 
 Box C: Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry. 
 Box D: Policies and Measures, Compliance, Accounting, Reporting and Review. 
 
The Note clearly showed that Parties had moved fairly close to a compromise. However, as described 
in Chapter 3, eventually the Parties did not reach agreement on the extent to which industrialised 
Parties could account for carbon sequestration through LULUCF activities (e.g., through different 
harvesting techniques on land so that less carbon would be released from soils) in their GHG emission 
reduction bookkeeping (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000a, p. 17). Consequently, COP-6 had to be 
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 sessions of SB had started in Lyon (September 2000) and were resumed in The Hague during the first 





suspended to June 2001. Below follows a description of the negotiations on design issues related to JI 
and CDM as discussed within the negotiation process under the Note by the President. 
 
5.3.1.  Box A: Adaptation Fund in relation to CDM 
In The Hague, within the context of Box A, Parties extensively discussed the issue of creating an 
adaptation fund in order to support developing countries which are particularly vulnerable for the 
adverse effects of climate change. Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol had stated that a share of the 
proceeds from CDM projects should be collected in such a fund, although it was unclear which share 
(UNFCCC, 1998). COP-6 agreed that the Adaptation Fund would be established under the GEF as a 
trust fund and that funding would be generated through a levy (‘share of proceeds’) of 2% on the 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated by CDM projects. The Fund would assist least 
developed countries and small island developing states in avoiding deforestation, combating land 
degradation, and avoiding desertification. In Box A it was furthermore proposed that, in order to 
encourage a greater flow of CDM projects to least developed countries, CDM projects implemented in 
these countries would be exempted from the levy on CERs. 
 
5.3.2.  Box B: Kyoto flexibility mechanisms issues 
On the eligibility of projects under the CDM, the COP proposed that each non-Annex I Party hosting a 
CDM project should have the discretion to evaluate itself whether a project contributes to its 
sustainable development. Nevertheless, COP-6 proposed that Annex I and non-Annex I Parties should 
refrain from using nuclear energy under the CDM (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000a, p. 12). 
Although COP-6 did not agree on the positive list proposal of the EU, it proposed that renewable 
energy (e.g., small-scale hydro) and energy efficiency improvement projects should be given priority 
under the CDM. 
Regarding the issue of supplementarity, the Note by the President suggested that Annex I Parties carry 
out their commitments primarily through domestic action (Pronk, 2000). Although the choice of the 
word ‘primarily’ implied an important role for domestic action in meeting commitments, COP-6 did 
not further specify this. Partly, this may have been due to the fact that the final stage of the 
negotiations began rather late
82
 so that there may not have been enough time to bring supporters and 
opponents of limiting the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms together. However, during the 
second week of COP-6, the EU had expressed interest in a possible qualitative ceiling instead of a 
quantitative formula, provided that other technical issues related to the application of the mechanisms 




At COP-6, Parties proposed a two-track project cycle for JI, which reflected the agreement reached 
between, among others, the EU, the Umbrella Group and CG-11 at SB-13 in Lyon (see above). 
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 In fact, the final negotiation stage began only on Thursday evening (23 November 2000) as some Parties had 
requested the COP President earlier that week for some extra time in order to be able to come to an agreement in 
the informal sub-groups. 
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 Based on a report from Environment Minister Yuriko Kawaguchi from Japan who co-facilitated the informal 
sub-group discussion on the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000a, p. 12). 
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According to the proposal, those JI host Parties with a proper national inventory system for GHG 
emissions, would be eligible for a fast-track JI procedure (JI Track-1). However, a problem with the JI 
two-track approach could be that such an inventory system was only required about a year before the 
commitment period.
84
 This could, given the preparation time usually required for JI projects, create a 
disincentive for early JI action (especially if crediting of such projects would only start as of 2008). In 
other words, countries interested in JI investments and acquiring ERUs as of 2008 would need to start 
with the project preparations around 2006 but may not have clarity by then whether the host country 
would be eligible for the fast-track procedure. The COP-6 Decision on the JI two-track approach was 
eventually adopted by COP-7 in 2001 and the detailed criteria for Annex I Parties to be eligible for 
fast-track JI are shown in Box 5-2 (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 2-4, Decision 16/CP.7 ). 
These compromises reflected the following tactical aspects, including how Parties formulated 
positions and managed to keep these positions alive during the negotiations or combined these with 
other positions: 
 Supplementarity: The EU’s argument to cap the overall use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
largely originated from a concern within the EU that a too large use of the mechanisms would 
slow down the development, deployment and diffusion of low-emission technologies within 
Annex I Parties. With a view to the medium to long run, the EU considered such a development a 
threat to the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol. Other Annex I Parties, instead, wanted 
a more flexible approach as they feared that capping the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
would lead to several missed opportunities in terms of transferring present state-of-the-art 
technologies to developing countries, where such technologies are not yet feasible or available. 
Already at COP-6, but especially at COP-6bis (in June 2001, when the negotiation power of some 
Umbrella Group countries had significantly become stronger, see Chapter 3), the EU gave up on 
its proposal for a quantitative ceiling and agreed on a qualitative ceiling, which Parties did not 
specifically define, so that it basically resembled the original Umbrella Group proposal. 
 JI two-track approach: On this topic, environmental integrity concerns were addressed by 
negotiation Parties as the JI slow-track would apply similar rules as for the CDM and the fast-track 
JI process could only be used if JI host countries had their GHG inventory systems in place. What 
remained was G-77&China group reservations that the fast-track process might give JI a 
competitive edge over the CDM, but this aspect turned out to be of insufficient importance to 
change the course of the negotiations. 
 CDM project eligibility: During the negotiations on CDM project eligibility, the EU proposals to 
limit possible CDM projects through a ‘positive list’ was not adopted, which resulted in a broader 
scope for CDM project investment with varying contributions to sustainable development. The 
compromise was clearly found in the decision to ‘refrain from nuclear energy’ under the CDM, 
whereas the eligibility of forestry projects was already covered by Box C negotiations (see below). 
Many countries were concerned about the appearance of nuclear energy projects in the CDM 
discussions (JIN, 2000a) (in 1999 there were rumours that South Africa and Canada were 
preparing a nuclear energy CDM project) and this compromise satisfactorily settled the issue. The 
scope for large-scale hydro power projects, of which the environmental integrity next to GHG 
emission reduction was also questioned during negotiations, was reduced under the CDM by 
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referring to the criteria of the World Commission on Dams (World Commission on Dams, 2000), 
which needed to be met anyway and which covered most of the concerns about large-scale hydro 
power projects expressed during negotiations on the CDM. 
Box 5-2. JI two-track approach 
For JI, the proposed two-track approach developed at SB-13 (Lyon, September 2000) was included in 
the Decision of COP-7. Paragraph 21 of the ‘Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol’ (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 2-4, Decision 16/CP.7) states that an Annex I Party which 
meets the following eligibility criteria: 
 it must be a Party to the Protocol; 
 its assigned amount has been calculated and recorded in accordance with the Marrakech decision 
on modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts; 
 it has in place a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic GHG emissions in accordance 
with Article 5.1 of the Protocol; 
 it has in place a national registry in accordance with Article 7.4 of the Protocol; 
 it has submitted annually the most recent required inventory, in accordance with Articles 5.2 and 
7.1 [of the Kyoto Protocol]; and 
 it submits supplementary information on assigned amount in accordance with Article 7.1; 
may “verify reductions in anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancements of anthropogenic 
removals by sinks from an Article 6 project as being additional to any that would otherwise occur … 
Upon such verification, the host Party may issue the appropriate quantity of emission reduction units 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision -/CMP.1” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 13, para. 23). 
This provision is generally referred to as the JI Track-1 (fast track) procedure, which implies that 
when both Parties meet the above eligibility requirements, they can transfer and acquire emission 
reduction units (ERUs) from JI projects without the approval of the JI supervisory committee, i.e. 
without an external validation of the project plan and verification of the emission reductions by a 
designated operational entity. 
The verification of emission reductions of JI projects that are implemented by Parties which do not 
meet the eligibility requirements of the above paragraph 23, shall occur through the verification 
procedure under the JI Supervisory Committee. This procedure is called JI Track-2 (slow track) and it 
was generally expected that this procedure would largely resemble the CDM project design 
procedures. 
 
5.3.3.  Box C: Eligibility of land use, land-use change and forestry projects in the CDM 
Finally, COP-6 reached a tentative agreement on the eligibility of afforestation and reforestation 
projects under the CDM. Nevertheless, Parties acknowledged the special concerns related to forestry 
projects, such as the issues of possible non-permanence of the carbon sequestration, possible adverse 
social and environmental effects, and replacement of deforestation activities (‘carbon leakage’) (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, pp. 6-7) (JIN, 2001a, p. 4). Projects preventing deforestation and land 
degradation would, according to the agreement, not be eligible under the CDM; as mentioned above, 
these project types are considered priority activities to be funded by the Adaptation Fund. Several 
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observers concluded that including forestry and land conservation projects in the Adaptation Fund 
would partly compensate those developing countries for which preventing deforestation and land 
degradation are important sustainable development priorities (JIN, 2000d).  
The compromise thus reached clearly limited the scope for forestry projects under the CDM. After all, 
from the statement on LULUCF submitted by the Latin American countries, it became clear that 
especially forest conservation and management projects were considered very important for the 
maintenance of their domestic forest areas (JIN, 2000c, p. 9) (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2000c, p. 
2). One reason why forest conservation was left out of the CDM as a project option was the 
complexity of determining baselines. Whereas the baseline for reforestation and/or afforestation 
projects can reasonably be based on the assumption that no forest activities on the areas concerned 
would have taken place under business-as-usual, the baseline for projects managing an existing forest 
must reasonably demonstrate that without the CDM the forest would have been deforested, which is 
generally more difficult to prove. Therefore, the compromise, on the one hand, increased 
environmental integrity by leaving out of the CDM several possibly controversial forest conservation 
projects, but, on the other hand, offered considerably less support to Latin American countries’ 
domestic forestry programmes. 
 
5.4.  Handling Issues Related to the Design of the Kyoto Project 
Mechanisms 
 
5.4.1.  Introduction  
After the successful conclusion of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action at the resumed session of COP-6 in 
Bonn (June 2001), negotiations continued at COP-7 (Marrakech, Morocco, October-November 2001). 
At Marrakech, Parties formulate a package of draft decisions (the so-called ‘Marrakech Accords’)85 on 
the operationalisation of the several policy elements in the ‘Bonn Agreement’ (see Chapter 3), 
including modalities and procedures for JI and CDM projects (UNFCCC, 2002b). The latter referred 
to the several steps in setting up JI and CDM projects and calculating the GHG emission reductions 
achieved. 
Table 5-1 presents an overview of the issues/steps addressed by the Marrakech Accords with respect 
to designing a CDM project, monitoring its implementation, and calculating the GHG emission 
reductions achieved.
86
 Key elements in the design phase of a CDM project are: 
 Additionality: determination that GHG emission reductions would not have taken place in the 
absence of the CDM activity; 
 Baseline: estimation of GHG emissions under business-as-usual circumstances of the CDM 
project;  
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 Project boundary: specification of GHG emission sources covered by the project; and 
 Monitoring and verification: check the performance of a project and verify whether GHG emission 
reductions have been achieved. 
In practice, the project design stage also contains negotiations between investor and host country 
partners on the investment terms and sharing of the project revenues, but as this aspect is typically left 
to the countries and/or project participants and does not have an impact on the calculation of emission 
reductions, it has not been dealt with in the Marrakech Accords. Once the CDM project design has 
been completed, it needs to be validated by an independent, third party entity. The CDM Executive 
Board (and JI Supervisory Committee) designates operational entities (DOE) for this task. Projects 
with validated project design documents can subsequently be registered as official CDM projects. 
During the implementation phase of the project, the actual investment takes place. The project’s 
emission reductions are subsequently calculated by taking the difference between the baseline 
emissions and the actually monitored emissions of the project itself. For CDM projects, these 
reductions must be verified by a DOE before they can be officially certified and issued as CERs to the 
CDM investor countries.  
The detailed elaboration in the Marrakech Accords on project design and implementation issues was 
directly related to the issue that JI and CDM had an inherent problem that GHG emission reductions 
had to be calculated against a counterfactual baseline scenario (i.e. a scenario that is replaced by the 
project and will therefore not become reality). This implied that emissions reduction calculations were 
surrounded by baseline uncertainties and could be subject to gaming by project developers in order to 
claim more emission reduction credits. In order to deal with this problem, the negotiations at the COP, 
SBSTA and at the level of the CDM Executive Board focussed on how to handle baseline 
uncertainties, develop strict rules to prevent abuse of these uncertainties, while at the same time trying 
to avoid that too strict rules would discourage project investments.  
The negotiation process and tactical aspects concerning baselines and additionality of emission 
reductions are explained in the next section. Below, a number of other design issues that were 
addressed during negotiations on the design of the CDM (and JI) are explained. 
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Table 5-1. CDM modalities and procedures dealt with by the Marrakech Accords 
Issue Addressed in ‘Marrakech’ Project design document 
Additionality Emission reductions shall be additional to what would otherwise occur 
Project boundaries All anthropogenic GHG emissions under the control of the project 
participants that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project 
Baselines 
 
 Reasonable representation of emissions in absence of the project 
 Project-specific and/or using multi-project factors 
 Take into account relevant national/sectoral policies and circumstances 
 Take into account project activity level 
 Simplified procedures for small-scale projects 
Leakage Measurable changes in emissions outside project boundary attributable to 
project 
Crediting lifetime For CDM projects either three possible periods of 7 years with 2 revision 
moments, or one period of 10 years only 
Equivalence of 
service 
 The activity level for the baseline should be the same as the activity 
level of the actual project 
 Emission reductions because of decreases in activity levels due to force 
majeure cannot be credited 
Validation of project 
design 
 To be carried out by operational entities 




 Monitoring of project emissions 
 Environmental assessment 
Verification and 
certification 
Designated operational entities 
Issuing of credits No ex-ante crediting; issuance after reductions have been verified at 
intervals to be agreed 
Source: UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 43-45 
 
5.4.2.  JI and CDM project system boundaries 
Before estimating a JI or CDM project baseline scenario, it must first be assessed which emission 
sources to include in the baseline. Basically, this should be any emission source that is affected by the 
project. However, a complication of this approach is that projects may have an impact on emission 
sources that are beyond the management control of the project developers. Therefore, according to 
‘Marrakech’, the project boundary must encompass all anthropogenic GHG emission sources which 
are under the control of the project participant(s) (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, para. 52 ). 
In this definition the key term is control. One way of dealing with the control issue for projects is to 
analyse to what extent the project is considered to be (in)dependent of any supply system in terms of 
their operation. Following this approach, a JI or CDM project can directly substitute an existing plant 
or a planned investment, e.g., a planned development of a conventional coal-fired power plant is 
changed to a higher-efficiency power plant. Also, an off-grid energy efficiency project in a rural area 
in a developing country can reasonably be assumed to be independent of the grid-connected energy 






5.4.3.  Leakage of GHG emission reduction effects 
Next to the impact of the project on emission sources within its boundary, the project may, as 
mentioned above, also have knock-on effects on GHG emission sources outside its boundary, which 
cannot be controlled by the project developers. These knock-on effects can be both positive and 
negative. A positive effect, e.g., a CDM emission reduction project leads to extra emission reductions 
outside the system boundary, is often referred to as spreading or spill over (Jackson, et al., 2001). 
When an emission reduction on the project site is (partly) offset by an increase in emissions outside 
the project boundary, carbon leakage occurs. In both cases, the project’s system boundary does not 
capture all direct and indirect effects of the project (OECD/IEA, 1999) (JIN, 2000e). 
The chapter in the Marrakech Accords dealing with CDM modalities and procedures defines leakage 
as “[t]he net change of anthropogenic emissions … which occurs outside the project boundary, and 
which is measurable and attributable to the … project activity” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, para. 51). In 
this text, there is also a requirement for “the identification of all potential sources of, and collection 
and archiving of data on emissions by sources outside the project boundaries which are significant and 
reasonably attributable to the project during the crediting period” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 38, para. 
53c). Furthermore, the CDM text requires “a description of the formulae used to calculate project 
leakage” (as part of the baseline emissions) (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 43-45, Appendix B, para. 2(i)(v)). 
The Marrakech Accords text is not really consistent in this respect, as it clearly defines the project 
boundary as the system for which the baseline must be determined and the leakage as changes in 
emissions due to the project but outside the project boundary. Nevertheless, project developers are 
required to present “a description of how the baseline methodology addresses potential leakage” 
(UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 43-45, Appendix B, para. 2(b)(ii)). 
The issue of leakage could be dealt with in a number of approaches.
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 First, leakage could be estimated 
in a similar way as is done with emission reductions within the project boundary, i.e. the leakage is 
calculated as the increase in emissions outside the project boundary beyond the emissions that were 
estimated to have occurred in the absence of the project. Hence, this assessment of leakage repeats the 
additionality/baseline exercises for emission sources within the project boundary. Second, leakage 
could be dealt with by defining standardised leakage correction factors (Chomitz, 1999), which 
provide a general estimate of leakage for a particular project type in a host country that can be applied 
to multiple projects. For each project of this type, the emission reductions achieved within the project 
boundary are reduced with the leakage correction factor (or increased with a correction factor for 
spreading). Determining a standardised leakage factor implies that the system boundaries for projects 
of a particular type in a host country can be assumed to be more or less of the same size. Though 
simple and cheap, the problem with the correction factor is to determine at what level it should be set. 
It could be conceived as being applied at the project type level as one project type may be more prone 
to leakage than another or it could be related to project size. 
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5.4.4.  Crediting lifetime 
In theory, the crediting lifetime of a JI or CDM project, i.e. the period of time during which the project 
can deliver GHG emission reduction credits, may be: 
 the technical lifetime of the technology implemented under the project, or 
 the period of time during which the project is considered additional to what would otherwise have 
taken place in the absence of the project, e.g., if it can be expected that five years after the 
project’s start a similar technology would have been implemented anyway, the crediting lifetime 
would be limited to five years only. 
The Marrakech Accords standardised the crediting lifetime for CDM projects to either 10 years with 
no possibility of renewal, or to 3 periods of 7 years with a possibility of renewal after each 7-year 
period. In case of the latter approach, project participants must renew or update the baseline for their 
project after each period of 7 years “taking into account new data where applicable” (UNFCCC, 
2002b, pp. 37, para. 49a). Should in the meantime, during the first 7-year period, a change have 
occurred which is relevant for the project, this will not affect the baseline for the first period; it should 
be included in the baseline for the second period though. A DOE must validate the new or updated 
baseline again. 
 
5.4.5.  Equivalence of service 
Following convention, in order to calculate the GHG emission reduction of a project, the baseline 
should provide the same ‘service’, e.g., in terms of energy output or land area. This concept is known 
as ‘equivalence of service’ (Jackson, et al., 2001). In practice, such equivalence may be difficult to 
ensure if, for example, a power plant in a project has a different output capacity than the one assumed 
under the baseline. Differences in efficiency, reliability, or fuel price between the project and the 
baseline may all cause plants to respond differently to the same demand. 
Moreover, it may be the case that equivalence of service can never apply. For example, a lighting 
project using solar photovoltaic panels and compact fluorescent light bulbs to replace kerosene lamps 
will provide 20 times the lighting service at 1/25
th
 of the energy input. Clearly, the concept is 
meaningless in this case. Projects that do not meet the equivalence of service condition cannot be 
compared on an activity basis, e.g., ktCO2/MWh. Other approaches may need to be taken, such as 
ktCO2/capita/year (Jackson, et al., 2001) (Begg, et al., 2002a) (PROBASE, 2003). Hence it is 
important to consider carefully whether this concept should apply and how it might be practically 
applied. 
 
5.5.  The Process of Negotiating Modalities for Determining Baselines and 
Additionality 
 
The decisions on the JI and CDM project cycle issues included in the Marrakech Accords were the 
result of the work carried out by the working groups on JI and the CDM at the SB-sessions during 





when designing and implementing JI and CDM projects. As is explained below, the translation of the 
‘Marrakech’ definitions to actual practice left scope for negotiations at a more informal level, i.e. 
where project developers submit project design documents based on their interpretation of the 
Marrakech Accords to the DOEs and where the CDM Executive Board decides on whether they agree 
with this interpretation. 
In the context of the CDM, this opened an entirely new dynamic process in which the CDM Executive 
Board, project developers, DOEs, review experts, and the Panel for Methodological Issues 
(MethPanel, operating under supervision of the CDM Executive Board) all tried to operationalise the 
‘Marrakech’ definitions, with different interests. The most profound example of how this dynamic 
process has taken place in the context of the CDM is the interpretation of the Marrakech rules on 
baseline determination and additionality assessment. This process is described below. 
 
5.5.1. The process of negotiating modalities for baseline determination 
The Marrakech Accords defined the baseline for JI and CDM projects as the scenario that reasonably 
represents the anthropogenic emissions by GHG sources that would occur in the absence of the JI or 
CDM project (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 18, Appendix B, para. 1) (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 36, Annex, para. 
44). In this decision the term ‘reasonably’ is of crucial importance. As explained above, because of its 
hypothetical character (i.e. the baseline scenario will not take place due to the project), the baseline is 
surrounded with uncertainties regarding the choice of the ‘right’ methodology, parameters, key 
factors, etc. As a consequence, more than one baseline could be considered reasonable. It should be 
noted that the modalities and procedures for setting CDM project baselines in the Marrakech Accords 
text are much more detailed than for JI project baselines, which relates to the fact that for JI a two-
track approach is envisaged (see Section 5.3). 
For the determination of CDM project baselines, the Marrakech Accords listed three approaches from 
which project participants must select the one which they consider most appropriate for the project 
activity (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, Annex, para. 48 ): 
1. Historical GHG emissions baseline: In the first approach the baseline is derived from actual or 
historical emissions relevant for the project. This approach assumes that the (recent) historic and 
actual emissions of GHGs at the project site (i.e. within the project’s system boundary) form a 
good representation of what reasonably would have happened in absence of the project during its 
crediting lifetime. 
2. Economically attractive course of action baseline: The second approach determines a baseline by 
identifying a technology that represents “an economically attractive course of action, taking into 
account barriers to investment” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, Annex, para. 48b). This approach 
assumes that, under business-as-usual circumstances, an economically attractive course of action 
would have occurred, although it does not specify economic attractiveness as a concept, which 
could imply that several different economically attractive options would qualify as a baseline, 
ranging from the economically most attractive course of action to less attractive ones. The choice 
of the baseline in this approach is to a certain extent narrowed down by the condition that under 
business-as-usual an economically attractive course of action would not have been hampered by 
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investment barriers. There could be an overlap between this approach and the first one if actually 
existing technologies represent an economically attractive course of action. 
3. Benchmark-type of baselines: The third approach differs from the first two in that it actually 
describes a multi-project baseline application, whereas the first two approaches can both be 
applied for single-project and multi-project baselines. It specifies that the baseline or benchmark 
is to be derived from the “average emissions of similar projects undertaken in the previous five 
years, in similar … circumstances, and whose performance is among the top 20 percent of their 
category” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, Annex, para. 48c). In this approach, actually two samples 
are taken. First, the average GHG emissions of all investments in a particular project category 
undertaken during the last five years are considered. Second, out of all currently operational 
plants within the project category the top 20% is taken, i.e. technologies with the lowest GHG 
intensity. Subsequently, the baseline is determined by taking the average emissions of those 
plants that belong to the top 20% in their category and that have become operational during the 
previous five years. 
Although the third baseline approach mentioned in the Marrakech Accords resembled a multi-project 
baseline approach, it was specifically stated in the text on the CDM that baselines shall be established 
on a project-specific basis (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 36, Annex, para. 45c). At first sight, this seemed to 
rule out the possibility of determining baselines by using multi-project approaches, but a closer look at 
the Appendices of the Marrakech Accords showed that multi-project baselines are allowed too, 
provided that such standardisation would lead to reasonable and conservative estimates of the 
emissions within the project’s system boundary in absence of the project (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 46, 
Appendix C, para. (b)(v)). 
Multi-project (or standardised) baselines are generic baselines derived for application to multiple 
projects and which contain reasonable descriptions of the future development of a sector (e.g., 
electricity grid) or country. For example, if for the power sector in a host country it can be reasonably 
assumed that under business-as-usual circumstances the power plants had used gas-fired boilers then 
this would be the technical performance on which to base the benchmark. The level of aggregation of 
these multi-project baselines depends on the project situation, but this could vary from aggregating the 
project technology/fuel situation to the sector level and perhaps to the country level. Most technology-
based performance standards are country-specific, but some may even apply across multiple countries. 
The discussion on baselines and the application of multi-project baselines is continued in the Chapter 
6. 
 
5.5.2.  The process of negotiating modalities for determining additionality of GHG 
emission reductions 
A general requirement of a JI or CDM project is that it must result in additional emission reductions, 
as these reductions are used as credits to compensate for GHG emissions in Annex I countries. 
Probably because of that, the debate on additionality was very harsh during negotiations, at the level of 





developers, DOEs and other stakeholders (irrespective of whether they were really involved in projects 
and government programmes or delivered public comments on project proposals).
88
 
The essence of the concept of additionality is closely related to the issue of determining a project 
baseline, as described above, in the sense that GHG emission reductions are additional when a 
CDM/JI project’s emissions are lower than the emissions estimated in the baseline scenario. This 
rather straightforward case can for instance be applied to situations where it can be clearly identified 
what the project replaces, e.g., a coal-fired plant being replaced with a gas-fired boiler. 
This picture changes if baselines are determined using standardised, multi-project baseline emission 
factors (for a particular project type in a host country or region, as explained above and elaborated on 
in the next chapter). Multi-project baselines use aggregate emission factors, which could, for instance, 
be a national average emissions factor, an average emission factor of all or a selection of grid-
connected power generation capacity, or a factor based on the best available techniques.  
An important difference with a project-specific baseline is that multi-project baselines are not directly 
related to the projects. In other words, all projects in a particular category (can) use the same multi-
project baseline. As a consequence, each project with lower emissions than the multi-project baseline 
could generate credits, irrespective of whether it would have been implemented with or without the 
CDM. Although application of multi-project baselines was generally supported because of its potential 
to lower transaction costs, many observers argued that multi-project baselines could also provide 
considerable scope for free riding, i.e. non-additional projects also receiving CDM credits 
(PROBASE, 2003, p. 12) (Ellis, et al., 2001) (Bode & Michaelowa, 2001) (Michaelowa & Stronzik, 
2002). 
In this context, from a methodological point of view, it was suggested by some to filter these free 
riders from the CDM crediting process through a project-specific additionality test (Bode & 
Michaelowa, 2001) (PROBASE, 2003, pp. 12, 21). Such a test could, for instance, contain an 
investment barriers analysis or contain threshold values for investment criteria, such as internal rate of 
return values, net present values, cost levels, etc. (PROBASE, 2003, pp. 109-110)
 
(Sathaye, et al., 
2001). Views on the functionality of such a project-specific additionality test have differed strongly 
(Jepma, 2002) (JIN, 2003b). As the EU-funded research programme PROBASE (2003) put forward, 
carrying out additionality tests would involve extra transaction costs and partly neutralise the 
transaction cost gains from using standardised baselines (PROBASE, 2003, pp. 21-22).  
In addition, there have been serious doubts in the literature about the extent to which free riders can be 
distinguished from genuine CDM investors. For some projects, e.g., landfill-gas CDM projects, the 
difference in return on investment between the project with the CDM credits and without credits may 
be sufficiently large to conclude that without the CDM such a project would not have come off the 
ground. For many other projects, however, where the CDM component only covers about 10% of the 
project funding, the internal rates of returns between the CDM and without-CDM cases are rather 
small (2 or 3%-points), which makes it difficult to conclude that the project is additional or not. 
Moreover, realising that a lower rate of return in the without-CDM case (the baseline) would make the 
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project officially additional could be an incentive for project developers to ‘talk up or talk down’ the 
figures in order to stay below additionality threshold figures (Jepma, 2002). 
Other ways to deal with free riding, as proposed by the literature, are setting conservative multi-
project baselines. This may not stop all free riders, but at least discourage most of them. The 
disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it would also discourage ‘genuine’ CDM project 
developers, because a conservative baseline would reduce the amount of credits to be achieved. 
Therefore, setting conservative multi-project baseline could lead to missed CDM opportunities 
(PROBASE, 2003, p. 49). 
These options for handling the concept of additionality had been discussed preceding COP-7. For the 
CDM, there were two proposed options (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2001, p. 6).
89
 According to the 
first option, a project must be ‘environmentally additional’ (i.e. produce reductions below a baseline) 
and show additionality by proving that the project’s internal rate of return is lower than a threshold 
level for the host country to be determined by the CDM-EB. The second option in the pre-COP-7 
negotiating text proposed the use of performance standards: the project must perform better, in terms 
of emission reductions, than an average performance of current activities in either the investor or host 
country. 
The final text of COP-7, however, did not contain modalities for carrying out a project-specific 
additionality test, i.e. the ‘Marrakech Accords’ require emission reductions to be additional to what 
otherwise would have taken place, but rather than through testing whether the project is additional, the 
additionality was assessed as part of the baseline study for a CDM project (see Table 1 and Box 3). In 
other words, given that a CDM project baseline must describe what would reasonably have taken place 
in the absence of the project activity (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 36, Annex, para. 44), additionality is 
shown if the baseline emissions are higher than the estimated project emissions. 
Therefore, the clearest message from COP-7 seemed to be that the investment criterion threshold was 
left out of the Marrakech Accords text, so that it seemed that that particular option had disappeared 
from the CDM project cycle. Several negotiators considered using an investment criterion threshold 
problematic, among other reasons because: 
 The transparency of an investment criterion threshold may not be high when confidential 
financial data are required but not disclosed, 
 The data could relatively easily be manipulated in order to arrive at a quantified figure which 
meets the threshold level (see also above), and 
 An investment additionality threshold value does not necessarily reveal several other factors that 
play a role in investment decisions (e.g., legal and institutional barriers, availability of human 
capital in the host country, capital market inefficiencies in the host countries). 
However, project-specific additionality was not entirely removed from the ‘Marrakech’ text 
(UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 20-49). In fact, as Box 5-3 shows, the treatment of additionality in the 
Marrakech Accords was not entirely consistent. For instance, whereas paragraph 43 clearly refers to 
additionality in terms of emissions reduced below the baseline, paragraph 2.d of Appendix B to this 
draft decision, requires project developers in their project design documents to show how GHG 
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emissions are reduced below the baseline. This latter paragraph could be interpreted as a project-
specific additionality test since it requires more information than simply the fact that the project 
emissions are below the baseline. Finally, the Marrakech Accords requested the CDM-EB to 
specifically address the additionality requirement. By doing so, the COP-7 basically left it to the 
CDM-EB to decide on how to operationalise additionality, either through baseline assessments, or 
project-specific additionality tests. 
Box 5-3. Additionality in the Marrakech Text on the CDM (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 20-49) 
Para. 37d Annex on CDM modalities and procedures: 
“The project is expected to result in a reduction in … greenhouse gases that are additional to any that 
would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity…” 
Para. 43 Annex on CDM modalities and procedures: 
“A CDM project activity is additional if…emissions…are reduced below those that would have 
occurred in absence of the …project.”  
Comment: The phrase “those that … project” refers to the baseline, which implies that additionality is 
shown if the emissions of the project are below the baseline. 
Para. 45b Annex on CDM modalities and procedures: 
“[A baseline shall be established] in a transparent and conservative manner regarding the choice of 
approaches, assumptions… additionality…” 
Comment: This paragraph clearly includes additionality as a parameter for baseline determination. 
Para 2.d, Appendix B – project design document: 
“[the project design document shall include a] Description of how the...emissions…are reduced below 
those that would have occurred in absence of… the project activity” 
Comment: This requirement was included in the Project Design Document on 29 August 2002 and 
requests project developers to explain how and why a project is additional. Given the above 
paragraphs 37d, 43 and 45b, this implies that project developers need to explain why the baseline for 
their project is above the project’s emissions level (e.g., by identifying barriers to business-as-usual 
implementation or by identifying which key factors or parameters have caused the baseline to differ 
from the project’s emissions scenario). 
Para. a(v), Appendix C – baseline guidance: 
“[the Executive Board shall develop and recommend general guidance in order to] address the 
additionality requirement of Article 12.5.c and paragraph. 43 of the above Annex.” 
 
5.6.  Process and Tactical Aspects Related to Operationalising Baselines and 
Additionality in the CDM practice 
 
Soon after the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005, the CDM pipeline started to 
grow very quickly. For instance, within two years, the CDM pipeline consisted of 2551 registered 
project activities, which together were estimated to reduce over 2.2 billion GHG emissions up until 
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2012 (by the end of the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period) (ENTTRANS, 2008, p. 18).
90
 From 
this CDM practice, it could among others be concluded that many projects in the pipeline were so-
called ‘greenfield’ electricity production projects. These projects do not replace clearly defined 
existing plants or systems, but replace power production capacity connected to the power grid in the 
CDM host country. These projects are often based on application of renewable energy technologies, 
such as wind farms, hydro power plants and concentrated solar plants. In October 2007, the share of 
these projects in the overall pipeline was approximately 40%, (ENTTRANS, 2008, p. 21) while in 
2013 this share had grown to over 55% (out of 7366 registered projects) (Fenhann & Antonsen, 2013). 
In order to determine which capacity will be replaced by the project, the baseline study must identify 
which grid-connected capacity would be dispatched first when new capacity becomes available and/or 
which capacity would have been added to the grid in the absence of the CDM project. As in most 
cases, it is difficult to specify such a marginal capacity (after all, the decision which capacity to 
dispatch or to replace is beyond the control of the CDM project developers who only sign a power 
purchase agreement with the power grid owner/operator), a baseline for a ‘greenfield’ project is in 
most cases determined with the help of an analysis to estimate which capacity connected or planned to 
be connected to the grid will be replaced by the CDM project, based on technology lifetime, 
operational costs, fuel availability, etc. 
As these baseline calculations are based on an analysis of the entire grid, they strongly resemble the 
methodologies for multi-project, standardised baselines. Consequently, this placed the issue of 
additionality back in the spotlights. After all, similar to the theoretical case of multi-project baselines 
described above, each project with GHG emissions below the aggregate grid-based baseline level 
could apply for CDM credits, irrespective of whether the project developers would have carried out 
the activity anyhow. As the COP, in the Marrakech Accords, had not settled this topic and had even 
given some confusing signals on the interpretation of additionality (see above), it was up to the early 
CDM movers and the CDM Executive Board to operationalise the issue. 
The most active early movers on the new CDM market were the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund initiative (PCF) of 2000 and the Netherlands Government with its CDM tender programme 
CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Units Procurement Tender) which was launched in 2001 
(JIN, 2001b) (JIN, 2001c). As early movers, PCF and CERUPT had to interpret the Kyoto Protocol 
Article 12 themselves, without clear guidance from the Marrakech Accords. Regarding baselines and 
additionality, PCF and CERUPT used different approaches. Although PCF initially (i.e. in 2000) did 
not request project developers to carry out separate additionality tests, it later required project 
developers to specifically show why the project scenario itself could not constitute the baseline, which 
implies an explicit assessment of additionality of the project.
91
 In the CERUPT programme a separate 
additionality test was not required; project developers submitting project proposals to the Netherlands 
Government had to carry out a detailed baseline analysis (with both the project-specific and the 
country context described), while showing that they had used the best available information (Ministry 
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of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2001). In this approach, it was assumed that the resulting 
baselines would implicitly reveal the projects’ additionality. 
As explained in Section 5.5.2, the CDM Executive Board formally had to provide guidance to the 
interpretation of the ‘Marrakech Accords’ in practice. The CDM Executive Board meets about five 
times a year during which it carries out several tasks: from the accreditation of the DOEs to the 
approval of baseline and monitoring methodologies (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 27, Annex, para.5). For the 
approval of methodologies, the board is supported by the MethPanel (an expert team to advise on each 
new methodology used by a CDM project developer). Methodologies approved by the CDM 
Executive Board can be used by other project developers as well for projects of the same type as 
covered by that methodology. 
The first round of decisions by the CDM Executive Board on baseline methodologies took place on 7-
8 June 2003 when the Board met for the ninth time. It considered fourteen new methodologies which 
had been compiled using the CDM Project Design Document (PDD) format which the CDM 
Executive Board had adopted on 29 August 2002 (Jepma, 2003) (JIN, 2003b). This document was 
mostly a one-to-one reflection of the modalities and procedures for the CDM in the Marrakech 
Accords with the exception that the requirement for an additionality assessment was explicitly 
formulated as a separate test next to the baseline analysis. The project developers using the PDD, 
however, generally had difficulties with precisely interpreting the ‘why’ and ‘how’ question in PDD 
Section B.4: “how and why this project is additional and therefore not the baseline scenario.” This was 
the more so because there was no particular guidance on whether also investment data and criteria had 
to be used in answering this question or that the assessment could have a more qualitative nature. 
The MethPanel in its recommendations to the CDM Executive Board used a rather strict interpretation 
of the required additionality assessment. This, in combination with the general dissatisfaction of the 
Panel with the baseline and monitoring methodologies submitted by project developers, made that the 
Panel recommended to only give an A-rank (approved) to the baseline methodology used the Ulsan 
HFC23 Decomposition project, planned to be carried out in South Korea with INEOS Fluor Japan as 
main investor country project participant. This recommendation was taken over by the CDM 
Executive Board. The other thirteen baseline and monitoring methodologies were rejected, either as a 
‘B’-case (rejected, but with a possibility to resubmit; 5 methodologies), or as a ‘C’-case (rejected, with 
no possibility of resubmission; 8 methodologies). Based on the decisions by the ninth meeting of the 
Executive Board, several stakeholders expressed their concern that the CDM prompt start was 
hampered by the Board’s and the MethPanel’s strict assessments (JIN, 2003b). 
During the process of approving methodologies by the CDM Executive Board at its ninth meeting, 
additionality was the most important obstacle. Ten out of the 14 methodologies were rejected by the 
board because they insufficiently showed how and why the project was additional to the baseline case. 
Whereas most of the project developers had interpreted the required additionality assessment in the 
PDD as environmental additionality (i.e. a project is ‘automatically’ considered additional if the 
project’s GHG emissions are below baseline emission levels), the Roster of Experts,92 the MethPanel 
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and the CDM Executive Board generally took the position that project participants must also explain 
why the project itself is additional. 
Baseline methodologies that had been proposed by project developers since June 2003 had dealt with 
additionality in basically two approaches. First, some project developers aimed at showing 
additionality by calculating the increase in a project’s internal rate of return if the CDM credits were 
taken into consideration. For some project types, as mentioned above, such as landfill gas capture 
activities, these two rates could strongly differ, thereby showing that the carbon credits make a 
considerable difference. Second, other methodologies contained a barrier test showing that without the 
CDM the investment would have faced prohibitive investment barriers. Examples of such investment 
barriers are: lack of technical expertise and adequate supply of equipment in the host country, poor 
utility infrastructure and lack of administrative infrastructure and legislative framework (incl. 
enforcement), shortage of capital, lack of financial incentives to carry out investments as envisaged 
under the project, risk of subsidised energy prices, low acceptance from the public, etc. 
In order to streamline the operationalisation of the CDM additionality assessment, the CDM Executive 




 meeting (2004), decided to adopt a ‘tool for the demonstration of 
additionality’. In order to provide more guidance on this aspect of the PDD, the Board consolidated 
the additionality methods used by project developers and approved earlier by the Board into one 
general framework for additionality (JIN, 2004). 
The consolidated additionality tool starts with the notion that the demonstration of additionality of the 
GHG emission reductions must be consistent with the project baseline determination. In other words, 
additionality and baseline determination are conceptually strongly related to each other and this must 
be reflected in their application in the overall project methodology. The tool contains a stepwise 
approach to assess whether a proposed CDM project activity would have been carried out in the 





Box 5-4. Steps for determining the additionality of CDM project emission reductions 
The CDM additionality tool consisted of the following steps (JIN, 2004): 
1. Explore whether alternatives to the project activity exist in the host country. For instance, in case 
laws and regulations in the country require the investment envisaged under the project to be 
carried out anyway, it can be concluded that alternatives to the project exist. 
2. Conduct a financial investment analysis, either via a simple cost analysis showing whether 
without the CDM credits the project would have insufficient benefits to go ahead, or, if that is not 
a viable option, to apply an investment comparison analysis or a benchmark analysis. 
3. Identify barriers that prevent the implementation of the proposed project activity, while not 
preventing alternatives. Box 5-5 shows an example of how such a barrier analysis has been 
applied to the El Gallo CDM project in Mexico. Project developers had the freedom to conduct 
either a financial analysis or a barrier analysis, or do both. 
4. Demonstrate that the project technology is not common practice within the host country. In this 
step, an analysis must be made of projects that have already been developed in the country/region 
and that rely on a broadly similar technology, are of a similar scale, and take place in comparable 
legal, policy and economic environment. As such, this common practice step was an extension of 
the investment/barrier analysis in steps 2 and 3 in the sense that it broadens the scope of the 
assessment from a project to a national/regional level. 
5. Show how CDM registration will help the project to overcome the barriers identified in steps 2 
and 3.  
 
By adopting the consolidated additionality tool, the CDM Executive Board reduced uncertainty among 
project developers. After the first rounds of evaluating CDM baseline and monitoring methodologies, 
project developers who had invested considerable amounts in project development and who also 
interpreted the additionality assessment in the Marrakech Accords as the difference between the 
baseline and the project emissions, were extremely reluctant to submit new project methodology 
proposals to the CDM Executive Board.
93
 When the Board turned out to have a stricter opinion on 
additionality and indeed took the liberty given to it by the Marrakech Accords in Appendix C of the 
decision on the CDM (see Box 5-3), many proposals for baseline methodologies were returned to 
project developers as insufficient. This led to a widespread frustration among project developers who, 
instead of hoping to be rewarded for helping a prompt start of the CDM as early movers, were 
suddenly confronted with extra costs (Jepma, 2003) (JIN, 2003b). 
Nonetheless, as explained above, from a purely methodological perspective, there was a valid 
argument to include an additionality test in the project development process, since many CDM 
projects turned out to be ‘greenfield’ activities with baselines derived from average emission factors of 
the electricity grid to which the project became connected. However, an important tactical aspect in 
the negotiations on the additionality assessment and the tool development was that, on the one hand, 
project developers had to do more than just calculating a baseline GHG emission scenario, but, on the 
other hand, project developers had the freedom to choose between testing additionality by conducting 
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 For instance, the Netherlands Government decided to redo most of its approved CERUPT projects with a more 
elaborate assessment of additionality, which caused considerable delays in project implementation and extra 
transaction costs. 
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a project barrier analysis and showing the financial feasibility of a project with and without the CDM 
credits. As explained above, investors were extremely reluctant to disclose financial information about 
the project, which may also require disclosing financial information about comparable investments of 
the project investor for the purpose of comparison. The additionality tool offered project developers 
the possibility to avoid a financial additionality analysis and use a more qualitative analysis of possible 
investment barriers. 
Therefore, in terms of environmental strictness, the agreed additionality tool was more flexible than 
the rather strict interpretation of additionality by the CDM Executive Board earlier, in June 2003, 
when it evaluated the first project GHG accounting methodologies. In those days, the additionality 
debate was largely fuelled by external experts who argued that the CDM procedures should exclude 
free riders (Greiner & Michaelowa, 2003) (Pearson & Loong, 2003). However, as an assessment of 
additionality of the project is hypothetical in itself, i.e. the project replaces the situation described by 
the assessment, free riders can never be clearly identified. Therefore, the tactical approach taken by the 
CDM Executive Board was to have tools and rules sufficiently strict to avoid non-additional projects 






Box 5-5. El Gallo project barriers under business-as-usual circumstances 
The El Gallo project is located on the Cutzamala River, near the town of Cutzamala de Pinzón in the 
state of Guerrero in Mexico (in the Southern part of the country) (Electricidad, et al., 2013). The 
project aimed at generating electricity using hydroelectric sources. It aimed at installing a 30 MW 
power plant at the already existing dam of El Gallo on the river. The dam was built between 1979 and 
1998 with the objective of irrigation and electricity generation. However, by the early 2000s, it has 
only fulfilled the irrigation objective, because the funding required to install power generation 
equipment was never raised. The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) subsequently 
contracted the project as a CDM activity. 
The main barriers to project implementation under business-as-usual listed in the project design 
document were: 
 The limited access to financing: due to the high domestic interest rates in Mexico (Mexican 
interest rates of approximately 29% in 1998 and 8% in 2003) in combination with the short loan 
terms, the project participants had to consider international loans. Although the loan conditions 
were generally more attractive on the international financial markets, it turned out to be difficult to 
attract foreign capital. An important reason for this difficulty was that possible international 
financiers demand power purchase agreements showing that the power produced would be bought 
by off-takers. Since these off-takers were generally relatively small entities, international 
financiers found it more difficult to evaluate the reliability and creditworthiness of these entities. 
This made financiers reluctant to provide funding 
 Moreover, small-scale hydroelectric technology was generally considered as relatively risky by 
financiers, who, according to the project design document, tended to prefer investments in 
conventional fossil fuel technologies or large-scale, government-advanced hydro projects 
 Finally, the transaction costs related to the development of a small-scale hydropower project were 
disproportionately high. Hence, this created another barrier to implementing the project. 
With a view to these barriers, the project participants decided in 2001 to explore the value of the CO2 
emission reductions that could be achieved by the project. This value could generate an extra source of 
(hard currency) funding that would increase the internal rate of return of the project. Subsequently, the 
project was developed as a CDM project activity in the framework of the PCF. According to the 
project design document, the backing of the World Bank increased the creditworthiness of the 
investment. 
 
By November 2014, the CDM market had developed into a pipeline of 8676 projects, of which 7572 
have been registered by the CDM Executive Board as validated CDM projects. The remaining projects 
are still in the process of validation by a designated operational entity or have requested registration. 
Table 5-2 presents an overview (number of projects per project type and share in total CDM market; 
number of CERs per year) (Fenhann, 2014a). 
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Table 5-2. CDM project pipeline November 2014  
Type No of projects      %  CERs issued (x1000) 
Wind 2624 30,24% 151,913 10,10% 
Hydro 2266 26,12% 194,400 0,13% 
Biomass energy 786 9,06% 45,547 3,03% 
Methane avoidance 717 8,26% 24,338 1,62% 
Landfill gas 410 4,73% 61,733 4,10% 
Energy efficiency own energy generation 399 4,60% 70,194 4,67% 
Solar 422 4,86% 1,978 0,13% 
Energy efficiency Industry 138 1,59% 3,033 0,20% 
Fossil fuel switch 136 1,57% 52,043 3,46% 
Energy efficiency supply side (power 
plants) 
114 1,31% 4,843 0,32% 
N2O 108 1,24% 277,045 18,42% 
Coal bed/mine methane 106 1,22% 37,715 2,51% 
Energy efficiency Households 103 1,19% 602 0,04% 
Afforestation & Reforestation 74 0,85% 10,924 0,73% 
Fugitive 58 0,67% 24,599 1,64% 
Energy efficiency service sector 36 0,41% 9 0,00% 
Transport 32 0,37% 1,168 0,08% 
Geothermal 35 0,40% 8,053 0,54% 
Cement 28 0,32% 4,704 0,31% 
Energy distribution 25 0,29% 1,575 0,10% 
HFCs 23 0,27% 522,431 34,73% 
PFCs and SF6 18 0,21% 4,481 0,30% 
Mixed renewables 10 0,12% 16 0,00% 
CO2 usage 3 0,03% 10 0,00% 
Tidal 1 0,01% 746 0,05% 
Agriculture 1 0,01% 0 0,00% 
Total 8,676 100% 1,504,109 100% 
Source: Fenhann, 2014a. 
 
 
5.7.  Discussion: Kyoto Flexibility Mechanism Negotiations in Light of 
Design, Process and Tactics Conditions 
 
In this chapter, negotiations have been discussed at the level of defining modalities and procedures for 
the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms JI and CDM. The inclusion of these mechanisms in the Kyoto 
Protocol enabled industrialised countries to fulfil part of their commitments through GHG emission 
reduction measures in other countries. After ‘Kyoto’, the challenge remained to define clear rules for 
the applicability of project types/technologies under JI and CDM and for the accounting of GHG 
emission reductions achieved through projects. The negotiation process for these rules can be divided 
into two phases. The first phase covered the period from the adoption of the Buenos Plan of Action in 
1998 to the Marrakech Accords in 2001 and involved a more political debate at the level of the COP. 





Protocol in 2005. The latter phase negotiations were more technical with a focus on modalities and 
procedures for the operationalisation of JI and CDM in practice.  
Meeting basic condition 1: design of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms for real and additional 
emission reductions 
Negotiations on the design of JI and CDM during 1998-2001 largely set the boundaries within which 
JI and CDM could be applied by Annex I Parties in their efforts to comply with their Kyoto Protocol 
commitments, including decisions on supplementarity, and scope for project types under JI and CDM 
(sinks, nuclear energy). To a large extent, these conceptual discussions were not about the concept of 
project-based emissions trading as such, but were mainly related to the larger Kyoto Protocol context 
and particularly to the question of how much flexibility industrialised country Parties could obtain 
when complying with their QELRCs. For instance, a discussion on supplementarity (within the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms’ context) was largely about which share of QELRCs should be implemented 
domestically by industrialised countries and which part could be done abroad through JI and CDM. 
Similarly, the debate on whether and to what extent to consider forestry projects and nuclear energy 
under JI and CDM was more about the overall compliance issue and desirability of some technologies 
under the Kyoto Protocol than about the conceptual basics of JI and CDM. 
Typical conceptual JI and CDM issues during the 1998-2001 negotiation phase were: how to 
determine whether CDM projects contribute to sustainable development in host countries, and how to 
enable JI project investors and hosts to invest early in projects (i.e. before the start of the first Kyoto 
protocol commitment period). The first issue was resolved in the negotiations by agreeing that 
developing countries as CDM host countries will have the prerogative to decide for themselves on 
whether a proposed project is in line with their domestic sustainable development priorities. The 
second issue was addressed by acknowledging that JI credits, unlike CDM project credits, could only 
be traded via Annex I Parties’ assigned amounts and that this trading could therefore only take place 
during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period of 2008-2012. Early JI actions (i.e. before 2008) could 
still be accounted for, but could only be traded between countries during 2008-2012. CDM credits, 
instead, could already be added to Annex I Parties’ assigned amounts as of the year 2000. For JI 
projects, it was decided by the COP that countries with proper national GHG inventory systems in 
place, could follow an easier JI accounting process. 
During the second negotiation phase on Kyoto mechanism (2001-2005 and beyond), decisions were 
taken on the operationalisation of JI and CDM given the boundaries set during 1998-2001. Here, 
negotiations strongly focussed on the conceptual weakness of JI and CDM that determining project-
based GHG emission reductions is inherently difficult as this requires baselines which in most cases 
are hypothetical, counterfactual scenarios. Therefore, it is often difficult to precisely determine 
whether GHG emission reductions would not have taken place in absence of the JI or CDM project 
and, if so, to what extent emissions have been reduced. This aspect became particularly important 
when during the operationalisation of the CDM it turned out that many projects were in the area of 
implementing renewable energy technologies on new sites (‘greenfields’) with the energy product 
(mostly power) transferred to a grid, without knowing precisely what grid-connected capacity would 
be replaced by that. The main solution that was worked out during negotiations was the development 
of standardised baseline methodologies to calculate a GHG emission average of grid-connected 
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installations. At this stage, in the negotiated policy design, it was accepted that some CDM project 
aspects could not be fully measured in a GHG accounting process, while it was agreed, at same time, 
that asking due diligence from project developers (e.g., the additionality test) would prevent large-
scale emergence of non-additional emission reduction credits. 
From the above, it can be concluded that an ‘ideal’ situation (point A in Figure 1-3) where all JI and 
CDM projects would unambiguously produce real, additional and verifiable GHG emission reductions 
and contribute to the host countries’ sustainable development priorities and goals, could not be 
achieved: the additionality and baseline accounting procedures could become too complex and costly 
for that, and positive lists with only those projects that would ‘by definition’ support developing 
countries’ sustainable development priorities were not accepted for most negotiation Parties. In order 
to achieve an agreement on modalities and procedures for JI and CDM, the negotiations offered more 
flexible interpretations of additionality assessments and (multi-project) baseline determination and 
passed the decision whether a CDM project contributes to sustainable development to the host 
countries (including the possibility that countries may be less critical on this criterion in order to 
attract more projects). 
By doing so, the two negotiation stages described in this chapter managed to agree on a package which 
was more flexible in terms of GHG accounting strictness (as compared to the ‘ideal’ situation A in 
Figure 1-3), while still requesting due diligence from project developers in their project design work, 
and which was sufficiently pragmatic for enabling worldwide implementation of the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms. Based on this assessment, it can be concluded that basic condition 1 has been met during 
negotiations on JI and CDM operationalisation, while acknowledging that the ‘acceptance’ of non-
additional projects under the Kyoto Protocol could in practice create a deviation, in terms of Figure 
1-3, between end point D and ‘ideal’ point A. 
Meeting basic condition 2: an enabling negotiation process for the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
The process for negotiating JI and CDM modalities and procedures during 1998 and 2001 was largely 
similar to that before ‘Kyoto’: technical discussions and decision preparations were done at Subsidiary 
Body sessions, while decisions were taken or endorsed by the COP once a year. Since 2001, the main 
authorities in negotiating and interpreting the technical modalities and procedures of JI and CDM have 
been the CDM Executive Board and the JI Supervisory Committee, within the framework of the 
Marrakech Accords.  
During the first, ‘political’, stage of negotiations, JI and CDM were covered by the boxes with crunch 
issues defined by the Dutch Presidency of COP-6. Through these boxes, the negotiations could be 
clustered so that agreement in one cluster would not have to depend on negotiation development in 
other clusters. In practice, however, this clustering did not result in a COP-6 agreement at its first 
session (in November-December 2000) as the integration of box outcomes into a ‘President’s Note’ as 
the final negotiation text was not supported by consensus. The prolonged COP-6 meeting (in June 
2001) took place against a totally changed backdrop for the Kyoto Protocol after the withdrawal by the 
USA and the activities of the EU and a number of key other Annex I Parties to keep the protocol alive. 
This also changed the process of negotiating the scope and flexibility of applying JI and CDM against 





Once the negotiation process on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action had been completed with the 
‘Marrakech Accords’, most negotiations on JI and CDM issues took place at the level of the SBSTA, 
but mainly at the level of the CDM Executive Board and the JI Supervisory Committee. As has been 
explained in this chapter, especially the role of the CDM Executive Board led to confusion among 
potential CDM stakeholders, which was largely based on the ambiguous formulation in the 
‘Marrakech Accords’ of the concept of additionality and the information that would have to be 
included in the CDM Project Design Document. 
On top of that, COP-7 requested the CDM Executive Board to develop and recommend general 
guidance to address the additionality requirement. By doing so, the COP in fact transferred part of its 
political decision making role to the more technical level of the CDM Executive Board. After all, 
when it turned out that several CDM project proposals based their baselines on aggregated sector 
averages (e.g., for ‘greenfield’ grid-connected renewable projects), a stronger scope for free-riding 
could emerge. However, the question whether such free riding was acceptable was typically a political 
question as it directly touched upon in the integrity of the Kyoto Protocol and it would have been more 
logical to return this issue to the COP. Instead, the CDM Executive Board decided to unilaterally 
apply a strict interpretation of baselines and additionality, which in the first rounds of evaluating 
baseline methodologies led to a disappointingly small number of approved methodologies and much 
frustration among the first movers in the CDM market. In the course of time, the CDM Executive 
Board came to a more flexible interpretation of the additionality issue, but during these years (2003-
2005), the COP hardly played a role in this process. Perhaps, earlier political guidance by the COP to 
this negotiation process could have contributed to a prompt start of the CDM. 
In terms of meeting the condition of an enabling negotiation process, this negotiation file has shown 
that the CDM Executive Board decision to unilaterally adopt strict additionality rules, without 
consideration by the COP, created strictness in operating the CDM which initially hampered the 
development of CDM projects. In this respect, it can be concluded that basic condition 2 was not met 
at all times during the negotiations on JI and CDM operationalisation. It turned out that, while 
technicalities regarding instrument design and implementation (such as with the handling of 
additionality) could largely be left to technical negotiations (such as SB and CDM Executive Board), 
at several points during these technical negotiations, the debate became political as the negotiation 
outcome could have a direct impact on the overall integrity of the overarching policy regime, i.e. the 
Kyoto Protocol. At these stages, as illustrated in this chapter, the technical and political negotiation 
‘levels’ did not ‘communicate’ well with each other, which limited the enabling capacity of the overall 
negotiation process towards a package for implementation of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. 
Meeting basic condition 3: key tactical aspects affecting the negotiation result on the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms 
As explained in Chapter 3, during 1998-2001, there were several differences of opinion between the 
EU, the Umbrella Group and the G-77&China on the strictness of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
consequently on the scope and flexibility of applying the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. Generally, the 
EU and the G-77&China were in favour of a stricter interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol, whereas the 
Umbrella Group focused on more flexibility, among others through a wide interpretation of LULUCF 
options and a widespread use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. These issues were specified in 
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negotiation boxes before the COP-6 negotiations which enabled negotiations both on individual issues 
and integrated packages (meeting basic condition 3). 
As explained, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 strongly changed the EU positions 
on a number of issues, including LULUCF and compliance, in order to gain support from Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and the Russian Federation. For the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, the change in the 
US position resulted in a much more flexible EU position on supplementarity (shifting from a 
quantitative ceiling on the use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms to a more generally formulated 
qualitative restriction). In this respect, the EU (and also the G-77&China) was willing to accept a 
trade-off regarding the environmental strictness of using JI and CDM in return for a sufficiently broad 
support for the Kyoto Protocol. In terms of Figure 1-3 in Chapter 1, after the withdrawal of the USA 
from the Kyoto Protocol, there was an accelerated move from point A to intermediate outcome B, after 
which EU flexibility enabled a move towards outcomes C and D (meeting basic condition 3). 
Finally, at the level of the technical discussions on CDM modalities and procedures, the CDM 
Executive Board’s strict interpretation of the sometime ambiguous formulations in the ‘Marrakech 
Accords’ was continued for almost three years, which resulted in the first registered CDM projects in 
2005, almost five years after the eligibility of crediting CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol and 
more than three years after the Netherlands Government and the World Bank PCF contracted their 
first CDM projects (in this respect basic condition 3 was not met). 
Eventually, the CDM, and later also JI, could develop into substantial project pipelines (see Chapter 4 
and Section 5.6) which was largely due to the successful interactions that emerged between the CDM 
Executive Board and project developers after 2005. The latter group had to develop GHG accounting 
methodologies for their projects which the Executive Board had to approve. Similar methodologies per 
project type (both for large and small-scale projects) were subsequently consolidated by the Board, so 
that other project developers could use these methodologies, thereby saving time and resources 
(thereby meeting basic condition 3). 
In conclusion, basic condition 3 in terms of decisive tactics supporting the negotiations on JI and 
CDM operationalisation leading to real, additional and verifiable GHG emission reductions, was met 
in terms of clearly distinguishing different JI and CDM-related issues in negotiation boxes at COP-6, 
allowing more GHG accounting flexibility after 2001 in order to obtain a broader support for the 
flexibility mechanisms and a more pragmatic approach by the CDM Executive Board after 2005 
(especially with respect to the consolidation of existing accounting methodologies). The condition was 
not met with respect to the initial strict interpretation of additionality testing so that several early 
mover projects had to be revised. 





Table 5-3. Design, process-related and tactical aspects related to negotiations on Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms 
 Description of basic condition in negotiation file 
























 Setting boundaries for JI and CDM use by Annex I Parties 
and determining what technologies to include/exclude 
from the mechanisms (e.g., forestry, nuclear energy) 





 Sustainable development  
Goals: 
 Support Annex I Parties to achieve QELRCs and host 
countries to achieve sustainable development 
Means: 
 Baseline methodologies 
 Host country prerogative to decide on sustainable 
development criteria 
 Additionality tests for avoiding non-additional emission 
reductions claimed as credits 
(+) The negotiations on the Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms resulted in 
a package which was sufficiently 
pragmatic to enable worldwide 























 Annual COP sessions 
 Meetings of SBSTA/SBI 
 CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee 
Strategy and Responsibility: 
 JI/CDM crunch issues were discussed at the level of 
SBSTA/SBI and decided by COP 
 Modalities and procedures for JI/CDM projects were 
decided by COP (2001) 
 Operational details were decided at level of CDM 
Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee 
(+) During 1998-2001, when 
negotiations had stronger 
political impacts, they were 
conducted at COP 
(–) During the technical negotiations 
(after 2001) on JI/CDM 
modalities, decisions on 
additionality had direct impact on 
the overall integrity of the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, technical and 
political negotiation ‘levels’ did 






















  At COP-6, crunch issues were divided in separate boxes 
 US withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol led to more flexible 
rules for application of JI/CDM mechanisms 
 Acknowledgment that GHG emission reductions cannot 
be fully measured, so that a balance is found between 
having pragmatic procedures while avoiding systematic 
non-additional projects  
 Ambiguous formulation on additionality of 
projects/emission reductions led to lack of clarity at 
which level to address this aspect: COP or JI/CDM 
supervising bodies 
 In order to support development of GHG accounting 
rules, the JI/CDM supervising bodies approved and 
consolidated methodologies developed by market 
players, for wider use and project acceleration 
(+)At COP-6, topics were specified in 
negotiation boxes to discuss 
individual and integrated issues 
(+) After US withdrawal from Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU accepted more 
flexible accounting procedures to 
gain support for the protocol 
(–) Strict interpretation by the CDM 
Executive Board of additionality 
and baselines delayed CDM 
project development 
(+) CDM Executive Board 
consolidated single-project 




 Chapter 6.  Negotiations on Standardised Baselines 




GHG emission reductions from a JI or CDM project are calculated as reductions below a baseline. As 
this scenario describes the situation that would have occurred in the absence of the project, it is 
counterfactual and therefore surrounded by uncertainties. Chapter 5 has also shown that in some cases 
the baseline may not provide adequate safeguards against free-rider behaviour which means that also 
non-additional projects may claim JI or CDM emission reduction credits. Baseline determination 
became an issue for climate policy makers for the first time during the second half of the 1990s when 
the first experiences with the AIJ pilot phase (see Chapter 4) showed that project developers handled 
the baseline issue in different ways. Some project developers simply assumed that the pre-project 
situation would have continued for the next 15 to 25 years, without taking into consideration any 
technological or policy change, whereas others used advanced (modelled) business-as-usual 
projections of the future situation, thereby keeping in mind expected changes in relevant project 
circumstances, such as government policy, international treaties, EU accession, etc. Some project 
developers simply indicated the baseline emission factor for their AIJ project without explaining the 
underlying methodology, which made an external review extremely difficult (Jepma, et al., 1998) 
(Jepma & Gaast, 2000) (PROBASE, 2003). 
Despite the diversity in baseline methodologies used, the AIJ pilot phase made clear that transaction 
costs related to baseline determination could be rather high due to: the design of the methodology to 
calculate the baseline emission factors; collection of data; identification of the emission sources 
affected by the project; a study of the context of the host country and/or the region within which the 
project is located; and, the validation of the baseline scenario (see also Section 6.2). With a view to 
this, already during the AIJ pilot phase, several experts suggested standardisation of baseline 
methodologies for projects within the same category and, eventually, to calculate ‘benchmark’ 
emission factors for project categories per host country or representative region. Such standardisation 
would enable project developers to use already existing and approved baseline methodologies, or to 
simply apply the standardised baseline emission factors to their projects (Jepma, 1997) (Sathaye, et al., 
2001) (Ruygrok, 2000) (Parkinson, et al., 2001) (PROBASE, 2003). 
Although standardisation of baselines is generally considered to be beneficial in terms of reducing 
transaction costs per project, there are a number of issues that need to be resolved before it can be 
applied. First, there are also costs involved with determining the standardised baseline methodology 
and/or emission factors. Early CDM experience has shown that project developers were reluctant to 
determine such methodologies/emission factors individually, because once validated by a designated 
operational entity (see Chapter 5), a methodology/emission factor became publicly available and could 





Second, standardisation of baselines could affect the allocation of JI and CDM projects if the resulting 
multi-project baseline insufficiently represents the project-specific circumstances and thus leads to an 
overestimation or underestimation of the emission reductions achieved. 
Third, standardisation of baselines could also face a trade-off between, on the one hand, aiming at 
high-level environmental integrity and, on the other hand, enabling larger participation of investors in 
the project mechanisms. After all, as explained in Chapter 5, standardised baselines can be applied to 
multiple projects and are not directly linked to the project itself, so that there could be a risk of free 
riding because each project with GHG emissions below the standard baseline could apply for credits, 
irrespective of whether the project is an additional JI or CDM project or would have been carried out 
anyway. Preventing free riding in a system of multi-project or standardised baselines would require 
additional measures such as conservative baseline estimates or additionality tests next to the baseline. 
Although these measures could enhance the environmental integrity of the CDM or JI, they could also 
create a disincentive to invest in such projects, both for ‘genuine’ investors and free riders (Bernow, et 
al., 2000) (PROBASE, 2003). 
How the latter ‘dilemma’ between environmental integrity and wide-scale applicability of multi-
project baselines has been addressed in negotiations on baseline methodologies is analysed in this 
chapter with a view to the question whether and how basic negotiation condition 1, as introduced in 
Chapter 1, has been met. Meeting basic condition 2 is analysed in terms of how the JI and CDM 
supervising bodies, in collaboration with the COP and Subsidiary Bodies, have enabled the step-wise 
formulation of modalities and procedures for multi-project baselines. With respect to basic negotiation 
condition 3, tactical and facilitating aspects are identified which contributed to policy makers’ 
knowledge base of multi-project baselines, such as from science and practical experiences, and 
subsequently had an impact on the negotiation outcome. 
 
6.2. Impact of Standardised Baselines on Costs, Environmental Integrity 
and Allocation of JI and CDM Projects 
 
A JI or CDM project is a GHG emission-neutral investment. A country with an assigned amount of 
GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol could increase this amount by reducing GHG emissions 
through a project on the territory of another country. If transaction costs are assumed to be zero and if 
it is assumed that baselines at all times correctly represent the situation in absence of the project, the 
allocation of projects takes place on the basis of an international comparison of marginal abatement 
costs (see Figure 4-1).
94
 However, the theoretically optimal allocation of projects could be disturbed in 
the real world where transaction costs exist and the baseline is surrounded by uncertainties. 
With transaction costs, the marginal cost curves for JI/CDM emission reductions (serving as the 
supply curves) shift upwards as for each quantity of GHG emission reduction produced the supply 
price (excluding transaction costs) is increased by the transaction costs (e.g., project design costs). 
Similarly, the demand curve for JI or CDM emission reductions shifts upwards with transaction costs 
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 As has been shown in Chapter 3, industrialised countries listed in UNFCCC Annex II could reduce ‘Kyoto’ 
compliance costs by 75 to 90% if they would partly achieve the required reductions abroad (IPCC, 2001, p. 537). 
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(e.g., search costs), so that the equilibrium price increases (Gaast, 2005) (Dudek & Wiener, 1996) 
(Krey, 2004). 
Typical transaction costs for JI and CDM projects (concerning the GHG emission reduction 
component) are costs related to: identifying the project; obtaining approval of the project idea by the 
host country government; compiling the project design document; negotiating the emission reduction 
purchase agreement (ERPA) with the host country government and relevant institutes; validating the 
project design; registering a CDM project with the CDM Executive Board; and monitoring and 
verifying the project results. 
In an overview based on early CDM projects (excluding small-scale projects), (Ellis, et al., 2004) 
found that the CDM-related transaction costs could vary from USD 50,000 per project to almost USD 
270,000. According to (Ellis, et al., 2004), even the lower cost figure implies that a project would need 
around 10,000 tonnes emission reduction credits over a crediting lifetime to cover transaction costs 
(assuming a credit price of USD 5). Moreover, several programmes established to generate CDM 
credits, such as the Rabobank Carbon Fund, the KfW Bankengruppe Fund, and projects established 
under the CDM programmes of the Netherlands Government (e.g., CERUPT), set a minimum to the 
amount of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) that proposed CDM projects must deliver during the 
crediting lifetime (in most cases 500,000 tonnes), in order to cover project transaction costs (JIN, 
2003c) (JIN, 2001d). Finally, the intermediate evaluation of the Dutch JI policy in 2005 showed that 
the transaction costs related to the purchase of JI credits by the Netherlands Government amounted to 
almost 25% of the nominal prices paid for these credits (CE, 2005, pp. 10, table 5). 
The inclusion of a large set of modalities and procedures for baselines in the Marrakech Accords, as 
well as the specific additional rules set by the programmes of individual governments and multilateral 
funds, resulted in a rather large share of baseline-related costs in the overall transaction costs of the 
project design (Krey, 2004) (Ellis, 2006). 
The procedures and modalities for baselines as included in the Marrakech Accords have been 
established in order to reduce the risk that project developers deliberately overestimate the baseline 
emission levels (see Chapter 5). High transaction costs as a result of detailed baseline rules or the 
overestimation of emission reductions due to inflated baselines in case of too lenient rules results in an 
allocation of JI and CDM projects which differs from an allocation based on an international 
comparison of marginal abatement costs only. With high transaction costs it becomes less attractive 
for investors to participate in JI and CDM projects so that the Kyoto Protocol compliance costs for 
industrialised countries increase. On the other hand, baseline inflation caused by too lenient rules 
cause that  JI/CDM projects are no longer GHG-neutral and do not contribute – or at least to a smaller 
extent – to reducing GHG emissions globally. 
With a view to the above, during the early years after the introduction of JI and CDM in the Kyoto 
Protocol, several literature sources recommended standardising baseline determination for JI and 
CDM projects (Jepma, 1997) (Jackson, et al., 2001) (PROBASE, 2003) (Kartha, et al., 2004). First, it 
was argued that with multi-project baselines costs related to compiling project design documents and 
the validation of the baseline could be considerably reduced. Second, with a multi-project baseline 
methodology, the scope for baseline inflation by project developers is much reduced, especially when 





A possible disadvantage of standardised, multi-project baselines is that they, in their turn, could also 
affect the allocation of projects. An example may clarify this. Suppose that in a particular country 
energy is produced by both coal and gas-fired plants. In this country, a CDM project aims at installing 
a modern gas boiler which emits fewer GHGs per unit of output than both the existing gas and coal 
plants. Should for the power sector in this country a multi-project baseline be determined based on the 
average emissions of the existing plants, the CDM project receives as credits the difference between 
the multi-project baseline emissions and the emissions of the modern gas boiler. This implies that 
replacing energy produced by a coal plant results in fewer credits than the actual emission reductions 
achieved, while investing in replacing gas boiler-based energy production results in more credits than 
actually achieved emission reductions. This could reduce the incentives for investors to invest in 
replacing coal-based energy capacity. In order to prevent such an adverse incentive, multi-project 
baselines could be determined per fuel or fuel technology; for example, one multi-project baseline 
covering the existing coal plants in the country and one for the gas boilers. 
Also the choice of the region covered by the multi-project baseline is important for the extent to which 
the baseline can be considered reasonable. The EU-funded research project PROBASE,
95
 among 
others, concluded that strong differences could exist between regions within potential JI and CDM 
host countries in terms of industrialisation, energy intensity and GHG intensity of production and 
consumption (see also Section 6.4). In several developing countries, the GHG intensity in the rural 
areas, which are often not even connected to the energy grid, is much lower than in the industrialised 
areas. Determining national average multi-project baselines for these countries could imply that these 
would neither be representative for the industrialised, nor for the rural area. Therefore, it is important 
that a multi-project baseline is sufficiently representative for the region where the project is 
implemented. 
 
6.3.  Theoretical Aspects of Multi-Project Baseline Determination 
 
6.3.1.  Introduction 
Standardisation of baseline determination for JI and CDM projects can take place in a number of 
ways: 
 Standardisation of procedures, which involves the identification of specific steps to be taken by 
all project developers when determining a baseline. Generally, this type of standardisation does 
not involve standardised parameter values or emission factors. An early example of such a 
standardised procedure has been the guidelines document for baselines published by the 
Netherlands Government when it launched its JI and CDM tender programmes in 2001 (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2001). This document provided specific systematic 
guidance for project developers on how to determine values for each baseline parameter. 
Similarly, the methodologies developed for CDM projects and approved by the CDM EB (see 
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 The research project “Procedures for Accounting and Baselines for JI and CDM projects” (PROBASE) was 
carried out by a European research consortium under the EU V Framework Programme (PROBASE, 2003): 
http://jiqweb.org/images/stories/mifiles/projects/ClimatePolicy/probase.pdf. 
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Chapter 5 and Section 6.5.4 below) can be considered standardised baseline procedures as other 
project developers can use them as so-called ‘approved methodologies’. 
 Standardisation of baseline parameter values, such as: a standard system boundary (e.g., one or 
two levels upstream and downstream); a standard fuel basis (e.g., average emissions of power 
plants installed in a host country during the past 5 years); a standard geographical scope (e.g., the 
geographical scope must be representative for the project); whether to derive baselines from 
recently installed plants in the host country (e.g., the last two or five years) or to use projections 
of the future, etc. 
 Standardisation of baseline emission factors, which involves the calculation of multi-project GHG 
emission reduction factors per unit of output for a particular project type in a particular host 
country (e.g., tonne CO2-eq. per kWh for grid-connected CDM power sector projects in Inner 
Mongolia, China). With such benchmarks, baseline determination is basically reduced to 
multiplying the standardised emission factors with the expected annual project output during the 
project’s lifetime. Benchmarks are the most far-reaching form of baseline standardisation and 
leave no scope for ‘talking up’ the baseline emission levels by project developers to earn more 
credits. An early approach to develop such benchmarks was proposed by (Luhmann, et al., 1995), 
who suggested developing a default project which would represent the most likely activity under 
business-as-usual circumstances for a particular sector in a host country. The emissions per unit 
of output of the default project would serve as baseline emission factors for JI/CDM projects. 
Irrespective of whether standardisation involves a common methodology or a benchmark emissions 
factor, a key requirement is that baselines reasonably identify what situation is replaced by the project. 
One method to identify this is to look at the context in which the project is planned. This method 
generally identifies two main groups of projects: 
 Retrofit projects, which aim at modifying existing plants to operate in a different way. For 
example, a JI or CDM retrofit project could modify an old oil-fired boiler in order to produce the 
same output with a gas-fired boiler. No new sites are involved with this type of project. 
 Greenfield projects, which always involve a new or greenfield site and which have been planned 
to meet an increase in energy demand, to replace written off capacity, or to install new renewable 
energy capacity. 
In addition, the baseline must identify what activity is affected by the project, e.g.: 
 Improvement of the energy efficiency of a particular production process in an energy or industrial 
plant. For example, the efficiency of fuel to electricity conversion of an old coal-fired power plant 
may only be about 30%, whereas a new plant may have a 38% or higher level of efficiency. In an 
industrial process, efficiency gains can be achieved through better insulation or recycling of heat. 
 A fuel conversion in energy production or industrial processes, such as, for example, switching 
from burning coal to natural gas firing or switching from oil to wind energy. 
 Demand-side management projects which affect the demand for heat or electricity service, such 
as activities to replace incandescent light bulbs with energy saving compact fluorescent bulbs, or 
projects to increase the energy performance of residential buildings. 
Finally, it should be noted that for greenfield energy sector projects there is no sharp conceptual 





Chapter 5, for these projects a baseline is generally based on an analysis of the entire grid or the 
relevant part of the grid, in order to identify the capacity that would under business-as-usual 
circumstances be the first to be dispatched. Such baseline methodologies strongly resemble multi-
project baseline methods. 
 
6.3.2.  Multi-project baseline parameters 
In order to identify which installations/units should be included in a multi-project baseline, several 
methodologies were identified in the literature (Sathaye, et al., 2001) (PROBASE, 2003) (Jackson, et 
al., 2001) (Schneider, et al., 2012) (Gaast, 2005) (Hayashi & Michaelowa, 2013), such as: 
 Operating margin method. This methodology estimates which of the currently operational 
installations are likely to be replaced when new installations (such as through JI or CDM 
projects) are added to the system (such as an electricity grid), in a situation where existing energy 
demand is not expected to increase (see for a further explanation elsewhere in this section). The 
method could, for instance, simply take an average of the GHG emissions of all operational 
installations or it could identify, e.g., the oldest installations for baseline determination, thereby 
assuming that these would be the first ones to be replaced, etc. In general, the operating margin 
method is applied when it is difficult to precisely identify what capacity a grid-connected JI or 
CDM project replaces (Lee, et al., 2004). 
 Comparable investments during the past 5 years. This methodology assumes that the technology 
implemented in a sector in the host country during the last 5 years will most likely also be the 
technology that would have been implemented in the future in absence of a JI or CDM project. 
This methodology would be specifically suitable for greenfield projects but could also be used for 
retrofit projects to find out whether the existing plant would likely have been replaced or 
retrofitted anyhow.  
 Currently best available techniques. Baselines determined with this methodology assume that the 
host country would in the future have implemented the best techniques (technologies or 
management programmes, such as demand-side management) that are available in the country. 
This method requires an (economic and technical) analysis to determine which techniques are 
feasible for the host country and/or a policy analysis to find out which techniques are mandatory 
by national or international policies. 
 Economically most attractive courses of action or least-cost technologies. These baselines assume 
that in the country the least cost/economically most attractive course of action would have been 
followed in the absence of the JI or CDM projects. 
From the above description of multi-project baseline methodologies, the following categories of 
baseline parameters can be derived: 
1. Choice of fuel technology: a multi-project baseline can be based on one fuel technology 
(‘technology/single-fuel’) or on an average of fuels/technologies for the entire sector or country 
(multi-fuel benchmarks or ‘sector averages’). 
2. Time aspect: multi-project baselines can be derived from recent capacity additions in the relevant 
sectors in the host country or region (e.g., ‘recent comparable 5-year’, assuming that recent 
capacity additions are most representative of what would have been added in the absence of the JI 
or CDM project), or based on expected future added capacity (e.g., ‘Currently best available 
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techniques benchmarks’ or ‘Economically most attractive/least cost technology benchmarks’). 
This consideration leads to the decision on the time horizon to apply for determining a benchmark 
for a particular host country. 
3. Geographical scope: a multi-project baseline can be set for a region within a country, nationally, 
or regionally for a group of countries. This parameter determines the geographical scope of the 
baseline. 
Figure 6-1, as well as the discussion on parameters below, shows that several multi-project baselines 
or benchmarks are possible given the combinations and range of the parameter values. The possible 










Figure 6-1. Multi-project baseline parameter choices (PROBASE, 2003, pp. 42, Figure 2.2) 
 
Technology/fuel combination or sector average 
Table 6-1 shows examples of possible JI and CDM retrofit projects in the power and heat sectors and 
possible multi-project baseline (benchmark) approaches. For example, a grid-connected project could 
aim at a switch from burning coal to burning natural gas. A multi-project baseline for this sector could 
be determined by calculating the average emissions from all fuel technologies connected to the grid 
(sector average of multi-fuel method) or by taking the average emissions of the fuel technology that is 
replaced by the project (single-fuel method), expressed as kg CO2-eq. per unit of kWh or GJ. Under 
the technology/single-fuel approach instead, the baseline would contain the average emissions of 
currently installed coal-fired boilers or oil-fired plants, depending on whether projects replace coal or 
oil-based technologies. A main advantage of such an approach is that it creates more incentives for 
replacing coal-based technologies than the multi-fuel method does since the emission reductions 
achieved will be fully credited. 
The above examples assume that the present energy mix would, under business-as-usual 
circumstances, have continued to exist in the near future. However, reality could be much more 
complex. For instance, there could be a government policy which requires all plants of a certain type 
to be replaced anyhow, or which sets targets for, e.g., the share of energy to be generated with 
renewable energy sources. Such a policy context could, in this stylistic example, lead to a baseline for 
a coal-to-gas project based on a gas-firing technology instead of the existing coal-based technology 















The choice which technology to include in the baseline is also an important aspect of determining 
baselines for grid-connected greenfield projects. Since these projects do not replace a particular, 
clearly identifiable plant, it must be explored which grid-connected capacity they replace. This largely 
depends on whether the project aims at meeting existing energy demand or new demand. In a situation 
where the energy demand in a host country is not expected to increase, the implementation of the 
project implies that (the output of) an existing plant will become redundant and could be closed. The 
latter plant, which is the marginal plant, could, for instance, be the oldest and least efficient plant. 
Alternatively, if a country must import natural gas, whereas it is largely endowed with coal, the 
marginal plant could be a gas-fired boiler (which would make the country less vulnerable for 
international gas price increases). As explained above, the case of a JI or CDM project replacing 
existing demand has been referred to in the literature as the operating margin baseline method (Kartha, 
et al., 2004) (Violette, et al., 2001) (Sathaye, et al., 2004) (Lee, et al., 2004). 
In case a project meets new energy demand, e.g., the production capacity in the host country’s energy 
sector is fully utilised, the baseline would identify the plant that would have been built in absence of 
the project in order to meet the new energy demand. This is referred to as the built margin baseline 
method. 





Fuel switch projects 
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Time scale for the baseline 
The parameter of time scale deals with the question of whether the standardised baseline will be 
derived from historic emissions data in the sector or country or from expected and/or planned 
developments in the future. Historic emissions data could be collected from investments in the recent 
past or from currently operational plants (see above). Assuming that recently installed plants are 
generally more efficient, a benchmark derived from recent investments would lead to a lower baseline 
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emissions factor than one derived from currently operational plants as this data set could also contain 
plants that have been operational for a longer period of time than, say, the last five or two years. 
Multi-project baselines could also be based on projections of the future energy mix, for instance, with 
the help of sector or country-level models (see Section 6.4). Such projections would take the present 
situation as a starting point and explore, assuming optimised decision-making (e.g., cost 
minimisation), the most likely development of the energy mix in the country or region during the next, 
say, 10 to 20 years. The GHG emission levels related to this optimised energy mix form the multi-
project baseline or benchmark. 
Geographical scope of the baseline 
Multi-project baselines can be calculated for different levels of geographical aggregation. The least 
aggregated multi-project baseline would be the one that covers a particular region within a country. 
One selection criterion for determining the region to which a benchmark applies is the extent to which 
there are interdependencies between different regions. For example, in some large countries (e.g., 
China, India, Russian Federation) the different geographical regions are, in terms of energy system or 
grid interdependencies, relatively separated from each other so that an investment in, e.g., a power 
plant in one region does not affect the energy system in the other regions. When such a condition is 
fulfilled, regional benchmarks can be constructed for each region. 
In case there are significant interdependencies between different regions in a country, a national 
benchmark would be a better aggregation option. However, system interdependencies do not always 
stop at the national border. For example, in case a country is part of an international liberalised energy 
market, a multi-country benchmark would need to be derived. Box 6-1 shows a practical example of 
choosing the most reasonable geographical aggregation for a multi-project baseline. 
An advantage of applying a low aggregation level for multi-project baselines is that projects are 
implemented where they are most effective, i.e. in regions with highly carbon-intensive industries. 
However, this could result in a reward for countries which in the past (indirectly) subsidised the use of 
carbon-intensive fuels, whereas countries with a less carbon-intensive production process would 
acquire fewer JI or CDM investments. 
Using multi-country or even global benchmarks implies that there is no geographical ‘preference’ for 
investors because a particular project, ceteris paribus, will be rewarded with the same amount of 
credits irrespective of where it is implemented. However, there could be a problem that a global or 
even a country benchmark may not be justifiable for some project types. Moreover, a global, multi-
country or even national-scale benchmark may contradict with the Marrakech Accords texts on 
baselines, which say that baselines should take into consideration the project context (UNFCCC, 
2002b, pp. 37, para. 45(e)), which complicates applying global or multi-country benchmarks as these 






Box 6-1. Choosing the geographical breadth of the Huitengxile wind farm project, China 
Huitengxile is located in Inner Mongolia in China. This CDM project intended to install a wind farm 
and deliver the electricity produced (45 GWh in 2004; 66 GWh as of 2005) to the Inner Mongolia 
Western grid. The project was scheduled to deliver electricity to the Inner Mongolia Western Grid 
which is strongly interconnected with the North China Power Grid (in 2004, 27.5% of the Inner 
Mongolian grid electricity is exported to the North China grid); as part of the North China grid it is 
also (indirectly) connected to the national grid  (SenterNovem, 2004). 
The project developers selected as the baseline for this wind farm project a scenario containing the 
average mix of electricity generated on the North China power grid. Limiting the regional aggregation 
of the baseline to the Inner Mongolia region in China was not considered reasonable because of the 
strong interconnection between the Inner Mongolian and the North China grid. Therefore, the project 
was expected to partly replace the energy mix of the North China grid. Aggregation of the baseline for 
the entirety of China was not considered necessary as the interconnection between the larger regional 
power grids (such as the North China grid) is relatively small and it was considered unlikely that the 
Huitengxile wind farm would have any effect on what will take place outside the North China grid 
(SenterNovem, 2004). 
 
Variations in parameter values leading to different benchmarks 
The eventual multi-project baselines or benchmarks are determined by the values chosen for each of 
the parameters described above. For example, it would make quite a difference if a multi-project 
baseline for a coal-to-gas JI project in a Russian power plant near St. Petersburg: 
 assumes coal as the baseline fuel technology, investments in the past 10 years as the time horizon, 
and the entire Russian Federation as its geographical area, or 
 chooses the European part of the Russian Federation as the appropriate region for the benchmark, 
gas as the baseline fuel, and takes the past two year as the time horizon in combination with 
modelled projections of the optimal future energy mix in the selected region. 
The parameter value choices are based on assumptions regarding the business-as-usual situation in the 
sector in the host country, the host country itself or the region. Box 6-2 shows an example of the 
Surduc-Nehoiasu run-of-river hydro project in Romania (selected as a JI project by the Dutch ERUPT 
programme), which illustrates how parameter value assumptions could influence the eventual baseline 
emissions scenario (both for single-project or multi-project baselines). 
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Box 6-2. General assumptions and considerations for baseline selection Surduc-Nehoiasu project 
The project design document for the JI Surduc-Nehoiasu project assumed that the project would, given 
the over-capacity in the Romanian grid, replace existing capacity. As a run-of-river (RoR) plant, it 
‘must run’ (with the flow of the river) and it was assumed that the plant would displace baseload grid-
connected capacity. For the baseline, the project developers considered two options: 
1. A poor economy scenario: It could be argued that the analysis of what would be the marginal 
plant (the one to be substituted) may change over time. The costs of maintenance per output are 
highest for the old coal fired plants in Romania, as they have high outage time due to repairs. 
However, coal is a relatively cheap and domestically available fuel. The gas-fired plants are 
easier to maintain, but natural gas is more expensive to buy and with price fluctuations on the 
international market. Therefore, since there were arguments both in favour of coal and gas, the 
average fossil fuel grid mix could be assumed as a surrogate for the marginal plant. 
2. An economic recovery scenario: In this scenario, it could be assumed that economic recovery 
leads to increased investments in the power sector, with more efficient plants, and gradually 
lower a emissions factor of the fossil fuel component of the grid mix. The scenario also assumed 
that more natural gas will be imported and used, whereas old power plants will be phased out 
because of more stringent environmental regulations due to Romania’s accession to the EU. 
 
6.4.  Case Studies of Multi-project Baselines Determination in the Power 
Sector 
 
6.4.1. Comparing benchmarks 
During 2001-2002, a European research consortium
96
 carried out a EU-funded research project called 
“Procedures for Accounting and Baselines for JI and CDM Projects” (PROBASE, 2003).97 The 
objective of PROBASE was to explore ways to streamline the overall accounting of GHG emission 
reductions achieved by JI and CDM projects for more transparent procedures, lower transaction costs 
and ensured environmental integrity. The analysis paid attention to all steps in the JI and CDM project 
cycle, as discussed in Chapter 5, but a considerable component of the work was dedicated to 
standardisation of baselines, in combination with an analysis of how such standardisation could lead to 
a reasonable probability that JI and CDM emission reductions claimed would be additional. 
An interesting aspect of the work undertaken by PROBASE was the application of several multi-
project baseline methodologies, identified in the literature (similar to those discussed in Section 6.3), 
to actual projects in potential JI and CDM host countries, such as Indonesia, Russian Federation, and 
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 The consortium was formed by the following institutes: Joint Implementation Network (JIN, the Netherlands, 
co-ordinator), Decision Support System Laboratory of the National Technical University of Athens (EPU-
NTUA, Greece), Centre for Environmental Strategies at the University of Surrey (CES, UK), Hamburg Institute 
for International Economics (HWWA, Germany), French-German Institute for Environmental Research at the 
University of Karlsruhe (UNIKARL-DFIU, Germany), and Factor Consulting + Management Ltd (Factor, 
Switzerland). The author of this study was a member of the research team, as part of JIN’s staff. 
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 EU Fifth Framework Programme, sub-programme Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development. This 
section is largely based on the research conducted under PROBASE by the entire project team, including and 





South Africa. As such, a sensitivity analysis of how applying different multi-project baseline 
methodologies would affect baseline emission levels, was carried out for a number of projects.
98
 




Table 6-2 shows the benchmarks constructed for this analysis. Sarulla is located on North Sumatra, 
Indonesia, and the project aimed at replacing grid-connected electricity production capacity by 
geothermal energy. The project could be classified as a greenfield activity. As explained in Section 
6.3, multi-project baselines or benchmarks can be determined using different aggregation dimensions 
such as sectoral, geographical and fuel/technology paths, as well as using historical, current or 
projected data samples. For the purpose of comparison, the project’s lifetime was considered 20 years 
(from the year 2000 through 2020) and benchmarks were calculated for this time interval. 
Next to comparing the several possible multi-project baselines with each other, also a comparison was 
made with the baseline that the Sarulla project developers had constructed themselves and reported to 
the UNFCCC secretariat. This baseline assumed that in absence of the project the power to be 
produced by the geothermal installation would have been produced by a coal power plant with 36% 
efficiency, fed with sub-bituminous coal. This resulted in an officially reported baseline emission 
factor of 0.964 tCO2/MWh, which was assumed to remain constant for the whole project lifetime. 
From Figure 6-2, which shows the benchmarks listed in Table 6-2 and calculated for Indonesia, it can 
be concluded that this baseline emissions factor was considerably higher than the benchmarks 
constructed in PROBASE. 
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 For the full analysis, the reader is referred to the final report of PROBASE (PROBASE, 2003). 
99
 This analysis has been conducted as part of the PROBASE project, thereby applying the PERSEUS and Reflex 
models, which were operated for the PROBASE project by the French-German Institute for Environmental 
Research at the University of Karlsruhe (UNIKARL-DFIU), Germany. 
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Table 6-2. Multi-project baselines/benchmarks constructed for Indonesia 
Benchmark name Short description 
B1 World’s best region Benchmark based on the weighted average emissions of all fossil fuel 
power plants (coal, oil, natural gas) in the world’s best region, using 
historic data. The world’s best region has the lowest weighted average 
emissions
100
 of fossil power plants of all the world’s regions. 
B2 World average Benchmark based on the weighted average emissions of all fossil fuel 
power plants (coal, oil, gas plants) in the world, using historic data.  
B3 OECD average Benchmark based on the weighted average emissions of all fossil fuel 
power plants (coal, oil, gas plants) of all OECD countries, using historic 
data. 
B4 National energy 
sector average in 
Indonesia 
Benchmark based on the weighted average emissions of all Indonesian 
power plants (fossil fuelled and renewables) in the year 2000. Its value is 




B5 National energy 
sector projected average 
in Indonesia 
Benchmark based on the projected weighted average emissions of all 




B6 National fossil fuel 
average in Indonesia 
Benchmark based on the weighted average emissions of all fossil fuel 
power plants (coal, oil, gas plants) in 1998. Its value is 0.761 tCO2/MWh 
and is assumed to remain constant for the period 2000-2020
103
. 
B7 Best Available 
Technology  (BAT) 
Natural Gas Combined Cycle Advanced is considered the default BAT 
with an emission factor of 0.36 tCO2/MWh that remains constant for 
2000-2020. 
B8 Fuel-specific, 
combined country and 
regional benchmark for 
Indonesia 
The benchmark is calculated according to the methodology described 
above. 
PERSEUS Benchmark constructed through an energy sector optimisation effort (see 
Section 6.4.2). 
Reflex Benchmark constructed through an energy sector optimisation effort; 
Reflex is a simplified version of the PERSEUS energy-system model 
(see Section 6.4.2). 
Source: PROBASE, 2003 
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 The data for B1, B2, B3 and B8 benchmarks have been taken by the PROBASE team (PROBASE, 2003) 
from (IEA, 2000). 
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 The data for B4 was derived from (State Ministry for Environment, 2001).  
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 The benchmark B5” was derived from the MARKAL model and implied that after 2005, fossil fuels, 
especially coal, would rapidly grow as a fuel for power generation; hence, the trend of the benchmark emission 
factor was an increasing one. The data for B5 was derived from (Government of Indonesia, 1999).  
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Figure 6-2. Comparison of the benchmarks for the Sarulla geothermal project – tCO2/MWh 
(PROBASE, 2003) 
 
The multi-project baseline scenarios shown in Figure 6-2 can be explained as follows: 
 The National energy sector projected average benchmark assumed that as of 2010, based on 
cost considerations, mainly coal capacity would be added to the energy sector capacity in 
Indonesia to meet increased energy demand. The increasing slope of the curve after 2010 reflects 
this. 
 The National fossil fuel average benchmark was derived from the average emissions factor for 
power generation from fossil fuels in 1998 and assumed this average to remain constant in the 
future. Consequently, it did not take into account any changes in the power generation in the 
future (similar to the National energy sector average benchmark based on year-2000 levels). 
 The World average, the World’s best region and the OECD average benchmarks had the 
highest spatial aggregation level of all multi-project baselines analysed and assumed that in the 
near future, Indonesia would have introduced world average, OECD average power sector 
technologies or technologies applied in the region with the lowest GHG emissions per energy 










2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 
PERSEUS benchmark 
World's best region 
National energy sector projected average 
National energy sector average 
World average 
OECD average 
Best available technique 
Fuel-specific combined country/regional benchmark 
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 The Best Available Techniques (BAT) benchmark reflected the most conservative multi-project 
baseline level for Indonesia.
104
 For the case of Indonesia, this benchmark implied that in order to 
be eligible for crediting, a CDM natural gas project should be better than an advanced combined 
cycle-technology or be a renewables project with no emissions at all. 
 The Fuel-specific, combined country and regional benchmark linearly combined the weighted 
average emissions factors of all currently operational fossil-fuelled power plants of Indonesia, 
those of the region East Asia and ones of the World’s best region. As this benchmark used 
already available data, its construction was not cumbersome and its development costs could be 
kept low. The benchmark combined some of the above benchmarks as it took the present situation 
of fossil fuel plants in Indonesia as a starting point and added to that scenario the assumption that 
Indonesia’s development would be in line with that of the East Asian region with the availability 
of technologies that are currently operational in the World’s region with the lowest GHG 
emissions from fossil fuel plants. In general it can be argued that the ‘Fuel-specific, combined 
country and regional benchmark’ provided a balance between the tighter benchmarks and the 
more lenient ones, which was reflected by the fact that the amount of GHG emissions reduced 
below the benchmark was exactly in the middle of the emission credits of all the other 
benchmarks. 
 
6.4.2.  Multi-project baseline modelling 
In addition to determining a number of different multi-project baselines, based on different 
assumptions about the business-as-usual course of action in the host countries, the project PROBASE 
also explored the applicability of energy-system models in determining multi-project baselines 
(PROBASE, 2003). For this purpose, the PERSEUS (Programme Package for Emission Reduction 
Strategies in Energy Use and Supply) model was used, as developed by the University of Karlsruhe 
(Germany) and run by UNIKARL-DFIU
105
 staff in the project PROBASE (PROBASE, 2003). 
PERSEUS is a so-called bottom-up model based on a technological representation of the entire energy 
sector, starting from the extraction of primary energy carriers to final energy use (via imports, 
conversion, transport, distribution of final energy). Technical systems within the energy sector are 
characterised by technological, economic and ecological data and are inter-connected by energy or 
material flows. Bottom-up models treat economic growth (annual GDP growth), as well as other 
macro-economic indicators, as fixed exogenous determinants. 
PERSEUS makes projections of the future mix of electricity production techniques in the host country. 
It takes the present composition of the energy mix as a starting point and, based on a forecasted future 
electricity demand (e.g., derived from official sources such as the International Energy 
Agency/OECD) and an assumed technological development, projects how this energy mix is likely to 
develop into the future (e.g., larger share of renewables or larger share of electricity produced with 
gas-fired plants). A key assumption in this respect is that operators aim at minimising investment and 
operational costs when taking decisions on the composition of the energy mix (e.g., coal technologies 
might be cheaper than gas installations but may require higher maintenance costs). 
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 The BAT in this context refers to the internationally existing best available technique, which is different from 
BAT in the Acquis Communautaire of the EU, which defines BAT as best among available techniques in EU 
member states (Gaast, 2003b). 
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The result of the PERSEUS modelling is a cost-optimal future composition of the energy mix in the 
power sector in the particular country or region. Subsequently, for each technology in this optimal 
energy mix the GHG intensity is determined in terms of tonne CO2-eq. per MWh produced. 
Aggregation of these GHG intensities results in an overall future GHG emissions figure per MWh for 
the energy mix concerned. Repeating this analysis for a number of periods delivers a multi-project 
baseline scenario for the power sector in the region concerned. 
Case study: Indonesia 
One of the PROBASE case study projects to which the PERSEUS model was applied is the Sarulla 
geothermal energy project in Indonesia (see above). For Indonesia, PERSEUS distinguished two 
regions: the islands of Java and Bali on the one hand, and the non-Java/Bali region on the other hand. 
This distinction was based on the fact that Java and Bali are strongly interconnected via electricity 
transmission lines, whereas the two islands are rather separated from the rest of the country. Figure 6-3 
shows some parameters for multi-project emission factors that could result from the PERSEUS 
model
106
. First, projects could be categorised as power sector investments in the rural areas, in central 
electricity production, or for industrial production. Second, the relevant distinction in regions is 
between Java/Bali and non-Java/Bali. Finally, projects may be classified according to the load range of 
the technology under consideration.
107
 
Since Sarulla is located on North Sumatra, the relevant PERSEUS multi-project baseline/benchmark 
was the one for non-Java/Bali. According to PERSEUS, following a cost-optimal energy mix 
composition path, up to 2010 the energy demand in the region would increasingly be met by 
renewable energy sources as new geothermal plants were planned to become operational in the region 
as of 2005. However, after 2010 energy demand would increasingly be met by energy produced with 
fossil fuels, which would then considered to be more cost-effective than constructing new geothermal 
power plants. A summary of baseline GHG emission factors for potential CDM projects in Indonesia 
up to the year 2020 is presented in Table 6-3, which includes the classification of projects into 
different regional areas, sectors and load ranges. 
Emission factors of the rural Non-Java/Bali region have not been subdivided into load ranges as only 
one technology (diesel generators) is added to satisfy demand in all load ranges. In Java/Bali, rural 
electricity demand will exclusively be satisfied by central electricity generation, so no specific 
emission factors have been calculated for that. The table also indicates that the emission reductions 
granted to a specific CDM project varies widely depending on the assignment of the project to one of 
the relevant categories. This fact implies that a standardisation of emission factors may only be 
justifiable up to a certain level of aggregation and that a sensible differentiation of standardised 
emission factors is vital for maintaining the environmental integrity of mitigation activities under the 
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 PERSEUS was operated by the partner UNIKARL-DFIU in the project PROBASE and also the case study 
was conducted by this partner. The description of the case study has been derived from project report 
(PROBASE, 2003). See also footnote 99. 
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 In the case of Indonesia, such a classification has been included using a technology’s annual operating hours 
as a criterion for its affiliation to a load range. Base load includes technologies running more than 6000 hours per 
year and peak load is characterised by an operation of less than 1500 hours. The remaining plants deliver 
intermediate load electricity. 
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Kyoto Protocol by minimising leakage and free riders while still providing sufficient incentives for 








Table 6-3. Average emission factors for the Indonesian electricity sector in gCO2/kWh 





Base 615 530 608 659 
Intermediate 408 388 388 388 
Peak 628 727 669 626 
Industry 
Base 409 658 744 789 
Intermediate 920 423 404 404 
Peak 697 628 610 629 






Base 405 293 349 516 
Intermediate 1,212 1,149 497 388 
Peak 673 747 763 800 
Industry 
Base 526 697 754 788 
Intermediate 920 429 404 404 
Peak 674 643 604 663 
Rural 889 889 889 889 
Average emission factors Indonesia 594 572 630 680 
Source: PROBASE, 2003. 
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 In this context it is illustrative to compare the PERSEUS multi-project baselines with the national average-
based baselines shown in Figure 6-1. Since the latter baselines calculate average emission factors for the whole 
country, they underestimate baseline emissions for Java/Bali and overestimate baseline emissions for non-
Java/Bali. As shown by Figure 6-2, the PERSEUS multi-project baselines were more conservative (i.e. lower 
baseline emission factors) than the national average-based baselines for Indonesia. 
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 Criteria for possible sub-sets of emission factors have been developed by the project PROBASE (DFIU/IIP & 
















Case study: South Africa 
The case study described how the company Eskom, in 2000, generated approximately 95% of the 
electricity in South Africa and also owned and operated the national transmission system. In 2000, the 
generating capacity in 2000 (36,500 MW) is primarily coal-based but also included: one nuclear 
power station at Koeberg (1,930 MW), two gas turbine facilities, two conventional hydroelectricity 
plants, and two hydroelectric pumped-storage stations. In addition to serving the domestic market, 
Eskom also exported power to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
The PERSEUS model for South Africa was divided into a geographical part covering the eastern 
region and a part covering the western region of the country. The reason for this partition was that 
electricity production in South Africa was mainly concentrated in the eastern provinces of 
Mpumalanga and Gauteng. In the year 2000, total domestic electricity demand was about 181 GWh of 
which 76% was consumed in the Eastern provinces while 24% was consumed in the western part 
(PROBASE, 2003, p. 74). The PERSEUS model assumed this share to remain constant in the near 
future. Furthermore, a relatively moderate annual energy demand growth of 2.8% was assumed as 
input into the model. In a cost-optimal development of the South African energy system, there would 
be an important role for domestically available hard coal. Existing capacities in the electricity sector 
would be sufficient to provide electricity up until 2010. After that, additional capacities would be 
required, e.g., reactivated and new high-efficiency coal-fired stations, nuclear, gas, and water 
capacities (import). 
Table 6-4 shows baseline emission factors per kWh electricity produced for the entire country as well 
as for the two geographical regions. The fact that almost 90% of the South African power is produced 
in the eastern part of the country is reflected by the high correlation between the national emissions 
factor and the factor for the eastern region. The baseline for the western region is significantly lower 
due to the higher shares of nuclear and hydro sources in the western energy mix. The rise in the 
western part after 2010 is due to increasing shares of gas and coal-fired capacities. 
Table 6-4. Estimated emission factors for South Africa: national, regional, and load-
range level (gCO2/kWh) 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Country-wide 844.17 857.39 876.02 825.35 812.18 795.68 
 Eastern Part 918.85 922.49 934.63 905.03 888.15 859.76 
 Western Part 229.39 228.65 227.71 390.42 466.9 465.03 
Base load 829.0 852.1 876.1 815.1 793.3 796.6 
Intermediate load 933.9 901.7 876.1 845.0 853.3 789.9 
Peak load 1,025.4 869.3 876.1 877.0 876.7 825.1 
Source: PROBASE, 2003. 
 
If these regional multi-project baselines were officially applied to CDM projects in South Africa, 
project developers might have an incentive to implement projects in the eastern region because of its 
higher baseline emission factors and, consequently, the larger amount of credits to be earned. In case 
of energy efficiency or refurbishment measures, this would be a desired effect, but if the CDM project 
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aimed at meeting an increase in power demand in the western region of the country, the effect would 
be less desirable. After all, implementing the project in the western region would result in emission 
reduction credits calculated as a reduction below the relatively low western benchmark (e.g., 228 
gCO2/kWh in 2005). Instead, implementing the project in the eastern region and transporting the 
electricity via the existing transmission system to the western region would result in reductions below 
the ‘eastern baseline’ (e.g., 922 gCO2/kWh in 2005). This large difference (about 60%) between the 
western and the eastern multi-project baselines and the existence of a transmission system between 
both regions could easily create a bias towards CDM investments in the eastern part of the country so 
that more emission reductions can be claimed (even if losses from the transmissions were included in 
the calculations as a leakage factor). 
Generally, the use of regional baseline emission factors can be very useful as they provide an incentive 
for plant operators in regions with a high share of carbon-intensive plants to improve the performance 
of these plants or to implement cleaner technologies. Nevertheless, the example of the South African 
power system above shows that when the product (e.g., electricity) can relatively easily be exchanged 
between regions, a regional approach to the calculation of multi-project baselines can cause politically 
and also environmentally questionable incentives as soon as a project intends to meet new energy 
demand. 
 
6.5.  Application of Multi-Project Baseline Methods in Practice 
 
6.5.1.  Multi-project baselines in the ‘Marrakech Accords’ 
In the Marrakech Accords clear references have been included to standardising baselines for JI and 
CDM projects (as explained in Chapter 5). For example, the draft decision on JI stated that a baseline 
shall be established “[o]n a project-specific basis and/or using a multi-project emission factor” 
(UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 18, Appendix B, criterion 1). Next to a clear reference to standardisation of 
baselines, it also indicated that applying a project-specific baseline methodology did not exclude 
standardisation of certain baseline parameters. 
A strong reference to developing multi-project/standardised procedures for CDM baseline 
methodologies could be found in (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 46, Appendix C (b) (v)), which stated that the 
CDM Executive Board shall provide guidance on the “appropriate level of standardization of 
methodologies to allow a reasonable estimation of what would have occurred in the absence of a 
project activity wherever possible and appropriate.” The latter was a clear reference to multi-project 
baselines. In addition, the CDM Executive Board should develop and recommend to the COP-MOP 
specific guidance on the “definition of project categories (e.g., based on sector, sub sector, project 
type, technology, geographic area) that show common methodological characteristics for baseline 
setting” (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 46, Appendix C (b) (i)). Finally, COP-7 decided that the CDM-EB 
should explore the possibility of using “decision trees and other methodological tools, where 
appropriate, to guide choices in order to ensure that the most appropriate methodologies are selected, 





An important question in the context of baseline standardisation is to what extent multi-project 
baselines matched with the three baseline approaches defined by the Marrakech Accords for the CDM 
(UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 37, para.48). As has been mentioned in Chapter 5, this would not be a problem 
for the third baseline approach, which in fact already described a benchmark-type methodology. A 
multi-project baseline methodology under the first approach of ‘Marrakech’ (baselines derived from 
existing or historical emissions) could be derived from the historic or existing emissions of 
comparable project activities in the same category (e.g., a particular sector). Any proposed CDM 
project would need to beat this sector-based emissions level to achieve emission reductions. 
Applying multi-project baselines under this first approach, however, provided scope for quite a large 
range of baseline methodologies. For example, multi-project baselines could refer to: 
 the average emissions for all fuels within a sector, 
 the average emissions of a particular fuel technology within the sector, or 
 technologies which have recently been added to the sector via new installations. 
According to the second approach of ‘Marrakech’, baselines must represent an economically attractive 
course of action. A multi-project baseline methodology under this approach could determine for a 
sector within a host country, or for the host country as a whole, a reasonable projection of the 
development in the sector or the country, i.e. a development, which is economically attractive and not 
hampered by significant investment barriers. 
Table 6-5 summarises the general applicability of multi-project baselines for JI and CDM projects 
with a view to the Marrakech Accords. From the table it can be concluded that multi-project baselines 
could be formulated for all the three baseline approaches of ‘Marrakech’. 
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Table 6-5. Compatibility of multi-project baseline methods with Marrakech baseline approaches 
‘Marrakech’ baseline 
approach 
Possible multi-project baseline method 
1. Existing actual or 
historical emissions 
 Best available technologies - if recent or actual practice is considered 
as best available in the host country 
 Recent comparable investments during past, e.g., 5 years or 2 years 
 Sector averages in a single country 
 Sector averages in a region, although link with project is weak 
2. Emissions representing 
economically attractive 
course of action, taking 
into account investment 
barriers 
 Economically most attractive investment, which is less stringent than 
economically attractive and needs an assessment of inefficiencies in 
the host country 
 Recent comparable investments, if these are considered 
representative for economically attractive course of action in the near 
future 
 Best available technologies, if ‘best’ is ‘available’ under 
economically attractive course of action 
 Energy-sector modelling with projections of the future energy mix 
based on cost-optimisation 
3. Average similar activities 
in recent 5-year + top 
20% threshold 
 Better-than-average-current practice, including an explicit definition 
of how much better a project must be 
 
Source: own compilation based on analysis in this section. 
 
 
6.5.2.  Multi-project methodology development by the CDM Executive Board 
Next to the theoretical case studies explained above, during the preparation of the JI and CDM 
operationalisation between 2001 (COP-7) and 2008 (when the Kyoto Protocol commitment period 
started) there were also been practical examples of standardising baselines and baseline procedures for 
JI and CDM projects. In light of the baseline approaches included in the Marrakech Accords (see 
above), project developers could construct baseline methodologies to be approved by the CDM 
Executive Board (and later the JI Supervisory Committee
110
). 
A further step towards standardisation was the approval of baseline methodologies by the CDM 
Executive Board (see Chapter 5). Once approved, a methodology can be used for multiple projects of 
the same type, which implies a form of standardisation. In the actual practice of the CDM, this led to a 
number of different methodologies approved for one project category. With an increasing number of 
approved methodologies, there could be a considerable variation in how emission baselines are 
determined for similar projects. This trend was observed in Ellis (2003) who categorised the baseline 
methodologies used in: ‘operating margin’ (the effect of a project on the operation of power plants on 
the grid), ‘built margin’ (the effect of a project in terms of delaying or avoiding the construction of 
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 As CDM projects could already generate emission reduction credits from the year 2000, most attention during 
2001-2008 was paid to formulation and approval of CDM baseline methodologies. For JI projects, for which 
crediting could only start in 2008, the JI Supervisory Committee could largely consider CDM approved 





future power plants), and ‘combined margin’ types of baselines (a combination of operating and build 
margin). 
However, even within these baseline categories different methods were used. For example, some 
methodologies identified within a particular host country a currently operating plant that would have 
been dispatched in case of newly added capacity. Other methods, instead, applied an operating margin 
method by taking a weighted average emission factor for the grid as a whole. In order to harmonise 
methodologies per project category, the CDM Executive Board decided to consolidate methodologies 
per category. In June 2004, the first two proposals for such consolidated methodologies were 
presented: for landfill gas project activities and for zero-emissions grid-connected electricity 
generation projects based on renewables. These consolidated methodologies would function as 
standardised baseline methodologies and could be used by all project developers proposing a project in 
the category concerned. As per November 2013, the Executive Board had approved 114 
methodologies for large-scale CDM projects in different sectors, which were harmonised into 23 
consolidated methodologies (UNFCCC (CDM), 2014). The advantages of consolidated methodologies 
were that project developers ‘only’ had to fill in the project or country-specific data in order to 
determine a project baseline, but also that it made validation of project plans more efficient; validators 
mainly had to check whether the methodology had been applied well and whether correct data had 
been used. 
A considerable step further in the direction of baseline standardisation is the calculation of multi-
project GHG emission reduction factors (i.e. benchmarks) for a particular project type in a particular 
host country. As has been argued above in this Chapter, this type of standardisation is most far-
reaching as it reduces baseline determination to an effort of multiplying the project activity level 
within the project boundary (e.g., number of kWh per year) with the benchmark emissions factor. An 
early example of such a benchmark application could be found in the Dutch ERUPT programme for JI 
projects, which offered a table with benchmark CO2 emission factors for electricity sector projects in 
each Central and Eastern European country (Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2001). 
The process of standardising baselines and baseline procedures applied during the start-up phase of the 
CDM and later JI (2001 – 2008) was primarily a bottom up exercise with standards being developed 
based on a number of individual project baselines (Ellis, 2000) (Gaast, 2005) (Matsuo, 2000). At the 
‘Conference on Baseline Standardisation’ held in Groningen in November 2003, for example, 
suggestions to establish a procedure under the auspices of the CDM Executive Board for the 
calculation of baseline default emission factors for CDM projects, next to the standardisation trend in 
terms of approval of methodologies by the CDM Executive Board, was considered undesirable if not 
unfeasible. Participants felt that standardisation could better be dealt with through experience with 
actual projects and their individual baselines than through academic exercises (Gaast, 2003a) (Jepma 
& Gaast, 2004). Much later, at its 68
th
 meeting (July 2012), the CDM Executive Board developed a 
‘Procedure for the Submission and Consideration of Standardized Baselines’ (CDM - Executive 
Board, 2012). According to this more top-down approach, a host country’s designated national CDM 
authority (DNA) could submit a proposed standardised baseline for projects in its country, for 
approval by the Executive Board. In this procedure, the DNA was the official channel for submission 
of the standardised baseline, which could be proposed by “Parties, project participants, international 
industry organisations or admitted observer organizations” (CDM - Executive Board, 2012). 
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The several steps towards baseline standardisation by the COP, the CDM Executive Board, project 
developers and the example of the Netherlands ERUPT programme are described in further detail 
below. 
 
6.5.3.  Early experiences with baseline standardisation: the Dutch JI and CDM tenders 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Netherlands adopted a commitment to reduce its GHG emissions during 
2008-2012 by 6% below its emissions level of 1990. As per Cabinet Decision in 1999, half of this 
abatement effort should be carried out domestically, while for the other half JI credits (one-third: 34 
Mt) and CDM credits (two-thirds: 66 Mt) could be acquired (JIN, 1999a) (JIN, 1999b). In 2000, the 
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs launched a tender programme for JI projects, called 
ERUPT (Emission Reduction Units Procurement Tender) (JIN, 2000f). Through the tender, managed 
by the government agency SenterNovem, Dutch and international project developers could propose JI 
project ideas and the best ones were selected for submission of detailed project design documents 
(including a business plan for the underlying investment). Out of these detailed project proposals a 
final selection was made of projects to be contracted.  
The first tender resulted in eight projects in Romania (4), Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovakia. For the 8 Mt CO2-eq. emission reductions from these projects the Netherlands Government 
paid about € 50 m upon delivery of the credits. As per January 2005, ERUPT had completed five 
tenders with 23 projects and a contracted amount of emission reductions of 16 Mt CO2-eq (CE, 2005). 
After 2005, the tender programme was changed into a more flexible programme where project 
developers could submit projects without the need to wait for tender publications (JIN, 2005). For this, 
a specialised Government agency, called CarbonCredits.nl, was established. In total, the Netherlands 
(both public and private sector buyers) invested in 200 JI projects (133 Track-1 and 67 Track-2; as per 
November 2014) (Fenhamm, 2014). These projects have both served the Dutch efforts to comply with 
its Kyoto Protocol commitments and supported Dutch installations to comply with their commitments 
under the EU emissions trading scheme, for which, as of 2008, also JI project credits could be used 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2004). 
Together with the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), which started more or less at the same 
time and in which the Netherlands Government also participated as an investor, ERUPT faced the 
challenge of translating the Kyoto Protocol into detailed modalities and procedures for the project 
cycle of JI (note that the Netherlands initiated ERUPT about a year and a half before launching a 
similar tender for the CDM, called CERUPT), without the guidance of the Marrakech Accords, which 
became available only in November 2001. For this purpose, a detailed Guidelines document was 
prepared, which explained project developers how to determine a baseline and how to deal with other 
JI accounting issues (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment of the Netherlands, 
2001). After the first ERUPT round, these Guidelines were reviewed based on the experiences of 
project developers and auditors who had to validate the project design documents (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2004). 
The ERUPT Guidelines document and its revised version were an important step in the direction of 
standardising procedures for baseline determination because all project developers proposing projects 





approach which took the recent past and current situation in the project area as a starting point and 
required project developers to carry out an analysis of relevant key factors such as national energy 
policies in the host country, energy market development, energy subsidy policies, international 
commitments, etc. (Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2004). 
Next to the standardised key-factor approach, the revised ERUPT Guidelines also standardised 
particular parameters of baseline determination, such as the definition of the project boundary, i.e. 
which emission sources to include in the baseline, and defining the additionality concept. In addition, 
the revised Guidelines contained multi-project baseline/benchmark values for the electricity sector in 
potential JI host countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The use of these benchmarks under ERUPT 
was optional; project developers who felt that the benchmark value did not reasonably represent their 
specific project’s business-as-usual situation, were free to develop their own baseline emission factors, 
provided that they used the ERUPT key-factor approach. 
When calculating these benchmarks, the following key issues had to be dealt with: 
 How to deal with low variable cost power capacity? Since power plants that operate at relatively 
low variable costs are usually operated as many hours as possible, they are unlikely to be 
dispatched when new power production capacity becomes available. Examples of such capacity 
are run-of-river hydropower, co-generation and nuclear power plants. 
 How to incorporate the EU pre-Accession process of Central and Eastern European countries into 
the benchmark calculation? Potential JI host countries who had become Candidate members of 
the EU had to incorporate EU standards (collected in the Acquis Communautaire) in their 
domestic laws, but by the time of calculating the ERUPT multi-project baseline carbon emission 
factors (2001), negotiations between the European Commission and the countries that were 
scheduled to become EU member state in May 2004 had not yet made clear to what extent these 
countries would be allowed a transition period to postpone incorporating the standards until after 
the accession date (countries such as Bulgaria and Romania had not yet begun pre-accession 
negotiations with EU). 
The starting point for calculating the ERUPT benchmarks for JI electricity production projects was the 
existing energy grid mix in each of the potential JI host countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, 2004, p. 38). By doing so, it was assumed that new 
power production capacity connected to the grid through a JI project would replace existing grid-
connected capacity. Moreover, capacity with relatively low operational costs were not included in the 
baseline as they were unlikely to be stopped due to a new JI project. Moreover, the ERUPT 
methodology assumed that, in case of new capacity, technologies with relatively high variable costs, 
such as oil and gas, would be dispatched from the system before coal technologies. Finally, with a 
view to the EU pre-accession process ERUPT assumed a linear trend from actual standards to EU Best 
Available Techniques. Box 6-3 shows, using the example of Bulgaria, how the availability of new 
information during later years have led to different insights into benchmarks. 
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Box 6-3. JI benchmarks for Bulgaria 
The ERUPT methodology resulted in a benchmark carbon emission factor for the Bulgarian electricity 
grid of 814 gCO2/kWh in 2005 and 689 gCO2/kWh in 2012. In the meantime, Bulgaria had entered 
into negotiations with the European Commission on the future membership of the country of the EU, 
which resulted into specific information about the Bulgarian pre-accession process. For the power 
sector, an important implication of the pre-accession process was that four nuclear units in Bulgaria 
would have to be terminated. According to the Bulgarian National Communication to the UNFCCC 
(Republic of Bulgaria, 2002), these plants would be replaced with lignite/coal and natural gas-based 
technologies. This development would imply an increase in the carbon intensity of the power grid, so 
that updated multi-project baseline emission factors for JI projects in the Bulgarian power sector 
became higher than the ERUPT factors: 1.19 gCO2/kWh in 2005 and 1.08 gCO2/kWh in 2012 (Gaast, 
2005). 
 
The CERUPT programme, which was launched in 2001 and which was limited to one tender round 
only, did not contain benchmark emission values for power sector baselines. Nevertheless, the projects 
that were selected by CERUPT largely used methodologies that strongly resembled multi-project 
baseline calculations. CERUPT contracted 18 CDM project proposals, of which 12 projects aimed at 
building renewable energy capacity to be connected to the electricity grid of the host country (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2008). The baselines for the latter projects were calculated by 
identifying the marginal capacity connected or planned to be added to the grid. Therefore, the baseline 
analysis took place at a higher aggregation level than the project itself, which is generally also the case 
with multi-project baselines. Table 6-6 shows for these 12 projects how the project participants used 





Table 6-6. Multi-project baseline elements in CERUPT projects 
Project Multi-project baseline element 
1.  Penas Blancas, Costa Rica Optimising dispatch model for the power sector 
2.  Wigton Wind farm, Jamaica Determining energy mix connected to the electricity 
grid 
3.  Hydroelectricity power station Fortuna, 
Panama 
Determining energy mix of thermal plants that are 
likely to appear in the margin (no hydro) 
4.  Tamil Nadu wind power, India Aggregation to level of State grid (but no extension to 
other grids from where imports take place) 
5.  Vestas RRB India Ltd wind power, India Baseline derived from national policy plans, adjusted 
for region-specific circumstances 
6.  AyP Sucre hydro plant, Bolivia Power sector for entire Bolivia 
7.  HFR geothermal energy project, El 
Salvador 
Standardised baseline emission factors given in 
CERUPT guidelines 
8.  Esti run-of-river hydropower project, 
Panama 
Multi-project baseline based on national generation 
expansion plan 
9.  Bayano hydropower project, Panama  Multi-project baseline based on national generation 
expansion plan 
10. Huitengxile wind farm, China Aggregation for the entire North China power grid, 
assuming increasing share gas-fired plants 
11. Gangangar biomass project, Rajasthan, 
India 
Regional aggregation to state level, northern grid level 
was not appropriate 
12. Ind-Barath Energies 7.5 MW biomass 
power plant, Maharashtra, India 
Regional aggregation to state level, example of 
application of built-margin baseline concept 
Source: compiled by author from (UNFCCC, 2014d). 
 
6.5.4.  Standardisation of baselines for JI Track-1 projects 
As explained in Chapter 5, the Marrakech Accords made a distinction between JI Track-1 and -2 
projects.
111
 Under Track-1, the emission reductions achieved through a JI project can be verified by 
the host country, without the need for external validation and verification of the project plan and 
outcomes (UNFCCC, 2002b, pp. 11-13, para.20-23).
112
 At workshops held in 2005 on JI Track-1 
cooperation (Sofia, April 2005; Prague, September 2005), it was noted that, in comparison with JI 
Track-2, Track-1 cooperation could be relatively simple (Gaast, 2005). For instance, the accounting of 
GHG emission reductions achieved through the project can take place through bilaterally agreed 
procedures, because possible miscalculations of GHG reductions at the project level will become 
visible in the national GHG inventories of the host countries. This provides a larger scope for 
simplification of procedures, including those on baselines and additionality (see Chapter 5). 
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 Note that ‘Track-1’ and ‘Track-2’ are not official terms used in the Marrakech Accords, but are informal 
terms for the two tracks used during negotiations (see also chapter 5). 
112
 Countries that do not meet the eligibility criteria for Track-1, as listed in the Articles 5 and 7 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, must use the Track-2 procedure, which includes an external, independent validation of the project 
design document and an independent verification of the emission reductions achieved, similar to CDM 
processes. 
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On the other hand, precisely because of the EU membership of most of the potential JI Track-1 host 
countries, the scope for potential projects under Track-1 strongly decreased. After all, several GHG 
emission reduction activities that could have been carried out under JI, became mandatory as part of 
the EU accession and through participation in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). With a view to 
the above, the largest scope for JI Track-1 projects remained in those areas which are not covered by 
the ETS, i.e. energy efficiency in built environment, transport, combined heat and power, agriculture 
and industrial waste management. Given the need to establish simplified procedures for JI Track-1 
expressed at the aforementioned workshops, it has been explored, as part of a study project conducted 
for the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs (Gaast, 2005), how baseline procedures could be 
standardised for projects in these categories. These procedures are summarised below. 
Built environment 
Standardising baselines for the built environment is generally considered very difficult as each 
building is unique in terms of a combination of building materials used, design, use of the building, 
maintenance, etc. A first step in the standardisation process could be the assumption that buildings are 
generally built to governmental regulations and no further (Begg, et al., 2002b). Second, an 
assumption must be made on the extent to which compliance with the regulations has taken place, 
which may differ from country to country. Third, governments may (have to) formulate improvements 
in the built environment, either through domestic policies or through EU pre-accession processes. 
Moreover, in the built environment a distinction can be made between residential and non-residential 
buildings. For example, a JI project could aim at improving the energy performance of a particular 
type of dwellings, e.g., mass residential buildings built in Sofia, Bulgaria, from the 1970s and 1980s 
with prefabricated walls, floors, roofs, bad thermal insulation, and the owner being also the occupant. 
A possible multi-project baseline could be derived from the energy performance of the dwellings on a 
default site. Meanwhile, the largest scope for multi-project baselines seemed to exist in the non-
residential sector, e.g., offices, schools/universities, hospitals, hotels, warehouses, and libraries (Begg, 
et al., 2002b). 
Baseline parameters for multi-project baselines in the built environment that need to be taken into 
consideration are: 
 Project type: In case a project constructs a new building thereby replacing an existing one, the 
multi-project baseline is generally based on the performance of the old building. In case the 
building replaces an otherwise planned building, the baseline is the energy performance of the 
planned new types of building. Finally, a project could aim at refurbishing an existing building, 
the baseline of which would again be the energy performance of the existing building, adjusted 
for planned improvements. 
 Elemental or whole-building method: A project could aim at improving a particular building 
element, e.g., heating, equipment used, cooling, lightning, and ventilation. A multi-project 
baseline could describe the present and expected energy performance of the element under 
consideration. For example, a JI project could aim at setting a national standard for air 
conditioning in a country. The baseline for such a sector-policy project would be the present 
average standard of air conditioning, adjusted for expected improvements under business-as-usual 





conditioners in the country. A whole-building multi-project baseline determines a fixed emission 
factor per, e.g., m
2
 for schools, hospitals, office buildings, etc. 
 Owner/occupier/tenant: It makes quite a difference whether the owner of a building is also the 
occupier or manager, or not. Simply put, when the owner must also pay the energy bill, he/she 
may have a stronger incentive to carry out energy saving measures than in case the lower energy 
bills go to the occupier/tenant. 
Given the complexity of the accounting (including monitoring) of GHG emission reductions from 
built environment projects, it has been argued that JI/CDM projects in this category could better be 
designed at the level of sector policies (i.e. a policy results in GHG emission reduction in the built 
environment sector) than at the level of each building separately (Bossi & Ellis, 2005) (Sterk & 
Wittneben, 2006). In this context, a multi-project baseline covering the sector could be derived from a 
sample of building elements or buildings, but also the project monitoring could be streamlined by 
taking samples and monitor their performance. 
Transport 
Possible GHG emission reduction projects in the transport sector are: 
 Modal shift: e.g., lorries to canal, car commutation to public transport, etc. 
 Fuel substitution: e.g., from diesel to compressed natural gas. 
 Fuel efficiency: e.g., filters for reduction of particulates emissions. 
 Driver behaviour and vehicle maintenance: e.g., through training programmes. 
When determining a multi-project baseline for transport sector JI projects, a clear vision is needed of 
future transport sector developments in the host country (Ellis, et al., 2001, pp. 21-24). For instance 
(Begg, et al., 2002b): 
 It is widely assumed that small operators under business-as-usual circumstances have no 
incentive to adjust their operations, as they generally face tight margins and need to keep afloat 
on a daily basis. 
 The host country may have a plan to introduce road haulage charges or set vehicle standards, 
which would need to be included in the baseline. 
 In JI Track-I host countries that have acceded the EU or will do so at short notice, EU standards 
will need to be incorporated in domestic law. These standards would, depending on the timetables 
agreed with the European Commission, need to be included in the baselines. 
Similar to the conclusion on the built environment sector, especially with a view to simplification of 
project monitoring, JI would better involve transport sector policies, such as green transport plans, fuel 
economy programmes, vehicle emission standards, smart growth programmes, etc., than individual 
projects covering, e.g., a company fleet (Begg, et al., 2002b). JI accounting procedures would 
subsequently focus on the estimated abatement effect of such policies, which implies multi-project 
baselines at the sector level and sample-based monitoring. 
A multi-project baseline for the transportation sector could be expressed as the average annual fuel 
consumption for vehicle types, e.g., lorries. For such calculations, IPCC methodologies used for the 
UNFCCC National Communications could be applied (UNFCCC, 2014e). In a more advanced 
manner, spreadsheet models can be used to estimate how employees of a particular organisation go to 
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work, e.g., for organisations with approximately 1000 employees within a particular region. Such 
spreadsheets would deliver a baseline emissions factor in terms of CO2 per passenger-km. In the UK, 
such a spreadsheet model has been developed by Napier University (Begg, et al., 2002b). 
Combined heat and power (CHP) 
In this category, an early project example was a rapeseed plant which was reconstructed into a plant 
with CHP in the town of Namyslów (Poland) (Mizuho Information & Research Institute, 2004). The 
power component of the CHP replaced power that would otherwise have been purchased from the 
grid, whereas the heat was sold to individual customers who were not connected to a district-heating 
grid. In this project example, the power component was standardised by taking a grid-based GHG 
emission factor; the heat component baseline was project-specific. 
Another example of an industrial CHP project was the Metrogas CDM activity, which was 
implementated in a food factory in Chile. Before the CDM project, the factory purchased the power 
from the grid, whereas it used natural gas for the production of heat. After the project, both power and 
heat would be produced through natural gas. The baseline for the electricity generation component was 
calculated by taking an emission factor for the entire grid (which resembles a multi-project baseline 
factor). For the baseline of the project’s heat component the emission coefficient of the pre-project 
industrial boiler was used. 
These two examples show that the baselines for the power component of CHP projects can be 
relatively easily standardised, as in many cases the power used to be purchased from the grid. The 
scope for standardising baselines for the heat component, however, depends on how the heat was 
produced before the project, i.e. grid-connected or individually within buildings (e.g., using gas, oil, 
coal, or wood). 
Industrial waste management 
An early example of an industrial waste management JI project was the Paper Factory Stambolijski in 
Bulgaria, which used wood waste from paper production as a fuel for electricity (Paper Factory 
Stambolijski, 2004). In the baseline it was assumed that under business-as-usual circumstances, 
clearing of wood waste in existing landfills would be allowed at least up to 2013. The reason for this 
assumption was that the waste from the factory was classified by the Bulgarian regulations around 
2005 as non-hazardous (Paper Factory Stambolijski, 2004) (Gaast, 2005) (Gaast, 2003b). According to 
the EU Directive on Landfilling of Waste (Council of the European Union, 1999), the activities 
foreseen under the project would have to be carried out anyway (assuming that Bulgaria becomes EU 
member state in 2007), but Bulgaria had agreed with the European Commission that this Directive 
would not have to be implemented in the country before 2012. Consequently, the baseline for the 
electricity from the biomass component referred to the power that would otherwise have been 
purchased from the grid. For this component, the ERUPT multi-project baseline emission factors have 
been used (see Section 6.5.3). 
The baseline component for the methane reduction part of the project was more complex, but it was 





experience (Paper Factory Stambolijski, 2004). This model took into consideration the possible 
differences between landfills in terms of waste composition, oxidation of gas, etc. 
In conclusion, standardisation of baselines for JI Track-1 projects not only had the potential to reduce 
transaction costs for projects and increase transparency of baseline procedures, it could also stimulate 
JI activities in the built environment and transport sector, which were likely to have a sector-based 
policy, rather than a project-by-project character. 
 
6.5.5.  Standardising JI power sector baseline using EU ETS verified data 
As an example of what a standardised baseline for JI Track-1 looks like and how the countries 
involved collaborated on this, this section describes the case of the ‘Hidroelectrica Hydropower 
Development Portfolio Track 1 JI Project’ implemented in Romania between 2009 and 2012.113 This 
project was the first JI Project which was approved under the Romanian Track-1 procedures. The 
ERUs originating from this project were purchased by the Netherlands Government. A special feature 
of this project was that its baseline is determined on an ex post basis, thereby using verified CO2 
emissions data of Romanian electricity generating installations covered by the EU ETS. Since 2008, 
Romanian installations have received annual GHG emission allowances under the EU ETS and by the 
end of each year they need to show that their actual emissions are below or equal to their allowances. 
As these emissions are monitored and verified according to EU ETS standards, it can be precisely 
calculated how many GHGs are emitted by, e.g., Romanian power plants for producing electricity 
(expressed in gCO2/kWh). For this JI Track-1 project, these carbon emission factors were used in the 
baseline calculations. 
The project aimed at developing nine new hydropower plants, which were located in different 
hydrographic basins in Romania. The project started in 2008 with the construction of the first plants 
with completion scheduled for 2011. The project design document was prepared in 2008 and in 2009, 
the Government of Romania issued a letter of approval for the project. The project envisaged the 
installation of 278.4 MW hydropower capacity, which was estimated to be 5.18% of Romania’s total 
hydro-based electricity capacity (equivalent to 1.3% of Romania’s annual electricity output). 
The project was carried out under the Romanian Track-1 procedures (based on the Ministerial order 
No. 297 dated 21 March 2008, Romanian Ministry of Environment). Romania has been a Party to the 
UNFCCC since 1994 and it ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Romania 
had a commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by 8% below its 1989 level during the period 2008-
2012. According to Romania’s National Communication to the UNFCCC of 2006, the country’s GHG 
emissions in 2004 were approximately 33% below the Kyoto Protocol target (this report was updated 
in 2013, (Ministry of Environment and Climate Change of Romania, 2013)). Table 6-7 below shows 
the share of different energy technologies in Romania’s electricity production for the years 2004-2007. 
 
                                                     
113
 The author of this study acted as consultant to this project and wrote the Project Design Document for 
approval by the Government of Romania (during May 2008-February 2009) (Hydroelectrica, 2009). This section 
is based on the analysis carried out for the preparation of this Project Design Document.  
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Table 6-7. Shares in Romania’s grid-connected electricity production of power production 
technologies (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Coal 37.55 35.80 39.57 41.69 
Hydropower 31.61 37.10 32.02 25.80 
Natural gas 16.01 14.07 16.69 17.42 
Nuclear energy 10.07 9.57 9.20 13.10 
Crude oil & petroleum 3.26 2.68 1.83 1.11 
Conventional fuels 1,50 0.75 0.68 0.89 
Source: Annual report Romanian Energy Regulatory Authority ANRE - ‘Date  Statistice  Aferente  
Energiei  Electrice’ (Hydroelectrica, 2009). 
 
From the table it becomes clear that during the period 2004-2007 the variation in hydropower (largely 
weather-related) was mainly covered by adjustments in the production of coal and natural gas-based 
electricity. This fossil fuel-based production capacity has therefore been functioning at the margin of 
increasing production when hydropower output was lower and of reducing production when 
hydropower output was higher. Since 2007, Romania’s nuclear power capacity has increased by 700 
MW to 1400 MW so that as of 2008 approximately 20% of Romania’s grid-based electricity would be 
nuclear based. 
Romania was an active country in terms of JI collaboration. It signed 10 Memoranda of Understanding 
on JI cooperation with JI investor countries: Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Finland, and World Bank. As per November 2014, 21 JI projects were in 
the pipeline (at validation or registered by the JI Supervisory Committee), of which 4 projects counted 
as JI Track-2 (Fenhamm, 2014).  
The following units were covered by the Hidroelectrica Hydropower Development Portfolio Track 1 
JI Project: 
• Dumitra hydropower project (HPP), 
• Bumbesi HPP, 
• Nehoiasu HPP, 
• Firiza I + II HPP, 
• Râul Alb HPP, 
• Plopi HPP, 
• Racovita HPP, 
• Rastolita HPP, and 
• Robesti HPP. 
These units, with the exception of Dumitra and Bumbesti HPPs, which were approved by a 
Governmental Decree in 2003, were all initially approved by the Government of Romania during the 
1980s. However, the actual development of the investment and construction works took place at a very 
slow speed if they had not just been stopped. Through the JI project, the construction of the nine 





From a national energy perspective, such as reflected by Romania’s latest national energy strategy, 
further expansion of the hydropower capacity could be expected for the future. However, with the 
increase (doubling) of the nuclear power capacity and the flexibility in the output expansion (and 
reduction) of coal and natural gas-fired power plants (thermal plants on average operate at around 57% 
of their full capacity) no strong short-term incentive existed for Hidroelectrica to increase its 
hydropower capacity. 
With respect to baseline determination, the project belongs to the category of greenfield projects 
which create new capacity on sites where formerly no power production took place. In order to 
determine a baseline emissions scenario for this project, an average CO2 emission factor (expressed in 
gCO2/kWh) was calculated for the power grid of Romania. However, contrary to the ACM0002 
methodology that is usually used for similar projects under the CDM (UNFCCC (CDM), 2014), for 
this project the baseline emission factor was calculated on an ex post basis using data verified for 
Romanian electricity generation installations covered by the EU ETS. 
The reason for using of Romanian ETS installations’ data for the baseline calculations was that these 
installations produce power mainly with fossil fuel combustion (that is the reason why they have been 
included in the ETS in the first place). It is common practice that a country’s power production 
capacity is as big as the highest annual peak in electricity demand, so that throughout the year there is 
excess capacity. Power plants are operated in different modes with nuclear energy and run-of-river 
hydropower plants normally being operational as many hours as possible because of their relatively 
low operational costs. Fossil fuel based plants, instead, are usually modulated depending on electricity 
demand developments while securing electricity supply. For the latter plants, it could generally be 
assumed that the higher the fuel costs and the lower the energy efficiency, the higher will be their 
variable costs and, therefore, it will be more attractive to reduce their operation when new capacity 
becomes available. 
One further specific aspect that needed to be considered in this baseline methodology was how to deal 
with CO2 emissions that originate from CHP or co-generation plants. Within the context of Romania, 
most CHP plants are used for district heating (SAVE II PROCHP, 2003). Until 2002, heat was mainly 
produced by district heating and CHP plants owned by Termoelectrica. As part of the liberalisation of 
the Romanian energy market, several Termoelectrica district heating and CHP plants became 
independent, with in many cases the municipality as single shareholder (Hydroelectrica, 2009). The 
complexity with CHP plants is that when, irrespective of the reason for it, a plant delivered less 
electricity to the grid, there is still a heat demand that needs to be met. A typical CHP plant produces 
heat for baseload heat demand (e.g., hot water during the summer), so that additional heat-only boilers 
are needed for meeting peak-load heat demand. Should a CHP plant’s delivery of electricity to the grid 
be reduced and in combination with that the heat production reduced, then extra heat needs to be 
produced elsewhere in order to be able to meet the municipality’s baseload heat demand, which would 
still cause emissions of CO2.Therefore, calculating CO2 emissions in terms of kWh of electricity 
produced and including this emission factor in the baseline would not be a conservative approach. 
With a view to the above, CHP plants with a preferential status in the dispatch order (by Energy 
Efficiency law–no. 199/2000, CHP for district heating had guaranteed access to the grid) were left out 
of the baseline as they are unlikely to become marginal plants due to a JI project. 
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For the calculation of such a modified (i.e. based on marginal technologies) grid-connected CO2 
baseline emission factor, the following data were needed: 
 The verified CO2 emissions data of Romanian power sector installations in the ETS that operate 
at the margin. These data are published on the published on the Internet site of Romanian 
Ministry of the Environment (between 1 May and 30 June of the following year) and are freely 
accessible (European Union, 2014). 
 Annual electricity supply to the grid by each of the ETS installations operating at the margin. 
Combining these two data sources results in an annual baseline emission factor, which is made 
publicly available by the Romanian Ministry of the Environment. For this annual ex post calculation, a 
‘CO2 Emission Factor Data Collection Protocol’ was developed which establishes a working 
relationship with National Environmental Agency (NEPA) and the Romanian Energy Regulatory 
Authority (ANRE) under the coordination of the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. The first year for which the baseline was prepared was 2009 based on data that 
became available during the first six months of 2010. 
 
6.6.  Discussion: Negotiations on Standardised Baselines in Light of Design, 
Process and Tactics Conditions 
 
The central theme in the application of multi-project standardised baselines to JI and CDM projects is 
to find a balance between: 
1. the requirement in the ‘Marrakech Accords’ that baselines must be project-specific and 
reasonably describe what would occur in absence of a JI/CDM project, and 
2. the desire to simplify baseline procedures with a view to reducing transaction costs and 
improving the transparency of procedures. 
In this chapter, development of multi-project baselines describing reference scenarios for JI and CDM 
has been discussed by looking at its political context (Kyoto Protocol Articles 6 and 12 and the 
‘Marrakech Accords’), research conducted on possible methodological approaches for multi-project 
baselines (modelling, determining operating and built margins, etc.), early practice in JI and CDM 
investment programmes and the work of the CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee. In 
this section, the development of multi-project procedures during 2001 and, around, 2010, is assessed 
against the three basic negotiation conditions in terms of: 
1. whether the design of the multi-project baseline procedures reflect the above requirement of 
reasonable baseline descriptions while reducing transaction costs and enhancing transparency 
(basic condition 1), 
2. whether the negotiation process has enabled reflection of all these aspects during the baseline 
procedure formulation work (basic condition 2), and 
3. whether there have been tactical and facilitating aspects to enable negotiations to work toward 





Meeting basic condition 1: environmentally integer and pragmatic multi-project baseline designs 
As has been explained in this chapter, a baseline describing a GHG emissions reference scenario for JI 
and CDM projects can either be: 
 derived from past or present data relevant for the project, thereby assuming that what has been 
taking place so far would continue to take place in the (near) future; or 
 based on forward looking data assuming that past or present data are insufficiently representative 
for the future, e.g., because of an expected/announced political change such as the EU accession 
in Central and Eastern Europe; or 
 a benchmark-type of baseline with a performance level in terms of GHG emissions. 
The ‘ideal’ baseline (situation A in Figure 1-3) would both be a reasonable representation of a 
project’s reference scenario which would be affordable for a wide range of small- and large-scale 
projects globally and which would avoid ‘talking up’ the achieved GHG emission reductions. As this 
chapter and Chapter 5 have shown, such an ideal situation is difficult to achieve with JI and CDM 
baselines as the reference situation can usually not be controlled, as it is hypothetical. Efforts to deal 
with this through strict and costly baseline methods could therefore reduce the interest in JI and CDM 
projects (hypothetical situation B in Figure 1-3). 
Through multi-project baselines, generalised estimates of baseline emission factors can be made, at 
relatively low costs and with a reduced scope for ‘gaming’ (unreal emission reductions by overstating 
baseline emission levels). However, multi-project baselines are usually less specific description of a 
project’s context and could provide a larger scope for free riding or non-additional project activities as 
each project with emissions lower than the baseline emissions could claim carbon credits, irrespective 
of whether the project was already planned or triggered by JI or CDM revenues (hypothetical outcome 
C in Figure 1-3). It has been shown in this chapter that in the practice of the CDM (and later JI) this 
issue has been addressed by adding additionality tests to each project, in order to test whether the 
CDM or JI revenues was decisive for moving on with the project (towards hypothetical outcome D in 
Figure 1-3), thereby meeting basic condition 1. The outcome of the negotiations on multi-project 
baselines has also provided a larger scope for, for instance, the transport and built environment sectors, 
where small-scale project activities generally benefit from standardised baseline procedures with 
default GHG emission factors (enhancing a move towards outcome D in Figure 1-3).  
Meeting basic condition 2: enabling negotiation process for multi-project baselines 
The main negotiation framework for JI and CDM project baselines was formed by the CDM Executive 
Board and JI Supervisory Committee which became responsible for supervising the operationalisation 
of JI and CDM projects and processes. The baselines themselves were determined by project 
developers. They had to develop an accounting methodology for GHG emission baselines and 
monitoring of project emissions during the project lifetime. These methodologies had to be submitted 
to the CDM Executive Board (and JI Supervisory Committee), which checked methodologies with 
help of experts and practitioners (CDM MethPanels). After a while, the CDM Executive Board began 
consolidating methodologies which had been approved for similar projects, so that these became 
standardised methodologies for these project categories. For small-scale projects, the CDM Executive 
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Board developed, in addition to that, standardised emission factors for baselines. All these activities 
took place largely outside the political scope of the COP. 
The main enabling aspect of the negotiations process for engaging with Parties and stakeholders on the 
elements identified for meeting basic condition 1 for multi-project baselines, has been the frequent 
interactions between CDM Executive Board (and JI Supervisory Committee) members, JI and CDM 
project practitioners, JI and CDM investor and host countries and knowledge institutes. For several 
decisive steps, the Executive Board and Supervisory Committee relied on research on calculating  
multi-project baseline emission factors for different country contexts and project types, as well as 
hands-on experience of JI and CDM practitioners (and Parties) with balancing the requirement of 
reasonable baselines and the desire to keep baseline determination reliable and cost-effective. 
Therefore, from this chapter, it can be concluded that during the process of developing multi-project 
baseline procedures for JI and CDM projects, basic condition 2 could only be met by enabling 
collaboration between members of the ‘political’ bodies CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory 
Committee and researchers and JI and CDM practitioners. 
Meeting basic condition 3: tactical aspects shaping multi-project baseline development 
During the development of multi-project baseline determination, basic condition 3 was met due to the 
following tactical aspects which broadened the knowledge base for multi-project baseline 
development: 
 Fundamental research on baseline standardisation, with a view to increasing environmental 
integrity and making processes cheaper and transparent (Kartha, et al., 2004) (Ellis, et al., 2001) 
(PROBASE, 2003), demonstrated what was methodologically possible, what were data needs, 
what were uncertainties and how to mitigate these, and how to arrange responsibilities in terms of  
methodology development, validation of its planned application and verification of its use. With 
these insights and case study analysis, it could be demonstrated that multi-project baselines would 
not necessarily imply lower integrity, but could actually reduce gaming and free ridership. 
 Work done by early movers with JI and CDM, such as the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund 
and the Dutch ERUPT and CERUPT programmes, was important for later baseline methodology 
work by the CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee. As these programmes started 
before the ‘Marrakech Accords’ in 2001, they had to formulate guidance for project developers 
largely from scratch, including baseline guidelines. Several of the elements in these programmes 
have later been used for JI and CDM approved (multi-project) baseline and monitoring 
methodologies. 
 The step made by the CDM Executive Board to make a distinction between operating margin and 
built margin capacity was an important facilitating step in developing multi-project baseline 
methodologies for greenfield projects, thereby stimulating CDM projects in the area of renewable 
energy. By this step it was acknowledged that not being able to identify what capacity a 
greenfield project replaces is not necessarily an obstacle for making reasonable estimates of 
marginal grid-connected capacity. 
 The linking of the CDM and JI to the EU ETS triggered demand from EU installations for JI and 





development of baseline and monitoring methodologies, including the process to consolidate 
these towards multi-project application. 
The above-discussed design, policy process and tactical/facilitating aspects of multi-project baseline 
development under JI and CDM have been summarised in Table 6-8. 
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Table 6-8. Design, process and tactical/facilitating negotiation aspects of developing multi-
project baseline methodologies for JI and CDM projects
 
 
Description of basic condition in negotiation file 
























 Multi-project baselines can be applied to multiple 
projects within the same category 
Principles: 
 Multi-project baselines must be reasonable 
representation of the situation replaced by a JI or CDM 
project 
Goals: 
 Increased transparency 
 Avoid non-additional GHG emission reductions 
 Reduction of project design costs 
Means: 
 Standardisation of baselines via multi-project 
methodologies and/or standardised carbon emission 
factors (e.g., performance benchmarks) 
(+) Multi-project baseline methods 
were accepted for CDM and JI 
project, thereby acknowledging 
that not ‘everything can be 
measured’ but realising that too 
detailed and complex methods 
would become too costly. This 
created a larger scope for CDM 
and JI projects, also in transport 
and built environment, as well as 





















 COP-7 (Marrakech) set principles for project modalities 
 SBSTA focussed on technical process with baselines and 
other accounting issues 
 CDM Executive Board approved CDM project baseline 
methodologies and, later, consolidate these into multi-
project baselines 
Strategy: 
 The process of consolidating baseline standardisation was 
mainly left to the CDM Executive Board 
 COP monitored this process from a distance 
Responsibility: 
 CDM Executive Board became responsible for approving 
CDM project baseline and additionality methodologies 
 This was later followed by the JI Supervisory Committee 
for JI methodologies 
 COP’s responsibility was to set principles and boundaries 
(+) The negotiation process enabled 
a frequent interaction with and 
feedback from research projects, 
project practitioners and 
























 Research projects such as Kartha et al. (2002) and 
PROBASE (2003) provided important insights on methods, 
tools and contexts for multi-project baselines 
 Early movers such as the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon 
Fund and the Dutch ERUPT and CERUPT carbon credit 
purchase programmes developed first multi-project 
baseline determination practice 
 The step of the CDM Executive Board to distinguish 
between operating and built margin baseline installations 
supported development of multi-project baseline 
methodologies for greenfield projects 
(+) Research on multi-project 
baselines underlined that these 
contribute to JI and CDM integrity 
(+) Early JI and CDM investors 
established ground work for 
multi-project baselines 
(+) Operating and built margin 
baseline distinction stimulated 
greenfield renewable electricity 
projects in developing countries 
(+) Demand for JI and CDM projects 









 Chapter 7.  Towards a Future Climate Policy – 
Linking Climate and Development  
 
7.1. Introduction: Aligning Climate Policies with Development Policies 
 
In Chapters 3 through 6 above, four negotiation files have been discussed that each have played a role 
in shaping the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. For each file it has been analysed whether and to 
what extent each of the three basic or least required negotiation conditions, identified in this study, 
have been met. From the files discussed in Chapters 3-6 it has become clear that a critical factor 
during the negotiations has been the division of responsibilities between developed and developing 
countries. According to Depledge & Yamin (2009), the division between industrialised and developing 
countries is the greatest weakness within the international climate change regime.  
In Chapter 2, but also after the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, the question was therefore 
raised whether GHG emission reduction measures would actually need a global support as only 
relatively few countries are responsible for most of the global GHG emissions (Victor, 2006) (Victor, 
2007) (Prins & Rayner, 2007) (Haas, 2008)  (WRI, 2009). At least, it may seem easier to negotiate 
within such a smaller group of countries (see for instance the example of Montreal Protocol 
negotiations in Box 1-2). As could be concluded from Chapter 3, the Kyoto Protocol de facto created a 
relatively small coalition of industrialised country Parties with quantified commitments, from which 
developing countries were exempted, although this coalition could not have emerged without the 
CDM cooperation between industrialised and developing countries. In 2009, the Major Economies 
Forum on Energy and Climate was launched to facilitate a dialogue on energy and climate change 
among larger developed and developing country economies, thereby potentially limiting the ‘coalition 
size’ to these countries.114 
Nevertheless, it can be questioned whether building such smaller coalitions would be simpler than a 
global approach, such as it has been aimed at under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. First of all, 
the group of countries with highest GHG emissions is very diverse; not only are major industrialised 
countries among them, with varying interests and profiles, but also rapidly industrialising countries, 
such as China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. As explained in Chapter 1, the recent negotiations on 
a post-2012 climate policy regime have made clear that the latter countries have been unwilling to 
follow a ‘target and timetable’ approach with national, legally-binding targets, which has complicated 
their joining of a climate policy coalition with such targets.
115
 Second, a system with emission 
reduction commitments for only a particular group of countries can lead to ‘trade leakage’, also called 
‘carbon leakage’ (Schreuder, 2009).116 Carbon leakage reduces the effectiveness of a geographically 
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limited climate policy regime as companies can move their business to countries or regions without 
commitments. Therefore, strong action by a limited number of Parties without comparable action by 
the other major emitters is not very useful (Gros & Egenhofer, 2010), so that the framework described 
in Chapter 1 (Figure 1-3) with the aim for a climate policy package with globally supported GHG 
emission reduction measures can also be applied for an analysis of post-Kyoto climate policy 
negotiations. 
As a consequence, also ongoing negotiations on a future climate policy regime will have to address the 
division between developed and developing countries. This has not become easier over time since the 
initial distinction between developed and developing countries (Annex I vs non-Annex I Parties) has 
become increasingly difficult to maintain. Negotiations have made particularly clear that treating all 
developing countries as one group does not do justice to the wide diversity among them. For example, 
in addition to the group of small-island state developing countries, which already operated as a 
negotiation group during the early 1990s (see Chapter 2, Box 2-1), negotiations have increasingly 
focussed on the position of rapidly growing developing countries and whether or not these countries 
would still have to be considered ‘real’ developing countries or should join the Annex I group. 
Moreover, countries differ in terms of their longer term economic, social and environmental priorities.  
Recent developments in climate negotiations, since ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Cancun’ (see Chapter 1), have 
shown an increasing interest in embedding climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in 
national economic, social and environmental planning, especially in developing countries, as climate 
change mitigation and adaptation have become increasingly interlinked with domestic planning. For 
instance, it has been estimated that, for making the Millennium Development Goals in Africa resilient 
to climate change, 40% more funding will be required over the following ten years (Anderson, 2011). 
Such increased knowledge of potential impacts and risks of climate change has resulted in an 
increased focus on the need to reduce countries’ vulnerability to climate change impacts, so that the 
sustainable livelihoods and ecosystem services on which people depend can be protected.
117
 This is 
especially important for least developed countries, which are likely to be the most vulnerable to 
climate changes. The latter aspect has been acknowledged in the ‘Cancun Agreements’ which call for 
the establishment of a process to enable least developed countries to formulate and implement national 
adaptation plans (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 5, para. 15-16). 
However, it is not only the area of adaptation where ‘climate’ and ‘development’ meet. In fact, the 
growing climate and sustainable development urgencies (e.g., energy poverty, degradation of land and 
forestry; see Gaast & Begg, 2012, for a detailed discussion) create stronger reasons for countries to 
realise their economic, social and environmental sustainable development goals with the lowest GHG 
emissions, and to have this supported under an international climate policy regime. The provisions in 
the ‘Cancun Agreements’, such as formulating nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) “in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
carbon content or to renewable energy sources. Due to the lower demand for fossil fuels in these countries fossil 
fuel prices will go down, which could create an incentive for countries without commitments to increase their 
demand for fossil fuels. The GHG emission reduction achieved because of the commitments would thus be offset 
by increased emissions elsewhere. Second, trade leakage can occur if companies decide to shift their production 
from countries with commitments to countries without commitments (Barrett, 1997) (Barrett, 2000) and 
(Schreuder, 2009). 
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the context of sustainable development” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 9, para. 48), could be important steps 
in that direction. Moreover, the process of technology needs assessment for climate change (TNA) 
(UNDP, 2010) takes developing countries’ development priorities as a starting point for identifying 
strategic sectors for achieving climate and sustainable development goals and selecting technologies 
for mitigation and adaptation with development benefits. 
After the failure at COP-15 in Copenhagen to achieve a global climate agreement with quantified 
emission reduction commitments for a wider group of developed and developing countries for the 
period beyond 2012, the 2010 ‘Cancun Agreements’ (COP-16) moved the negotiations away from a 
focus on national, legally-binding emission reduction commitments towards an approach whereby 
developed and developing countries could pledge (voluntary) emission reductions. Moreover, 
developing countries’ mitigation actions should be ‘nationally appropriate’ (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 7-
12) based on ‘low-emission development strategies’ (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 9 and 11, para. 45 and 65). 
With the decisions at ‘Cancun’, which were further specified at COP-17 (Durban, 2011), COP-18 
(Doha, 2012) and COP-19 (Warsaw, 2013), climate negotiations have taken a turn, at least 
temporarily, from legally-binding quantitative commitments to nationally appropriate climate change 
mitigation actions. It is furthermore noted that the concept of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs), which Parties can, as agreed at COP-19, propose as GHG emission reduction 
measures could have various forms, ranging from quantified national targets to policy measures or 
technology transfer activities (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2013). While not guaranteeing that these 
actions taken together would lead to the objective of limiting global temperature increase to 2
o
C (as 
recommended by the IPCC, 2007, and UNFCCC, 2011a, p. 3; para. 4), integrating climate policy 
actions in countries national development planning could create additional incentives for countries to 
take climate measures as these support reaching their national development targets. 
In light of these recent negotiation developments, this chapter assesses how meeting the three basic 
negotiation conditions identified in this study can result in a future climate policy coalition whereby 
climate change mitigation and adaptation actions are formulated in accordance with countries’ 
sustainable development priorities, with a specific focus on how this supports developing countries’ 
participation in a future climate policy coalition. In terms of basic condition 1, it will be assessed how 
such a negotiation process could result in an outcome which would bridge the climate emissions gap 
as identified by the UNEP Emissions Gap report (UNEP, 2014) (i.e. a situation where outcome D is 
close or even equal to outcome A in Figure 1-3). With respect to basic condition 2, it will be explored 
how the existing UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol negotiation process and it bodies, including the new bodies 
established at Cancun, Durban and Doha for technology transfer, adaptation and finance, could enable 
a flexible approach towards a global coalition. Concerning basic condition 3, scope for tactical 
manoeuvres and facilitating support to negotiations will be explored. 
For that, the chapter takes as a starting point the process of stimulating low-emission development by 
technology transfer and innovation through the TNA process under the UNFCCC. TNAs form an 
illustrative file as these have been conducted since 2001 by over 120 developing countries, in order to 
support them in identifying technologies for climate change mitigation and adaptation in light of 
countries’ national development priorities. The chapter subsequently focuses on the question how 
insights gained from TNAs could be used for identifying NAMAs and identifying finance and capacity 





their implementation. Finally, the chapter assesses how international climate policy making could 
organise financial, technical and capacity building transfers across (developing) countries for more 
rationalised climate policy support, which could enhance countries’ interest in and benefits from a 
global climate policy coalition. 
 
7.2. Climate Negotiations and Sustainable Development 
 
7.2.1. Inter-dependencies between climate change and sustainable development
118
 
The increasing insights on the socio-economic, technical and environmental risks of climate change 
have resulted in a range of international climate policy agreements. The first of these agreements was 
reached at the UN Earth Summit of 1992 with the adoption of the UNFCCC (see Chapter 1). 
However, climate change was not the only issue on the agenda of the Summit. The overall focus was 
on the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation, such as climate 
change, threats to biodiversity and forest degradation. In order to address these concerns, other 
adopted documents, in addition to the UNFCCC, were: 
 Agenda 21 as a programme for global action on sustainable development; 
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; 
 The Statement of Forest Principles; and  
 The Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Together, these documents formed the message “that nothing less than a transformation of our 
attitudes and behaviour would bring about the necessary changes” (UN, 1992). 
In order to mark the 20
th
 anniversary of the 1992 Earth Summit, the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD) or ‘Rio+20’ (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 4-6 June 2012) discussed progress made 
since 1992 and explored gaps between goals and achievements. Among the aims of Rio+20 were a 
new policy agenda for a “green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication” and “creating an institutional framework for sustainable development” (United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), 2011). 
The developments and initiatives between 1992 (UNCED) and 2012 (Rio+20) have increasingly made 
clear that climate policy making has increasingly become interrelated with economic, financial, 
environmental and sustainable development policies, both in industrialised and developing countries 
(Jackson, 2009). For example, efforts to reduce GHG emissions have to take place against the 
backdrop of an increasing global energy demand (IEA, 2014a). Another example of the increasing 
interlinkage of climate change with other policy areas is that in developing countries the urgency of 
climate change exists alongside the development urgencies as formulated by the Millennium 
Development Goals. According to (Practical Action, 2010), one and a half billion people in the world 
have no access to electricity and three billion people rely on traditional biomass and coal for cooking. 
The impact of the latter on people’s health is illustrated by the fact that indoor smoke from traditional 
cook stoves causes 1.4 million deaths per year. In general, “energy poverty is critically undermining 
the achievement of the [Millennium Development Goals, MDG]. As long as hundreds of millions of 
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people remain deprived of the basic energy services needed to stay fed and healthy, earn a living, and 
allow the time needed for learning and fulfilment, the MDGs will remain out of reach” (Practical 
Action, 2010, p. vii). 
In 2010, the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change (AGECC) 
recommended universal access to modern energy services by 2030 (basic minimum threshold of 
modern energy services for both consumption and productive uses) and to reduce global energy 
intensity by 40% by 2030, by building and strengthening countries’ capacity to implement effective 
policies, market-based mechanisms, business models, investment tools and regulations with regard to 
energy use (AGECC, 2010). The Least Developed Countries Expert Group under the UNFCCC 
pointed out that development and adaptation policies and practice need to be blended (LDC Expert 
Group, 2009). 
These inter-dependencies show a need for strategies in countries whereby actions for low GHG 
emission pathways are identified in the light of countries’ increasing energy demand and sustainable 
development priorities, including countries’ need for reducing energy poverty.119  
 
7.2.2. Increased focus on low-emission development strategies
120
 
The above described need for linking countries’ climate policy actions with their sustainable 
development priorities is reflected in the 2010 Cancun Agreements which contain a joint vision for 
long-term cooperative action between all countries which “addresses mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology development and transfer, and capacity-building in a balanced, integrated and 
comprehensive manner to enhance and achieve the full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
Convention, now, up to and beyond 2012” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 2, para. 1). For developing countries 
in particular, the Cancun Agreements contain a decision that they “will take nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions [NAMAs] in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by 
technology, finance and capacity-building, aimed at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to 
‘business as usual’ emissions in 2020” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 9-10, para. 48). 
In addition, all Parties are invited to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework, through “planning, prioritising and implementing adaptation actions, including projects 
and programmes, and actions identified in national and sub-national adaptation plans and strategies 
[with] impact, vulnerability and adaptation assessments, [to] establish a process to enable least 
developed country Parties to formulate and implement national adaptation plans [NAPs]” (UNFCCC, 
2011a, pp. 4-6, para. 14a-b, 15, 20e). 
As mentioned above, developing countries are also encouraged to develop low-emission development 
strategies (LEDS) or plans in the context of sustainable development (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 3, para.6). 
This concept was introduced by a number of Parties during and after the 2009 Climate Conference in 
Copenhagen (COP-15). For example, the EU suggested that developing countries prepare low carbon 
growth plans from which NAMAs could be formulated (UNFCCC, 2009a). Another example is the 
proposal submitted by Republic of Korea, suggesting that: “… developed country Parties need to 
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provide developing country Parties with a roadmap for low carbon development which includes 
appropriate policy tools and necessary support to enable them to pursue greenhouse gas emission 
reduction and economic development at the same time” (UNFCCC, 2009a). LEDS121 can be domestic 
strategy documents that integrate national climate change policy into a broader framework of 
development (Clapp, et al., 2010). While there is as of yet no clearly established process for LEDS, 
several studies identify key steps of the process (Clapp, et al., 2010) (World Bank, 2009) (Project 
Catalyst, 2009). 
In addition to the decisions on LEDS, NAMA and NAP formulation, the Cancun Agreements: 
 Elaborated on how capacity building and financial support to developing countries could be 
arranged; 
 Offered guidelines for reducing GHG emissions through avoided deforestation and reduced land 
degradation; and 
 Established the Technology Mechanism for support of development and transfer of technologies 
for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries. 
As such, the text contained several conceptual agreements between countries which were formalised at 
the COP-17 and COP-18 (Durban, South Africa, 2011, and Doha, Qatar, 2012). 
 
7.3. Stimulating Low-Emission and Climate-Resilient Development through 
Technology Transfer and Innovation 
 
7.3.1. Acceleration of innovation for climate and development
122
 
Low-emission and climate-resilient development will involve technology transfer and innovation on a 
large scale and these concepts are briefly explored below as they relate to how the climate and 
development goals of a country may be attained. In the next section, further elaboration on technology 
transfer and innovation is provided. Development literature, such as Practical Action (2010), clearly 
demonstrates that energy access through low-emission technologies is a major means of addressing 
poverty alleviation, thus addressing both sustainable development and climate goals. In addition, 
coping strategies are urgently needed to help countries adapt to climate change impacts and ensure a 
changing climate does not hamper poor people’s access to energy (Practical Action, 2010). 
Technology transfer is a complex process involving not just equipment or measures, but also people. It 
can be defined as a set of processes “covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment, for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, 
private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/education institutions” (IPCC, 2000b, 
p. 3). In line with this, technology transfer is a process of “learning to understand, utilise and replicate 
the technology including the ability to decide which technology to transfer and adapt it to local 
conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies” (IPCC, 2000b, p. 3). 
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The process of transfer and innovation of the technology or measure into a country system therefore 
involves a dynamic mix of actors, institutions and organisations as well as the hardware and the tacit 
knowledge needed for success. Moreover, technologies can be in different stage of development (e.g., 
still in the process of research and development, ready for deployment in the market, or near 
commercial application) which will have implications for what the necessary changes are in the 
country for successful transfer and innovation processes. Finally, the country context is important as it 
determines the current enabling environment for the technologies, including the specific cultural and 
business habits, language, trust, networks and capacity available for successful transfers. A strategy 
may involve a range of activities to overcome barriers to technology diffusion into the market or 
system. These activities can include enabling policies and measures, networks, market or system 
support (e.g., quality control), education and training, etc., derived from the accelerating activities 
required for the specific country and technology characteristics. 
The above observations are in line with the recent analysis by Jackson (2009) who illustrates how 
economies in developed and developing countries need to transform to low-emission societies in order 
to achieve long term sustainable development. In Jackson’s view, system changes are crucial in this 
respect, with a central role for innovation. 
 
7.3.2.  Why is technology important?
 123
 
Technology transfer can be a powerful solution for simultaneously addressing the climate change and 
development challenges described above. This was recognised in Art. 4.5 of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 
1992a). Also, as explained in Gaast & Begg (2012, pp. 7-8, 18), there are increasing insights that 
meeting a growing global energy demand with improved energy access for the poor can only go hand 
in hand with low GHG emission pathways. The recognition that these pathways involve rapid 
innovation of low-emission technologies has moved technology development and transfer to the heart 
of the climate negotiations and development debate. 
Though technology transfer was discussed at succeeding sessions of the COP within the context of the 
Convention’s Art. 4.5, it was not until 2001 that significant change occurred. COP-7 (Marrakech, 
Morocco) took a decision on ‘Development and Transfer of Technologies’ and established the Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) (UNFCCC, 2002c, pp. 22-31). The key elements of this 
decision were (UNFCCC, 2002c, pp. 22-31): 
 Assessment of technology needs; 
 Technology information: technical and other information; 
 Enabling environments to solve policy and legal barriers; 
 Capacity building for identifying countries’ technology needs; and 
 Mechanisms for the coordination of technology transfer and formulation of technology projects. 
New areas introduced were: 
 Innovative options for financing technology transfers; and 
 Technologies for adaptation. 
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In 2009, the additional financing needs for low-emission technologies in developing countries were 
estimated at USD 105 to 402 billion per year (which is 40 to 60% of global climate technology finance 
needs) (SBI, 2009a, p. 32). It was also concluded that “not all countries have the technologies needed 
or the ability to innovate new technologies to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Those countries 
that are lacking in the technologies or capacity, mainly the developing countries, need to be helped not 
merely to adopt the existing environmentally friendly technologies but also to develop the capacity to 
innovate new technologies and practices in cooperation with others” (SBI, 2009b, p. 11). 
As is discussed below in this chapter, identification of technologies and possibly implementing them 
in projects may not be enough to initiate a system change for widespread low-emission and climate-
resilient technology innovation in a country. The latter will also need overarching strategies with 
activities such as organisational/institutional behavioural change, system supporting services (e.g., 
finance and legal support), network creation and support, skills training, international cooperation and 
intellectual property rights, and corresponding policies and measures.  
This has been made clear by Subsidiary Body for Implementation (2009, p. 11) as follows: 
“Technology transfer includes not merely transfer of hardware but also of best practices, information 
and improvement of human skills, especially those possessed by specialized professionals and 
engineers. The acquisition and absorption of foreign technologies, and their further development, are 
complex processes that demand considerable knowledge and efforts on the part of those that acquire 
them. It is the capacity of the countries and the enabling environment in those countries that will 
enable them to change to a low carbon economy.” 
 
7.3.3.  Assessing technology needs for climate and development
 124
  
The provisions that have been developed under the UNFCCC and included in the Cancun Agreements, 
such as LEDS and TNA, as well as NAMA and NAP, all enable for a developing country-specific 
identification of low-emission and climate-resilient development measures. Of these provisions, LEDS 
and TNA aim at formulating sector and/or national strategies, whereas NAMAs and NAPs are actions 
that could result from such strategies and the policies and measures derived from these (Gaast & Begg, 
2012). In this section, the process of identifying mitigation and adaptation technologies and measures 
in the light of a country’s national development priorities is illustrated with help of the TNA process. 
COP-7 encouraged “…developing countries…to undertake assessments of country-specific 
technology needs, subject to the provision of resources, as appropriate to country-specific 
circumstances” (UNFCCC, 2002c, p. 24). These Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) were 
defined as “a set of country-driven activities that identify and determine the mitigation and adaptation 
technology priorities of Parties other than developed country Parties…particularly developing country 
Parties” (UNFCCC, 2002c, p. 24). In order to support countries in conducting TNAs, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) developed a TNA handbook.
125
 After 2002, 92 developing 
countries received funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for conducting TNAs 
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(UNFCCC, 2009b), of which 78 were supported by UNDP, and 14 by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). 
At COP-13 (Bali, Indonesia, December 2007), the importance of technology transfer under the 
Convention was further emphasised as a building block for a future climate policy regime (UNFCCC, 
2008b). The GEF was requested to elaborate a strategic programme to scale up the level of 
investments for technology transfer to help developing countries assess their needs for 
environmentally sound technologies. The programme was adopted at COP-14 (Poznań, Poland, 
December 2008) as the ‘Poznań Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer’ (UNFCCC, 2008c) 
and it envisaged supporting 35 to 45 developing countries to prepare or update TNAs and formulate 
technology action plans as TNA output. This new of round of TNAs was has been implemented by 
UNEP with financial support from the GEF (USD 9 million) (UNFCCC, 2011b) (UNEP DTU, 2014a). 
In November 2010, an updated TNA Handbook was endorsed by the EGTT (UNDP, 2010).
126
 
Between 2009 and 2013, 32 developing country Parties conducted TNAs for mitigation and adaptation 
(UNFCCC, 2013a), for which they received support from regional centres, a help-desk facility and 
regional training workshops. 
Figure 7-1 shows which countries have conducted TNAs since 2002 and have reported on their TNAs 
to the UNFCCC secretariat as input for TNA synthesis reports (UNFCCC, 2009b) (UNFCCC, 2013a). 
 
Figure 7-1. TNA countries included in the second and third TNA synthesis report (UNFCCC, 
2009b) and (UNFCCC, 2013a). 
 
The overall TNA process involves the formulation of strategies and action plans for enabling a change 
to low-emission sustainable development. It contains two main stages: 
                                                     
126
 The author of this study was consulted by UNDP to co-author the updated TNA Handbook (UNDP, 2010), 





1. Identification of the technologies or measures for a country which could be used to reduce GHG 
emissions and climate change vulnerability at the same time as delivering the required sustainable 
development benefits; and 
2. Identification of activities to accelerate the innovation into the country system by identifying 
actions for overcoming barriers and then formulating them into a strategy and action plan at the 
technology, (sub)sector, or national level. 
The main steps and issues for conducting a TNA are summarised in Figure 7-2 below. 
 
Figure 7-2. Key steps of the TNA process (UNDP, 2010, p. 8) 
 
The TNA approach is built on the vision that integrating development and climate into climate 
strategies requires taking a developing country’s sustainable development priorities as a starting point 
and using these priorities as criteria for identifying strategic sectors for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and achieving development goals (after the initial organisation of the assessment, these are 
the second and third step in Figure 7-2). As argued by CCAP (2010), embedding the action based 
processes into such a long-term national framework would increase the coherence of the action 
portfolio. In the fourth step in Figure 7-2, country stakeholders are familiarised with technologies 
within each of these priority sectors or measures for mitigation and adaptation using a range of 
approaches, including on-line technology platforms, such as ClimateTechWiki (UNDP, et al., 2014a). 
An initial list of technologies is generated and possibly structured according to whether the technology 
or measure is available in the short term or the medium to long term and whether it is a small scale or 
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large scale technology. A multi criteria decision approach is then used to prioritise a portfolio of 
technologies and measures in the priority sectors in support of the country’s sustainable development. 
The prioritisation of technologies or measures within each priority sector can be based on a benefit-to-
cost ratio or cost-benefit analysis over all the sustainable development and climate and/or adaptation 
benefits. This produces a summary table of portfolios of projects per priority sector with their 
sustainable development benefits, costs of roll out and climate /adaptation benefits, which can be used 
for input to a national strategy and for meta-analysis across countries. Table 7-1 shows a hypothetical 
example of such an output table for prioritised technologies for cooking in a developing country. The 
table shows the potential benefits and costs of technology options should they be implemented in the 
(sub)sector at their technical potential. 
Table 7-1. Hypothetical example of TNA summary table for prioritised cooking technologies in 






2025 at sub-sector 
level  
Benefits identified from multi criteria 










3.4 Mt CO2-eq  Improved health because of reduced in-house 
smoke 
 Reduced drudgery for women and children 
because of reduced need of firewood 






2.7 Mt CO2-eq  Enhanced carbon sink and moisture reservoir 
 Enhanced household energy security 
 Greater entrepreneurial opportunities created 
through sales of poles and firewood  
 Time spent daily on gathering fuel wood is 
saved for use in more productive activities 
25,000,000  
Long term/small scale technologies 
Solar 
cookers 
3.8 Mt CO2-eq  Time savings which results from the 
reduction in wood gathering 
 Build and emphasise links with women's 
empowerment by creating new organizations 
led by women 
 The impact of solar stoves on the household 
economy depends on the organisation of the 
household economy and the extent to which 
the household is linked to the wider 
economic network  
 Improvement of health conditions, 
promotion on equitable access to energy and 
poverty alleviation 
34,000,000  
Source: author’s example based on UNDP (2010, pp. 60-61, tables 5-3 to 5-6); also published in 






Within the process, it is important that the voices of different stakeholder groups are heard so that 
stakeholders’ knowledge and concerns are incorporated. Care is taken to have a participatory approach 
with stakeholders right from the start which supports their ‘buy in’ in the process, including their role 
in the eventual implementation of prioritised low-emission and climate-resilient technologies and 
actions. As an example, Figure 7-3 shows an example of how the TNA process was organised during 
2010-2013 and how stakeholders from different sectors were represented in sectoral and technology 
work groups and collaborated with national experts (on, e.g., sectors, technologies, and overall country 
strategies), a national TNA committee, a process coordinator, and the steering committee. The figure 
also shows the international and regional support organised under the GEF/UNEP TNA project. 
 
 
Figure 7-3. TNA organisation in GEF/UNEP TNA Project (National Science Technology and 
Innovation Policy Office, 2012)   
 
Finally, it is important that the approach takes account of the uncertainties that surround the choices. 
Assessing development and climate change mitigation and adaptation needs implies that decisions are 
taken for a relatively long period of time, e.g., 20 years, so that stakeholders need to develop a feeling 
not only for what is happening now, but also for what might happen in the future. For instance, a 
country with a relatively small tourist industry could expect this sector to become bigger in the next 
two decades and among the larger GHG emitters. Such expectations can be included in the analysis 
and stakeholders could identify options for making areas suitable for tourism more climate-resilient. 
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The second stage, represented by the fifth step in Figure 7-2 is to move from the prioritised 
technologies and measures to strategies and technology action plans (TAP). This stage is explained in 
further detail in the next section. 
The new TNA process, as applied by 32 developing countries during 2009-2013, has been stricter than 
the process applied for earlier TNAs (before 2009). There have been a number of reasons for the more 
structured approach. First, the TNA reports before 2009 were difficult to compare as, due to relatively 
less structured guidance, countries had to largely formulate their own interpretations of what TNA 
steps would look like. This limited the scope for analysis and policy conclusions across TNA reports. 
Second, the second round of TNAs was set up to be more strongly connected to national development 
priorities so that technology choices could be better embedded in countries’ national planning 
processes (UNDP, 2010, pp. 5, 6). Third, and related to the second reason, the updated TNA 
Handbook (UNDP, 2010, p. 5) considered TNAs an important source of information for the 
formulation of, among others, NAMAs and other national low-emission and climate-resilient 
innovation processes. 
However, this does not imply that the relatively strictly structured TNA as described in this section is 
the only way for developing countries to assess their technology needs for mitigation and adaptation. 
For instance, there can be multiple ways for organising TNAs without losing the benefits of well-
structured and mutually comparable TNA country reports (UNFCCC, 2014f). For example, instead of 
starting from development priorities and working bottom up, through the TNA steps, towards a 
technology portfolio, a country could first identify national priority areas (or problems) such as 
electricity (limited security of supply), transport (increasing congestion problems) and water 
management issues, and only then start a TNA process to identify solutions within these areas which 
are also beneficial with a view to climate change. Alternatively, a country could identify within its 
priority or problem areas, a portfolio of policies and instruments to spur climate change mitigation and 
adaptation (e.g., feed-in tariffs in the electricity sector) and then let technology choices be determined 
by the market. 
 
7.4.  From Prioritised Technology Options to a Climate and Development 
Strategy 
 
7.4.1.  Formulating technology action plans for implementation of technologies
127
 
As explained above in this chapter, the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2011a) call upon developing 
countries to undertake mitigation actions that are nationally appropriate (NAMAs) and to formulate 
national adaptation plans (NAPs), along with low-emission development strategies (LEDS). However, 
details on how these can be formulated have not been worked out yet under the UNFCCC. The 
discussion below outlines the bottom up approach taken in the TNA process (UNDP, 2010) for 
generating these outputs and then looks at the other approaches for developing strategies to address 
technology innovation for sustainable development goals. 
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Once the portfolios with prioritised technologies have been put together in a TNA, a next step is to 
identify actions to support the implementation of these technologies. For that, stakeholders can first 
identify technology transfer barriers that may exist in the country, such as insufficient capacity, market 
inefficiencies, lack of regulatory framework, need to purchase technology licenses, etc. (Boldt, et al., 
2012) For addressing these barriers, measures can be identified at the level of a technology, the sector 
or the country as a whole, which would then form input for a technology action plan (TAP) (UNEP 
Risoe Centre, 2012). Activities in a TAP can first of all be structured in categories, such as: 
 Measures for creation of stakeholder networks to enable the exchange of ideas and information to 
ensure dissemination of innovation;  
 Policies and measures to promote technology transfers; 
 Organisational/behavioural change; 
 Market, system support, and financial services;  
 Skills training and education; and 
 International cooperation. 
In addition, as described above, whether the technology is applied on a small or large scale needs to be 
taken into account, as well as the stage of innovation of the technology: RD&D, deployment in the 
market and diffusion to commercial application (UNDP, 2010, p. 71). Technologies which are still in 
the process of RD&D need a different enabling environment than technologies which are close to 
commercial application. For example, for technologies in the RD&D stage it is important that research 
capacity is available within the country with a strong supporting role by public sector developers, and 
that intellectual property right issues are taken into account. On the other hand, for technologies in the 
process of deployment into a market, the main focus may be on the required the skills base for 
technology operation and maintenance or on how quality control and enforcement for the technologies 
can be created.  
Most attention on innovation or technology transfer in early TNA reports has been on implementing 
single projects and overcoming the barriers to their success  (UNFCCC, 2011b). The updated TNA 
process allows both a project technology strategy (in the form of project ideas) and a larger scale 
technology innovation, such as for a sector or the country as a whole. A technology strategy is 
generated by identifying activities for accelerating the development and transfer of the technology 
within the (sub)sector at a desired scale. For example, for improving the enabling environment for 
technologies for adaptation within the agriculture sector, it could be suggested that the government 
organises a country-wide training programme for, e.g., crop rotating techniques. This could increase 
the knowledge level within the sector of operating the prioritised technology or measure. This activity 
could then be categorised under the core element ‘skills training and education’ as an input for a 
strategy.  
This can be repeated for other priority technologies identified for the (sub)sector. Larger scale 
strategies can be generated by aggregating across technology-level strategies for a (sub)sector level 
strategy and by aggregating across (sub)sectors for a national strategy. 
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7.4.2.  Enhancing implementation of TNA results 
The main objective of technology action plans (TAPs) resulting from a TNA is to support 
implementation of technologies prioritised in a TNA. On the basis of the experience with TNAs 
conducted between 2009 and 2013, interviews were held with 30 TNA practitioners and technology 




 What information should be included in TAPs and project ideas? 
 Who should take part in the formulation of TAPs and project ideas? 
 What potential sources for funding could be considered for inclusion in TAPs and project ideas? 
 How interlinkages between TNAs and NAMAs/NAPs may spur implementation of TNA results? 
 What could be the role of Multilateral Development Banks to support implementation of TNA 
results? 
Interviewed experts from financial institutes, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other 
development banks generally argued that TAPs and project ideas, prepared as part of TNAs during 
2009-2013, lack information about the business case of technologies. For a government to decide on 
how to allocate resources for technology implementation, information is needed about the ratios of 
benefit to costs of a technology-related programme and/or project. Examples of such ratios are internal 
rates of return or economic rates of return. 
As an example, interviewees explained how, for instance,  MDBs use economic internal rates of return 
to explore the broader economic benefits an investment could bring to the economy of a country by 
estimating the economic values of benefits that may not have direct financial return (e.g., better air 
quality, reduced congestion, etc.). According to the interviewees, in some sectors, particularly those 
related to adaptation, this economic internal rate of return would need to be substantial to justify the 
use of public funds. Such an economic benefit to cost ratio does not have to be detailed, but policy 
makers and investors (both public and private) need to have a good overview of the economic benefits 
of a technology (e.g., at the project/programme level or for the national economy) within a country 
during a certain timeframe, including the impact of policy decisions on the implementability of the 
technology. With such information, technology investments can be screened for prioritisation and 
allocation of resources: e.g., will the economic benefits significantly outweigh the costs; and are there 
realistic policy instruments that can enhance the viability of such technologies? 
In order to facilitate this process, several interviewees suggested that financial experts and potential 
investors actively take part in the TNA process. These experts could explain requirements for well-
structured investment plans. As a result, technology project ideas could already be ‘pitched’ to 
potential investors during the TNA. However, some interviewed technology transfer experts have 
cautioned against involvement of potential investors in the TNA as this may lead to conflicts of 
interests during the TNA steps. 
Alternatively, some TNA practitioners have suggested that TAPs and project ideas may acquire a 
higher quality and gain financial sector credibility if prepared by sector and technology experts. Two 
options suggested for that are: 
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 To let the technology prioritisation and TAP and project idea formulation be done by smaller 
groups with sector experts and/or engineers using their professional knowledge of a sector 
(supported by iterative consultation with wider stakeholder groups for discussion, questions, 
modifications, and eventually acceptance). According to this suggestion, adding such expert 
knowledge to the TNA process would eventually result in TAPs and project ideas that are more 
credible for potential financiers. 
 To include in a TNA a call for proposals to invite technology owners to prepare investment plans 
for prioritised technologies. These plans could then be screened by the national TNA teams and 
subsequently shared with potential investors. 
Most interviewees, both TNA practitioners and technology transfer experts, emphasised that 
involvement in TNAs of key ministries for national development planning (e.g., Finance, Economic 
Affairs or Planning) can support the eventual implementation of TNA results. Without their 
involvement, there is a risk that TAPs are not endorsed as inputs for national planning as they are 
considered a result from ‘outside’ the ministries. This view was also expressed by some experts with a  
MDB background. They explained that these banks’ primary counterparts in partner countries are the 
ministries of Finance, and for project implementation they work closely with specific sector ministries 
such as those responsible for energy, transport, water, and agriculture.  
Therefore, even though  MDBs work closely with the environment ministries on climate change 
issues, experts argued that it would be easier to support technology implementation if TNAs were 
better integrated into national planning processes so that the primary counterpart ministries are 
involved and on board. If, instead, TNAs largely remain ‘stand-alone’ exercises (with a practical 
deviation from national development planning), then there may be a lack of coordination with the 
responsible ministries for the sectors and as a result  MDB involvement may become more difficult. 
Other suggestions by interviewees on possible stakeholder roles in supporting the implementation of 
priority technologies in TNA countries include: 
 Role of intermediary agents or companies: For example, an intermediary company could buy a 
technology from a producer and bring it to the market in the TNA country. This enables the 
technology producer to enter the market, but its contract is only with one intermediary, a partner 
which it knows and trusts. 
 ‘Brokers’ with good understanding of banking sector: Interviewed international financial 
consultants stated that project ideas in a TNA could be difficult for the banking sector to adopt as 
the return on investment may be unclear. A TNA consultant with a good understanding of the 
banking sector could help to mitigate the risks for potential investors. 
 Technology project ‘champions’: For successful technology implementation, several interviewees 
highlighted the role of personalities or champions who are familiar with potential funding sources 
and can ‘knock on doors’ of key ministries. For instance, if local industry were to be engaged in a 
technology transfer project, then the champion could be a local industry association, a local lender 
or a technology vendor. 
Next to identifying funding requirements for technology implementation, interviewees have pointed 
out that in TAPs and project ideas also more and better information about potential funding sources 
should be included. One source of information for that are the TNA guidebooks for accessing 
international financing for climate change actions, as prepared by UNEP DTU (Limaye & Zhu, 2012) 
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(Christiansen, et al., 2012). These guidebooks aim at supporting TNA countries to better identify and 
access financial resources for the mitigation and adaptation activities included in their national TAPs, 
thereby acknowledging “the very different financial needs and strategies associated with mitigation 
vis-à-vis adaptation”. The guidebooks elaborate on: 
 multilateral financing sources, such as MDBs and special agencies created by them (such as the 
GEF), including the special funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Clean Investment 
Funds, Clean Technology Fund and Strategic Climate Fund). MDBs could support inter-country 
cooperation for a better matchmaking between country TNA programmes, especially when 
countries within a region have similar technology, capacity support and finance needs. MDBs can 
also enhance technology implementation by, e.g., supporting technology demonstration projects 
and providing expertise for technology deployment and diffusion. 
 bilateral financing sources, such as bilateral financing institutes (e.g., JICA, KfW and AfD) 
which are created by national governments for the purpose of giving aid or investing in targeted 
development projects and programmes in developing countries and emerging markets. 
 private funding sources, such as local and international banks and financial institutions, venture 
capital, private equity funds and some special funds created to address climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.  
The guidebooks also explore public-private partnerships to leverage private funding flows to fill 
funding gaps, transfer service delivery risks and improve the cost effectiveness of service delivery. 
Interviewed TNA practitioners and technology transfer experts furthermore explained how, in their 
view, implementation of TNA results can be enhanced through links with NAMA and NAP processes. 
For instance, NAMAs could leverage support for new technologies which have been prioritised in a 
TNA but which have no track-record in the country. These technologies could be implemented as part 
of a NAMA or NAP, thereby also utilising available funding for these processes. What such 
interlinkages could look like is the topic of the next section. 
 
7.5. Interlinkages of TNA with other UNFCCC Processes and Potential for 
Harmonisation 
In the above, it has been shown how through a TNA a (developing) country can formulate a long-term 
vision with development priorities and prepare pathways towards that vision with the inclusion of low-
emission and climate-resilient ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ technology options. As such, the TNA process could 
be considered an illustration of a ‘bottom-up’ climate arrangement, which (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, 2013, p. 29) identified as the main development in post-2020 climate negotiations. However, 
TNA is not the only bottom-up process under the UNFCCC, as also NAMAs, NAPs and LEDS aim at 
identifying measures for climate change mitigation and adaptation that are ‘nationally appropriate’ and 
‘need to be in the context of sustainable development.’ (UNFCCC, 2011a, p. 9) 
Each of these processes have their own role under the UNFCCC: TNA based on Decision 4/CP.7 
(UNFCCC, 2002c) and NAMAs, NAPs and LEDS based on Decision 1/CP.16 (UNFCCC, 2011a).
129
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However, since their orientation is to embed climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in 
(developing) countries’ sustainable development priorities, there could be overlaps between the 
processes and a potential for harmonisation of process steps. UNFCCC (2011) discussed possible 
interlinkages between TNA, NAMA, NAP and LEDS processes and concluded that a technology 
prioritisation process with help of a TNA, as described above, could result in measures or technologies 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation which could be considered as NAMAs and for inclusion 
in NAPs. The potential benefits of such harmonisation were also underscored by COP-18 (Doha, 
Qatar, 2012) which agreed that the TNA process “should be integrated with other related processes 
under the Convention, including nationally appropriate mitigation actions, national adaptation plans 
and low-emission development strategies” (UNFCCC, 2013c, p. 7). In addition, COP-18 recognised 
that TNAs and their syntheses are a key information source for the work of the Technology 
Mechanism, in particular the Technology Executive Committee (TEC),
130
 as well as “for governments, 
relevant bodies under the Convention and other stakeholders” (UNFCCC, 2013c, p. 7).  
In light of the above, the section examines the interlinkages between TNAs and: 
a. Related processes under the UNFCCC, including NAMAs and NAPs, and  
b. The work of the TEC in preparing recommendations on guidance on policies and programmes 
regarding TNAs and possible interlinkages with related processes under the Convention. 
 
7.5.1.  Potential interlinkages TNA and NAMA and NAP processes
131
 
As explained above in this chapter, the TNA process contains the following key steps:  
1. To identify key priorities based a country’s long term vision on climate and development, 
2. To identify strategic sectors or areas to support these priorities, 
3. To prioritise technologies and measures for mitigation and adaptation within these sectors, 
4. To identify barriers for development and transfer of these technologies/measures within a 
country, and 
5. To formulate TAPs in the form of projects, programmes or strategies. 
NAMA and NAP processes basically follow a similar structure, although for these processes a detailed 
methodology, such as for TNAs, has not been formulated under the UNFCCC. Nonetheless, the focus 
in a TNA on a country’s long term climate and development vision is comparable with the COP-16 
Decision that NAMAs need to be “in the context of sustainable development” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 
9, para.48). As a result, for example, NAMA and NAP processes could use outputs from different 
TNA stages, while TNAs for adaptation could particularly contribute to the elements of NAPs as 
identified by COP-17 (UNFCCC, 2012d, pp. 85-86): “In developing NAPs, consideration would be 
given to identifying specific needs, options and priorities on a country-driven basis,… coordinated 
                                                                                                                                                                     
while a LEDS may be considered to have a stronger connection with NAMAs (as both are included in the same 
chapter on ‘mitigation’ in the Cancun Agreements) and therefore be considered more ‘political’. 
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  Among the functions of the TEC is to “provide an overview of technological needs and analysis of policy 
and technical issues related to the development and transfer of technology for mitigation and adaptation.” 
(UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 19, para.121a)  
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of this study at the fifth Meeting of the Technology Executive Committee, 26-27 March 2013 (UNFCCC, 
2013d). 
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with sustainable development objectives, policies, plans and programmes.” Table 7-2 presents an 
overview of commonalities and differences between TNA and NAMA/NAP processes. 
Table 7-2. Overview of commonalities and differences between processes  
To what extent are TNA, NAMA and NAP processes embedded in a country’s long term 
development vision? 
Commonalities Differences 
 Common focus on a country’s overall 
sustainable development context 
 Strategic (sub)sectors and areas identified in 
a TNA could be used as inputs for NAMAs 
and NAPs 
 Processes are generally participatory 
 Unlike for TNAs, under the Convention no specific 
methodologies exist for NAMAs and NAPs as of 
yet 
How are technologies or measures for mitigation and adaptation in the country identified? 
Commonalities Differences 
 TNA procedures are in principle suitable for 
other policy concepts that identify 
technologies and actions in light of climate 
policy and sustainable development. 
 Therefore, TNA results could be input for 
NAMA and NAP processes. 
 TNAs explicitly focus on technology choices. In 
NAMAs and NAPs prioritisation of technologies is 
more an implicit step before formulating policy 
action. 
What actions are envisaged for low-emission and climate-resilient pathways? 
Commonalities Differences 
 There is a common focus on strategic 
pathways with action plans either at the 
technology or sector and national levels.  
 NAMA and NAP formulation could possibly 
benefit from the identification in a TNA of 
actions for acceleration of technologies for 
mitigation and adaptation. 
 Whereas a TNA focuses mainly on technologies and 
measures for mitigation and adaptation,  NAMAs 
and NAPs could be more overarching and focus on 
broader mitigation, adaptation and development 
issues 
Source: UNFCCC, 2013d. 
 
Interlinkages between TNAs and NAMA/NAP processes could support TNAs in the following ways 
(UNFCCC, 2013d): 
 Inform a TNA about a developing country’s development objectives as formulated under a 
NAMA and/or NAP, after which the TNA stepwise methodology can be used to identify options 
for mitigation and/or adaptation and which can be considered further as a NAMA or in a NAP. 
 Enhance the higher-level policy attention for TNAs, which are often ‘owned’ by the ministries of 
Environment, while national development planning processes are often managed by the ministries 
of Finance, Economic Affairs, Transport, Agriculture, etc. As NAMAs and NAPs often have a 
higher-level policy recognition within developing countries (i.e. recognition by key ministries), 
higher-level consideration of TNA results within countries may be enhanced through 
interlinkages with NAMAs and NAPs (UNFCCC, 2012c). This may also enhance the 





In terms of TNAs supporting NAMA and NAP processes, the following possible benefits can be 
identified (UNFCCC, 2013d): 
 Prioritisation of measures: As has been explained above, the TNA methodology can be used for 
a detailed prioritisation of measures to be implemented as NAMAs or included in a NAP. This 
supports the process of embedding NAMAs in national mainstream processes (Fukuda & 
Tamura, 2012). A key step in this process is technology familiarisation to ensure that all possible 
options are considered during the prioritisation. For this, the TNA process includes a set of data 
sources, such as the on-line technology database ClimateTechwiki (UNDP, et al., 2014a)
132
 and 
technology guidebooks (UNEP DTU, 2014b). Technology familiarisation can also be supported 
by the information from technology roadmaps (IEA, 2014b) (Londo, et al., 2013). 
 Clarity on scale of implementation: at the ‘Experience-Sharing workshop on Technology Needs 
Assessment’ (Bangkok, September 2012) (UNFCCC, 2012c), it was noted that, while several 
NAMAs have been identified in developing countries, the scale at which these actions could 
potentially be implemented within a country is often not clear. For instance, implementation 
could be at full technical potential, at a scale required for meeting country and/or sector goals, or 
in the form of a project. TNAs could offer this information as these assume a certain scale of 
technology implementation (e.g., implementation as project, sector programme, or national 
strategy). 
 Clarity on mitigation and adaptation benefits: Part of a TNA, during technology prioritisation 
and formulation of technology action plans, is to estimate how a technology contributes to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation and sustainable development within the country 
context. This includes an assessment, with methods to handle uncertainties and data limitations, 
which could also be applicable for NAMA and NAP processes as these are also seeking options 
that deliver a range of climate and development benefits for the countries concerned.  
 Identification of actions to accelerate development and transfer of technologies and/or 
measures for mitigation and adaptation: In a TNA, stakeholders analyse how the development 
and transfer of priority technologies can be accelerated in the country by exploring gaps and 
barriers in the enabling environment (e.g., markets, legal and regulatory context, public 
engagement and international collaboration) for prioritised technologies and by identifying 
actions to solve these gaps and barriers. The actions thus identified can be characterised in terms 
of: why is an action important, how should it be done, who would be responsible for the action, 
when would the action need to be implemented, how much would it cost, what are monitoring, 
reporting and verification requirements, etc. These actions taken together help create an enabling 
environment in a country for technologies for mitigation and adaptation, which can be used for: 
technology implementation projects, sector-level technology programmes, and/or a national 
strategy for technology development and transfer with action plans. Each of these outputs could 
be considered inputs for a NAMA and NAP.  
 Exchanging data and knowledge: TNAs could be complicated by lack of data (especially on 
costs) or limited exchange of data between country institutes. Interlinkages with other processes 
could support collaboration on data collection, avoid ‘data competition’ between processes and 
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help rationalise existing data and other (human) resources across the processes. This would 
streamline similar but not identical processes and avoid or reduce ‘institutional congestion’ 
(Fukuda & Tamura, 2012). 
In conclusion, TNA results can be used as inputs for NAMA and NAP processes through exchange of 
data, outputs and recommendations, while harmonisation with NAMAs and NAPs could also support 
the acceleration of implementing TNA results, e.g., by more efficient allocation and use of data and 
developing country resources and enhancing high-level recognition of TNA results when interlinked 
with particularly NAMAs and NAPs which have received more high-level political attention in 
developing countries. Finally, establishing interlinkages between TNAs, NAMAs and NAPs would 
help a country rationalise the outputs from these processes. Non-harmonised processes could result in 
duplications and ‘blind spots’ or it could result in a patchwork of, potentially conflicting, messages to 
policy makers, financial entities, capacity building supporters and other stakeholders. The findings in 
this chapter on interlinkages between TNA and NAMA and NAP processes have been summarised in 
Figure 7-4. 
 
Figure 7-4. Possible impact of interlinkages between TNA, NAMA and NAP processes  
(UNFCCC, 2013d) 
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7.5.2. Potential relationship between the TNA process and the Technology Mechanism 
As explained above in this chapter, technology transfer is an important aspect of the UNFCCC and the 
mechanism for how it would operate, the Technology Mechanism, has been transformed progressively 
as its importance for moving to a low-emission future has been realised. The Technology Mechanism 
is based on the activities of the former EGTT (see above) and was established at COP-16 (Cancun, 
2010) to facilitate enhancement of technology transfer and development for mitigation and adaptation 
for achieving the full UNFCCC objectives. It will have a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) 
which “shall further implement the framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the 
implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention …. adopted by decision 4/CP.7 and 
enhanced by decision 3/CP.13” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 19, para. 119). 
More specifically, the TEC will support developing countries in developing and enhancing capacity 
for RD&D, deployment and diffusion of technologies for mitigation and adaptation, as well as getting 
access to private and public investment funding. The second component of the Technology 
Mechanism is the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which has a more operational 
focus as it “shall facilitate a Network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology 
networks, organizations and initiatives” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 20, para. 123). 
UNFCCC (2011) and UNFCCC (2013) explore possible interlinkages between the Technology 
Mechanism and TNAs, which  were considered from two viewpoints. On the one hand, it was argued 
that the Technology Mechanism could support TNA processes, such as by providing developing 
country stakeholders with tools, guidance and access to networks. On the other hand, outputs from 
TNAs could provide useful information to the Technology Mechanism in terms of insights on 
countries’ technology, finance and capacity needs. This viewpoints are further elaborated on below. 
Possible interlinkages between the Technology Executive Committee and TNAs 
Among the functions of the TEC is to “provide an overview of technological needs and analysis of 
policy and technical issues related to the development and transfer of technology for mitigation and 
adaptation” (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 19, para. 121a). This function could be supported by the TNA 
outputs as described above, such as: portfolios of prioritised technologies, insights in barriers within 
technologies’ enabling environment, and identified capacity-building and finance needs. However, 
concluding general lessons from TNAs on mitigation and adaptation needs is an important challenge, 
since for technology transfer “the country context is important … as it determines the current enabling 
environment for the technologies, including the specific cultural and business habits, language, trust, 
networks and capacity available for successful transfers” (Gaast & Begg, 2012, p. 20). The challenge 
for the TEC, therefore, is to derive, to the extent feasible, homogenous lessons across heterogeneous 
TNA reports. Figure 7-5 illustrates this challenge for a hypothetical TNA example (showing, for 
instance, how generic lessons across adaptation areas and countries can be drawn). 
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Figure 7-5. Hypothetical example with generalised conclusions on barriers for adaptation 
identified across TNAs for adaptation (UNFCCC, 2013d) 
 
In addition, generalising across country-specific TNA outputs could help the TEC to obtain a global or 
regional picture of, e.g.: 
 Technology needs for households and/or communities in, e.g., Small Island Developing States;133 
 Recommended actions to address the technology barriers in a region;134 and 
 Proven practices for implementing TNA outputs and improving the enabling environment for 
technology development and transfer which could be useful information for other countries.
135
 
There are several ways to present synthesised information.
136
 Figure 7-5 shows one example and 
Figure 7-6 presents a world map showing the example of how data from TNA reports (in this case, 
budgets estimated by countries for project ideas identified in their TNAs) can be presented (UNFCCC, 
2013a). 
This synthesized TNA information could also help the TEC to obtain insights in capacity needs for 
technology development and transfer in (sub)sectors and regions and how, e.g., training programmes 
can be tailored towards these needs. This could contribute to a shared vision on tackling particular 
barriers in a coordinated manner as opposed to solving them individually in each country (UNFCCC, 
2011a, pp. 20, para. 121e) (UNFCCC, 2011c). A similar broader picture can be obtained of (regional) 
finance needs for accelerating development and transfer of priority technologies for mitigation and 
adaptation. This information could possibly form inputs for the Finance Mechanism under the 
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UNFCCC and financial support programmes outside the UNFCCC (Limaye & Zhu, 2012) 
(Christiansen, et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 7-6. Example of data derived from project idea budgets as reported in TNAs (UNFCCC, 
2013a) 
 
The above insights could support formulating policy recommendations on technology development 
and transfer to the COP. Moreover, as TNAs directly link technology choices to national development 
priorities in developing countries, the TEC could obtain a clearer insight from TNAs on, e.g., poverty 
alleviation, increased energy security of supply and improved health conditions in relation to climate 
policy objectives. 
Finally, although the TNA process acknowledges the difference between prioritisation of technologies 
for mitigation and adaptation, experience with TNAs has shown that more methodological support 
may be required for preparing technology portfolios and technology action plans for adaptation. For 
instance, cost calculation for adaptation options are generally considered more difficult (and less 
tangible) than for mitigation options, which is also caused by the often non-market nature of 
adaptation options (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro, 2012). The 
TEC could possibly explore these specific needs for adaptation and advice on improving the TNA 
process accordingly. 
Possible interlinkages between the Climate Technology Centre and Network and TNAs 
An important task of the CTCN is to provide support to developing countries in conducting TNAs and 
enhancing the implementation of TNA outputs in the form of technology projects, programmes or 
strategies (UNFCCC, 2013d, p. 12) (UNFCCC, 2011a, pp. 20, para. 123a(i)-(iii)). For instance, 
experts interviewed as part of a UNFCCC analysis on TNA good practice (UNFCCC, 2014f), in 
particular those with a  MDB background, argued that the CTCN could help countries to find bilateral 
and multilateral funding sources, as well as tools and support for specific technology implementation 
Towards a future climate policy – linking climate and development 
213 
 
aspects. This implies that a TAP and project idea should be clear about actions needed for technology 
transfer within a country and characterise these in detail with identification of what kind of support is 
needed for TAP and project idea implementation, including ‘how much?’ and ‘when?’. With this 
information, the CTCN can select support tools and services from its portfolio. 
As a suggestion, during the interviews the example was given of how MDBs could look at requests 
coming from countries to the CTCN (UNFCCC, 2014f). Should they identify requests that would fit in 
the activities that they can support, they could consider responding to such requests. Possibly, this 
could also be the case for the propositions coming out of TNAs and TAPs, especially if banks’ 
stakeholders have been involved in the TNA process. 
Some of these suggestions on interlinkages between CTCN work and TNA processes may overlap 
with the possible relationship between TNAs and TEC activities as described above. However, 
whereas the TEC might have a stronger focus on generalised technology, finance and capacity needs 
for mitigation and adaptation across countries, CTCN’s focus may be more on country-specific needs 
and support requests. Both the TEC and CTCN consolidated information from TNA reports might be 
included in their joint annual report (UNFCCC, 2012a, Decision 2/CP.17). 
Towards an integrate climate and development approach 
Figure 7-7 summarises the possible interlinkages between TNAs (and other processes discussed in this 
chapter) and the Technology Mechanism, as well as Capacity Building Framework, Finance 
Mechanism and Adaptation Framework. It suggests that, at the country level, (harmonised) processes 
identify options for mitigation and adaptation and actions for their enabling environment. To avoid 
duplication, these options and actions could be rationalised at the country level (e.g., possibly as part 
of a TNA or a LEDS). These country strategies and plans for mitigation and adaptation could then 
form input for, inter alia, the TEC and the CTCN in support of an integrated approach for efficient 
country support for accelerated low-emission and climate-resilient innovation.
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In conclusion, this section has described how TNAs conducted at the level of individual countries can 
be rich sources of information for governments, relevant UNFCCC bodies and other stakeholders as it 
supports low-emission and climate-resilient innovation processes and can support NAMA and NAP 
processes, in terms of: embedding selection of mitigation and adaptation options in countries’ 
economic, environmental and social priorities; prioritising technologies and measures for mitigation 
and adaptation that could be considered NAMAs or included in NAPs; and formulating technology 
action plans for acceleration of technology development and transfer which could form inputs for 
NAMA- and/or NAP-based strategies.  
Harmonising NAMA, NAP and LEDS processes with TNAs could: strengthen high-level recognition 
of TNAs by high-level public and private sector decision makers in developing countries; streamline 
similar but not identical processes within countries by streamlining data collection and exchange (e.g., 
between ministries); and support rationalisation of actions across TNA, NAMA, NAP and LEDS 
processes so that duplications and blind spots can be avoided. 
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 The diagram also includes, for the sake of completeness, the possible roles of the Capacity Building 







Figure 7-7. Generalising and rationalising climate and development strategies in countries and 
possible support from UNFCCC bodies (Gaast & Begg, 2012, p. 106) 
 
The TEC could generate homogeneous lessons from the heterogeneous, country-specific TNA reports 
as a key information source for prioritising its activities under the Technology Mechanism. This work 
is supported by the secretariat’s TNA synthesis reports (UNFCCC, 2013a). Based on completed 
TNAs, the TEC and CTCN could support countries in improving their enabling environments for 
development and transfer of TNA priority technologies at desired scales. This could support private 
(e.g., financial and business communities), public and multilateral institutes in preparing finance and 
capacity building programmes and allocating support actions.  
 
7.6. Discussion: Negotiations on a Post-2020 Climate Agreement in Light of 
Design, Process and Tactics Conditions 
 
Contrary to the above chapters, the discussion in this chapter has been on a negotiation file which is 
still subject of international climate negotiations (with an important milestone being COP-21 in Paris 
in 2015). In this chapter, an approach has been discussed to international climate policy cooperation 
between countries which has emerged since 2009, after the failure to agree on a ‘post-Kyoto’ 
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agreement with (updated) QELRCs for main GHG emitting developed and developing countries. The 
approach takes national development priorities of (developing) countries as a starting point and 
explores how these can be realised with low GHG emissions and enhanced climate resilience. It has 
been suggested in the chapter that such an embedding of climate policy measures in national 
development planning processes would strengthen developing countries’ willingness to engage in 
global climate policy cooperation. This section explores how the three basic conditions identified for 
this study in Chapter 1 would need to be met for a successful negotiation outcome based on this 
approach. 
Meeting basic condition 1: agree on an inclusive climate policy regime with developed and 
developing countries 
As a starting point, this chapter has concluded that, despite the differences between developed and 
developing countries and how these have complicated climate negotiations in the past, both at higher 
and more technical negotiation levels, an effective international climate policy regime will need the 
inclusion of developed and developing countries. It has been suggested that such an inclusive climate 
policy regime would need to consider climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in light of 
individual countries’ national economic, social and environmental development priorities. This chapter 
has suggested what such an approach could look like by examining the experiences since 2001 with 
conducting technology needs assessments under the UNFCCC (TNAs). 
When analysing the negotiation processes at COP-15 (Copenhagen) and following COP sessions, it 
has become clear that the negotiations on a future, post-2020 climate policy regime are characterised 
by similar game-theoretical aspects as could be observed during high-level negotiations on the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol during the 1990s (as discussed in Chapter 3). In particular, the divide 
between developed and developing countries still exists. Moreover, negotiations are still hampered by 
free-rider risks and public good characteristics of climate change mitigation actions, which are 
extravagated by the absence of an overarching international disciplinarian. Two important differences 
with the climate negotiations of the 1990s are that: 
1) Scientific information about emerging climate change and related risks for global ecosystems and 
people’s well-being has considerably grown since the 1990s (e.g., IPCC, 2013), so that nowadays 
a long-term target (i.e. the 2
o
C threshold) forms a guidance for negotiations and has been included 
in a COP decision (UNFCCC, 2011a); and  
2) A relatively sharp dividing line between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties does not do justice to 
the economic and social diversity of countries within both groups, while some of the non-Annex I 
Parties have become important GHG emitters. 
In terms of Figure 1-3 in Chapter 1, the process since ‘Copenhagen’ has shown that achieving the 
‘ideal’ negotiation outcome A is still complex, for largely similar reasons as in concluded in Chapter 
3; even though negotiations are more strongly guided by scientifically supported targets, countries 
seem even more diverse in terms of taking (or perhaps better: sharing) responsibilities. Consequently, 
only an outcome such as B in Figure 1-3 was feasible at COP-9 (leading to a negotiation failure). 
Since COP-16 (Cancun, 2010), negotiations have moved to an outcome similar to C in Figure 1-3, 





limitation measures that they are willing to undertake domestically.
138
 However, outcome C is not a 
satisfactory outcome, either, as the pledged measures taken together are still far away from what is 
required for reaching the 2
o
C target (UNEP, 2014), and still several countries have not submitted their 
pledges. 
This chapter has suggested an approach which could support negotiations towards an outcome D as in 
Figure 1-3: 
 By prioritising technologies and measures for mitigation and adaptation in light of countries’ 
longer term development priorities, and 
 Organising, as part of an international climate regime, financial, technical and capacity building 
support for acceleration of innovation within countries towards low-emission and climate-
resilient development strategies, so that 
 Countries have a stronger incentive to undertake stronger actions for mitigation and adaptation 
than they would have done under business-as-usual circumstances, as enhanced international 
financial, technical and capacity building support enhances the affordability of actions for 
mitigation and adaptation which are in countries’ development interests. 
Bottom-up processes, such as discussed in this chapter, which focus on embedding climate measures 
in national development objectives, could therefore contribute to a broader international climate 
coalition which is prepared to take stronger GHG emission reduction measures, as these actions 
support both mitigation and adaptation and national development planning. 
In order to bring negotiation outcome D as close as possible to ‘ideal’ outcome A (thereby reducing or 
even closing the gap towards the 2
o
C target), the climate policy regime is recommended to: 
 Generalise and rationalise, as explained in this chapter, countries’ technology, finance and 
capacity building needs so that international support (e.g., through MDB and other international 
supporting organisations) can be more efficiently and effectively organised towards countries’ 
needs. 
 Build in the negotiation process regular ‘milestone measuring points’ for evaluating the adequacy 
of global actions towards the 2
o
C target (similar to the UNEP, 2014, Emissions Gap Report 
approach) and suggest additional actions to support countries in undertaking climate change 
mitigation and adaptation measures in light of their development priorities. 
Meeting basic condition 2: an enabling negotiation process for embedding climate policy 
measures in national development planning 
As a result of the Bali Plan of Action (UNFCCC, 2008b), climate negotiations have taken place with a 
focus on a number of building blocks or pillars for a new climate policy regime: mitigation, 
adaptation, technology transfer, and finance. In the 2010 ‘Cancun Agreements’, capacity building has 
been described as cross-cutting, but from the discussion in this chapter it has become clear that also 
mitigation and adaptation activities could overlap and that there are cross-cutting issues for these 
building blocks as well. For example, there are overlaps in areas such as water resource use and in 
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for developed and developing countries to propose voluntarily climate change mitigation measures (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin, 2013). 
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facilitating energy access for the poor to alleviate poverty. Moreover, countries may not have either 
just mitigation needs or just adaptation needs, so that initiatives developed under, e.g., the Technology 
Mechanism and Adaptation Framework could interfere with each other or duplicate activities, as they 
may not be aware of the wider range of activities in the country. This could lead to wastage in terms of 
funding allocation. An additional concern is that the processes undertaken by different institutions will 
diverge over time to the extent that syntheses will become difficult and meta-analysis at the regional or 
global scale of doubtful value. 
As a consequence, in order to meet basic condition 2 of an enabling negotiation process towards an 
outcome D or even A in Figure 1-3, there is a need to ensure an integrated approach in climate 
negotiations for supporting mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and finance so that coherent 
actions can be formulated and separation of outputs to different institutions avoided. This integration 
could take place through a rationalisation process at the UNFCCC level of mitigation, adaptation, 
capacity building, technology development and transfer and finance actions to avoid, e.g., the need for 
developing countries to do multiple separate exercises and to conduct institutions and processes 
efficiently and where possible in a harmonised way. This would support that the outputs for mitigation 
and adaptation strategies and action plans will deliver the sustainable development benefits for 
countries, with access to advice, networks, finance, and overall capacity building, such as education, 
supporting economic, legal and technical services, and improved enabling environments for adoption 
of measures for mitigation and adaptation in the timescales and scale required. 
An example of what an integrated policy making process could look like is the work of the TEC which 
has assessed interlinkages between TNAs and other processes under the UNFCCC (e.g., NAMA, 
NAP) as explained in this chapter. At its fifth meeting (March 2013), TEC discussed “Interlinkages 
between TNAs and other processes under the Convention,” based on which it established a working 
group on interlinkages to prepare a Technology Brief for further policy discussions (Technology 
Executive Committee, 2013). Recommendations formulated in such briefs are considered by the 
SBSTA and eventually the COP to become formal policy steps. As such, the negotiation process 
follows the similar COP-level steps as explained in the earlier chapters, but for exploring the 
interlinkages between several bottom-up climate and development-based climate policy making 
processes, the mechanisms established under the four pillars of the Bali Plan of Action have a strong 
role to play in examining technically what harmonising or even merging processes or process steps 
could look like, for effective and efficient country support for low-emission and climate-resilient 
domestic strategies. 
Meeting basis condition 3: decisive tactical and facilitating aspects towards a future climate 
policy 
A crucial point during negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate policy regime has been the failure to agree 
on quantified emission reduction commitments for major emitting countries at COP-15 in 
Copenhagen. After the meeting, there were several comments on the process at COP-15 itself and 
criticism on the Danish Presidency of the session (JIN, 2010). However, already before COP-15, 
negotiations had been extremely difficult and slow and the ‘Copenhagen Accords’, which Parties 
failed to adopt, did not contain legally binding quantified emission reduction commitments. Therefore, 





commitments were weak. Instead, after ‘Copenhagen’, increasing attention was paid by negotiators on 
proposed bottom-up measures such as NAMAs and NAPs. 
Of tactical importance in this respect is that Parties have already gained experience with such bottom-
up actions under the Convention. One example is the CDM with its objective to support developing 
countries’ sustainable development (see Chapters 4 and 5). Although it can be doubted whether this 
latter objective has been achieved for most CDM projects (ENTTRANS, 2008), the CDM has 
contributed to building confidence among developing countries that such a bottom-up approach can 
work. Moreover, over 120 developing countries have experience with identifying climate technology 
needs and required actions for technology implementation through TNA processes. 
It may also be important for countries that a process as described in this chapter can be applied 
flexibly, as long as a number of key conditions for implementation are met. The TNA approach 
described in this chapter is an example of structured process, but with full decision flexibility left to 
the countries concerned. The stepwise TNA approach was a response to earlier TNAs (96 countries 
between 2002 and 2009) for which such structured stepwise guidance was not available and which 
made it difficult for countries to assess technology needs in light of their national development 
circumstances (UNFCCC, 2009b). The latest round of TNAs (between 2009 and 2013) has shown that 
a step-wise guidance provides a better analytical structure for countries, while it still leaves countries 
sufficient scope for organising each step according to national preferences (UNFCCC, 2014f).  
Key tactical conditions for successful implementation of TNA or NAMA and NAP results (UNFCCC, 
2014f) are that these processes are recognised by key national planning ministries as an important 
source for national planning and that these ministries express willingness to make resources available 
for implementation of the identified measures for mitigation and/or adaptation. Another key condition 
for implementation is that the processes produce clear business cases for each identified measure for 
mitigation and adaptation so that potential investors (e.g., the national government, multilateral 
development banks, private investors, banks) can assess the economic feasibility of the investment. 
NAMAs are more ‘mandatory’ than TNAs in the sense that developing countries have agreed under 
the 2010 ‘Cancun Agreements’ that they will undertake nationally appropriate mitigation actions, but 
the sizes, extent, budgets, etc., of these actions have all remained undefined and have therefore been 
left as a prerogative for developing countries. Tactically, therefore, the recent negotiation steps since 
‘Copenhagen’ in 2009 have enabled developing countries: 
 to play an increasingly active role in future climate policy making, even in the absence of top-
down legally-binding commitments, 
 with internationally organised support to bottom-up climate change mitigation and adaptation 
actions, that are 
 embedded in domestic environmental, economic and social development priorities.  
These tactical aspects could eventually support the formation of a larger international climate policy 
coalition. 
The above design, process and tactical aspects are summarised in Table 7-3.  
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Table 7-3. Design, process and tactical/facilitating negotiation aspects of design bottom-up 
climate policy regime with climate measures embedded in development goals 























 Climate change mitigation and adaptation measures are 
identified in light of countries’ development priorities 
 These measures can be used as inputs for NAMAs and 
NAPs for stronger climate change measures based on 
development planning 
Principles: 
 Climate change mitigation and adaptation are likely to be 
more acceptable for countries if they are in line with their 
national development planning 
 Climate policy measures remain largely voluntary 
Goals: 
 Policy measures leading to climate policy measures, 
which support closing the ‘Emissions Gap’ 
 Broader participants by developing countries in 
international climate policy coalition 
Means: 
 Bottom-up processes such as TNA, NAMA and NAP 
 Supported by mechanism under the UNFCCC 
 Integrate country-level decisions 
on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation actions in countries’ 
national sustainable 
development planning and 
priorities 
 Generalise and rationalise 
countries’ technology, finance 
and capacity building needs so 
that international support can be 
more efficiently and effectively 
organised towards countries’ 
needs 
 Build in the negotiation process 
regular ‘milestone measuring 
points’ for evaluating the 























 Annual COP sessions 
 SBSTA technical negotiations 
 Sessions of Technology Executive Committee, Green 
Climate Fund, Adaptation Fund, etc. 
Strategy: 
 Current climate negotiations focus on four building blocks 
 These blocks have their own negotiation ‘silos’ 
 It is recommended to rationalise across these ‘silos’ to 
avoid overlaps and arrange efficient and effective 
international capacity, financial and technological support 
Responsibility: 
 COP is responsible for negotiation process with 
milestones for a post-2020 climate agreement at COP-21 
 Each ‘silo’ has its own executive bodies for spurring 
contributions to international climate policy regime 
 There is a need to ensure an 
integrated approach in climate 
negotiations for supporting 
mitigation, adaptation, 
technology transfer and finance 
so that coherent actions can be 
formulated for climate and 
development, and separation of 
outputs to different institutions 
avoided 
 This implies that UNFCCC bodies 
responsible for the building 
blocks of a new climate regime 
























  Failure at COP-15 to agree on a climate regime with new 
QELRCs led to increased focus on embedding climate 
actions in national economic and development planning 
 CDM, TNA, NAMA and NAP provide vast experience with 
this approach, as well as organising domestic ‘ownership’ 
of decision-making process for climate and development 
 Integrating climate actions in national development 
planning can support closing Emissions Gap (towards 2
o
C) 
 Parties have already gained 
experience with bottom-up 
actions under the Convention 
(TNA, NAMA, NAP and CDM) 
 These processes are recognised 









 Chapter 8.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study has examined five climate negotiation files (covering the period from the early 1990s until 
the present) in order to obtain a better understanding of how countries formulate their negotiation 
positions and how these positions are brought together in an international climate policy coalition. It 
has been argued that since climate change is a global issue, effective climate policy making also 
requires a global participation of countries. However, such an ‘ideal’ situation is difficult to achieve as 
countries may have incentives for free-rider behaviour while countries cannot be excluded from the 
benefits of GHG emission reduction efforts by other countries. According to game-theoretical insights, 
in the absence of an overarching international authority, the size of a policy coalition will be 
determined by the number of countries for which the benefits of joining the coalition outweigh the 
costs. 
Climate negotiations since the early 1990s have also been complicated by an initial lack of scientific 
knowledge of the impact of human activities on global climate systems and what could be the damage 
of such an impact. As a result, climate negotiations could not be clearly guided by an overall, 
scientifically substantiated climate policy goal. In fact, determining climate policy goals became a 
subject of negotiations. 
As a reference point, this study has described what an ‘ideal’ climate policy regime could look like, 
with climate change policy measures determined in order to avoid irreversible climate change damage 
(UNFCCC, 1992a), which are globally supported by countries. In actual practice, however, climate 
negotiations often develop in a direction where initially proposed measures (e.g., targets) are only 
supported by a subset of countries. In order to gain the support from more countries, negotiations 
usually lead to a scaling down of climate policy measures (e.g. lower GHG emission reductions). In a 
final negotiation stage, solutions are tried to be found to achieve a package with climate policy 
measures on which countries can reach international consensus. 
Based on this observation, this study has formulated the hypothesis that for successful climate policy 
negotiations the following three basic conditions need to be met. First, the design of the policy 
package must reflect the preferences of different (groups of) countries and address the game-
theoretical considerations that countries may have. Second, the negotiation process needs to enable 
consideration of country positions during the several negotiation stages and modify the policy design 
accordingly. Third, during the negotiation process, the course of negotiations needs to be changed 
several times in order to work towards stricter climate policy measures and global support. Such 
(tactical) manoeuvres can be stimulated by, for instance, personalities of key negotiators, emerging 
scientific evidence or efficient support by facilitating services such as the UNFCCC secretariat. 
In this study, the first research question of whether and how these three basic conditions have been 
met during international climate negotiations since the earlier 1990s, has been addressed by examining 
four past negotiation files and one ongoing negotiation process. The latter file aims at achieving a 
future global climate policy regime, the main design of which is scheduled to be completed by the end 
of 2015 in Paris. The files have been selected with the objective to test whether and how the three 
basic conditions have been met at different negotiation levels, ranging from a highly political 





responsibilities and commitments, to more technical negotiations about modalities and procedures for 
implementation of policy instruments. 
The first file examined in this study has been the preparation, adoption and entry-into-force of the 
Kyoto Protocol during 1995-2005 (Chapter 3). The Kyoto Protocol has been the first specification of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992a). During negotiations, 
developing countries called upon the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and 
argued that industrialised countries had to take the lead on reducing their GHG emissions. Several 
industrialised countries, in particular the USA, protested against this position by pointing at several 
rapidly industrialising developing countries with growing GHG emissions. The compromise achieved 
at ‘Kyoto’ was that only industrialised countries adopted legally binding emission reduction 
commitments, while developing countries were exempted from such commitments. This deal could be 
reached as developing countries, among others, agreed on a global application of GHG emissions 
trading mechanisms, which enabled industrialised countries to comply with their commitments cost-
effectively. Eventually, it turned out that basic condition 1 was not fully met for the Kyoto Protocol as 
the agreement did not correctly reflect domestic positions of participating countries (the most 
important of them being the USA, which withdrew from the protocol in 2001) while its weak 
compliance regime provided little guarantee that countries would meet their commitments.  
In terms of negotiation process, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations took place with several 
small steps at the time. During negotiation sessions during 1989-1992, progress was slow, but taken 
together it brought about a decision at the 1992 UN Earth Summit on the UNFCCC. Negotiations 
continued with small steps towards the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in Berlin 1995, where a 
mandate was agreed to negotiate on further specifications of the UNFCCC in the form of a Protocol. 
For this mandate the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was formed which met 
twice a year. This process was also characterised by taking several small steps each time, whereby 
negotiations initially focussed on procedural steps towards reaching an agreement, followed by 
discussing negotiation inputs from Parties. By the time of COP-3 in Kyoto (1997), political pressure 
had increased so negotiation tactics could become decisive for reaching a final agreement. During this 
negotiation process, basic condition 2 was met. 
An important tactical aspect of the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol was the change in the 
position of the US delegation at COP-3, which was initially determined by the US Congress resolution 
(Byrd-Hagel) not to agree on a protocol without meaningful participation by rapidly growing 
developing countries. At COP-3, the G-77&China group managed to remain exempted from quantified 
commitments in return for which they supported the emissions trading mechanisms Joint 
Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The latter had been a US desire 
throughout the negotiations. The US delegation was also satisfied with the agreed multi-year 
commitment period and the accounting of GHG emission reductions across six GHGs, rather than only 
carbon dioxide. Both aspects had been suggested by the US proposal for the Kyoto Protocol. In this 
respect, basic condition 3 was met. 
Other key tactical aspects during the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process were: the personalities of key 
negotiators who managed to translate slow progress at one session into an acceleration of negotiations 
at another session; the emerging scientific (IPCC) knowledge on the impact of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions on global climate systems; the role of the UNFCCC secretariat in terms of supporting the 
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negotiation process with technical papers and provision of timely information; the handling of the 
‘Kyoto Protocol crisis’ by the EU troika delegation when in 2001 the US President George W. Bush 
decided to withdraw from the protocol; and the link between the decisive Russian ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Russian desire to become World Trade Organisation member which the EU 
and Russian negotiators established during 2004. These aspects and their impact on the negotiations 
made that basic condition 3 was met. 
The second negotiation file analysed has been the development and operationalisation of JI, which 
enables countries with GHG emission reduction targets to achieve these (partly) on the territory of 
other countries (Chapter 4). Countries with high GHG emission reduction costs could, with JI, invest 
in emission reduction projects in countries with lower costs. From a climate perspective, the location 
of such investments does not make a difference as GHGs mix even evenly in the atmosphere. This 
contributed to meeting basic condition 1 in the final negotiation outcome. 
During the negotiations between 1995 and 1997, JI was frequently linked with the overarching, more 
political ‘Kyoto’ negotiation process, as developing countries considered JI a opportunity for 
industrialised countries to avoid domestic investments. In this respect, it was not the suitability of JI as 
a climate policy instrument that drove its negotiations, but its possible implications at higher policy 
level negotiations. By the time of COP-1 (1995), JI had become so strongly interlinked with 
negotiations on which countries should take emission reduction commitments that it was, for tactical 
reasons, (temporarily) taken out of the AGBM negotiation process. Instead, JI negotiations continued 
in a more technical context whereby a pilot phase for JI (called Activities Implemented Jointly) was 
established.  
At COP-3, JI appeared again during the negotiations as an instrument to enable developed countries to 
purchase carbon credits through projects all over the world and thus to lower the costs of complying 
with their quantified emission reduction commitments. This inclusion of the JI concept (in the form of 
JI among developed countries and the CDM between developed and developing countries) was a key 
breakthrough factor for achieving success during the COP-3 negotiations. The flexibility of the 
negotiation process on JI and the described tactical manoeuvres, by temporarily moving the concept to 
more technical negotiation processes so that it could be re-introduced during the final stages of Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations, are a clear indication that basic conditions 2 and 3 were met. 
The third file (Chapter 5) focussed on another, more technical negotiation level by examining the 
process of developing modalities and procedures for the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms JI and CDM. 
These negotiations focussed on technical issues such as accounting of GHG emission reductions and 
what types of project investments to include in JI and CDM portfolios. The main issues during these 
negotiations were how to determine the additionality of claimed emission reductions and how to 
determine a baseline as a reference for calculating project-level GHG emission reductions. Basic 
condition 1 was met during these negotiations, as the policy outcome enabled full use of JI’s cost-
effectiveness potential, while acknowledging (and providing safeguard measures for that) that 
widespread application of JI could postpone pathways in industrialised countries towards low GHG 
emission growth and that too flexible accounting rules may result in non-additional emission 





The process for negotiating JI and CDM modalities and procedures during 1998 and 2001 was largely 
similar to that before ‘Kyoto’ with technical discussions taking place at sessions of the UNFCCC 
Subsidiary Bodies (SB) with decisions taken or endorsed by the COP. Once the negotiation process on 
the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of Action’ of 1998 had been completed with the ‘Marrakech Accords of 2001, 
most negotiations on JI and CDM issues took place at the levels of SB, the CDM Executive Board and 
the JI Supervisory Committee. Basic condition 2 was met for this negotiation file with respect to the 
flexibility that the process provided to have political and technical issues addressed by the levels 
where these issues belonged. However, basic condition 2 was not fully met when the COP de facto 
transferred part of its political decision making role to the more technical level of the CDM Executive 
Board, by leaving it to the board to decide on the strictness of handling additionality and baseline 
methodologies for CDM projects. 
In terms of tactics, after the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the EU, which initially 
wanted to limit the use of JI and CDM, took a more flexible position on this. However, basic condition 
3 was only partly met for this file due to the rather strict interpretation by the  CDM Executive Board 
of the modalities and procedures for JI and CDM in the ‘Marrakech Accords’, which continued for 
almost three years. As a result, the first CDM projects were only registered by the Executive Board in 
2005, which was almost five years after the eligibility of crediting CDM projects under the Kyoto 
Protocol and more than three years after the Netherlands Government and the World Bank’s Prototype 
Carbon Fund had contracted their first CDM projects. 
The fourth negotiation file (Chapter 6) has been the most technical of all files examined. It has 
focussed on methodologies and principles for standardising GHG accounting procedures for JI and 
CDM projects. Motivations for standardised procedures were to define methodologies which would 
ensure that GHG emission baselines are sufficiently project-specific and applicable to a multitude of 
projects. It has been concluded that multi-project baselines can be especially useful in case it is not 
entirely clear what a JI or CDM project actually replaces, such as greenfield projects based on 
renewable energy technologies. Through baseline standardisation also the scope for smaller scale 
projects could be broadened as it reduces the need for costly project-specific baselines. Finally, with 
multi-project baselines also the aspect of ‘gaming’ (‘talking up’ a baseline GHG emission level in an 
attempt to claim more emission reduction credits) could be addressed, since individual project 
developers cannot change the standardised baseline. With this outcome, basic condition 1 was met for 
this negotiation file. 
The main policy development framework for JI and CDM project-baseline determination has been 
formed by the CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee which have been responsible for 
approving GHG emission baselines and monitoring methodologies developed by project developers 
and consolidating these for application to multiple projects. The CDM Executive Board has been 
supported on that by methodological panels (established for large-scale and small-scale projects, 
forestry projects, and CDM programmes of activities), which contributed to meeting basic condition 2. 
Important tactical aspects which accelerated the development of multi-project baseline policies for JI 
and CDM have been the following. First, multi-project baseline negotiations were widely supported by 
research projects, such as Karta et al (2002) and PROBASE (2003), which made strong cases for 
baseline standardisation, by pointed at cost saving and integrity improvement benefits. Second, early 
investors in JI and CDM projects, such as the World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund and the 
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Netherlands' ERUPT and CERUPT programmes developed their own guidelines for baseline 
determination, including procedures for standardising baselines. Several of the elements in these 
programmes have later been used for JI and CDM approved baseline and monitoring methodologies. 
Third, on the basis of an number of approved project-specific baselines, the CDM Executive Board 
started to consolidate baselines for multiple use by other projects, which was a clear step in the 
direction of adopting standardised baselines. Finally, development of baseline and monitoring 
methodologies for JI and CDM project was strongly accelerated through the linking of JI and CDM to 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which triggered extra demand for JI and CDM projects and 
(standardised) methodologies. These aspects contributed to meeting basic condition 3 in this file. 
With a view to research question 2 in this study, in Chapter 7, the ongoing process of negotiating a 
new climate policy regime for the period after 2020 has been examined with the objective to conclude 
how the three basic conditions identified in this study would need to be met for a successful 
negotiation result. It has been described how negotiations on a new set of quantified GHG emission 
reduction commitments for major emitting developed and developing countries failed during the 
negotiation period 2005-2009 and how instead a (voluntary) ‘pledge and review’ process was initiated 
after that. Analysis by the UNEP Emissions Gap project, however, shows that these pledges taken 
together will not be enough to reach the goal of limiting global average temperature increase to 2
o
C 
(above pre-industrialised times levels) (UNEP, 2014). 
In order to meet basic condition 1, it has been argued in Chapter 7 that an effective climate policy 
regime will need the inclusion of both developed and developing countries. It has been suggested that 
such an inclusive climate policy regime would be enhanced if (developing) countries were supported 
in considering climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in light of their national economic, 
social and environmental development priorities. What such a country-driven, bottom-up approach 
could look like has been illustrated in the chapter by examining country experiences since 2001 with 
conducting technology needs assessments under the UNFCCC (TNAs). 
Furthermore, for meeting basic condition 1, Chapter 7 has suggested that an international climate 
regime would need to organise financial, technical and capacity building support for acceleration of 
innovation processes within countries towards low-emission and climate-resilient development 
strategies. This could create an incentive for countries to undertake more GHG emission reduction 
measures for climate and development, as this would enhance the affordability of these actions. 
Moreover, a desired negotiation outcome would be regular ‘milestone measuring points’ for 
evaluating the adequacy of global actions towards the 2
o
C target (similar to the UNEP, 2014, 
Emissions Gap approach) and suggesting additional actions to support countries in undertaking 
climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in light of their development priorities. 
In terms of policy making/negotiation processes, it has been argued in Chapter 7 that, for meeting 
basic condition 2, comparable or similar processes, such as TNAs and processes under the UNFCCC 
to identify nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and to formulate National Adaptation 
Plans (NAPs) need to be rationalised in order to avoid ‘institutional congestion’ within developing 
countries and data competition between processes and to support that outputs from one process can be 
used as inputs for other processes. For instance, a portfolio with priority technologies for mitigation 
and adaptation developed as part of a TNA could be considered by countries as NAMAs or inputs for 





development banks and UNFCCC bodies such as the Technology Mechanism, Adaptation Fund and 
Green Climate Fund. 
The failure of the ‘Copenhagen’ negotiations in 2009 on a prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period structure with quantified emission reduction commitments for major emitting 
countries has been an important tactical aspect towards a negotiation focus on a ‘pledge and review’ 
approach to which country-driven, bottom-approaches (such as TNA, NAMA and NAP) could further 
contribute. Basic condition 3 can further be met by considering the experience with over 8000 CDM 
projects, TNAs in over 120 developing countries in multiple rounds since 2002, as well as ongoing 
experiences with NAMA and NAP formulation. These experiences have contributed to building 
confidence among developing countries that TNAs can be linked to NAMA and NAP processes 
(Technology Executive Committee, 2013). Key tactical conditions for successful implementation of 
TNA or NAMA and NAP results are that these processes need to be recognised by key national 
planning ministries as an important source for national planning and that these ministries express 
willingness to make resources available for implementation of the identified measures for mitigation 
and/or adaptation (UNFCCC, 2014f).  
Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the negotiation files in this thesis has made clear that with respect to the design of an 
international climate policy regime the main challenge has been to agree on globally supported GHG 
emission reduction measures. In the Kyoto Protocol, this condition could only be met to a limited 
extent as only industrialised countries adopted quantified GHG emission reduction commitments. 
Developing countries participated in emission reduction actions through, among others, the CDM. In 
the other files, the divide between developed and developing countries also became evident as the 
negotiations on the concept of JI were largely influenced by developing countries’ reluctance to agree 
with wide opportunities for developed countries to achieve their commitments through JI projects. 
Also the discussions on the modalities and procedures for the Kyoto mechanisms JI and CDM were 
characterised by disagreements on how much flexibility developed countries would enjoy when 
complying with their quantified commitments. 
In Chapter 7, it has been argued that the likelihood of effective climate policy measures adopted by a 
wide group of countries, including developing countries, increases if climate measures are more 
closely embedded in countries’ longer term sustainable development priorities and/or mainstreamed in 
existing development policies. In combination with support to countries from several mechanisms and 
frameworks under the UNFCCC, as well as from other international institutes such as multilateral 
development banks, this bottom up approach could lead to stronger incentives for a larger group of 
(developing) countries to undertake climate policy actions than through a Kyoto Protocol-type of 
agreement with national GHG emission ceilings. 
The analysis of the negotiation files in this study has made clear that next to designing the climate 
policy framework, the process of negotiations is of crucial importance for success. The UNFCCC 
negotiations have been characterised by high-level negotiations taking place annually at the COP 
sessions, which are supported by more technical negotiations at Subsidiary Body sessions. For 
achieving important milestones, the COP establishes ad-hoc working groups with mandates to prepare 
key negotiation documents (e.g., AGBM for the Kyoto Protocol or Bali Plan of Action for a post-
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Kyoto climate regime). Negotiations on more technical topics, such as Kyoto flexibility mechanisms 
and GHG accounting processes for JI and CDM projects, usually take place under auspices of the 
Subsidiary Bodies and the CDM Executive Board and JI Supervisory Committee. 
A key characteristic of climate policy negotiations at different levels is that they usually take place 
through several small steps with an initial focus on negotiation procedures, followed by assessing 
Parties’ proposals and concluded by attempts to agree on a negotiation outcome. The small-steps 
approach enables achievements of relatively small successes that are easier to adopt by a larger group 
of countries than aiming a large breakthroughs requiring relatively strong compromises at once by 
some (groups of) Parties. This does not mean, however, that the small steps straightforwardly lead to a 
larger scale agreement. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol was prepared by a range of AGBM meetings, 
but the eventual agreement at Kyoto was still a relatively big step in comparison with the latest session 
of AGBM before ‘Kyoto’ (which actually limited the eventual ratification of and compliance with the 
protocol by leading industrialised country Parties). Nonetheless, the several small AGBM steps before 
‘Kyoto’ contributed to building a basis for an agreement at ‘Kyoto’. 
Finally, it has become clear that several tactical aspects can play a crucial role in achieving negotiation 
successes. Such tactics can vary from the aspect of personalities of key negotiations to the importance 
of scientific reports on anthropogenic impact on global climate systems, as the following examples of 
tactical aspects discussed in this thesis illustrate. The publication of the IPCC second assessment 
report in 1995 made clear that more urgent climate policy actions were needed and this supported the 
decision on the Berlin Mandate. The role of chair Raul Astrada during AGBM and COP-3 negotiations 
was important for bringing positions of G-77&China and developed countries together in the Kyoto 
Protocol with quantified commitments for developed Parties and a global scope for GHG emissions 
trading, including projects in developing countries. The role of the EU during negotiations after the 
US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process in 2001 was decisive for keeping the protocol alive. 
Finally, the procedural tactical move at COP-1 to temporarily take the concept of JI out of the AGBM 
negotiations and transfer it to the level of the Subsidiary Bodies, as the concept of Activities 
Implemented Jointly, eventually enabled the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of JI among developed 
and the CDM between developed and developing countries. 
The detailed examination of climate negotiation files since the early 1990s has shown that for 
negotiation success or failure the ‘devil can be in the detail’. A good design of a policy and policy 
instruments is needed for addressing all details that are related to international climate policy making 
including combining different preferences of developed and developing countries in an international 
climate coalition. The negotiation process needs to enable that the broad range of often detailed 
(differences in) viewpoints of all Parties are heard and incorporated in the negotiation texts, which 
implies that steps are preferably small and frequent to do justice to the details related to global climate 
policy making rather than large and less frequent steps. Finally, climate policy negotiations need to be 
open for allowing tactics to change the course of the negotiations by incorporating timely scientific 
knowledge in discussions, accept ‘defeats’ when successes are not feasible and adequately respond to 
changing economic and political contexts. Since climate policy making has not been straightforward 
since the early 1990s and will become increasingly complex over time with stronger embedding of 





conditions described in this thesis will remain a minimal requirement for addressing the negotiation 
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Klimaatverandering is onderwerp geweest van internationale onderhandelingen sinds de jaren tachtig 
van de vorige eeuw. Het eerste resultaat hiervan was het Raamwerkverdrag voor Klimaatverandering 
(UNFCCC) waarover in 1992 overeenstemming werd bereikt tijdens de VN-conferentie over milieu en 
ontwikkeling (the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro). Vijf jaar later ontstond, tijdens een VN-klimaattop 
in  Kyoto een klimaatprotocol waarin het UNFCCC verder werd uitgewerkt. Voor industrielanden 
bevatte dit Kyoto-protocol gekwantificeerde en juridisch bindende verplichtingen voor het 
terugdringen van de uitstoot van broeikasgassen. In 2009 werd in Kopenhagen geprobeerd een nieuw 
klimaatverdrag te sluiten met nieuwe afspraken over uitstootvermindering van broeikassen. Ditmaal 
zouden deze verplichtingen ook moeten gelden voor snel groeiende ontwikkelingslanden zoals China, 
India en Zuid-Afrika. De onderhandelingen in Kopenhagen mislukten echter, waarna een nieuw 
onderhandelingstraject werd gestart dat in 2015, tijdens de VN-klimaattop in Parijs, moet leiden tot 
een mondiale klimaataanpak, dat vanaf 2020 zal moeten ingaan. 
In dit proefschrift zijn vijf klimaatonderhandelingsdossiers bestudeerd vanaf 1990 met als doel te 
onderzoeken aan welke voorwaarden klimaatonderhandelingen ten minste moeten voldoen om te 
resulteren in internationaal breed gedragen klimaatmaatregelen. Een basisaanname bij het onderzoek is 
geweest dat klimaatverandering een mondiaal vraagstuk is dat een mondiale aanpak vereist. Aangezien 
broeikasgassen zich gelijkmatig door de atmosfeer verspreiden, profiteren alle landen van 
uitstootvermindering. Dit betekent ook dat landen niet van de baten van klimaatmaatregelen kunnen 
worden uitgesloten, hetgeen voor landen een prikkel kan zijn geen klimaatbeleid te voeren en, in plaats 
daarvan, mee te liften op het werk van andere landen (free riding). Uiteindelijk kan dit de algehele 
bereidheid tot mondiaal klimaatbeleid verminderen. 
Het doel van klimaatonderhandelingen is daarom steeds geweest om internationale consensus te 
bereiken over klimaatpakketten. Volgens het voorzorgsprincipe van het UNFCCC zouden dergelijke 
pakketten moeten voorkomen dat een te hoge concentratie van broeikasgassen in de atmosfeer leidt tot 
aantasting van ecosystemen met bijbehorende humanitaire en natuurschade. Klimaatonderhandelingen 
sinds 1990 hebben laten zien dat het bereiken van een dergelijk pakket niet eenvoudig is en vaak 
meerjarige onderhandelingsprocessen vereist. In de eerste plaats laten onderhandelingen vaak een 
beweging zien van landen die voorgestelde maatregelen te duur vinden of als belemmering van hun 
economische groei zien. Ook is tijdens de onderhandelingen over het UNFCCC, het Kyoto-protocol, 
maar ook ten tijde van ‘Kopenhagen’ gebleken dat ontwikkelingslanden pas bereid blijken te praten 
over vermindering van hun broeikasgasuitstoot nadat industrielanden belangrijke stappen richting 
uitstootvermindering hebben gezet. Om toch richting een mondiaal gedragen verdrag te werken, 
bewegen onderhandelingen zich vervolgens richting een uitkomst waarbij voorgestelde maatregelen 
worden afgezwakt, waardoor ze voor meer landen acceptabel worden. Deze tussenoplossing kan voor 
andere landen echter weer te weinig ambitieus zijn, waardoor in het ‘eindspel’, vaak onder hoge 
tijdsdruk, geprobeerd wordt een oplossing te vinden waarover mondiale consensus kan bestaan. 
Op basis van deze gegeneraliseerde beschrijving van onderhandelingen is in dit proefschrift de 
hypothese geformuleerd dat voor succesvolle onderhandelingen minimaal aan de volgende drie 




1. Het geformuleerde klimaatbeleidspakket moet een juiste afspiegeling zijn van de posities van 
verschillende (groepen van) landen in het onderhandelingspel en in voldoende mate rekening 
houden met speltheoretische onderhandelingsprikkels. 
2. Het proces van onderhandelingen moet voldoende flexibel zijn om verschillende posities en 
prikkels goed te kunnen overwegen en te verwerken in de onderhandelingsteksten. Hierbij kan het 
bijvoorbeeld wenselijk zijn om meerdere kleine stappen te nemen in plaats van enkele grote. 
3. Tijdens het onderhandelingsproces moet een aantal keren van koers worden veranderd om aan de 
wensen van diverse landen tegemoet te komen. Voor het maken van deze tactische bewegingen 
kunnen de persoonlijkheid van een onderhandelingsleider, nieuw wetenschappelijk inzicht of 
andere tactische of faciliterende aspecten doorslaggevend zijn. 
In dit proefschrift is voor een vijftal klimaatdossiers onderzocht of en in welke mate aan deze drie 
basisvoorwaarden is voldaan tijdens klimaatonderhandelingen.  
Het eerste dossier betreft het onderhandelingsproces tussen 1990 en 2005 om te komen tot het 
UNFCCC (1992), gevolgd door overeenstemming over het Kyoto-protocol (1997) en de 
inwerkingtreding ervan in 2005. Het UNFCCC is een raamwerkverdrag met beginselen voor verdere 
uitwerking van internationaal klimaatbeleid. Het Kyoto-protocol was de eerste concrete uitwerking 
van het UNFCCC met verplichtingen voor industrielanden om hun uitstoot van broeikasgassen te 
verminderen, alsmede een pakket aan beleidsinstrumenten om aan de verplichtingen te kunnen 
voldoen. Tijdens de onderhandelingen over het UNFCCC en Kyoto-protocol beriepen 
ontwikkelingslanden zich op het principe dat landen weliswaar een gemeenschappelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid dragen voor klimaatbeleid, maar dat de invulling hiervan per land kan 
verschillen (common but differentiated responsibilities). Volgens ontwikkelingslanden betekende dit 
principe dat zij vooralsnog konden worden vrijgesteld van verplichtingen tot uitstootvermindering. 
Diverse industrielanden, aangevoerd door de VS, protesteerden hiertegen en wezen op de snelle 
toename van uitstoot van broeikasgassen door een aantal snel groeiende ontwikkelingslanden (met 
name China en India, maar ook, bijvoorbeeld, Zuid-Korea en Mexico). 
Het compromis dat in Kyoto werd bereikt hield in dat alleen industrielanden kwantificeerbare 
verplichtingen op zich namen, maar dat men daarbij gebruik kon maken van het concept van 
verhandelbare emissierechten. Als gevolg hiervan konden industrielanden aan hun verplichtingen 
voldoen door te investeren in relatief goedkope projecten in ontwikkelingslanden (en in andere 
industrielanden) in plaats van in relatief dure binnenlandse maatregelen. Dit compromis vormde een 
doorbraak tijdens de onderhandelingen in Kyoto. Na 1997 bleek echter dat de gemaakte afspraken niet 
acceptabel waren voor het Amerikaanse Congres waarna President Bush in 2001 besloot het Kyoto-
protocol niet verder te ondersteunen. Om het protocol vervolgens te redden, werden in 
vervolgonderhandelingen eerder gemaakte afspraken over, onder andere, het meetellen van bronnen 
van broeikasgasuitstoot en opties voor uitstootvermindering, alsmede hoe naleving van verplichtingen 
af te dwingen, opgerekt. Het resultaat hiervan was dat aan voorwaarde 1 in deze onderhandelingen niet 
volledig werd voldaan. 
In termen van proces werden onderhandelingen over het UNFCCC en het Kyoto-protocol gekenmerkt 
door het nemen van een lange reeks kleine stappen, waarbij de jaarlijkse VN-klimaattop (COP), vanaf 
1995, steeds wordt voorafgegaan door meer technische onderhandelingsronden. Hierdoor waren 
landen in staat om concrete voorstellen in te dienen, naast elkaar te leggen en uiteindelijk te proberen 




UNFCCC en Kyoto-protocol werden deadlines vastgesteld, zoals de Earth Summit (1992) en de 
klimaattop van Kyoto (1997). Tegen de tijd dat deze deadlines naderden, werden onderhandelingen 
ook steeds politieker waardoor tactische aspecten steeds belangrijker, zo niet doorslaggevend werden. 
Ondanks dat aan voorwaarde 1 niet geheel werd voldaan, bleek de flexibiliteit van het 
onderhandelingsproces omtrent UNFCCC en Kyoto-protocol met de diverse kleine stappen vooruit 
een belangrijke faciliterende factor voor onderhandelingen. 
Het bereiken van overeenkomst over het Kyoto-protocol in 1997 werd gefaciliteerd door een aantal 
belangrijke tactische factoren. In de eerste plaats stimuleerde de draai van de VS-delegatie een 
doorbraak tijdens de klimaattop in Kyoto. Voorafgaand aan de top kregen Amerikaanse 
onderhandelaars van het Congres (Byrd-Hagel resolutie) de instructie mee om geen 
uitstootvermindering te beloven zonder vergelijkbare inspanning van snelgroeiende 
ontwikkelingslanden. Interventie van Vice-President Al Gore in Kyoto zorgde dat de VS akkoord 
gingen met een verplichting tot uitstootvermindering in ruil voor mondiale toepassing van het concept 
van verhandelbare emissierechten. Ander tactische aspecten waren: de persoonlijkheid van 
onderhandelingsvoorzitter Raul Estrada; de in 1995 gepubliceerde aanwijzing (door het VN-panel van 
klimaatwetenschappers IPCC) van de invloed van menselijk handelen op het klimaat; en de 
doortastendheid van de EU na de Amerikaanse afwijzing van het Kyoto-protocol in 2001 om 
internationale steun voor het protocol te behouden. De laatste aspecten, waarmee aan basisvoorwaarde 
3 werd voldaan, zorgden ervoor dat het Kyoto-protocol in 2005 in werking kon treden.  
Het tweede bestudeerde onderhandelingsdossier betreft het beleidsinstrument Joint Implementation 
(JI). JI was opgenomen in het UNFCCC om samenwerking tussen landen mogelijk te maken waarbij 
een land een klimaatdoel behaalt door te investeren in een ander land, bijvoorbeeld omdat het daar 
goedkoper is (terwijl het voor het effect op het klimaat geen verschil maakt waar uitstootvermindering 
plaatsvindt). Als neveneffect zou JI ook overdracht van schone technologie kunnen stimuleren, 
bijvoorbeeld tussen industrie- en ontwikkelingslanden. Hierdoor was JI conceptueel geschikt voor 
opname in het Kyoto-protocol en kon aan voorwaarde 1 worden voldaan. 
Rond 1995, tijdens de onderhandelingen over het Kyoto-protocol, werd JI echter onderdeel van een 
hoger politiek onderhandelingsspel, omdat met name ontwikkelingslanden vonden dat industrielanden 
eerst in eigen land moesten investeren in uitstootvermindering alvorens naar goedkopere 
investeringsopties over de landsgrenzen te zoeken. Daarnaast vreesden ontwikkelingslanden dat JI zou 
kunnen leiden tot investeringen in projecten die niet noodzakelijk zouden bijdragen aan de 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen van de gastlanden. Tijdens de klimaattop van Berlijn in 1995 werd JI 
daarom tijdelijk uit de onderhandelingen over het Kyoto-protocol gehaald en werd een proeffase voor 
JI gestart om te experimenteren met projecten en met methoden voor het berekenen van 
uitstootvermindering. Hierdoor ging de ontwikkeling van JI als concept in ‘de schaduw’ door om 
tijdens de hectische klimaattop van Kyoto in 1997 terug te keren als belangrijk middel om een 
compromis tussen industrie- en ontwikkelingslanden te bereiken over verplichtingen voor 
industrielanden. De flexibiliteit van het proces waarmee JI kon worden overgeheveld van politieke 
naar meer technische onderhandelingen en de gevolgde tactiek om het instrument in het protocol op te 
schalen naar mondiale toepassing was, gezien de stand van onderhandelingen kort voor Kyoto, boven 




Als gevolg van de Kyoto-onderhandelingen werd JI opgesplitst in projectsamenwerking tussen 
industrie- en ontwikkelingslanden (Clean Development Mechanism, CDM) en tussen industrielanden 
onderling (verder JI genoemd). Het meer technische onderhandelingsproces over het vaststellen van 
operationele procedures voor JI en CDM is het onderwerp van het derde dossier in dit proefschrift. 
Deze onderhandelingen, die plaatsvonden tussen 1998 en 2008, richtten zich vooral op de vragen 
welke projecttypen voor JI en CDM in aanmerking kwamen (bijv. wel of geen bosbouwprojecten of 
kernenergie), hoe te beoordelen of met name CDM-projecten bijdragen aan duurzame ontwikkeling in 
de gastlanden, en hoe de behaalde uitstootvermindering te berekenen (accounting). Het Marrakech-
akkoord van 2001 gaf antwoord op de meeste van deze vragen.  
Het vraagstuk van accounting bleef echter ook na ‘Marrakech’ nog onderwerp van onderhandelingen, 
vooral omdat het Marrakech-akkoord op een aantal punten onduidelijk was en voor meerdere 
interpretaties vatbaar (waardoor niet volledig aan basisvoorwaarde 1 werd voldaan). Deze onduidelijk 
gold vooral voor het vooraf vaststellen of een JI- of CDM-project additioneel was aan wat een land of 
de investeerder al van plan was te doen zonder JI of CDM. De basisregel was dat alleen additionele 
projecten mochten meetellen in de ‘Kyoto-boekhouding’, maar onderhandelingen moesten een 
oplossing vinden voor het vaststellen van additionaliteit die enerzijds streng genoeg was om eerlijke 
uitstootrechten te behalen, maar anderzijds niet zo ingewikkeld en beperkend dat investeerders in JI- 
en CDM-projecten zouden worden ontmoedigd. Deze onderhandelingen vonden vooral plaats binnen 
de nieuw opgerichte uitvoeringsorganen voor JI en CDM (JI Supervisory Committee en CDM 
Executive Board).  
In dit dossier werd aan basisvoorwaarde 1 (structuur) voldaan doordat de onderhandelingsuitkomst het 
mogelijk maakte dat het kosteneffectiviteitpotentieel van JI en CDM op mondiale schaal kon worden 
benut (met slechts de beperking dat kernenergieprojecten waren uitgesloten alsmede 
bosbeheerprojecten), met als uitzondering dat het Marrakech-akkoord op een aantal punten ten aanzien 
van accounting onduidelijk en tegenstrijdig was. Aan basisvoorwaarde 2 (proces) werd slechts 
gedeeltelijk voldaan. Enerzijds bleek het proces tot en met 2001 (‘Marrakech’) in staat om technische 
aspecten bij technische onderhandelingsorganen te houden en politieke onderwerpen op het niveau van 
de COP af te werken, anderzijds nam de CDM Executive Board na 2001 beslissingen over 
additionaliteit die politieke consequentie hadden (omdat deze beslissingen van invloed waren op de 
reikwijdte van met name het CDM), maar nauwelijks met de COP werden overlegd.  
Aan voorwaarde 3 (juiste tactische manoeuvres) werd voldaan door na het terugtrekken van de VS in 
2001 uit het Kyoto-proces meer flexibel te worden ten aanzien van JI- en CDM-procedures, waardoor 
deze voor meerdere industrielanden aantrekkelijker werden en het Kyoto-protocol daarom makkelijker 
te accepteren was. Tactisch minder handig was de strikte houding van met name de CDM Executive 
Board ten aanzien boekhoudregels voor vaststelling van uitstootvermindering, waardoor investeerders 
als de Nederlandse overheid en de Wereld Bank, die volgens het Kyoto-protocol al vanaf 2000 in 
CDM-projecten mochten investeren,
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 pas in 2005 duidelijkheid kregen over de toe te passen 
rekenmethodes. 
Nadat het eerste dossier betrekking had op onderhandelingen op hoog politiek niveau (Kyoto-protocol 
met verplichtingen en beleidsinstrumenten), het tweede op het ontstaan van het beleidsinstrument JI, 
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het derde op de rijkwijdte van dit instrument, is in het vierde dossier van dit proefschrift aandacht 
besteed aan hoe rekenmethodes voor het vaststellen van uitstootvermindering door JI- en CDM-
projecten kunnen worden gestandaardiseerd. Met behulp van gestandaardiseerde rekenmethodes 
kunnen projectkosten worden verlaagd en kan worden vermeden dat projectpartijen met eigen 
rekenmethodes de behaalde uitstootvermindering te hoog zouden vaststellen (teneinde meer 
emissierechten te verkopen). Als uitkomst van het onderhandelingsproces begon de CDM Executive 
Board na verloop van tijd rekenmethoden voor verschillende CDM-projecten per projectcategorieën 
samen te voegen tot gestandaardiseerde methoden die vrij toegankelijk waren voor andere 
projectinvesteerders. Hiermee werd aan basisvoorwaarde 1voldaan.  
Voor wat betreft het onderhandelingsproces over standaard methoden kon aan basisvoorwaarde 2 
worden voldaan doordat de CDM Executive Board en de JI Supervisory Committee meerdere keren 
per jaar bij elkaar kwamen/komen om methoden en toepassing ervan op projecten te beoordelen en te 
verbeteren. Daarbij worden ze ondersteund door gespecialiseerde panels. Vanuit tactisch oogpunt 
werden de onderhandelingen over gestandaardiseerde rekenmethodes in belangrijke mate gestimuleerd 
door: 1) onderzoekprojecten (zoals het EU-project PROBASE), 2) vroege investeerders in JI- en 
CDM-projecten zoals het Prototype Carbon Fund van de Wereld Bank en de Nederlands ERUPT- en 
CERUPT-tenderprogramma’s, die reeds een eerste aanzet gaven tot standaard rekenmethodes, 3) het 
samenvoegen door de CDM Executive Board van individuele projectmethoden in gestandaardiseerde 
methoden (zoals hierboven beschreven), en 4) de toenemende vraag naar JI- en CDM-uitstootrechten 
vanuit het Europese Emissiehandelssysteem waardoor er ook meer vraag kwam naar methoden, 
inclusief gestandaardiseerde methoden. Deze aspecten droegen bij aan het voldoen aan 
basisvoorwaarde 3 in deze onderhandelingen. 
Het laatste dossier in dit proefschrift betreft het lopende onderhandelingstraject dat moet leiden tot een 
nieuw internationaal klimaatverdrag dat moet ingaan vanaf 2020. Het dossier beschrijft hoe 
onderhandelingen over een nieuw ‘post-Kyoto’ pakket met kwantitatieve verplichtingen tot 
uitstootvermindering voor industrie- en snelgroeiende ontwikkelingslanden mislukten tijdens de 
onderhandelingsperiode 2005-2009 en hoe onderhandelingen zich vervolgens toelegden op vrijwillige 
uitstootbeperkingen door landen. Het dossier laat ook zien, op basis van berekeningen door het project 
UNEP Emissions Gap, dat de aangekondigde vrijwillige maatregelen waarschijnlijk niet toereikend 
zijn om de gemiddelde temperatuurstijging op aarde te beperken tot 2
o
C (dit doel is gebaseerd op 
IPCC-rapporten en politiek vastgelegd in de Cancun Agreements). 
Om te voldoen aan basisvoorwaarde 1, is in dit dossier betoogd dat de actieve deelname van met name 
ontwikkelingslanden aan een internationaal klimaatbeleid kan worden bevorderd door nationale 
klimaatmaatregelen te integreren in nationaal beleid voor (duurzame) economische, sociale en 
milieuontwikkeling. Hierdoor worden landen gestimuleerd om een visie te formuleren waarin 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen worden behaald met een lage(re) uitstoot van broeikasgassen. Het dossier 
illustreert een dergelijke aanpak aan de hand van de ervaringen binnen het UNFCCC met Technology 
Needs Assessment (TNA); dit is een programma dat ontwikkelingslanden ondersteunt bij het kiezen 
van schone technologieën die ook passen binnen binnenlandse ontwikkelingsplannen. 
Ter ondersteuning van de implementatie van aldus geïdentificeerde klimaatmaatregelen per land, zou 
via internationale klimaatsamenwerking financiële, technische en capaciteitsondersteuning kunnen 




meer maatregelen voor vermindering van broeikasgasuitstoot te nemen dan ze zich onder normale 
omstandigheden hadden kunnen veroorloven. Met andere woorden, door bestaande 
ontwikkelingsdoelen klimaatvriendelijk in te vullen, kan via internationaal klimaatbeleid meer geld, 
technologie en capaciteitsondersteuning beschikbaar komen dan anders het geval zou zijn geweest. 
Om te controleren of de aldus gestimuleerde individuele inspanningen van landen tezamen voldoende 
zijn om aan de 2
o
C-doelstelling te voldoen, zou het onderhandelingsproces periodiek de beoogde en 
gerealiseerde acties moeten vergelijken met benodigde inspanningen. De gebruikte methode van het 
jaarlijkse rapport UNEP Emissions Gap kan daarbij als voorbeeld dienen. 
In termen van het proces van onderhandelingen over een toekomstig klimaatverdrag wordt aanbevolen 
dat bestaande methoden voor het integreren van klimaatmaatregelen (bijv. technologieën) in nationale 
ontwikkelingsplannen, zoals  TNA, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) en national 
adaptation plans (NAP), zoveel mogelijk op elkaar worden afgestemd zodat een geharmoniseerd 
proces ontstaat dat (ontwikkelings)landen efficiënt en effectief kunnen toepassen. Hierdoor kunnen 
overlappingen worden vermeden, maar kan ook worden voorkomen dat andere aspecten van klimaat- 
en ontwikkelingsplanning over het hoofd worden zien. In de toepassing van een dergelijk 
geharmoniseerd proces en in de implementatie van de geïdentificeerde acties voor klimaat en 
ontwikkeling is, in dit proefschrift, een belangrijke rol voorzien voor, onder andere, multilaterale 
ontwikkelingsbanken en UNFCCC-organen zoals het Technologiemechanisme, het Adaptatiefonds en 
het Groene klimaatfonds. 
Het mislukken van de klimaattop van Kopenhagen in 2009 over een voortzetting van het Kyoto-
protocol met kwantitatieve verplichtingen per land is een belangrijke tactische factor geweest voor het 
veranderen van de onderhandelingskoers richting het sterker integreren van klimaatmaatregelen in 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen van met name ontwikkelingslanden. Aan basisvoorwaarde 3 kan verder 
worden voldaan door de ervaringen met meer dan 8000 CDM projecten, meer dan 120 TNAs en 
diverse ervaringen met NAMAs en NAPs in ontwikkelingslanden mee te nemen in de 
onderhandelingen over een toekomstig klimaatverdrag. Deze processen hebben bijgedragen aan het 
opbouwen van vertrouwen dat het kiezen van klimaatmaatregelen, mits goed georganiseerd met 
betrokkenheid van juiste ministeries, goed samen kan gaan met ontwikkelingsplanning. 
